OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE ASSOCIATION • NEW YORK

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations

VOLUME 8 • 2009

ADDLETON ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS • NEW YORK

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations
A peer-reviewed international academic journal
Volume 8 / 2009

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations deals with language and the foundations of its study, a subject which is basic to contemporary linguistics and philosophy and which is rapidly becoming indispensable to an increasing number of other disciplines. The journal appears at a time when there is increasing awareness among scholars who deal with language that attempts should be made to exchange information relating to their respective domains of investigation. ***Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*** endeavors to publish general or technical contributions which deal with the foundations of language, study the impact of language on various disciplines, or render the result of research in particular areas fruitful for other fields of study.

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations (ISSN 1841-2394) is published yearly by Addleton Academic Publishers, 30-18 50th Street, Woodside, New York, 11377. All papers in this journal have undergone editorial screening and anonymous double-blind peer-review. Subscriptions, contributions or correspondence to phd_lazaroiu@yahoo.com

Addleton Academic Publishers is an imprint of RIOTS, New York.
Produced in the United States of America

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

www.addletonacademicpublishers.com

The publications of Addleton Academic Publishers are books and other materials that further scholarly investigation, advance interdisciplinary inquiry, stimulate public debate, educate both within and outside the classroom, and enhance cultural life.

In its commitment to increasing the range and vigor of intellectual pursuits, Addleton AP continually extends its horizons to embody university publishing at its best. We are now focused on a future in which large-scale electronic delivery will augment or possibly replace today's paper delivery where appropriate. Through its publishing programs, Addleton AP promotes research and education, enriches cultural and intellectual life, fosters regional pride and accomplishments, and diligently pursues the best and most innovative technology to meet the needs of our readers.

Addleton AP publishes academic books and journals of high quality on a wide range of subjects primarily in the humanities and social sciences and issues a few publications for primarily professional audiences. It is best known for its publications in the broad and interdisciplinary area of theory and history of cultural production, and as a publisher willing to take chances with nontraditional and interdisciplinary publications, both books and journals. The titles we publish are subject to peer review, which guarantees their relevance. As an academic press, our mandate is to serve the world of scholarship and culture as a professional, not-for-profit publisher. Intent on delivering high-quality research into the hands of students and faculty in a timely manner, Addleton AP has succeeded in attracting first-rate authors.

Subject areas. Addleton AP is an independent company, established to serve the needs of the academic and professional community through the international dissemination of ideas. We publish scholarly books and thoughtful books for the educated general reader in: history, philosophy, law, economics, public policy, natural science, history of science, psychology, and education. While primarily an academic publisher, many of our books are also of interest to a general readership and we are committed to publishing out-

standing books which stimulate public debate about key issues in social, political and cultural life.

Mission. Whether it be in content, production, marketing or distribution or any other aspect of a book's publication, we place quality at the core of our publishing. Addleton AP's infrastructure is underpinned by professionalism and expertise. Our aim is to combine the publication of original, cutting-edge work of the highest quality with a systematic program of textbooks and course books for students and scholars in further and higher education. We always adhere to the highest production standards; whether it be accuracy, readability or production quality and pride ourselves on the service we provide editors and societies.

Partnership. We are committed to meeting the needs of the academic and professional communities, and to working with those communities to define the needs of the future. We recognize the importance of personal attention, flexibility and responsiveness in our relationships with editors, authors, societies and customers. Our continuing strategies are developed within the context of a deep understanding of the implications that the electronic dissemination of ideas will have on both publishing and the world of academic research. We understand that a rewarding publishing partnership is founded on mutual trust and respect for what each party brings to the relationship.

Addleton AP publishes a range of leading international journals presenting original research from international scholars. We are committed to meeting the needs of academic and professional communities and to working with those communities to define and meet the information needs of the future. We also strongly encourage ideas for new journals that reflect or extend the range of our publishing.
editors@addletonacademicpublishers.com

CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE ASSOCIATION NEW YORK

www.contemporaryscienceassociation.net

Contemporary Science Association is a research and development unit within APP-DP-TLS (Academic Division) New York. CSA features links, descriptions and other information for thousands of academic journals in all disciplines, collates information from a variety of sources to conveniently provide access to the latest scholarly research, and is devoted to the advancement of electronic scholarly communication. CSA web site offers searchable databases of journals. Advanced information technology necessarily improves the effectiveness of scientific and scholarly research. CSA editors performing journal evaluations have educational backgrounds relevant to their areas of responsibility as well as experience and education in information science. We operate a research platform that deploys information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Papers appearing in ***Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*** are abstracted in Academic Papers Database, Contemporary Research Index, Current Index to Scholarly Journals, Digital Journals Database, Directory of Academic Resources, Elite Scientific Journals Archive, Recent Science Index, Scholarly Journals Index, Scientific Publications Index, and Scientific Resources Database.

SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS

With a covering letter to the Editors, send an original copy with name(s), institutional affiliation and full address (with e-mail if possible), plus two copies bearing *only* the paper title. This latter is for 'blind' review purposes; no name(s) of author should appear on the opening page, last page or in page headers. The suggested length for ***Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*** papers is 4,000 to 8,000 words, or about 10 to 20 double-spaced, typewritten pages, with about one inch margins on all sides. References should be typed double-spaced in a separate section, and numbered consecutively. They will be printed at the end of the paper. No part of a paper can be rewritten in galley or page proofs. Any addenda on galley proofs other than corrections of typographical errors may be disregarded at the discretion of the Editor. Special conventions, if followed consistently, are permitted where formal language is used. Diagrams, tables, and illustrations should be on separate sheets with their desired position in the text clearly indicated. Symbolic formulae appearing as separate lines should be clearly distinguished in the text. Foreign letters (Greek, German, etc.), special symbols, as well as zero and capital O and prime marks should be indicated in the margin. Materials to be printed in italics, especially single letters in text or in formulae, should be underlined. Failure to follow house style requirements, provide disk or electronic copy, an abstract and institutional affiliation details may delay review process, publication schedule and citation.

All submitted manuscripts are independently refereed by readers recommended by the Editors in consultation with the Editorial Advisory Board. Anonymity is assured. Decisions to publish or not, to request revisions, if necessary resubmission, and/or extra adjudication, are entirely at the discretion of the Editors. Format acknowledgement may take up to one month, full consideration may take up to six months. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors. Permission for papers to be reprinted can only be granted by authors, who should be contacted directly. Due acknowledgement of source and authorship where applicable, and copyright clearance of cited matter in the articles are the express responsibility of the authors. The Editorial Advisory Board and the publishers accept no responsibility for any lapses or infringements. Endnotes are preferred to footnotes. They should be flagged in text by a superscript note number at the appropriate point (not via name and date). References within numerically ordered endnotes should follow Harvard style rather than Oxford style, i.e. last name, initials of author, title of book or article, name of journal or collected work, followed by publisher (excepting journals) and place of publication, year of publication and exact page citation (e.g. p. 82, pp. 86−87). Abstracts, of between 50 and 100 words, must be included. Longer quotations should be set in separate paragraphs, so as to be printed in small type. In the manuscript they should still be typed double-spaced, but separated from the remainder of the manuscript by a small space before and after. Quoted sentences should be indicated by double-quotes (“). Words or phrases mentioned should be single-quotes (‘).Single quotes are acceptable inside double when used for a quote within a quote.

Please direct subscription, back-issue requests, and address changes to
editors@addletonacademicpublishers.com

CONTENTS

ON THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS

ACHILLE C. VARZI
Columbia University
av72@columbia.edu

ABSTRACT. On the one hand, logic has (or ought to have) nothing to do with metaphysics; it ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. On the other hand, metaphysics can hardly get off the ground without the help of logical analysis; to be is to be a truth-maker, and the search for truth-makers requires that we lay open the logical structure of our language. So something's gotta give: either logical analysis is metaphysically biased, or metaphysicians must make up their mind before resorting to logical analysis. Or both.

1. The neutrality of logic

As a theory of reasoning, logic has—or ought to have—nothing to do with metaphysics. It ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. It is precisely because of its metaphysical commitments that Aristotelian syllogistics, for example, was eventually deemed inadequate as a canon of pure logical reasoning. The inference from an A-form statement such as

(1) All humans are mortal

to the corresponding I-form statement,

(2) Some humans are mortal,

is syllogistically valid. But it depends on the existence of humans beings and should not, therefore, count as valid as a matter of pure logic. (It depends on the existence of human beings because, in a world with no such beings, (2) would be false whereas (1) would be true, although vacuously.) Likewise, modern quantification theory[1] has been

found inadequate insofar as it sanctions as valid the inference from a universal statement such as

(3) Everything is mortal

to the corresponding existential statement

(4) Something is mortal,

whose truth-conditions, unlike those of (3), appear to clash with the metaphysical possibility that there is nothing at all. It also sanctions as valid the inference from (3) to any of its substitution instances, such as

(5) Socrates is mortal,

whose truth depends on the contingent existence of Socrates. So-called free logics have been put forward precisely with the aim of freeing logic from such "defects in logical purity", as Russell called them.[2] Nor is this the end of the story. Free logics have their defects, too, or so one could argue. For instance, they normally include among their theorems statements such as

(6) Everything is either mortal or not mortal.
(7) Nothing is both mortal and not mortal.

And, on the face of it, these theorems appear to rule out the metaphysical possibility that there be entities that are incomplete, or even inconsistent, with respect to certain properties (here: the property of being mortal)—a possibility that some philosophers regard as perfectly legitimate as far as logic goes.[3] (We are certainly free to regard (6) and (7) as necessary truths—the objection goes. But this would be a way to giving expression to our metaphysical convictions, not a logical imperative.) And we could continue. Whether there is, today, a logical theory that can claim full metaphysical neutrality is an open and controversial question. But there is no question that this is an ideal *desideratum*. As a pure theory of reasoning, and as a theory of what is true no matter what is the case (or in every possible world,

as some like to put it), logic should carry no metaphysical commitments. It should ideally be compatible with every metaphysical view. In short, it should be metaphysically neutral.

This conception of logic reflects what Bencivenga calls the "locked room" metaphor.[4] Logicians must pretend to be locked in a dark, windowless room, and to know nothing about the world outside. When confronted with a sentence, they must try to evaluate it exclusively on the basis of their linguistic competence. If they can establish that the sentence is true, then the sentence is *logically true*. And if they can establish that the sentence is true *if* certain other sentences are true, then the corresponding argument is *logically valid*. Logical truth and validity are based on how our language is defined, independently of what extralinguistic reality might look like. The difficulty, of course, arises from the fact that the boundary between linguistic competence and metaphysical presuppositions is far from clear. Some would regard such statements as (6) and (7)—for example—as reflecting certain fundamental principles governing our ordinary use of such connectives as 'either ... or', 'both ... and', and 'not'; others would regard those statements as reflecting specific assumptions about what the world might be like. This is why there is controversy as to what exactly should count as logically true or logically valid. Nonetheless, there is little controversy that if logic is to qualify as a pure theory of reasoning, then the boundary should be drawn in conformity to the locked room metaphor.

2. Metaphysical ramifications

But logic is not only a theory of reasoning. It is also, and to a great extent, a theory of language. At least as a matter of practice, a logical theory includes also an account of the meaning structures that underlie our ordinary discourse, for it is only relative to such structures that a rigorous theory of reasoning can be formulated. After all, insofar as logically valid reasoning must be truth-preserving, logic must tell us

something about truth. It mustn't tell us *which* sentences are true; but it must tell us *what it takes* for a sentence to be true. It mustn't tell us what are the truth-makers of a sentence; but it must tell us what the truth-makers of a sentence must be like. And as such logic has a lot to do with metaphysics.

One sense in which logic, so construed, is tied up with metaphysical matters is that the question of what the truth-makers of a sentence must be like calls for a specification of the ontology underlying our language—i.e., of the ontological categories that must be posited in order to provide an explicit semantics for the language. The debate on the status of second-order logic is a good example of this sort of metaphysical concern. If we follow Quine in characterizing our ontological commitments in terms of values of the bound variables showing up in the logical form of our statements[5], then an inference of, say,

(8) There is a property that everything has

from a premise such as (3) would be acceptable only if properties are admitted as *bona fide* entities. A platonist would have no qualms about this; for a nominalist, by contrast, talk about properties is merely a *façon de parler*, hence the inference from (3) to (8) should be blocked. (If there are no properties whatsoever, there are no properties that everything has.) The same goes for certain inferences that can be formulated entirely within the scope of first-order logic. Both a platonist and a nominalist would agree on the truth of an arithmetical statement such as

(9) 3 is greater than 2.

But whereas a platonist would take (9) to imply the existential statement

(10) There is a number greater than 2,

a nominalist about arithmetic would reject the inference on account of her refusal to take number talk at face value. Of

course, such a disagreement on the logical status of the inference reflects a deeper disagreement on the meaning of the relevant statements. For a platonist, (9) is a perfectly unambiguous statement: it asserts that the number designated by the numeral '3' is greater than the number designated by the numeral '2'. For a nominalist, by contrast, an utterance of (9) amounts to a different assertion—an assertion which, when properly understood, involves no numerals whatsoever. For example, (9) may be understood as an abbreviation for the schema

(9') Whenever there are at least three things that ϕ there are at least two things that ϕ,

where ϕ is any predicate in the language and the locutions 'there are at least three things' and 'there are at least two things' can be expressed in terms of ordinary first-order quantification without any appeal to number-referring expressions:

(9") If among the ϕ-ers there exist x, y, z such that $x \neq y$, $x \neq z$, and $y \neq z$, then among the ϕ-ers there exist x, y such that $x \neq y$.

Whether this is a good way of cashing out the meaning of (9) may of course be matter of controversy. For one thing, (9") expresses a logical truth whereas a platonist may well insist that (9) expresses a necessary *arithmetical* truth, i.e., a proposition that holds true in every model *of arithmetic*. But this is precisely the point: what inferences should qualify as logically valid, and what statements as logically true, depends on the sort of entities that one is willing to countenance. And this is a metaphysical issue. (Likewise, in the case of a contingent statement such as (3), the platonist's reading will eventually differ from the nominalist's. Both would agree that (3) is the universal closure of the formula

(11) x is mortal.

But whereas the nominalist would understand (11) as asserting that the object picked out by the variable 'x' has the

property denoted by the predicate 'is mortal', the nominalist would understand (11) as asserting a brute fact about *x*: to say of *x* that it is mortal is not to say that there is something *in virtue of which x* is mortal.[6] Again, this is obviously a metaphysical disagreement, indeed one that has been the focus of intense philosophical disputes throughout the history of philosophy.)

This link between logic and metaphysics ties in with another sense in which logic, construed as a theory of language, is hooked up with metaphysical matters. One fundamental intuition about truth is that every true statement, at least a statement that is contingently true, must be *made true* by some entities in the world. Yet the language that we ordinarily speak is so rich and varied that it can be misleading, and there is no reason to suppose that every statement wears its truth-makers on its sleeves (as it were). We have already seen that a statement such as (9), which seems to be about the numbers 2 and 3, may be understood nominalistically in such a way as to avoid any explicit commitment to an ontology of numbers. Likewise, and more generally, it can be argued that many ordinary sentences have a grammatical form that is ambiguous or otherwise deceptive. When we say that the winged horse does not exist, do we really mean to speak of a non-existing individual? When we say that John gave Mary a kiss, do we really mean to say there is something—a kiss—that John gave to Mary? When Alice says that she saw nobody on the street, does she mean to speak of a person called 'Nobody'? On the face of it, there are no straightforward answers to questions such as these. And it is reasonable to argue (following a tradition that goes back at least to Frege) that in order to come up with definite answers it is necessary to go beyond the "surface grammar" of such statements and look at their "deep structure". This is a distinction that linguists have taken very seriously.[7] But the tools needed to work out the distinction—the tools needed to exhibit the deep structure underlying the grammatical form of our ordinary statements—involve in a crucial way the tools of logic.

A paradigm example of this line of thinking is provided by Russell's analysis of negative existentials involving definite descriptions[8], as in

(12) The winged horse does not exist.

Prima facie, a statement such as (12) seems to take us straight to a paradox, asserting *of something* (namely, the winged horse) that it does not exist. To put it differently, to see whether the statement is true we would have to look for the object designated by the term occupying the subject position and check whether it satisfies the condition expressed by the propositional function that follows. But in this case there is no object we can look for; indeed, the statement is true precisely insofar as the term occupying the subject position does *not* designate an object. So we have a problem. That is, we have a problem unless we deny that the expression 'the winged horse' is a genuine singular term acting as the subject of the proposition expressed by (12). And this is exactly the way out offered by Russell. For Russell the grammatical form of (12) is misleading. The very fact that it makes sense to ask *whether* the winged horse exists constitutes a sufficient reason to deny that 'the winged horse' is a genuine singular term, hence a term that can occur as the subject of a proposition. Rather, 'the winged horse' is for Russell an "incomplete symbol" that lacks "any significance on its own account" and disappears as soon as we exhibit the deep structure of the sentences in which it appears. In the present case, the relevant deep structure is explained as follows:

(12') It is not the case that there exists one and only one winged horse,

i.e., as the negation of the conjunction of the following two statements:

(12a) There exists at least one winged horse
(12b) There exists at most one winged horse

And the semantic analysis of these two statements poses no problems. Because the predicate 'winged horse' has an empty extension, (12a) is false, hence the conjunction of (12a) and (12b) is false, hence their negation is true. No paradox here. In other words, for Russell (12) is nothing but a convenient abbreviation for (12'). And it is (12'), not (12), that delivers the right truth-conditions.[9]

This analysis, of course, applies to every statement whose grammatical form follows the pattern

(13) The so-and-so is ϕ.

Not only that. It also applies to those statements in which the definite description 'the so-and-so' is replaced by a designating phrase of a different sort, including ordinary proper names such as 'Pegasus' or 'Socrates'. Precisely insofar as it makes sense to ask whether Pegasus or Socrates exists, the corresponding expressions do not for Russell qualify as genuine proper names. They are, rather, disguised descriptions and should be treated as such. For example, 'Pegasus' could be seen as an abbreviation of the description 'the winged horse'; hence a potentially paradoxical assertion such as

(14) Pegasus does not exist

could be identified with (12) and analyzed accordingly. It might be objected that in some cases it may be difficult to identify the description that hides behind an ordinary proper name. But this is a practical complication that in principle does not interfere with the theoretical force of the analysis. Besides, as Quine famously emphasized,[10] there is always a possibility to dispense of *all* ordinary names by relying on descriptions in which the descriptive predicate is construed directly from the names themselves. 'Pegasus' could correspond to the description 'that thing called: P-e-g-a-s-u-s' or, more simply, 'that thing that pegasizes', so that (14) would eventually boil down to

(14') Nothing pegasizes,

which is perfectly unproblematic. In this way, every apparent name would be eliminated in favor of a predicating phrase and the paradoxical flavor of negative existentials would disappear: though it makes no sense to use a name that names nothing, it is perfectly alright to use a predicate that is *true of* nothing, i.e., a predicate whose extension is the empty set. It follows that for Russell and Quine the only genuine singular terms are demonstrative pronouns such as 'this' and 'that', namely those expressions that in standard logical notation correspond to the individual variables. For it makes no sense to ask 'Does this exist?' or 'Does that exist?', just as in logic it makes no sense to ask whether an individual variable has a value. For Russell this conclusion ties in with a precise metaphysical thesis, according to which the only things that exist are those with which we can be directly acquainted.[11] For Quine the conclusion is a by-product of a general ontological criterion, summarized in the dictum "To be is to be the value of a bound variable". Either way, the nexus between metaphysical concerns and logical analysis is apparent. As a theory of reasoning logic ought to be metaphysically neutral, but as a theory of language it is a primary tool of metaphysics.

3. Logical analysis across the board

These are just examples. To appreciate the general point, it is now important to notice that the same sort of consideration can be applied to all sorts of cases where the metaphysical import of a statement is at issue. For example, earlier we asked whether a statement such as

(15) John gave Mary a kiss

should be understood as implying the existence of an entity corresponding to the noun phrase 'a kiss'. Evidently, the answer is in the affirmative if we interpret (14) as asserting that there is something—namely, a kiss—that John gave to

Mary. This interpretation would establish a deep similarity between (14) and a statement such as

(16) John gave Mary a book,

in which the reference to a book seems unquestionable. However, things look different if we interpret (15) as a mere grammatical variant of

(15') John kissed Mary.

This is a simple relational statement about John and Mary and nothing else, so the analogy with (16) is lost or, rather, discarded as pertaining exclusively to the level of surface grammar. The verb phrase 'gave a kiss' would be a mere grammatical variant of 'kissed' (whereas there is no corresponding variant for the verb phrase 'gave a book'); and the fact that in English we can use the former in place of the latter—one could argue—is merely a linguistic accident, a peculiarity of the English language that should not mislead our ontological intuitions. Even a statement in which the *prima facie* analogy between kisses and books is explicitly asserted, as in

(17) John gave Mary two things: a book and a kiss,

could be suitably paraphrased so as to break the analogy. It would be enough to rewrite (17) as

(17') John gave Mary a book and kissed her,

or something along these lines. We often speak *as though* there were such things as kisses along with people and books. But we often speak loosely—it might be argued—and what we say should not be taken literally. A good deal of logical analysis is needed before one can draw any ontological conclusions from the words we use.

Here are a few more examples of logical analyses of this sort, taken somewhat randomly from the literature. In each case, a statement that seems to be about ontologically "dubious" entities (a crack, a walz, a difference in age,

etc.) is analyzed as expressing a proposition that is, in fact, ontologically neutral with respect to those entities:[12]

(18) There is a crack in the vase.
(18') The vase is cracked.

(19) Sue was dancing a waltz.
(19') Sue was dancing waltzly.

(20) There is a difference in age between John and Tom.
(20') Either John is older than Tom or Tom is older than John.

(21) This tomato and that fire engine have the same color.
(21') This tomato and that fire engine agree colorwise.

(22) There are many virtues that Tom lacks.
(22') Tom might conceivably be much more virtuous than he is.

(23) The average star has 2.4 planets.
(23') There are 12 planets and 5 stars, or 24 planets and 10 stars, or . . .

Nor are these the only sort of cases that one can find in the literature. All of these are examples that illustrate an *eliminativist* strategy, as we may say. They implement a pattern of logical analysis whereby the entities mentioned in the surface grammar of a sentence (corresponding to the top item of each pair) are gently "eliminated" at the level of deep structure. But there are also cases where the analysis goes in the opposite direction—e.g., cases where the logical analysis discloses a hidden quantifier, thereby introducing ontological commitments that do not appear at the level of surface grammar. It is not difficult to find examples of this *introductionist* strategy in the literature, and the kiss example mentioned above can be turned into a case in point. We have said that a statement such as

(15) John gave Mary a kiss,

which seems to be about John, Mary, *and* a kiss, can be interpreted as

(15') John kissed Mary,

which is only about John and Mary. This is the eliminativist strategy. But one could equally well argue in the reverse, viewing (15) itself as the correct way of understanding (15'), which would therefore be interpreted as a statement involving *implicit* reference to a kiss. Indeed, there are philosophers (most notably Donald Davidson and Terence Parsons[13]) who have argued that this is the right way to go, in spite of its greater ontological commitments. One reason is that there are patterns of logical inference that would otherwise be difficult to explain. For instance, if (15) is analyzed as (15'), i.e., as a statement asserting that a certain two-place relation obtains between John and Mary, then it would be hard to explain why (15) is logically implied by

(24) John gave Mary a kiss on the cheek,

i.e., by

(24') John kissed Mary on the cheek,

a statement that involves a different, three-place relation. One would have to appeal to some *ad hoc* meaning postulate linking the two predicates, or else construe the second predicate as the result of applying the adverbial modifier 'on the cheek' to the first *and* then explain the inference in terms of the logic of adverbial modification—notoriously a difficult task. By contrast, if we take (15) and (24) at face value then the entailment is straightforward. The latter statement says that John gave Mary something, namely a kiss, *and* that the kiss was on the cheek; the former says only that John gave Mary a kiss—a plain case of conjunction elimination. This is not a proof that (15) and (24) are in order as they stand. But if we are interested in an account of how it is that certain statements mean what they mean, and if the meaning of a statement is at least in part determined by its logical relations to other statements, then one can hardly ignore the relevance of facts such as these. In-

deed, from this perspective it is reasonable to suppose, not only that (15) and (24) are in order as they stand, but that *they* exhibit the deep structure of (15') and (24'), not vice versa. It is because (15') and (24') make implicit reference to a kiss —one could argue— that one can explain their inferential tie in terms of logical entailment.

4. The traps of logical form

At this point, however, it is crucial to take stock. We have seen that logical analysis can play a key role in revealing the "deep structure" of our ordinary statements, and that this is necessary when it comes to matters of metaphysics. Before knowing *what* a sentence is about, or even *whether* it is about anything at all, we must understand what the sentence means "deep down". For only the deep structure of a sentence is "intrinsically non-misleading" (as Ryle put it[14]) and therefore ontologically transparent. The surface grammar is full of traps.

This is the positive side of the story. But there is a negative side, too. For we have also seen that there is no unique way of revealing the deep structure of a sentence. We can read a sentence such as (15), which mentions kisses, as (15'), which only mentions John and Mary. But we can also read (15') as (15). And this is a problem. For how do we choose? How do we determine the direction of the analysis? Appeal to a general principle of ontological economy would favor the first, eliminativist strategy. But arguments *à la* Davidson would resolve the dilemma in the opposite direction, favoring of the introductionist strategy. How do we choose?

To borrow a maxim from Hilary Putnam, it appears that under such circumstances "Occam's Razor doesn't know what to shave".[15] Perhaps in this specific case a careful scrutiny of the costs and advantages of the options might deliver an answer. After all, that was Davidson's point. But the dilemma is a general one and arises in every case. Take again a sentence such as

(18) There is a crack in the vase,

which seems to commit us to the existence of a crack, and its crack-free paraphrase:

(18') The vase is cracked.

Ontological parsimony would suggest that we take the paraphrase to reveal the deep structure of the initial statement. To say that there is a crack in a vase is to say something about the vase, namely, that it has a certain shape or structure. So if (18) is true, it is true *because of how the vase is*. But one may also reverse the order of the analysis. One may think that it is *because there is a crack in it* that the vase is cracked, in which case it would be (18) that supplies an "ontologically transparent" paraphrase of (18'), not vice versa. And there may be good reasons for holding this view. It may be argued that the eliminativist strategy is not fully implementable, or that its full implementation (if possible) would involve unpalatable consequences.[16] For example, since there are many ways in which a vase can be cracked, the eliminativist would have to rely on the availability of a large number of structural predicates that specify, not only *that* the vase is cracked, but also *how* it is cracked. Thus, a sentence such as

(25) There is a thin crack in the vase,

would have to be paraphrased by suitably modifying the predicate 'is cracked':

(25') The vase is thinly-cracked.

But then the inference from (25) to (18) would be difficult to explain in terms of logical form, just as with the inference from (24) to (15), and a Davidsonian line of argument would apply. (The inference is of course straightforward if we take (25) at face value, as a statement asserting that there is a crack in the vase *and* that the crack is thin.)

Again, the problem is not peculiar to these examples. If indeed it turned out that cracks cannot be paraphrased away in a systematic way, then we might gather that the eliminativist strategy is wrong-headed after all, and we may conclude that to properly describe the world around us we have to posit an ontology that includes cracks as well as vases. But what if it turned out that the eliminativist strategy *can* be fully implemented? Shall we then conclude that cracks are indeed a *façon de parler*? Shall we decide that the crack-free paraphrases reflect the deep structure of the corresponding crack-committing statements? Why so, and on what grounds? Ditto for all other cases, where the dispute concerns the existence of dances, age differences, virtues, colors, and so on. Whenever we have a paraphrase *p′* of a certain statement *p*, we have the option to think of *p′* as expressing the deep structure of *p*. But we can also think of *p* as expressing the deep structure of *p′*. After all, paraphrases must be meaning preserving in both directions. So if in one direction the analysis reflects an eliminativist strategy, in the other direction it reflects an introductionist strategy. And the choice is up for grabs.

The trap, here, is to think that we can resolve these issues by mere logical analysis. Paraphrasability is at best a necessary condition if we want to *avoid commitment* to entities of some sort, and assertibility is a sufficient condition if we want to *proclaim commitment*, but neither is necessary or sufficient to provide us a clue to what there is. Neither is necessary or sufficient to determine the ontology itself. This point is important because it affects the link between logic and metaphysics that we were looking at. To put it in a slogan, logical analysis can be a tool for metaphysical investigations; but it is not a key. For the very issue of *which* sentences must be logically paraphrased—let alone *how* they ought to be paraphrased—can only be addressed against the background of one's own philosophical inclinations. If you don't like cracks, then you may try to paraphrase them away. But if you like them (so to speak), then you feel no need to regard statements such as (18) and the like as mis-

leading. If you don't like kisses, then you may try to paraphrase them away. But if you think kisses are genuine denizens of reality, then you feel no need to regard statements such as (15) and the like as ontologically deceptive. Ditto for all other cases. Logic plays an important role in your decisions because—as I said—the meaning of a statement is at least in part determined by its logical relations to other statements. But logic cannot settle such issues for you.

As a matter of fact, this complex trade-off between logical analysis and metaphysical inclinations is already apparent in the first examples we considered, which focused on the opposition between platonist and nominalist readings of property-talk and arithmetical truths. To the extent that an eliminativist, non-committal analysis of such portions of our language can be systematically pursued, nominalism can be coherently defended. But the defense as such becomes part of a thoroughly metaphysical dispute. Logic plays a crucial role in setting up the dispute, but it does not and cannot solve it. Indeed, we may now observe that even Russell's analysis of definite descriptions, and Quine's radical enhancements, are to be understood in this light. When Russell says that

(12) The winged horse does not exist

must be paraphrased as

(12') It is not the case that there exists one and only one winged horse,

it is because he holds that (12), as it stands, is incompatible with our sense of reality—with that robust "feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies"[17]. The analysis as such yields no ontological discovery. It is Russell's own ontological convictions that lead him through the quest for an appropriate logical form for (12), not *vice versa.* Likewise, it is Quine's "taste for desert landscapes"[18] that leads him through the quest for a principled generalization of Russell's strategy. A philosopher of differ-

ent convictions, however, may feel no need to take such actions. For Meinong (for example) the surface structure of a sentence such as (12) may well coincide with its deep structure because, for him, the winged horse has the same ontological dignity as any other object. It does not exist; but it is nonetheless to be included in a complete, philosophically respectable inventory of the world.[19] And surely enough, this does not make Meinong an incompetent speaker of the language. It simply means that he has different ontological views.

5. Interpretation and revolution

Here is another way of pressing this point.[20] Following John Burgess and Gideon Rosen, let us distinguish two ways in which the link between a sentence *p* and its "transparent" paraphrase *p'* can be understood.[21] The first is what they call the *hermeneutic* understanding. On this understanding, the paraphrase, *p'*, *reveals* the deep structure of *p* and therefore its truth conditions, those conditions that are supposed to take us straight to the truth-makers of *p*. This is arguably how Russell and Davidson (and many others) conceived of the logical analyses they propose in the examples discussed above. The second way to understand a paraphrase is what Burgess and Rosen call the *revolutionary* way. On this conception, the paraphrase, *p'*, does not reveal the meaning of the given sentence *p* but *explains* it; its purpose is not to exhibit the logical form of *p* but rather to *fix* it by dint of resisting alternative interpretations. For the sentence as such can be used by different speakers to mean different things. This is not how Russell or Davidson would put it but it is, for example, what Quine had in mind.[22] In short: the revolutionist is not interested in understanding language; she just doesn't want *her* language to be misunderstood.

Now the point I want to stress is that revolutionary paraphrases are perfectly all right, but they don't play any direct role in our metaphysical investigations. They do not and

cannot play any direct role because they presuppose that we already have a cause to fight for— that we already have a view about what there is. We just want to make sure that people don't draw the wrong inferences from what *we* say, so we provide (only upon request, perhaps) all the necessary linguistic amendments. This is where the tools of logical analysis enter the picture. On the other hand, the hermeneutic paraphrases *could* be of great help, because they could be truly revealing; yet it is unclear where we can look for the relevant evidence. In fact, it is not even clear whether there can be any evidence at all, or whether the hermeneutic approach delivers a picture that is intelligible. For the picture would be this: our daily language—the language that we have learned and made ours since our very first contacts with the surrounding world—that language would consist of sentences whose real meaning often eschews us. It would consist of sentences most of which are acceptable only as loose talk. It would at best qualify as a sort of metaphoric language with regard to the logically regimented language of the philosophers, the latter being the only genuine object language and thus the only language that can express our genuine ontological commitments. Is this an acceptable picture?

It might be thought that this is not different from what happens when logical regimentation take place in scientific discourse. To borrow an analogy from Peter van Inwagen,[23] suppose we heard an educated person say

(26) The sun moved behind the elms.

Arguably, we should not interpret her statement as asserting that the sun has really moved in the sky. We should be charitable: she spoke loosely and we must reinterpret (26) in a way that makes this statement consistent with the heliocentric theory—for example as

(26') Owing to the change in the relative positions and orientations of the earth and the sun, it came to pass that a straight line drawn between here and the sun would have passed through the elms.

This would be legitimate insofar as we would be entitled to assume that the speaker has indeed subscribed to the Copernican revolution (so to speak). The speaker has certain views about astronomy, we know that, and we know that if the need arises she can express herself more clearly. We know that so well that we can take care of that *on her behalf*, interpreting (26) as (26'). However, metaphysics is not like physics, and when it comes to metaphysics we can hardly base our interpretation of what someone says on the basis of the principle of charity. Ordinary speakers need not be astronomy experts to know that the sun does not move and the hermeneuticist may rely on this fact. But most people who assert common-sense sentences about cracks, or about kisses, or about other "dubious" entities, are totally unaware of any metaphysical theories about such entities. So how should one reinterpret *those* assertions? "The speaker could not possibly mean to say that *there is a crack* in the vase! She was speaking loosely. She meant to say that the vase *is cracked*." Is *this* interpretation legitimate? The revolutionist is free to mean what she wants by the words she uses, like Humpty-Dumpty. But what entitles the hermeneuticist to assume that all speakers mean the same?

Nor is this the whole story. As it turns out, both ways of engaging in logical analysis involve a duplication of languages. For neither is willing to give up natural language altogether. Whether we are revolutionists or hermeneuticists, we surely want to carry on speaking with the vulgar, hence we are going to emphasize the pragmatic indispensability of ordinary language against the philosophical value of the regimented language (ontologically impeccable but practically unspeakable). However, *this duplication of languages only works fine for the revolutionist*. For only the revolutionist is always in a position to tell which language is being spoken.

Take the crack-eliminativist once again. When speaking with the vulgar she can give expression in English to the fact that a vase is cracked by asserting the sentence

(18) There is a crack in the vase.

However, when speaking strictly and literally she would rather assert the negation of (18), namely

(27) There are no cracks in the vase.

This may be confusing to some people but the revolutionist will always know when is when, and she will be happy to explain. She may even want to express her views by uttering the conjunction of (18') and (27) in the same breath, and we would understand:

(28) The vase is cracked, but there are no cracks in the vase.

Not so for the hermeneuticist. If you are a hermeneuticist you do not have the same leeway. To the extent that (18) is to be interpreted as (18'), (27) will have to be interpreted as (27'):

(27') The vase is not cracked.

This is so because (27) is just the negation of (18), so the paraphrase of one must be the negation of the paraphrase of the other. But this is bizarre. After all, the vase *is* cracked. More generally, there appears to be no way for the hermeneuticist to express her ontological views to the effect that

(29) There are no cracks.

For this would have to be interpreted as

(29') Nothing is cracked,

which contradicts (18'). The only option would be to say that (27) and (29), unlike (18), are to be taken strictly and literally. Unlike (18), (27) and (29) are *not* to be paraphrased. But this is absurd. For then the fundamental distinction between grammatical form and logical form becomes utterly arbitrary and there appears to be no principled way of discriminating the loosely true from the strictly false.

6. Concluding remarks

So what are we to make of this? I started out by saying that logic can play a crucial role in protecting us from the metaphysical traps of surface grammar: We should not think that *all* those things exist that are referred to or quantified over in our ordinary statements. But we have seen that there is also a deep structure trap, namely, to think that *only* those things exist that are referred to or quantified over at the level of deep structure, i.e., in the logical paraphrases of our statements. This is a trap because of the multiplicity of the available paraphrases and, more importantly, because of the reversibility of the link between a sentence and any of its logical paraphrases. At this point, however, we can add that this trap leads to serious drawbacks only if we think of logical analysis in hermeneutic terms—only if we expect the tools of logic to provide us with a key to disclose the true ontology underlying our language, or the system of concepts embodied in our language. From a revolutionary perspective the picture looks different. The revolutionist engages in honest metaphysical theorizing and uses logic only for the purpose of clarifying her views. She does not build her metaphysics into the mind of all speakers of the language. She does not expect logic to tell us what our words *deep down* really mean—what they have meant all along. She only expects logic to provide some help when it comes to clarifying what *she* really means when she uses certain words. And this is perfectly alright.

So here is how I suggest to cash out the complex trade-off between logical analysis and metaphysics. I suggest to cash it out in terms of an asymmetric dependence. Because all metaphysical theorizing takes place in language (or about language), and because logic is to a great extent a theory of language, metaphysics can hardly get off the ground without the help of logic. But because logical analysis cannot by itself reveal anything about the world itself, logic cannot do any work for metaphysics except in the revolutionary sense. From this perspective, the slogan is:

Put metaphysics first. On the other hand, all of this is to be understood against the background of our initial remarks about the neutrality of logic. What counts as metaphysically possible, or as metaphysically necessary, should still be defined within the constraints of logic, so the notions of logical possibility and necessity should be as wide as possible and should not rule out any *prima facie* metaphysical options. In this sense, it is logic that comes first, and logicians should beware of any metaphysical biases that may surreptitiously enter into the picture. Our coin has two sides: To be a tool for metaphysics, logic must be metaphysically neutral. But when it comes to metaphysical theorizing the tools of logic cannot be neutral on pain of falling into the hermeneutic trap. The final slogan, then, is this: Metaphysics comes first, as long as logic is already there.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. By modern quantification theory I mean ordinary textbook logic, as rooted in the logical theories of Frege (1893) and Whitehead and Russell (1910).

2. Russell (1919: 203). For an overview of free logics, see Bencivenga (1986) and Lambert (1991).

3. Counterexamples to (6) find expression in various sorts of "partial logics" (see Blamey 1986 for an overview); counterexamples to (7) find expression in "paraconsistent logics" (see Priest *et al.*, 1989).

4. Bencivenga (1999: 6f).

5. Quine (1939).

6. Compare Quine (1948: 30). For an articulated formulation of this view see Sellars (1962).

7. The classic reference is Chomsky (1957), but it will be apparent that distinction need not be cashed out in Chomskyan terms.

8. The *locus classicus* is Russell (1905a).

9. Of course, this analysis is not uncontroversial. Strawson (1950), for example, objected that a subject-predicate statement does not *assert* the existence and unicity of an entity corresponding to the subject term—it *presupposes* it.

10. See Quine (1939).

11. This is explicit in Russell (1910).

12. Sources: Lewis and Lewis (1970: 4) (with 'crack' in place of 'hole'); Ducasse (1942: 233); White (1956: 68f); Loux (1998: 66f); Alston (1958: 9); Melia (1995: 224).

13. See Davidson (1980) and Parsons (1990).

14. Ryle (1931-32).

15. Putnam (1987: 76).

16. The impossibility issue is discussed at length in Casati and Varzi (1994).

17. Russell (1919: 169).

18. Quine (1948: 3).

19. See Meinong (1904), reviewed by Russell himself (1905b). (Here I am going along with the received doctrine, but see Oliver (1999).) Meinong had his followers; see e.g. Parsons (1980) and Routley (1980).

20. This section expands on section 4 of Varzi (2002).

21. Burgess and Rosen (1997).

22. See especially Quine (1960: §33).

23. See Van Inwagen (1990: ch. 11).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alston, W. P., 1958, 'Ontological Commitments', *Philosophical Studies* 9: 8–17.

Bencivenga, E., 1986, 'Free Logics', in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), *Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 3: Non-Classical Logics*, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 373–426.

Bencivenga, E., 1999, 'What Is Logic About?', in A. C. Varzi (ed.), *The Nature Of Logic* (European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 4), Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 5–19.

Blamey, S., 1986, 'Partial Logic', in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, *III: Non-Classical Logics*, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1–70.

Burgess, J. P., and Rosen, G. A., 1997, *A Subject with No Object. Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Casati, R., and Varzi, A. C., 1994, *Holes and Other Superficialities*, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.

Chomsky, N., 1957, *Syntactic Structures*, The Hague: Mouton.

Davidson, D., 1980, *Essays on Actions and Events*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Ducasse, C. J., 1942, 'Moore's Refutation of Idealism', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, Evanston (IL): Northwestern University Press, pp. 225–251.

Lambert, K. (ed.), 1991, *Philosophical Applications of Free Logic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leonard, H. S., 1956, 'The Logic of Existence', *Philosophical Studies* 7: 49–64.

Lewis, D. K., and Lewis, S. R., 1970, 'Holes', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 48: 206–212.

Loux, M. J., 1998, *Metaphysics. A Contemporary Introduction*, London and New York: Routledge.

Meinong, A., 1904, 'Über Gegenstandstheorie', in A. Meinong, R. Ameseder, and E. Mally (eds.), *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*, Leipzig: Barth, pp. 1–50.

Melia, J., 1995. 'On What There's Not', *Analysis* 55: 223–229.

Oliver, A., 1999, 'A Few More Remarks on Logical Form', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 99: 247–272.

Parsons, T., 1980, *Nonexistent Objects*, New Haven (CT), Yale University Press.

Parsons, T., 1990, Events in the Semantics of English. A Study in Subatomic Semantics, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.

Priest, G., Routley, R., and Norman, J. (eds.), 1989, *Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent*, Munich: Philosophia-Verlag.

Putnam, H., 1987, 'Truth and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism', *Dialectica* 41: 69–77.

Quine, W. V. O., 1939, 'Designation and Existence', *Journal of Philosophy* 36: 701–709.

Quine, W. V. O., 1948, 'On What There Is', *Review of Metaphysics* 2: 21–38.

Quine, W. V. O., 1960, *Word and Object*, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.

Routley, R., 1980, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, Philosophy Department, Australian National University in Canberra.

Russell, B., 1905a, 'On Denoting', *Mind* 14: 479–493.

Russell, B., 1905b, Review of A. Meinong et al., *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* (Leipzig: Barth, 1904), *Mind* 14: 530–538.

Russell, B., 1910, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Suppl. Vol., 11: 108–128.

Russell, B. 1919, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, London: Allen and Unwin.

Ryle, G., 1931-32, 'Systematically Misleading Expressions', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 32: 139–170.

Sellars, W., 1962, 'Naming and Saying', *Philosophy of Science* 29: 7–26.

Strawson, P. F., 1950, 'On Referring', *Mind* 69: 320–344.

van Inwagen, P., 1990, *Material Beings*, Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press.

Varzi, A. C., 2002, 'Words and Objects', in A. Bottani, M. Carrara, and D. Giaretta (eds.), *Individuals, Essence, and Identity*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 49–75.

White, M. G., 1956, *Toward a Reunion in Philosophy*, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

DREAMS OF DIONYSUS: WINE, PHILOSOPHY AND EROS

MICHAEL A. PETERS
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
mpet001@illinois.edu

For sensible men I prepare only three kraters: one for health (which they drink first), the second for love and pleasure, and the third for sleep. After the third one is drained, wise men go home. The fourth krater is not mine any more - it belongs to bad behaviour; the fifth is for shouting; the sixth is for rudeness and insults; the seventh is for fights; the eighth is for breaking the furniture; the ninth is for depression; the tenth is for madness and unconsciousness.

Attributed to Dionysus, in a surviving fragment of the lost play by Euboulos.[1]

And so, my instinct at that time turned itself *against* morality in this questionable book, as an instinct affirming life, and invented for itself a fundamentally different doctrine and a totally opposite way of evaluating life, something purely artistic and *anti-Christian*. What should it be called? As a philologist and man of words, I baptized it, taking some liberties — for who knew the correct name of the Antichrist? — after the name of a Greek god: I called it the *Dionysian*.

Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Attempt at Self-Criticism', 1886, *The Birth of Tragedy*[2]

ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the idea of the philosophy of wine, reflecting upon the nature of the symposium which literally meant 'to drink together' by reference to texts by Plato, Xenophon and Euripides. The essay investigates the origins and classical texts that describe the historical and social relations between wine, philosophy and eros. It focuses on Dionysus (Bacchus), the god of wine, and traces the philosophical archeology of wine as a religio-moral space that constitutes a discourse of wine, intoxication, and sex.

1. Philosophy and wine: The symposium

Wine has not been the subject of serious philosophical appreciation in the modern context until very recently even although it has had an intimate associate with philosophy since its institutionalization in classical Greece under Socrates and Plato. The exact translation of the Greek word *symposion* is 'to drink together.' In classical Greece

the symposion was an occasion when a group of men and male youths that eat and drink together, according to strict nutritional, religious and cultural rules, while they entertain, talk and discuss philosophical issues. Eating and drinking in his context had become part of civilized society and culture. Indeed, wine, along with bread and olives (especially olive oil), were not only the basic and necessary aspects of the traditional Greek diet but were considered part of the divine—a gift from the gods—and accordingly took on a sacred place in Greek life elevated as part of religious and cerebral cultural life. Wine, bread and olive oil, still the main ingredients of the Mediterranean diet, were to be distinguished from the foods provided through hunting, fishing or gathering as they were the result of agriculture and technology. Drinking wine and eating food as *social* acts taking place with family or friends and in ceremonies such as feasts and religious rituals became the cornerstone of the Greek food and dietary system and the basis of civilization that was part of learning, socialization, religious life and also significantly, philosophy.

The symposion was one of four main forms of ritualized consumption where men ate and drank together as equals and therefore reinforced a set of community values. There was in addition, the religious festival, the military common meal, the public meal granted as an honor by the *polis,* and the *symposion* for pleasure. The Greeks also established a distinction between eating and drinking according the latter, the consumption of wine, a privileged place above eating. As Oswyn Murray (1990) notes in *Sympotica: A symposium on the symposion*

> The rituals concerned with food relate to distribution (especially of sacrificial meat) rather than consumption… It is rather the consumption of wine at the *symposion* after the *deipnon* [dinner or feast]*,* that became the focus of elaborate ritualization, concerning the obligatory mixing of wine with water, the objects for use at the *symposion* the serving of the drink, the order and character of singing or speaking, and the entertainments evolved. For the purpose of tracing Greek influence on other cultures, one of the most important of these elements is the mixing of the wine with water, normally diluting it by at least a half: it is

characteristic of barbarians that they drink their wine neat, thus infringing the prerogatives of the gods. The mental world of the Greeks of the Archaic age is revealed to us most clearly in the decoration of the objects made for the ritual of the *symposion,* Greek painted pottery, and in the poetry composed for performance there.

Murray (1990: 7) goes on to explain that the 'sympotic space' consisted in a dining-room (*andron*) with specific dimensions, capable of seating in reclining fashion on couches (with two to a couch) between 14-30 members of the group which formed strong and intimate group loyalties and operated according its own rules that were very different from those of the *polis*. There was a strict code of honor and a willingness to establish alternative behaviors that carried with them their own sense of occasion creating a type of 'free love' with the *hetaira* and the homosexual bonding of young males according to a strict ethical code. Young men were introduced to the group and inducted into the rites and rituals of the symposion as a companion and *erosmenos* of an adult male with whom he was involved in a pederastic relationship. The Greek pederastic relationship was considered an aristocratic moral and pedagogical institution with its supposed origin in Indo-European rites of passage or a means of birth control inherited and formalized in Crete (Sergent, 1986; Percy, 1996). In the discipline of philosophy today little is made of the actual historical experience of the symposium, its clubbishness, its all-male grouping, its pederastic relationship and its wine-drinking bouts. The fact that philosophy has its origins in symposia, in wine-drinking and pederastic relationships has drawn little comment from philosophers themselves except perhaps for the French philosopher-historian Michel Foucault who in his *L'histoire de sexualite* written toward the end of his life examines an analytics of power and a science of sexuality in the West by focusing on ancient erotics indicates how 'homosexuality' is a social construct barely a hundred years old.

Symposium scene: from the north wall of the fresco from the *Tomb of the Diver,* 475 BCE. Paestum Museum, Italy, http://www.androphile.org/preview/Museum/Greece/symposium01.htm.[3]

'Symposium' as the Greek term for a drinking-party and now used to refer to an academic conference, was a distinctive ceremonial banquet occasion where wine and food was shared among men, young and old, who enjoyed conversation, drinking games, rhetorical contests, music and dancing, and other forms of entertainment. Philosophical subjects were also discussed at these symposia which were very frequent in Athens. We have two contemporary accounts of symposia given by Plato and Xenophon.

Plato's *Symposium* written some time after 385BC is a wine-drinking party where a discussion on the nature of love takes place in terms of a number of speeches that together constitute one of the most influential treatments of love in Western literature. The speeches are given by a group of seven men (Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Socrates and Alcibiades) at the house of Agathon in Athens and comprise a very complex structure consisting in an introduction, three *agons*—Phaedrus vs. Pausanias, Erixymachus vs. Aristophanes, and Agathon vs. Socrates—separated by comic interludes and followed by an epilogue. The introduction has Apollodorus conversing with a friend in an Athenian street, who in the course of the conservation recounts a conversation with Glaucon about a symposion or drinking party that took place at the home of Agathon, and shares some news of it from Aristodemus. In this context Apollodorus provides some (second-hand) details about the nature of drinking at the feast:

Socrates took his place on the couch, and supped with the rest; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had been sung to the god, and there had been the usual ceremonies, they were about to commence drinking, when Pausanias said, And now, my friends, how can we drink with least injury to ourselves? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of yesterday's potations, and must have time to recover; and I suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you were of the party yesterday. Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest?[4]

Eryximachus, the physician, in the course of the opening discussion mentions 'weak heads' and those 'who cannot drink' only to advise that 'drinking deep is a bad practice.' It is agreed by all participants that 'drinking is to be voluntary, and that there is to be no compulsion,' probably a perquisite for philosophical reflection, and Eryximachus proposes that instead of listening to the flute-girl they make speeches in honor of love. This is not the place to embark on a full exposition of the dialogue on love except to say that it emerges that love for Socrates is a mystical contemplation of the good and the beautiful. It its highest form it is love of a pure abstraction. I have referred to Plato's *Symposium* for what light it sheds on drinking wine and also for a source on the way in which wine-drinking is part and parcel of the institutional beginning of philosophy, tied up as it is also with *eros*: wine, philosophy and love. Yet Murray (1990: 7) remarks: 'Despite the enormous importance of Plato's *Symposium* within the classical tradition, the tradition itself betrays limited understanding of Greek sympotic customs.'

Xenophon's *Symposium* by contrast consists in a witty contest between Socrates and Callias at a feast given by Callias for his *eromenus* ('beloved'; adolescent boy aged 12-17) Autolycus and his father. In this dialogue Socrates ends up by praising Callias for his love of Autolycus.[5] Xenophon tells a great deal about the nature of symposia: the bathing, the libations, the feasting, the supping, the entertainment of the flute-girl and the jester, the hymn singing, the unguents, and the dancing. In Act II Socrates in the name of moderation remarks:

Wine it is in very truth that moistens the soul of man,[46] that lulls at once all cares to sleep, even as mandragora[47] drugs our human senses, and at the same time kindles light-hearted thoughts,[48] as oil a flame. Yet it fares with the banquets of men,[49] if I mistake not, precisely as with plants that spring and shoot on earth. When God gives these vegetable growths too full a draught of rain, they cannot lift their heads nor feel the light air breathe through them; but if they drink in only the glad supply they need, they stand erect, they shoot apace, and reach maturity of fruitage. So we, too, if we drench our throats with over-copious draughts,[50] ere long may find our legs begin to reel and our thoughts begin to falter;[51] we shall scarce be able to draw breath, much less to speak a word in season. But if (to borrow language from the mint of Gorgias [52]), if only the attendants will bedew us with a frequent mizzle[53] of small glasses, we shall not be violently driven on by wine to drunkenness, but with sweet seduction reach the goal of sportive levity.

Wine in the Greek context is inseparable from the symposium and the dramatic form becomes the classical dialogue that animates so much Greek philosophy especially as written by Plato.

Euripides' *The Bacchae* reveals more of Dionysus and Dionysian ritual.[6] The play which won first prize in the City Dionysian festival competition concerns King Pentheus of Thebes and his mother and their punishment by Dionysus for refusing to worship him.[7] As Ian Johnston (2001) records in an introductory note on the play 'The central conflict in the play focuses on the clash between this new religion and the traditional Greek way of life'. He goes on to suggest that the central action of the play involves the invasion of Greece by an Asian religion, originating in Thebes and sweeping through Asia Minor.

It's also clear enough what this religion involves, a rapturous group experience featuring dancing, costumes, music, wine, and ecstatic release out in nature away from the city (in the wild, potentially dangerous nature of the mountains, not in the safer cultivated areas). It is presented to us as a primarily (but not exclusively) female experience, one which takes women of all ages away from their homes and their responsibilities in the polis and confers on them amazingly irrational powers, beyond the traditional controls exercised by the male rulers of the city, and brings them into harmony with wild nature (most obviously symbolized by the dancing in bare feet). In the Bacchic celebrations the traditional lines of division between human beings and animals and bet-

ween different groups of human beings (social and gender differences) break down and disappear or are transformed. The play stresses the beauty, energy, creativity, and communal joy of this Bacchic ritual, while at the same time repeatedly informing us of the destructive potential latent in it.

Standard interpretations, as Johnston indicates, see *The Bacchae* as (i) a Punishment for Impiety, (ii) an Indictment of Dionysian Religion, and (iii) a Choice of Nightmares ('a despairing vision of the destructiveness inherent in the ambiguities of human existence'). Johnston continues:

> The play forces us to examine the destruction of this earlier harmony between gods and men and hence of the political and communal ideal which it endorses. Dionysus, an eastern god (or a god bringing with him a different relationship to the divine) is interested in submission, ecstatic revelry, and drink. Those who do not at once celebrate this vision of divinity are subjected to harsh, instant, irrational punishment for disobedience. And the penalty he inflicts here--the killing of a child by his mother and the banishment of the royal family into barbarian lands (a significant contrast to the *Oresteia*, where the killing of a mother by the son helps to establish human justice under divine auspices in the polis)--marks an end to whatever Greek Thebes was all about to begin with. The barbarian East, where Cadmus originally came from, has triumphed.

In this respect we can understand the deep mythological and historical reasons why Nietzsche chose Dionysus as a model or principle for defining Greek culture and for understanding Greek tragedy as that high art form which transcends meaninglessness and nihilism of life. The Dionysian element or principle is mostly evident in the music of the chorus comprised of goat-men and satyrs that defined Dionysian revelry and drunkenness, giving birth to tragedy. It is only with Socrates and Plato that we get the attempt to redefine the basis of the good life based on rational principles that for Nietzsche undervalues the value of myth, minimizes the ecstatic, and underscores the significance of suffering in human life.

2. Wine gods, morality and history

The early pre-history of wine is thought to date back to the Neolithic period and the collection and eventual domestication of the wild grape, *Vitis vinifera*, common around the coasts of Asia Minor. It is also often assumed that winemaking came to Greece through Cretan trade with the Phoenicians. Archaeological evidence points to the fact that winemaking was common to Greece by the end of the Minoan civilization around 1500BC and certainly well established by the time of the establishment of the Greek cit states in 750-550BC. In the preceding two hundred years 900-700Bc, the period when the Homeric poems are thought to be recorded, the first references are made to Dionysus, with an early reference to a deity named 'Diwonysos' appearing as part of a Linear B inscription found at a Mycenaean site near Pylos. As the Greek winermakers' website records:

> Whether this deity was associated with wine cannot be proven, but there is little doubt that wine, which already had become an integral element of Greek culture, had developed a religious status by the end of this period.[8]

Menahem Luz (1998) writing a text for a Dionysus exhibition at Museum Hecht, Haifa University comments:

> The myths and fables surrounding Dionysus, God of Wine, are the most savage and emotional in the whole of Greek mythology. They describe drunkenness, madness and wild ritual. They tell of cannibalism, voyeurism, transvestitism, infanticide, omophagia and the murder of a son by his mother. All of this by command of the Lord of Wine. Obviously, this mythological tradition also proves to be one of the richest in Greek literature.[9]

And he goes on to write:

> In classical Greek society, the festivities of Dionysus – the Dionysia or Bacchaea – signified a break from the routine of everyday life: a rest for the wife from her weaving and for the husband from social conformity. Nonetheless, as early as the 8th century B.C.E., the God of Wine was thought to be an ambivalent source of good and evil. In Homer, he was considered to have been 'the pleasure of mortals' (Iliad, xiv. 325),

but in Hesiod, his is a 'bittersweet gift to men' (Shield of Hercules' 400). Thus, from the very beginning of Greek poetry, Dionysus was considered both a good as well as an evil for those who abstain from his gifts.

The complicated genealogy of wine and its hidden or subterranean network of religio-moral concepts is connected to Ancient Greece and the wine gods Dionysus and Bacchus. The archeology of wine stretches back a long further. Briefly, Dionysus is the Thracian god of wine and Bacchus is the Lydian name for Dionysus. While there is some dispute about the origin of the name Dionysus some commentators suggesting that the cult arrive from Anatolia (present day Turkey) or Libya, Ethiopia, or Arabia, Dionysus' name is found on ancient syllabary tablets in Mycenean Linear B script which predated the Greek alphabet by several hundreds of years. Károly Kerényi (1976), the Hungarian historian of myth and collaborator of Jung, traces Dionysus to Minoan Crete, a Bronze Age culture *circa* 2700 to 1450 BC which became dominant on Crete.

Dionysus was the product of a union between Zeus and Semele – the king of the gods and a mortal woman – and in another version, Zeus and Persephone, Queen of the underworld. His childhood and early life are also the subject of speculation and there are different versions of myths surrounding him. Dionysus as an adult discovered wine and taught the culture of the vine in Asia and famously in India. Dionysus is the god of wine and more widely known as the patron deity of agriculture and theatre. He is viewed as a promoter of civilization and a lawgiver. The ancient Greek Διόνυσος or Διώνυσος is associated with the Roman *Liber*, itself the basis of the Roman festival *Liberalia* traditionally held on March 17 to honor Liber Pater, an ancient god of fertility and wine. Bacchus was also known as the Liberator (*Eleutherios*, an epithet of Dionysus and Eros) for freeing oneself from one's normal state of selfhood through the intoxication of wine.[10]

As the Musagora website indicates Dionysus is the god of festivities and wine.[11]

But once again he is 'multiple': he is Bacchus and Lusios, source of mania and liberator, and he almost always preserves a wild personality… depictions of the festivals are innumerable, the frenzied maenads who dance for the god to the music of the flute and the tambourine. He is the god of Ecstasy, while in his other persona he is simultaneously the 'sweet and effeminate god of wine'… But Dionysus remains the god of the mask; and theatre originates from festivals celebrated in his honour. Comedy and tragedy are directly associated to religious festivals honouring the god, and to the sacrifice celebrated on such occasions. Great Dionysia was also the occasion for the Athenians to assert the excellence of their city. http://www.musagora.education.fr/Dionysus/Dionysusen/intro.htm.

3. Philosophy of wine today

In April 2007 the Pacific Division of the American Philosophy Association (APA) held a mini-conference on Philosophy and Wine in Francisco at their annual meeting with papers addressing questions of wine perception and variation in interpretation, the judgment of taste and the possibility of objective standards, analysis of taste, wine categories, wine evaluation, its beauty, aesthetics and communication, together with a closing panel of viticultural experts and tutored tasting.[12] In essence mini conference focused on wine appreciation and particularly wine tasting in the same way that art appreciation focuses on the critical experience in appreciation of art by attention to examples of art works.

This mini conference has been added to by the publication of two books. The first is a collection of essays edited by Barry Smith (2007) called *A Question of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine.*[13] As Nigel Warburton summarizes in a very positive review of the book

Questions of Taste consists of essays by a range of philosophers, including Roger Scruton, Barry Smith and Tim Crane, together with pieces by wine professionals such as Paul Draper (chief wine-maker at Ridge Wines, California, himself a philosophy graduate), Steve Charters, a Master of Wine who has written on the topic of wine and society, the wine writer Andrew Jefford, and the wine scientist Jamie Goode. (http://nigelwarburton.typepad.com/virtualphilosopher/2007/07/book-review-bar.html).

The lead essay by Smith referenced against Hume's 'Of The Standard of Taste' examines the idea of taste distinguishing between taste as sensibility (considered as a property of the wine) and tasting that refers to the subjective experience of taste. Smith argues for an objectivist account where elements of the wine, such as its acidity, can be established through objective means.[14]

The second book entitled *Wine & Philosophy: A Symposium on Thinking and Drinking* is edited by Fritz Allhoff (Western Michigan University) explores a range of philosophical topics related to food including 'The Art & Culture of Wine', 'Tasting & Talking about Wine', 'Wine & Its Critics', 'The Beauty of Wine', 'The Metaphysics of Wine', and 'The Politics & Economics of Wine'. The collection incorporates traditional areas of philosophical study and is written in an accessible way for general audiences although we might also say it is written in the analytical mold. This is not to say that the essays on 'Wine in Ancient Greece' (Haold Tarrant) and in the politics and economics of wine do not touch my interests but only to say that the approach is through traditional philosophical lens of questions of aesthetics, of taste, of beauty and so on, leading to questions about evaluation and assessment and the notion of standards – questions which. This approach is both valuable and significant and clearly critical for the wine industry.

I should also take the opportunity to mention in this context the new *Journal of Philosophy of Wine* called *Tacuinum* whom the editor Giacomo Mollo describes as follows:

> "Tacuinum" is a middle age Latin term meaning 'notebook', 'small book of thoughts'. It has been inspired by the "Tacuinum Sanitatis", a manuscript that was circulating in Europe during the 13th and 14th centuries. This was based on a pre existing Arab treatise on health which was subsequently implemented by the Christianity-inspired Latin tradition. It described the six fundamental habits for wellbeing and preservation of health. "Vitineum" is the neutral form of the Latin adjective "vitineus,a,um". This is the simplified version of "vitigineus" (together with "vitigenus") which is composed by 'vitis', vine and the verb 'generare', to generate. The literal translation would be "originated from the vine". The conjunction of terms can be translated like "a book of thoughts generated by the

vine". The journal, to summarize, is the result of thoughts created from the contact of the mind with the essence of the vine and materialized in the written form.

Tacuinum: Journal of Philosophy of Wine is an electronic publication available at http://www.tacuinumvitineum.com/web/home.htm and its first issue has the same or similar essays by Smith, Scruton, Bach with contributions also from Ophelia Deroy, and Noga Arikha. Mollo provides his journal with a set of opening reflections including the following final paragraph:

> I strongly believe that philosophy has incredible intuitions and conceptual frameworks able to provide crucial insights about the nature of wine and the experience of wine tasting. Unfortunately these aspects never received the attention they deserved within the wine sector. The journal aims therefore at emphasizing these intuitions: wine has embedded in it a profound nature that is revealed by the philosophical discourse. Publishing a journal on philosophy of wine will be one of the first steps toward stimulating an academic debate about the issue together with promoting an alternative view on wine. A view that regards the experience of wine as a genuine intellectual experience: it is refinement of the senses and refinement of the mind. It requires to be imaginative, to be critical and also to share thoughts for mutual growth. After all, this is also what philosophy is about.

These very recent contributions are extremely welcome and excellent beginnings to a virgin field. What is remarkable is that the philosophy of wine should take so long to mature. It is as if the bottle of philosophy has been in the racks for 9,000 years and never opened. (Only some wines improve with age). There is an interesting question here that the historiography of wine philosophy will eventually revise as the evidence becomes available.

There are at least two broad approaches to the philosophy of wine. I therefore prefer 'philosophies of wine' as opposed to *the* philosophy of wine. I make this distinction tentatively and invite others to explore the soundness of it. The first is what I call the humanities approach, that is, philosophies of wine that raise philosophical questions through the traditional humanities disciplines—archeology, mytho-

logy, religion, history, geography, political economy and so on. This approach should not be seen simply devoted to raising second order questions about wine from the perspective of the discipline. I have indicated my reasons for making this assertion above. The second approach is broadly speaking that notion of philosophy that attaches itself to technique (*technē*) and to processes in general: wine making, wine production, wine tasting and both wine appreciation and wine education which are wider categories. This approach may be seen to subsume the analytic approach to the question of taste, although it does arise proper out of traditional questions and branches of philosophy. The distinction is not meant to be absolute but merely a heuristic device and tool for investigation.

I have attempted to elaborate an approach from the first of these categories that focuses less on the question of taste and traditional aesthetics and rather more on what we might call the genealogy of wine discourse through an investigation of Greek mythology and the pre-history of wine that has created for us a religio-moral space (as well as an aesthetic one) that constitutes the discourse of wine, intoxication, and sex, among other things which to me constitutes an important part of wine education.[15]

REFERENCES

1. The passage is quoted at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symposium. All websites accessed 3rd January 2009, unless otherwise specified.

2. See the translation by Ian C. Johnston at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/An_Attempt_at_Self-Criticism which was added to the original text written in 1870-71.

3. The caption from the website reads: *Men partying. The man on the right is making advances to the youth with the lyre, who is declining the offer. The one in the center is casting the last of his wine into a bronze bowl (not visible), a feature of the ancient game of kottabos. The one to make the bronze ring loudest was rewarded with the sexual favors of a chosen attendant.* [Kottabos was a game where wine drinkers drank their *kylixes* or wine vessels and then threw them at a specified target].

4. All translations are from Benjamin Jowett's translation of the web version posted at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/symposium.html .

5. See the Ancient History Sourcebook's web version at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/xenophon-sym.html based on H. G. Dakyns' translation.

6. I am indebted to Prof Marianna Papastephanou from the University of Cyprus for this reference and for generously providing me with a copy of the play.

7. There are many different translations in both prose and verse – see the Wikipedia site for a list and access to online versions – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Bacchae

8. See the website at http://www.greekwinemakers.com/czone/history/2ancient.shtml.

9. Luz's text appears at http://research.haifa.ac.il/~mluz/dionysus.html.

10. One of the best web encyclopedias that include a section on Dionysus (Διονυσος) is Theoi Greek Mythology at http://www.theoi.com/Olympios/Dionysus.html but also see Dionysus Links at http://www.baubo5.com/Dionysus.html.

11. See the website at http://www.musagora.education.fr/Dionysus/Dionysusen/intro.htm: 'Musagora est un site créé en 2000 avec le soutien de la Sous-Direction des technologies de l'information et de la communication pour l'enseignement (MEN, SD-TICE) et édité depuis octobre 2007 par le SCÉRÉN-CNDP'.

12. The mini conference was organized by Kent Bach from San Francisco State University; see the link on the APA Pacific Division webpage: www.apa.udel.edu/apa/divisions/pacific

13. Barry Smith explores the questions 'Is wine tasting a purely subjective matter? Why should we value the experience of drinking wine?' in an interview for Philosophybites at http://www.philosophybites.libsyn.com/index.php?post_id=227559.

14. For a set of essay by Smith, Scruton, Bach and others see 'Philosophy and Wine: From subjectivity to science' at http://www.wineanorak.com/philosophy_of_wine.htm.

15. The author is the Co-Director with his wife, Tina Besley, of Waipara River Estate, a farm that contains a small 10 acre vineyard in the Waipara Valley, North Canterbury, New Zealand, a region known for its Riesling and increasingly for its Pinot Noir. See http://www.waiparawine.co.nz/.

REFERENCES

Allhoff, F. (2007) *Wine & Philosophy: A Symposium on Thinking and Drinking*. Oxford, Blackwell.

Bowie, A.M. (1997) 'Thinking with Drinking: Wine and the Symposium in Aristophanes'**,** *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 117: pp. 1-21.

Henrichs, A. 'Between City and Country: Cultic Dimensions of Dionysus in Athens and Attica' (April 1, 1990). *Department of Classics, UCB. Cabinet of the Muses: Rosenmeyer Festschrift*. Paper festschrift18 at, http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucbclassics/ctm/festschrift18.

Johnston, I. (2001) 'An Introductory Note to Euripides' *Bacchae*' at http://records.viu.ca/~Johnstoi/euripides/Bacchae_ Introduction.htm.

Kerényi, K (1976) *Dionysus Archetypal Image of Indestructible Life*. Princeton: Bollingen Series LXV.

Luz, M. (1998) 'Dionysus: Myth and Ritual in sources of the Archaic Period'. In: *Dionysus and His Retinue in the Art of Ertetz-Israel* (ed. R. Rosenthal-Heginbottom), Hecht Museum Catalogue 14 (1998), 52-56 (Eng,), 68-71 (Heb.).

Murray, O. (1990) (Ed.) *Sympotica: A symposium on the symposion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1886) 'Attempt at Self-Criticism', added to *The Birth of Tragedy*. Trans. by Ian C. Johnston http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/An_Attempt_at_Self-Criticism.

Percy, W.A. (1996) *Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic Greece*, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Sergent, B. (1986) *Homosexuality in Greek myth* (transl. of *L'homosexualité dans la mythologie grecque*); Beacon Press, Boston.

Smith, B. (2007) (Ed.) *Questions of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine*. Foreword by Jancis Robinson. Oxford: Signal Books; OUP in the USA.

Appendix: The Cult of Dionysus in Athens

Source: From *Musagora* at http://www.musagora.education.fr/Dionysus/Dionysusen/intro.htm

Four festivals are dedicated to Dionysus, from the beginning of Winter to the beginning of Spring:

The rustic Dionysia, during the month of Poseidon (corresponding to our December).
This festival spreads throughout the month of Poseidon. Each deme would organise its thiasos. A symbol of the phallos, sign of fertility, was carried through the dancing and singing procession which ended with a

sacrifice consisting of baked bread or a gruel of cereal (Aristophane, *The Acharnians*, verse 237 and following).

The Lenaea, during the month of Gamelion (January-February).
The most ancient of the festivals dedicated to Dionysus: the procession would advance towards the sanctuary of Dionysus called Lenaeon, probably at the foot of the western slope of the Acropolis. It seems that this festival consisted of orgies (*to do Lenaea = to do bacchanalia(s)*) led by the daduchus (the torch carrier, *dais*, *daidos*), who invites the participants to invoke Iacchos, son of Semele, provider of the earth's fertility. This invocation is maintained in the inauguration of the theatrical competitions.

The Anthesteria, during the month of Anthesterion (February-March).
Takes place before the full moon of March, and is connected with the growth of vegetation (*anthos = flower*). It is thought that this three-day festival lifted the ban on the consumption of produce saved during the winter. On the first day, jars (*pithoi*) containing the new wine were opened. On the second day, there was a drinking competition (the wine was poured into earthenware pitchers, *khoes*): "This competition was open to men and young boys from the age of three. For the occasion, they received a jug adapted to their capacity" (Louvre.edu, Sophie Padel). The champion was crowned with ivy and received a filled wine skin. The festival honours beneficial humidity: the image of the god was carried on a float shaped like a boat. Afterwards, at the sanctuary called the Boukoleion, a hierogamy would take place - the King Archon and his wife would unite symbolizing the union of Dionysus and Basilinna - ancient queen of Athens. On the third day, the festival of the pot (khytroi) was the festival of the dead: a gruel was prepared from several cereals, the panspermy, which was to be eaten with one's family before night fall. Sacrifices were made to Hermes psychopompos (conductor of souls into the underworld) and bad spirits were willed away: "Go, you Keres, the Anthesteria is ended".

The Great Dionysia, during the month of Elaphebolion (March-April).
The first day was consecrated to choruses called dithyrambs (*dithurambos*, probably the double *thriambos*, which gave the latin name *triumphus*), eulogies in honour of the gods: fifty men danced and sang around Dionysus' altar (altar called *thymele*) to the sound of flutes and tambourines, on the Agora not far from the altar of the twelve gods. Originally these dithyrambs would take place at night in the glow of torches and lead to phenomenon of ecstasy or hysteria. The second day, athletic or poetic (rhapsodist competitions) jousting matches (agones) were held. The three following days were dedicated to theatre: tragedies, dating from 534 (etymologically songs in honour of the goat, tragos, animal associated with Dionysus), each trilogy of tragedies was followed by a

satiric play (the chorus made up of satyrs, half men/half goats). Comedies, which some say originate from the cortèges of inebriated peasants, (songs of komoi, of the villages) do not become dialogued texts until 486. From the point of view of the cult of Dionysus, the Great Dionysia festival ends with a triumphal procession and the crowning of the god.

Acknowledgement: Musagora est un site créé en 2000 avec le soutien de la Sous-Direction des technologies de l'information et de la communication pour l'enseignement (MEN, SD-TICE) et édité depuis octobre 2007 par le SCÉRÉN-CNDP. Il est animé par une équipe d'enseignants de lettres classiques, at http://www.musagora.education.fr/credits.htm.

CARNAP'S "ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS THROUGH LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE"

•

A Retrospective Consideration of the Relationship between Continental and Analytic Philosophy

GOTTFRIED GABRIEL
Friedrich Schiller University
gottfried.gabriel@uni-jena.de

ABSTRACT. Carnap's article "Elimination of Metaphysics", which is directed against Heidegger, not only conducts a fundamental critique of metaphysics based on logic, but also marks in an exemplary way "a parting of the ways" (M. Friedman) between analytic and Continental philosophy. With regard to possibly overcoming this separation, it should be kept in mind that the positions of both Carnap and Heidegger have their origins in the same premises, namely in the critique of life-philosophy (*Lebensphilosophie*) on neo-Kantianism. While Carnap passes the contents of traditional metaphysics on to poetry and reduces philosophy to its methodological function qua logic and theory of science, Heidegger, providing a new interpretation, adheres to these contents and with them sets off in the opposite direction – towards poetry.

Rudolf Carnap is a classic proponent of the ideal language school within analytic philosophy. He has divided opinion more sharply than other representatives of this tradition and thus contributed decisively to the ongoing separation of analytic and continental philosophy. The essay "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Languages" (Carnap 1931, 1959), in particular, contributed to the polarization because it made Martin Heidegger, *the* classic author of continental philosophy, the target of exercises in a logically inspired criticism of metaphysics.

The following essay reconsiders the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy, using the Carnap-Heidegger controversy as an example. We should bear in mind, however, that the roles of analytic and continental philosophy have in the meantime been strangely reversed. Whereas the continental tradition struggles above all with

the deconstruction of supposed remnants of old metaphysics, a new metaphysics is celebrating its reemergence in logically ingenious theories of analytic philosophy. The order of the day is not an elimination of metaphysics, but its new foundation through the logical analysis of language. We would suppose that this development would have the disapproval of both Carnap and Heidegger. For example, Carnap would surely have accused the metaphysics of possible worlds (and his philosophical grandchild David Lewis) of confusing internal and external existence, whereas Heidegger would have critized such metaphysics as a kind of forgetfulness of Being of a presence-at-hand ontology (*Vorhandenheitsontologie*).

There are more profound reasons for assuming such agreement between Carnap and Heidegger. For it is not so much the attitude towards metaphysics itself, but their views as to what remains for philosophy to do following the end of metaphysics that constitutes the opposition between Carnap and Heidegger.[1] This opposition shows in different forms of linguistic presentation, and indeed, it is primarily through linguistic differences that analytic and continental philosophers can be recognized today. Before pursuing this idea, we discuss the philosophical-historical setting of Carnap's and Heidegger's thinking to display their common ground.

To begin, we should remember that the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy is problematic in two ways. Firstly, the two designations are askew, because 'analytic' is a methodological determination, whereas 'continental' is geographical. Secondly, the implicit geographical division, according to which all analytic authors are assumed to be Anglo-Saxon, doesn't work. The ranks of analytic philosophy include, along with Carnap, G. Frege, B. Russell, G.E. Moore, L. Wittgenstein, G. Ryle and J.L. Austin. Frege, Wittgenstein and Carnap not only come from the Continent, but also received their essential intellectual formation there (Frege and Carnap in Jena, Wittgenstein in Vienna).

With regard to Carnap and Heidegger their philosophical beginnings at least are congruous, albeit with different emphasis. Both received their initial education in the context of Neo-Kantianism: Carnap under B. Bauch in Jena, Heidegger under H. Rickert in Freiburg. (During his time in Freiburg, Carnap also heard Rickert.) Carnap was influenced decisively by Frege, and Heidegger in a corresponding manner by Husserl. Both concurred with the anti-psychologistic logism of their respective teachers in the form of a theory of validity (which goes back to H. Lotze). Both, however, also acknowledged the other tradition: the early Heidegger (1912, 20) refers to Frege, and the young Carnap to Husserl.[2] Whereas for Carnap the distinction between validity and genesis of statements remained decisive throughout his life, Heidegger, under the influence of life-philosophy (W. Dilthey, F. Nietzsche), distanced himself from linking the concept of truth to statements, that is from the propositional concept of truth, essential for the logical tradition since Aristotle.

This difference concerning the nature of truth drives Carnap and Heidegger in differing directions. But this difference did not arise through Carnap's having paid no attention to life-philosophy. Instead, here too the initial situation for Carnap and Heidegger is identical. Both experienced the contest between Neo-Kantianism and life-philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. Central to this conflict was the question regarding the relationship between logic and life and — proceeding from this question — the determination of the task of philosophy. The result was that the two Neo-Kantians treated the challenge of life-philosophy in different ways. For Heidegger the course was set by Husserl, and for Carnap by Wittgenstein. Their paths parted for good with Heidegger's inaugural lecture in Freiburg *What is Metaphysics?* (Heidegger 1929). Carnap had previously taken part in the famous dispute between E. Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos. Although the independence of Heidegger's thinking had also impressed Carnap, he remained philosophically bound to the rationalistically

oriented Neo-Kantianism as represented by Cassirer. By taking his examples of meaningless metaphysical statements from Heidegger's inaugural lecture in particular, he sent a signal, for, as he emphasized, he might "just as well have selected passages from any other of the numerous metaphysicians of the present or the past" (Carnap 1959, 69, footnote 2).

The list of metaphysicians adduced by Carnap as examples (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger) displays a large degree of agreement with the usual enumeration of continental authors with one important exception. Nietzsche, who in today's controversy is viewed (by both sides) as a model author in the continental tradition, is spared in Carnap's criticism. This fact has not been appreciated sufficiently until now, not least because with his move to the USA, Carnap had cut or at least suppressed his own continental roots in orienting himself to the new philosophical circumstances, especially to the pragmatism found there.[3] In his intellectual biography only weak traces of the continental tradition are recognizable, and even these have been ignored.

For several years a historical reconsideration of the origins of analytic philosophy that seeks to revise its 'forgetfulness of the Continent' has been in progress. After Frege had found his fixed place in Neo-Kantianism (cf. Gabriel 2002), Carnap's relationship with this tradition, which dominated German philosophy at the turn of the century, has been largely investigated (cf. in particular Richardson 1998). A part of Carnap's continental roots have thus been revealed.

M. Friedman has presented the first thorough historical study of the relationship between Carnap and Heidegger, in which he attempts to show how, by dealing with the same basic ideas of Neo-Kantianism, two traditions of philosophy were able to develop which have led to the current opposition of analytic and continental philosophy (Friedman 1996). One factor, however, which Friedman does not take into account is the role of life-philosophy.[4] It is only

by considering this that the picture is completed and the actual differences are brought into the open. The final section of Carnap's (1931) essay, entitled "Metaphysics as expression of an attitude towards life (*Lebensgefühl*)", provides important clues here. The expression "*Lebensgefühl*" is a central term for W. Dilthey. Presumably Carnap adopted the term not directly from Dilthey, but from his student Herman Nohl, whom Carnap had heard in Jena.[5] It is revealing that, apart from Bauch and Frege, Nohl is the only one of his teachers in Jena that Carnap mentions by name in his *Intellectual Autobiography*. And this mention is not limited to academic reasons. Carnap writes:

> I remember with special pleasure and gratitude the seminars of Hermann [correctly: Herman, G. G.] Nohl (at that time a young instructor in Jena), in philosophy, education, and psychology, even when the topic, for example, Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*, was often somewhat remote from my main interests. My friends and I were particularly attracted by Nohl because he took a personal interest in the lives and thoughts of his students, in contrast to most of the professors in Germany at that time, and because in his seminars and in private talks he tried to give us a deeper understanding of philosophers on the basis of their attitude toward life ("*Lebensgefühl*") and their cultural background. (Carnap 1963, 4)

The personal element addressed here has its place in Carnap's life itself. The "friends" (such as the later pedagogue Wilhelm Flitner) were committed members of the German youth movement with whom Carnap bounded through the Jena woods. The "deeper understanding of philosophers" mentioned here amounts to discerning their respective *Lebensgefühl* as the driving force of their differing metaphysics. The basis of such an assessment, which Carnap adopted from Nohl, is Dilthey's *Weltanschauung* doctrine. Before turning to this as the actual 'point' of Carnap's 'Elimination of metaphysics', I would first like to expand on the methodological framework as set out in Carnap's essay (1931).

The basic features of the criticism of metaphysics developed by Carnap, namely the linking of formal logic with the principle of verifiability are not new: they had al-

ready been worked out in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, to which Carnap explicitly refers. The familiar problems with the formulation of the empiricist criterion of meaning are not to be elaborated here. Difficulties already result from the fact that the meaning of a sentence is supposed to be deter- mined by its truth conditions (cf. Carnap 1959, 62). Meaning is hence linked to the form of statements, and is reduced to propositional meaning. Accordingly, normative statements are considered meaningless by Carnap: "It is altogether impossible to make a statement that expresses a value judgment." (ibid., 77) Now the criterion of meaning is not to be understood as a merely descriptive criterion of distinction, but as a normative criterion of exclusion and hence falls prey to its own verdict of meaninglessness.[6]

In comparing Carnap and Wittgenstein, an important terminological difference is to be noted. For Wittgenstein the only statements (propositions) that have sense are those that describe logically possible facts (in the sense of existent or non-existent states of affairs). Already the statements of logic lack sense. This determination is not to be understood pejoratively, but merely as characterizing their status as logically true, i.e. as tautologies, that say nothing about the world. Carnap, however, understands these statements as being meaningful because they are "true solely by virtue of their form" and follows Kant in defining them as analytic statements (Carnap 1959, 76). Accordingly they are valid *a priori*. Alongside analytic statements Carnap recognizes empirical statements corresponding to Kant's synthetic *a posteriori* statements. As distinct from his Jena dissertation *Der Raum* (1921) Carnap now denies the possibility of *a priori* synthetic statements.

Carnap speaks of meaningless statements (*sinnlose Sätze*) when words without meaning occur in them, or when they are not correctly logically syntactically formed. The *meaningless* statements in Carnap's terminology thus correspond to the *nonsensical* (*unsinnigen*) propositions in Wittgenstein's terminology.[7] The thesis that words without meaning occur in metaphysical texts is old. It is stated em-

phatically, for example, by D. Hume. New, however, is the view that there exist statements in which the logical syntax is violated, though they accord with historical-grammatical syntax (cf. Carnap 1959, 69). This insight goes back to Frege and was first developed into the basis of a criticism in principle of metaphysics by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. The basic features of this criticism are adopted by Carnap. The consequences he sees are admittedly quite different from those of Wittgenstein.

Whereas Wittgenstein's farewell to metaphysics was not without sadness, Carnap cheerfully issues the command for philosophy of science to 'clean up' and allows philosophy to be absorbed by the logic of science. This 'way out' is ruled out for Wittgenstein because for him a metalogic that attempted to 'say' once again what can only 'show' itself is impossible. The categorial discourse that sets out the logic of our language is compelled to overstep the limits of this logic. This discourse itself breaks the rules of syntactic well-formedness that it seeks to explicate. Hence not only are the statements of traditional metaphysics nonsensical, but so too are those statements in which this criticism is formulated, in particular therefore the statements of the *Tractatus* itself.

This view has consequences for the form of presentation of Wittgenstein's texts, a form which must be called literary rather than logical. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* presents logic as literature. It is no wonder that through to the present day the logical and scientific faction within analytic philosophy has preferred to appeal to Carnap and has its difficulties with Wittgenstein. It is the logical tradition of propositionalism that binds knowledge to the (true) proposition and causes the methodical function of forms of presentation to be misunderstood.

The logic taken as a basis by both Wittgenstein and Carnap is the propositional and predicate logic developed by G. Frege in his *Begriffsschrift*. In this logic the traditional subject-object structure of propositions is replaced by an argument-function structure, through which a completely

new and far-reaching analysis of language is made possible. Within the framework of such an analysis Frege had in particular proposed a logical distinction between four categorially different uses of the verb 'to be': predication (subsumption), identity, subordination (of concepts) and existence.

Carnap makes use of these distinctions in his criticism of Heidegger. In doing so he presents some exemplary sentences of Heidegger's, which — so as to heighten the rhetorical 'effect' — are contracted into the following passage:

> What is to be investigated is being only and — *nothing* else; being alone and further — *nothing*; solely being, and beyond being — *nothing*. *What about this Nothing? ... Does the Nothing exist only because the Not, i.e. the Negation, exists?* Or is it the other way around? *Does Negation and the Not exist only because the Nothing exists?* ... We assert: *the Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation*. ... Where do we seek the Nothing? How do we find the Nothing? ... We know the Nothing. ... *Anxiety reveals the Nothing*. ... That for which and because of which we were anxious, was 'really' — nothing. Indeed: the Nothing itself — as such — was present. ... *What about this Nothing? — The Nothing itself nothings*. (Carnap 1959, 69)

In Carnap's view, Heidegger makes the logical mistake "of employing the word 'nothing' as a noun (*Gegenstandsname*), because it is customary in ordinary language to use it in this form in order to construct a negative existential statement" (ibid., 70). The negative existential statement 'It is not the case that there exists something which has a certain property' is also expressed by the sentence that *nothing* has this property. It is through the objectification of this use of 'nothing' that the meaningless talk of 'the nothing' comes about. Part of the responsibility for this lies in the confusion of the uses of 'to be' in the sense of predication and in the sense of existence.

Now Carnap in no way fails to recognize that something important can be addressed in metaphysics. He disputes, however, that it can be represented in the form of meaningful statements. Apart from this Carnap admits that

language still has functions other than making statements. Alongside a cognitive function it assumes an emotional one. This serves in particular to give expression of the attitude towards life (*Ausdruck des Lebensgefühls*). It is in precisely this function that Carnap sees metaphysics, which, however, attempts to clothe something in the form of statements that cannot be said. A legitimate need underlies metaphysics, however, the adequate expression of the attitude towards life is not metaphysics, but art:

> [I]n the case of metaphysics we find this situation: through the form of its works it pretends to be something that it is not. The form in question is that of a system of statements which are apparently related as premises and conclusions, that is, the form of a theory. [...] The metaphysician believes that he travels in territory in which truth and falsehood are at stake. In reality, however, he has not asserted anything, but only expressed something, like an artist. (Carnap 1959, 79)

As the historical source for his surrogate thesis ("Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability") Carnap adduces Nietzsche, as that metaphysician, "who perhaps had artistic talent to the highest degree" (ibid., 80) and was hence able to give expression to the *Lebensgefühl* in the form of poetry (in *Zarathustra*). At this point a surprising contiguity shows up between the positions of Carnap and Heidegger that leads us back to the theme of forms of presentation.

If we consider the historical stock of philosophical forms of presentation, we find the complete spectrum between the poles of science and poetry. The question is always to which does one orient oneself. Carnap orients himself methodically towards science, that is, towards the justification of statements. With him philosophy is absorbed by the logic of science; it no longer has contents of its own. These contents are passed onto poetry where they find the form appropriate to them. With Carnap, so to speak, Frege's *Begriffsschrift* lies on the desk and Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* on the bedside table. For the intermediate form of a "concept-poetry" (*Begriffsdichtung* in the sense of F. A.

Lange) there is no place on either. The result is a problematic dichotomy of cognition and feeling. Apart from this dichotomous accentuation Heidegger seems to proceed from the same finding of a conflict between the form and content of metaphysics. But since it is the contents that matter to him, he departs from the scientific form and consistently approaches (as Nietzsche did) the form of poetry. Carnap and Heidegger, as well as the philosophical traditions founded by the two, have a common point of departure, but proceed from there in opposite directions and thus arrive at diametrically contrary forms of philosophy.

What Carnap announces in "The Elimination of Metaphysics" (Carnap 1959, 62), namely a detailed exposition of a "metalogical" theory of syntactically meaningful languages, is presented by him in *The Logical Syntax of Language* (Carnap 1934, 1967). It should be noted that this exposition of the (later) so-called "linguistic framework" represents a transformation of traditional category theories along the lines of the linguistic turn. Whereas in Aristotle we are concerned with categories of being, and in Kant with categories of thinking, the analyses of analytic philosophy of language pertain to the categories of language. Considered in terms of philosophical history, the following line of development results: ontology – epistemology – philosophy of language. Carnap's analyses differ from related endeavours within analytic philosophy in that they do not lead to the establishment of a single categorial framework, but conceive of different frameworks as being theoretically possible.

In the course of its development — starting with *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt* (Carnap 1928) via *Die logische Syntax der Sprache* (Carnap 1934) through to *Meaning and Necessity* (Carnap 1956) — there were indeed shifts in accentuation in Carnap's thinking, namely from a more epistemological (in the sense of Neo-Kantianism), via a formal logical, through to a semantic analysis, but an attitude which Carnap (1934, 44f.; 1967, 51f.) himself formulated as his "principle of tolerance" prevailed constantly. This atti-

tude is characterized by a *conventionalist* apprehension of languages within the framework of the theory of science.

Carnap also spoke later of the "principle of conventionality of language forms" (Carnap 1963, 55). The basic idea lies in resolving scientific-theoretical disputes over *content*, such as the foundational dispute between logicists and intuitionalists in mathematics, through the description of different language *forms*:

> *In logic, there are no morals*. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i. e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. (Carnap 1967, 52)

The principle of tolerance is thus part of Carnap's endeavour to eliminate so-called metaphysical "pseudo-problems" from the sciences. It formulates a metatheoretical standpoint which amounts to replacing ontology with logical syntax.

Carnap also applied the principle of tolerance in modified form to the dispute between nominalists and Platonists in semantics. In doing so he distinguished between "internal" questions of existence that must be answered relative to a specific language form (a "linguistic framework") and "external" questions of existence that are concerned with reality as such. External questions of existence continued for him to be pseudo-problems, whereas with admitting language forms that provide the framework for internal questions of existence he recommended the principle of tolerance. The criterion for the admission of linguistic forms was to be *scientific* utility alone (Carnap 1950; 1956).

Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions, which has Kantian roots, has for a long time not been taken seriously enough in analytic philosophy.[8] This is shown by the discussions of scientific realism which are troubled by not having distinguished (from the beginning) between internal and external realism. Yet Carnap had already made clear that science presupposes an internal re-

alism — an empirical realism in the Kantian sense — but that every attempt to found, inductively as it were, an external metaphysical realism on a scientific basis is an impossible undertaking, because it involves a transcendent use of experience.[9] The analytic students did not understand their teacher's continental inheritance.

If, for a moment, one ignores the fact that Carnap restricts philosophy from the outset to the explication of scientific language forms, then one could say that he is in agreement with Heidegger at least in the criticism of the presence-at-hand *ontology*; he adheres, however, to a presence-at-hand *syntax*.

The subject of language forms is the key to understanding the conflict between Carnap and Heidegger. With the rejection of certain language forms the expressive possibilities of philosophy are curtailed. Carnap acts tolerant, but his tolerance extends only so far as it is possible to translate the language form into a *logical* syntax. He accuses Heidegger of adopting "many pecularities of the Hegelian idiom (*Sprachform*) along with their logical faults" (Carnap 1959, 75). Heidegger reacted to this objection in his "Epilogue to *What is Metaphysics?*". His answer shows that he had understood the point precisely.

> The suspicion against 'logic', of which logistics[10] may be considered a consistently developed degeneration, emerges from the knowledge of that thinking which finds its source in the experience of the truth of Being [*Sein*], but not in the consideration of the objectivity of the being [*des Seienden*]. Exact thinking is never the strictest thinking [...]. (Heidegger 1976a, 308)

Heidegger denies the logic oriented towards propositional thinking the right to establish logical linguistic forms as the possible forms of thought altogether. He sees metaphysics as being at work precisely in logistics, and this in the sense of an objectual presence-at-hand ontology. (With his self-critique in the *Philosophical Investigations* of the one-sided ontology of objects in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein later agreed with him indirectly.) Even though Heidegger

has a different metaphysics from Carnap in mind, he too is concerned with an "*Überwindung* of metaphysics" (he uses this formulation several times). Yet he does not want to *eliminate* metaphysics, he wants to *overcome* it. Heidegger wants to direct thinking away from the question of being as the being (*Seiendes*) towards the question of Being (*Sein*) itself (Heidegger 1976b, esp. 367f.).

The comparison of Heidegger and Carnap ought to have made clear that the difference between continental and analytic philosophy is above all a matter of the style of thought which manifests in linguistic style. The linguistic style is a matter of rhetoric, and it is not difficult to distinguish authors according as to whether their rhetoric orients itself towards poetry or logic. Such an orientation is not simply a matter of personal taste, rather the apprehension of philosophy itself comes to bear therein — namely as to whether poetic metaphors or logical analysis take on the guiding function in philosophical speech.

It remains to be asked whether analytic and continental philosophy can be 'reconciled' with one another against the background of their shared past. What is meant by this cannot be a colorful 'postmodern' mixture of styles, or even the levelling of the differences existing between the forms of presentation. What matters far more is a thorough analysis of the respective peculiarities from the point of view of their functions. If the one-sided orientation towards the *logic* of linguistic forms could be overcome and extended in favour of a more comprehensive *rhetorics* of linguistic forms, then the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy will prove to be historically explicable, but systematically mistaken. For the time being, however, something would already have been gained if the 'fears of contact' were broken down further. In this spirit I would like to conclude by bringing out some elements of continental thinking with Carnap.

If one takes Kant's understanding of metaphysics as a basis, then the appropriate place for the metaphysical ideas (of Freedom, God, and Immortality) is in practical phi-

losophy. Such a shift in location is also undertaken by Carnap in that he traces the theoretical hypostasizations of metaphysics back to practical needs. Carnap's moral point of view is comparable to that of a Kantian socialism, as had been developed in the Marburg Neo-Kantianism. The essential difference lies in that, for Carnap, there is no practical reason which could do justice to this need *discursively*. To this extent he follows Nietzsche. Morality without justifiability amounts to moral decisionism.

We are, however, also involved with practical, albeit not *morally* practical, decisions in the approach to the sciences. Carnap's best known example is the decision between idealism and realism (in the question of the existence of an external world), which is classified only as theoretically, but not as practically irrelevant. Carnap also deals with other metaphysical questions in this way. At the official theoretical front door of his philosophy he turns them away, but at the same time he keeps open a back door to the courtyard of practical decision making. This theory-practice dualism is the result of his 'crossing' of Neo-Kantianism and life-philosophy.[11]

The influence of Kant shows itself with Carnap not only in the adoption of several distinctions (such as those between genesis and validity, and between analytic and synthetic statements), but also in matters of theory construction. Carnap was very well aware that the development of scientific theories takes place from the points of view of unity and fruitfulness (Kant's *Zweckmäßigkeit*). Such points of view are, however, external in kind. The metaphysical suspicion must then apply to them too. Here once more Carnap backs out of the difficulties by declaring these matters to be practical ones relating to application.

As we have already seen, Carnap uses the expression 'metaphysics' in a somewhat indeterminate manner. In doing so he refers to authors and questions as examples and not generally to everything that has been traditionally counted as metaphysics. In a remark to the English text of "The Elimination of Metaphysics" he notes that

the expression 'metaphysics' is used "for the field of alleged knowledge of the essence of things which transcends the realm of empirically founded, inductive science. Metaphysics in this sense includes systems like those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger. But it does not include endeavors towards a synthesis and generalization of the results of the various sciences." (Carnap 1959, 80) With the addition (in the last sentence), the *regulative* epistemological function (in the Kantian sense) of metaphysical ideas is obviously being addressed.

A. Naess has rightly noted that, despite the life-philosophical reinterpretation of the concern of metaphysics, Carnap and Dilthey have one thing in common with the metaphysical systems: "They are 'totalizing' views of reality, in Dilthey's sense; they 'set' certain values and represent decisions." (Naess 1968, 46) Last but not least, this is already expressed linguistically in the programme of a "scientific *Weltauffassung*". The replacement of the Diltheyan expression *Weltanschauung* (cf. Carnap 1959, 79) with *Weltauffassung* is nothing more than a word-political measure.[12] The difficulty remains of determining how the categorial discourse is to be understood that attempts to speak in a "totalizing" manner about the whole of meaningful language and is hence compelled to go beyond the bounds which it determines as being such. It does not have to become 'poetic' for this reason alone, but it will not be able to abstain from metaphors and other 'rhetorical' forms of presentation. With this philosophy has at least one foot in the poetry camp, it *is* concept-poetry. It is at this point, I think, that the discussion between Carnap and Heidegger, between analytic and continental philosophy is to be taken up once again.

NOTES

1. On the tacit common ground between Heidegger and Carnap cf. Kambartel 1968, 195-197; also Rentsch 1985, 140-146, 192 f.

2. Carnap 1928. See the references to Husserl in the index of names and bibliography.

3. It should be borne in mind that the older pragmatism itself had links with the continent. H. Lotze in particular had left traces of influence. It would be worth examining whether the holism of W. V. O. Quine goes back *indirectly* to the Hegelianism of Lotze's metaphysics.

4. In his new book (Friedman 2000) he does, however, draw attention to this.

5. The influence of Dilthey on Carnap was first pointed out by Naess (1968, 41-48): "Metaphysics as the Expression of an Attitude to Life. Dilthey, Nohl and Carnap"; cf. also Patzig 1966, 100.

6. Cf. Carnap's self-critique in Carnap 1963, 45f.

7. At one point Carnap erroneously calls contradictory, i.e. logically false, sentences absurd (*unsinnig*) (Carnap 1959, 71, but cf. correctly 76).

8. Cf. on this distinction Krauth 1970, esp. Chap. VII; also Norton 1977. On the relationship to continental philosophy cf. Parrini 1994, esp. 274 f. (footnote 4) and the literature listed there.

9. Contrary to Carnap H. Reichenbach, Carnap's companion in promoting a "scientific *Weltauffassung*", was convinced at times that he could give an inductive justification of realism. For a critical evaluation cf. Klein (2000, section 2.10-2.12).

10. 'Logistics' (*Logistik*) was at the time the usual term, also used by Carnap, for mathematical logic.

11. This connection already becomes clear in Carnap 1928. Cf. in particular the conclusion §§ 179-183.

12. It probably goes back to O. Neurath. Cf. Stadler 1997, 372.

Translated by Andrew Inkpin

REFERENCES

Carnap, R. 1928. *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*. Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag. 2nd edition, Hamburg: Meiner 1961.

—. 1931. "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache". *Erkenntnis 2*: 220-241.

—. 1934. *Logische Syntax der Sprache*. Vienna: Julius Springer.

—. 1950. "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". *Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4*: 20-40. Reprinted in Carnap 1956, 205-221.

—. 1956. *Meaning and Necessity*. 2nd edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—. 1959. "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language". In A. J. Ayer, ed., *Logical Positivism*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 60-81. Translation of Carnap 1931.

—.1963. "Intellectual Autobiography". In P. A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*. The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 11. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1-84.

—. 1967. *The Logical Syntax of Language*. 7th impression, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Friedman, M. 1996. "Overcoming Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger". In R. N. Giere and A. W. Richardson, eds., *Origins of Logical Empiricism*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press (=Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. XVI), 45-79.

—. 2000. *A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger*. Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.

Gabriel, G. 2002. "Frege, Lotze, and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic Philosophy". In E. H. Reck, ed., *From Frege to Wittgenstein. Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: University Press, 39-51.

Heidegger, M. 1912. "Neuere Forschungen über Logik". In *Frühe Schriften* (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1978, 17-43.

—. 1929. *Was ist Metaphysik?* Bonn: Friedrich Cohen. In *Wegmarken* (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1976, 109-122.

—. 1976a. Afterword to: *Was ist Metaphysik?* In *Wegmarken* (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9), Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 303-312.

—. 1976b. Introduction to: *Was ist Metaphysik?* In *Wegmarken* (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 365-383.

Kambartel, F. 1968. *Erfahrung und Struktur. Bausteine zu einer Kritik des Empirismus und Formalismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Klein, C. 2000. *Konventionalismus und Realismus. Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Relevanz der empirischen Unterbestimmtheit von Theorien*. Paderborn: mentis.

Krauth, L. 1970. *Die Philosophie Carnaps*. Vienna and New York: Springer.

Naess, A. 1968. *Four Modern Philosophers: Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Norton, B. G. 1977. *Linguistic Frameworks and Ontology. A Re-Examination of Carnap's Metaphilosophy*. The Hague, New York, and Paris: Mouton.

Parrini, P. 1994. "With Carnap, Beyond Carnap: Metaphysics, Science, and the Realism/Instrumentalism Controversy". In W. Salmon and G. Wolters, eds., *Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories. Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial*, University of Konstanz, 21-24 May 1991. Pittsburgh and Konstanz: University of Pittsburgh Press and Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 255-277.

Patzig, G. 1966. Afterword to Carnap, *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 85-136.

Rentsch, T. 1985. *Heidegger und Wittgenstein. Existential- und Sprachanalysen zu den Grundlagen philosophischer Anthropologie*. Stuttgart: Klett-Kotta.

Richardson, A. W. 1998. *Carnap's Construction of the World. The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism*. Cambridge: University Press.

Stadler, F. 1997. *Studien zum Wiener Kreis. Ursprung, Entwicklung und Wirkung des Logischen Empirismus im Kontext*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

PREDICTIVISM

RICHARD SWINBURNE
Oxford University
Fellow of the British Academy
richard.swinburne@oriel.ox.ac.uk

ABSTRACT. Normally, whether evidence of observation *e* confirms hypothesis *h* relative to background evidence *k* is a matter of the logical relations between *e*, *h*, and *k*, and independent of whether *h* was formulated before or after the discovery of *e*. This is supported by intuitions about various examples from history of science, and fits in with a Bayesian account of confirmation. There are however abnormal cases where the background evidence has a special character, when it does become relevant when *h* was formulated and *k* records that.

„Potrivit ortodoxiei empiriste logice moderne, în a decide dacă ipoteza *h* este confirmată de dovada *e*, şi cât de bine este ea confirmată, trebuie să analizăm doar enunțurile *h* şi *e*, şi relațiile logice dintre ele. Este destul de irelevant dacă *e* a fost cunoscut mai întâi…" a scris Alan Musgrave în 1974. El a denumit „acest punct de cotitură al empirismului logic *abordarea logică a confirmării*", contrastând-o cu abordarea *istorică*, ce susține că ordinea sau circumstanțele descoperirii sau formulării lui *e* sau *h* sunt relevante pentru confirmare. În mod evident, trebuie să adăugăm *k*, cunoaşterea fundamentală pentru ecuație, şi confirmarea, conform abordării logice, va susține că este doar o problemă a relațiilor logice dintre *h*, *e* şi *k*, şi independentă de ordinea sau circumstanțele descoperirii sau formulării variatelor elemente. Dar chiar cu această adăugire evidentă, sugerez că Musgrave a formulat întrucâtva eronat problema. Confirmarea este o măsură a sprijinului dat de dovadă ipotezei, iar singurul lucru ce poate funcționa ca dovadă este ceva cunoscut. Ordinea sau orice din descoperire este în mod clar irelevant pentru confirmare dacă nu este cunoscut, şi atunci ea însăşi va fi un element al dovezii. Confirmarea este, prin urmare, în mod inevitabil

(într-un sens extins), o problemă logică. Disputa este mai curând între cei care analizează că atunci când avem o dovadă e_1 relevantă pentru confirmarea unei ipoteze *h*, adăugarea la e_1 a unei dovezi suplimentare e_2, cu rezultatul că e_1 a fost într-un sens anume o dovadă nouă, descoperită într-un sens ulterior formulării lui *h*, creşte valoarea confirmării, şi cei care cred că e_2 este irelevant. Voi numi cele două viziuni *atemporală*, respectiv *istorică* (sau *predictivistă*). Deoarece susțin că aceste chestiuni pot fi formalizate prin calcul probabilistic şi în particular prin teorema lui Bayes, voi înțelege „confirmarea" în termenii săi. Astfel restricționată, ea poate fi totuşi înțeleasă fie ca „probabilitate" ($P(h/e\&k)$), fie ca o creştere a probabilității în termeni absoluți ($P(h/e\&k) - P(h/k)$) sau ca o creştere proporțională ($P(h/e\&k))/P(h/k)$). În mod evident, rezultatele pentru controversa noastră vor fi aceleaşi, în oricare din aceste moduri înțelegem „confirmarea". O voi înțelege deci pur şi simplu ca „probabilitate". Considerațiile pe care le voi furniza cred că, în mod normal, vor susține înțelegerile confirmării ce nu pot fi axiomatizate în termeni de calcul, pe care le voi numi înțelegeri non-bayesiene, deşi nu voi susține asta direct. Problema se reduce, prin urmare, la faptul dacă ($P(h/e_1\& e_2\&k$) diferă vreodată de ($P(h/e_1\&k$), unde e_2 este dovada noutății lui e_1.

Sunt trei înțelegeri distincte ale noutății lui e_1, şi astfel ale priorității față de aceasta a lui *h*. e_2 ar putea prezenta prioritatea temporală a formulării lui *h* față de descoperirea lui e_1; e_1 este atunci „noutate de întrebuințare". Apoi avem prioritatea psihologică a formulării lui h; e_1 nu este luat în considerare în formularea lui *h* şi astfel e_1 este „nouă temporal". Şi în cele din urmă avem prioritatea epistemică a formulării lui *h*; cândva oamenii nu aveau temeiuri bune oferite de teoriile curente pentru a crede că e_1 va apărea înainte ca *h* să fie pus în discuție. Numesc aceasta „noutatea relativă" a lui e_1 – e_1 este nouă relativ dacă, atunci când ea este destul de probabilă date fiind *h* şi *k*, e foarte improbabilă date fiind teoriile actuale în vogă când *h* a fost formulată. Această „noutate relativă" este o caracteristică

istorică a circumstanțelor descoperii lui e_1 (în ce climat a fost formulat *h*) – pentru a fi distinsă ferm de redusa probabilitate anterioară a lui *e* – $P(e/k)$, sau probabilitatea sa redusă dacă *h* este falsă – $P(e/\sim h\&k)$. Ultimele două valori apar din probabilitatea lui *e* asupra tuturor variatelor ipoteze care ar putea fi sustenabile, evaluate prin probabilitatea lor anterioară – indiferent dacă ele au fost recunoscute sau nu la momentul formulării lui *h*. Dintre aceste trei tipuri de noutate, majoritatea teoreticienilor nu consideră că noutatea temporală este cea relevantă, preferând să folosească fie noutate (de pildă, Worrall [1989]) sau noutate relativă (Musgrave [1974]). Voi numi orice asemenea dovadă de noutate a lui e_1 dovadă a noutății. Ea este o specie a dovezii istorice, în sensul dovezii cu privire la care ipoteze au fost formulate, de către cine, când şi sub ce circumstanțe. Voi susține că pentru dovada noutății normale *k* este irelevant pentru confirmarea lui *h*, dar că pentru o anumită *k* o asemenea e_2 este relevantă.

Prin *k* normală înțeleg că *k* descrie condițiile experimentale în care apare e_1 (nu condițiile în care ea a fost observată) sau dovezi fundamentale cu privire la alte teorii ştiințifice care sunt relevante dacă e_1 confirmă *h*. *k* nu urmează să includă vreo dovadă istorică despre cine formulează *h* sau alte ipoteze, în ce circumstanțe şi care este coeficientul lor de succes.

Iată un exemplu banal în care *k* este normală, iar după mine teoria atemporală este corectă. Fie *h* „toate metalele se dilată atunci când sunt încălzite", fie *k* „1000 de bucăți de metal încălzite", e_1 fie „acele 1000 de bucăți de metal dilatate", fie e_2 o dovadă a noutății astfel încât *h* este pus în discuție înainte ca e_1 să fie cunoscută. *k* şi *h* (dacă sunt adevărate) ar explica-o pe e_1 – metalele dilatate întrucât au fost încălzite, şi întrucât toate metalele se dilată când sunt încălzite (presupun că ultima este o legătură similară unei legi). Teoria atemporală afirmă apoi că $(P(h/e_1\&k) = (P(h/e_1\&e_2\&k)$. Sugerez că simplitatea ipotezei şi capacitatea sa de a explica (dată fiind *k*) o cantitate mare de dovezi este ceea ce o face verosimilă, destul de indepen-

dent de când a fost formulată. Ea este de asemenea destul de independentă de ceea ce a condus pe oricine să formuleze *h*, şi de dacă *e* a fost foarte (im)probabilă, date fiind teoriile la modă în momentul formulării lui *h*. Unele teorii bizare cu fundament astrologic ar fi putut fi la modă atunci (laolaltă cu *k*), prezicând şi explicând pe e_1. Totuşi, acest lucru nu ar face ca e_1 să fie o dovadă mai puțin bună pentru *h*.

În exemplul de mai sus *h* este o ipoteză universală. Teoria atemporală funcționează totodată pentru predicții – dată fiind *k* normală. Dovada observațională este cea tipică pentru predicții, fiind dovadă confirmatoare a ipotezelor universale (sau statistice) a căror predicție este o consecință deductivă (sau inductivă). Fie e_1 şi e_2 ca înainte, fie *k* „1001 de bucăți de metal încălzite”, iar *h* fie „a 1001-a bucată de metal dilatată”. e_1 cu *k* este dovada că „toate metalele se dilata la încălzire, şi astfel a 1001-a bucată de metal se va dilate la încălzire”. *h* îşi derivă probabilitatea din a fi o consecință a unei ipoteze simple capabile să explice o mare cantitate de dovezi, independent de faptul dacă *e* a fost nouă în vreun sens. $(P(h/e_1\&k) = (P(h/e_1\&e_2\&k)$.

În cele ce urmează, prezint observațiile mele asupra acestui exemplu simplu. Acestea sunt şi observațiile mele asupra unor exemple mai sofisticate din viața reală, unde apare sustenabilă condiția mea asupra cunoaşterii fundamentale. Ele sunt, de pildă, observațiile mele cu privire la teoria lui Mendeleev, recent discutată de Maher [1993] din perspectivă istorică şi de Howson şi Franklin [1991] din perspectivă atemporală. Teoria lui Mendeleev (*h*) a implicat şi (dacă este adevărată) a explicat existența şi multe din proprietățile scandiului, galiului şi germaniului (e_1). Teoria lui Mendeleev nu a fost doar orice teorie veche care a avut această consecință; nu a fost doar e_1 plus un *f* nerelaționat. A fost o teorie integrată a grupurilor elementelor relaționate ce au proprietăți analoge ce reapar odată cu creşterea greutății atomice, din care a rezultat existența a aproximativ 60 de elemente deja cunoscute (*k*). În virtutea de a fi o teorie integrată şi astfel simplă în raport cu oricare altă teo-

rie din care a rezultat şi prin care ar putea fi explicată, a fost deja mai probabil să fie adevărată decât oricare altă teorie. Informaţiile suplimentare din care au rezultat celelalte rezultate şi care ar putea fi explicate de aceasta au fost deci, în mod plauzibil, dovezi suplimentare în acest sens independent de când şi cum au fost ele descoperite. Howson şi Franklin compară relaţia teoriei lui Mendeleev cu privire la elementele chimice cu relaţia modalităţii octuple referitor la particulele elementare, iar predicţia celor trei elemente de prima cu predicţia particulei Ω de a doua. Ei ([1991], pp. 579–80) citează un pasaj din Yuval Néeman, unul dintre inventatorii modalităţii octuple în care el realizează totodată comparaţia şi comentează că „importanţa ataşată unei predicţii de success este asociată cu psihologia umană mai curând decât cu metodologia ştiinţifică. Ea nu ar fi fost redusă din caracterul efectiv al modalităţii octuple dacă Ω ar fi fost descoperit înainte ca teoria să fie avansată".

Faptul că teoriile pot ajunge la un nivel foarte ridicat de sprijin pur şi simplu în virtutea capacităţii lor de a explica dovezile deja disponibile este ilustrat de situaţia teoriei newtoniene a mişcării de la sfârşitul secolului al XVII-lea. Ea a fost considerată de foarte mulţi (şi, cu siguranţă, în mod corect) ca fiind foarte probabilă când a fost avansată iniţial. Totuşi, ea nu a făcut predicţii noi testabile imediat, în afară de cele care au fost deja făcute de legi care au fost deja cunoscute şi pe care aceasta le-a explicat (de pildă, legile kepleriene ale mişcării planetare şi legea căderii corpurilor a lui Galilei). Probabilitatea sa ridicată a apărut doar din faptul că este o teorie foarte simplă de nivel înalt din care sunt deductibile acele diverse legi. Observaţiile mele îmi spun că ar fi fost nu mai puţin probabil ca ea să fie adevărată dacă ar fi fost avansată înainte ca legile lui Kepler să fie descoperite şi ar fi fost folosită spre a le prezice.

Deocamdată mă opresc cu observaţiile pe care le am. Dar observaţiile mele intră în conflict cu cele ale predictivistului. Astfel că este necesar să arăt că observaţiile mele sunt compatibile cu o teorie mai extinsă a confirmării pentru care pot fi furnizate alte argumente şi este necesar

să explic de ce predictivistul are tendința de a oferi o explicație eronată a cazurilor similare cu cele pe care le-am amintit. Observațiile mele sunt compatibile cu perspectiva bayesiană completă, în favoarea căreia există desigur şi alte motive bune. Să analizăm primul meu exemplu, în care *h* = „toate metalele se dilată atunci când sunt încălzite”, *k* = „1000 de bucăți de metal încălzite”, e_1 = „acele 1000 de bucăți de metal dilatate”, iar e_2 = „*h* a fost avansat înainte ca e_1 să fie cunoscută”. În teorema lui Bayes,

$$P(h/e_1 \,\&\, k) = \frac{P(e_1/h \,\&\, k)}{P(e_1/k)} P(h/k)$$

şi $$P(h/e_1 \,\&\, e_2 \,\&\, k) = \frac{P(e_1 \,\&\, e_2/h \,\&\, k)}{P(e_1 \,\&\, e_2/k)} P(h/k)$$

Atunci $(P(h/e_1\&e_2\&k)$ va fi doar mai mare decât $(P(h/e_1\&k)$, aşa cum predictivistul afirmă că este, dacă adăugarea lui e_2 la dovadă diminuează $P(e_1/k)$ (şi astfel $P(e_1/\sim h_1\&k)$ printr-o proporție mai mare decât reduce $P(e_1/h\&k)$. Aceasta ar însemna că având simpla informație că 1000 de bucăți de metal sunt încălzite, ar fi mai probabil că ipoteza că toate metalele se dilată la încălzire ar fi fost propusă înainte de a şti că 1000 de bucăți de metal se dilată dacă ipoteza este adevărată, decât dacă ea este falsă. Aşa mi se pare, şi sper că şi predictivistului mediu ea i se pare extrem de implauzibilă. Acelaşi lucru se aplică în cazul în care considerăm e_2 ca „e_1 a fost folosită în formularea lui h_1”. Atunci, un predictivist bayesian este angajat la: având simpla informație că *k* ar fi mai probabilă decât când e_1 este descoperită, e_1 ar fi luată în considerare în formularea lui *h* dacă *h* ar fi adevărată, decât dacă ea nu ar fi astfel. Iar dacă e_2 este „teoriile în vogă la momentul formulării lui *h* ar fi astfel încât e_1 este improbabilă date fiind ele”, predictivistul bayesian este angajat la: ar fi mai probabilă decât când a fost descoperită e_1, teoriile atunci în vogă ar prezice

e_1 dacă *h* ar fi adevărată, decât dacă n-ar fi. Toate acestea sunt din nou extrem de implauzibile. De aici predictivistul îşi poate salva teza abandonând teorema lui Bayes, şi există, sugerez, motive bune spre a nu proceda astfel.

Dar dacă predictivismul este fals, care este sursa tentației de a-l expune? Cred că sunt două surse. Mai întâi există afirmația că orice set de dovezi poate întotdeauna să se adecveze unei teorii, adică pentru orice e_1 şi *k* putem inventa întotdeauna o teorie *h*, astfel încât $P(e/h\&k) = 1$, sau este ridicată. (Într-adevăr, putem întotdeauna inventa un număr infinit de asemenea teorii). Aceasta a părut să sugereze, total eronat, pentru unii, că nu există criterii obiective pentru când o teorie interpretată astfel este sprijinită de dovezi. Dimpotrivă, odată ce avem o ipoteză ce formulează o predicție, putem urmări să vedem dacă predicția se împlineşte şi dacă ea este o chestiune obiectivă clară. Dar de fapt există în mod normal criterii obiective foarte clare pentru când o teorie este sprijinită de un set de dovezi. În exemplul banal cu bucățile de metal pe care l-am prezentat anterior, adecvat la fel de bine dovezii că 1000 de bucăți de metal au fost încălzite şi dilatate, avem h „toate metalele se dilată la încălzire", h^1 „metalele de la 1 la 1000 se dilată la încălzire, iar alte metale nu", şi, presupunând că toate metalele observate până acum au fost analizate de fizicieni din Marea Britanie, h^{11} „Toate şi doar metalele observate de fizicieni din Marea Britanie se dilată la încălzire". Destul de evident, h^1 şi h^{11} nu sunt sprijinite de dovezi, pe când *h* este. Motivul evident pentru aceasta (deşi unii filosofi ai ştiinței s-au trudit să recunoască aceasta) este că *h* e (relativ la dovezi şi rivali posibili logic) o ipoteză simplă, în timp ce h^1 şi h^{11} nu sunt ipoteze simple.

Simplitatea este o problemă a unei ipoteze ce este simplă matematic, postulează puține entități şi tipuri de entități, puține proprietăți şi tipuri de proprietăți (adecvate cunoaşterii fundamentale) şi fiind astfel integrată, şi nu *ad hoc*. Fireşte, este o sarcină filosofică dificilă (nerezolvată încă, după părerea mea) să explicăm pas cu pas, în detaliu, la ce se reduce aceasta. Dar acest lucru nu aruncă vreo îndoială

asupra faptului că acest criteriu funcționează, şi evident aşa stau lucrurile, iar acesta este un criteriu al adevărului (teoriile mai simple, ca atare, sunt mai probabil adevărate). Dacă nu am crede asta, ne-am gândi că, după dovezile amintite, h^1 şi h^{11} ar fi la fel de probabil adevărate ca şi *h*, şi astfel predicțiile lor ar fi la fel de probabil adevărate, ceea ce evident nu credem. Teoriile care „se adecvează mai bine" cunoaşterii fundamentale, cunoaşterea legilor ce operează în câmpurile învecinate, sunt totodată mai probabile spre a fi adevărate. Dar aceasta este astfel finalmente din cauza aceluiaşi criteriu al simplității – teoriile care se adecvează mai bine cunoaşterii fundamentale constituie teorii mai simple pentru suprafața totală (suprafața cea nouă şi câmpurile ce se învecinează) decât o fac teoriile care nu se adecvează bine. Teoriile mai simple, ca atare, au o probabilitate anterioară mai mare. Astfel, de asemenea, precum recunoaşte toată lumea, procedează teoriile cu conținut mai redus (adică teoriile care formulează afirmații din ce în ce mai puțin precise despre lume), dacă h_1 implică h_2, atunci pentru orice *e* şi *k*, $P(h_1/e\&k) \leq P(h_2/ehk)$, şi în mod normal „≤" urmează a fi interpretat ca „<". Cu cât spui mai multe, cu cât te angajezi în mai multe detalii, cu atât este mai probabil să greşeşti.

Astfel, există în general criterii obiective clare pentru când o teorie care se adecvează dovezilor este sprijinită de acestea. Totuşi, nu întotdeauna. Criteriile noastre nu sunt atât de stricte, iar unii oameni de ştiință înțeleg simplitatea puțin diferit de alții. Iar în asemenea cazuri, ipoteze rivale sunt la fel de bine susținute de dovezi (sau, chiar dacă una este susținută mai bine, nu este evident că aşa se întâmplă). Dar acest şir dezordonat de neclaritate este necesar să nu arunce vreo îndoială asupra principalului aspect că nu toate dovezile pot fi susținute de o ipoteză suficient de simplă pentru ca dovezile să o sprijine. Există într-adevăr texte obiective pentru care dintre cele două teorii este susținută de dovezi anterioare, care de obicei oferă rezultate clare. Şi predicții particulare e posibil să nu

ofere rezultate precise – ele pot distinge între multe teorii, dar nu pot discrimina toate teoriile (doar un număr infinit de predicții ar putea face asta).

Aceste aspecte despre afirmații mai precise ce au o astfel de probabilitate anterioară mai redusă şi teorii mai simple ce au o asemenea probabilitate anterioară mai ridicată explică observații predictiviste despre un alt tip de exemplu pe care ele îl aduc uneori, unde observații ulterioare pot fie completa detaliile unei teorii existente sau să fie prezise de o teorie existentă. Aici, spun ele, predicția este o dovadă mai bună pentru adevăr decât adecvarea. Avem o teorie h_1 cu un parametru variabil. e_1 este observată. h_1 va fi sustenabilă ddacă acel parametru are o anumită valoare. Dat fiind acel parametru, valoarea în cauză o transformă pe h_1 într-o ipoteză mai precisă h_2. Să punem în contrast aceasta cu o altă ipoteză la fel de precisă h_3 formulată înainte ca e_1 să fie observată, care prezice cu succes pe e_1. Atunci, spune predictivistul, $P(h_3/e_1\&k) > P(h_2/e_1\&k)$. Dar, presupunând $P(e_1/h_3\&k) = P(e_1/h_2\&k)$, aşa stau lucrurile, dacă înainte ca e_1 să fie observată, spune bayesianul, $P(h_3/k) > P(h_2/k)$. Aşa ar sta lucrurile dacă $P(h_3/k) = P(h_1/k)$, întrucât cea mai detaliată completare a lui h_1 va produce o teorie cu probabilitate anterioară mai redusă. Şi asta este ceea ce predictivistul a presupus în exemplul lui – că realmente nu există nimic de ales între h_1 şi h_3 înainte ca e_1 să fie observată (de pildă, deoarece deşi h_3 este mai precisă decât h_1, ea este totodată mai simplă). Dar în acest caz cu siguranță h_3 va fi mai bine confirmată de e_1 decât h_2, din motive care nu au nimic de-a face cu noutatea lui e. Dar dacă, pentru început, $P(h_1/k) > P(h_3/k)$, nu există vreun motiv să începem cu observațiile predictivistului despre acest exemplu.

Cea de-a doua sursă a predictivismului, în viziunea mea, este aceasta. O ipoteză h care implică (pentru anumite circumstanțe k) apariția unui eveniment e, are o probabilitate crescută de e, cu atât e mai puțin probabil ca e să apară dacă h nu ar fi adevărată, cu atât mai redus este $P(e/\sim h\&k)$ şi astfel $P(e/k)$ este mai redus. Dacă am formulat

deja h_1, ştim pe care e să o căutăm, care va avea această caracteristică a lui $P(e/h\&k) = 1$ şi $P(e_1/{\sim}h\&k)$ foarte redusă. Putem determina k şi astfel să vedem dacă ~e sau e apar, iar aceasta va furniza un „test sever" al teoriei. Dacă formulăm h după ce acumulăm dovezi, putem avea sau nu printre acele dovezi o e cu acea caracteristică, dar este mult mai probabil să o avem dacă o căutăm realmente. De aici, realizarea ipotezelor şi apoi testarea lor poate fi într-adevăr un mod mai bun de a obține dovezi care (dacă sunt adevărate) le susțin pregnant, decât să încerci a le adecva dovezilor pe care deja le avem. Dar acest lucru nu tinde să arunce îndoieli asupra faptului că pentru o dovadă dată e, $P(h/e\&k)$ are o valoare independent de când a fost descoperită e. Există întotdeauna, este adevărat, tentația pentru cel care realizează adecvarea să includă printre dovezile sale doar pe cea care ipoteza îl conduce să o aştepte. Dar probabilitatea care s-ar cuveni să ghideze acțiunea e cea relativă la dovezile totale disponibile, toate dovezile relevante ar trebui luate în considerare, iar asta va include dovezi despre orice metode folosite pentru a obține alte dovezi (de pildă, oprirea opțională, precum încetarea de a trage la sorți cu ajutorul banului când proporția de avers în raport cu reversul ajunge la o valoare preferată). Această a doua sursă de predictivism este criteriul „testului sever", pe care Mayo [1991], printre alții, l-a văzut în mod corect ca stând în spatele solicitării de dovezi noi, dar, aşa cum a susținut ea, dovezile noi nu sunt sub nicio formă nici necesare, nici suficiente pentru severitatea testelor.

Afirmația mea că dovada nouă e_2 este irelevantă pentru confirmare şi explicația mea de ce unii teoreticieni au gândit altfel doar sunt presupuse a se aplica în tipurile normale ale cazului. Acestea sunt cazurile în care dovada fundamentală k este cea normală despre circumstanțele apariției lui e_1 (şi nu circumstanțele în care ea a fost observată) şi dovada despre valoarea altor teorii ştiințifice relevante cu privire la faptul dacă e_1 confirmă h. Dar afirmația mea nu este sustenabilă pentru orice k şi ar fi foarte neobişnuit să presupunem că ar fi, întrucât pentru orice do-

vadă şi pentru orice ipoteză, există întotdeauna dovezi fundamentale care o fac pe prima relevantă în raport cu a doua. În particular, afirmația mea nu este sustenabilă în multe cazuri în care *k* prezintă dovezi de un tip istoric, a cărei capacitate (laolaltă cu e_1 şi e_2) este de a indica faptul că cineva are acces la dovada relevantă pentru *h* care nu este disponibilă public.

Iată un exemplu în care *k* este dovadă a acestui tip istoric. Fie *h marea teorie unificată a câmpului*, iar e_1 o consecință observată rezultată din aceasta. Fie *k* astfel încât *h* să fie formulată de Hawks, care întotdeauna îşi avansează teoriile după asamblarea multor elemente ale dovezii observaționale pe care nu le dezvăluie publicului, şi care (câtă vreme, ulterioară formulării, ele fac o nouă predicție adevărată) sunt întotdeauna confirmate ulterior şi niciodată falsificate. Atunci, desigur, dovada că o consecință a teoriei a fost observată ulterior formulării sale măreşte confirmarea sa. $P(h/e_1\&k) < P(h/e_1\&e_2\&k)$. Sau, un alt exemplu, fie *h* o teorie despre ordinea cărților de joc într-un pachet, fie e_1 faptul că pachetul a fost amestecat de binecunoscutul trişor Jones, iar *k* că *h* a fost propusă de un trişor rival, Smith, care pariază pe *h*. Deoarece Smith este mai probabil să cunoască ordinea cărților după ce au fost amestecate decât înainte (întrucât dacă pariul este pus înainte de amestecarea cărților, Jones va încerca să le aranjeze într-o altă ordine decât *h*), $P(h/e_1\&e_2\&k) > P(h/e_1\&k)$. În ambele exemple, dovada istorică este cea care (laolaltă cu e_1 şi e_2) arată că cineva ştie mai multe decât *h*, decât doar e_1; ele au dovezi care nu sunt accesibile publicului, iar pentru acest motiv trebuie să avem încredere în ele (sau, pentru un *k* anume, nu trebuie să avem încredere în ele).

În lumina tuturor acestor considerații, să ne întoarcem la exemplul avansat de Maher în apărarea predictivismului:

> Ne imaginăm un experiment în care o monedă este aruncată de 99 de ori şi o persoană care înregistrează când moneda a ajuns pe avers sau revers la fiecare aruncare. Moneda pare normală, iar seria de aruncări pare întâmplătoare. Persoanei respective i se cere acum să anunțe

rezultatul primelor aruncări ale monedei. Subiectul răspunde prin parcurgerea rezultatelor primelor 99 de aruncări ale monedei, şi adaugă că a 100-a aruncare va fi avers. Presupunând că nu s-au făcut greşeli în înregistrarea aruncărilor observate, probabilitatea ca subiectul să aibă dreptate în legătură cu aceste aruncări este egală cu probabilitatea ca ultima monedă să fie avers. Toată lumea pare să cadă de acord că probabilitatea va fi de ½.

Acum să modificăm uşor situaţia. Aici unei persoane i se cere să prezică rezultatele a 100 de aruncări ale monedei. Persoana răspunde cu o serie aparent întâmplătoare de aversuri şi reversuri. Moneda este aruncată de 99 de ori, iar aceste aruncări sunt exact cum a prezis persoana în cauză. Moneda urmează a fi aruncată acum pentru a 100-a oară, iar persoana respectivă a prezis că în urma acestei aruncări moneda va ajunge pe sol cu aversul deasupra. În acest moment, probabilitatea ca subiectul să aibă dreptate cu privire la toate cele 100 de aruncări este din nou egală cu probabilitatea ca a 100-a aruncare să fie avers. Dar în acest caz toată lumea pare să cadă de acord că îi vor da o probabilitate apropiată de 1.

Diferenţa dintre cele două situaţii este că în prima subiectul a adecvat informaţiile cu privire la primele 99 de aruncări, în timp ce în a doua informaţiile au fost prezise. În mod clar, motivul pentru atitudinea noastră diferită în cele două situaţii este că predicţia încununată cu succes constituie o dovadă puternică că subiectul are o metodă de încredere în a prezice aruncările monedei, în timp ce adecvarea încununată de succes nu oferă vreun motiv să credem că subiectul are o metodă demnă de încredere de a prezice aruncările monedei. (Maher [1993], p. 330)

Fie e_1 rezultatele primelor 99 de aruncări, h fie e_1 plus judecata că aversul va apărea la a 100-a aruncare, e_2 fie că h a fost formulat înainte ca e_1 să fie observat, iar k fie o descriere a unei structuri „în care moneda pare normală, iar seria de aruncări apare la întâmplare”. k va trebui totodată să includă informaţia că h este singura (sau aproape singura) ipoteză formulată, întrucât aşa cum subliniază Howson şi Franklin ([1991], p. 577), dacă toate ipotezele posibile au fost formulate, exemplul nu va funcţiona. h ar fi nu mai puţin probabil adevărată decât ipoteza alcătuită din e_1 plus judecata că reversul va apărea la a 100-a aruncare. Faptul că cineva a ghicit numerele de la loterie nu este un motiv pentru a presupune că va ghici numerele data viitoare, când cu această ocazie încununată de succes

toate numerele posibile au fost ghicite de o persoană sau de alta.

Totuşi, dată fiind *k* precum mai sus, afirmă Maher, „toată lumea pare a fi de acord că" $P(h/e_1\&e_2\&k)$ este apropiată de 1. Toată lumea are dreptate asupra acestui aspect. Totuşi, susține de asemenea Maher, „toată lumea pare a fi de acord" că $P(h/e_1\& \sim e_2\&k)$ este cam ½. De aici, va rezulta că $P(h/e_1\&e_2\&k) > P(h/e_1\&k)$, şi astfel dovezile istorice măresc confirmarea. Dar dacă „toată lumea cade de acord" cu ultima, este chiar posibil ca ele să fie fost măsluite. Întâmplarea aparentă nu poate fi realmente întâmplare. E posibil să existe un model de regularitate în primele 99 de aruncări pe care subiectul ce l-a avansat pe *h* l-a observat. Atunci $P(h/e_1\&k)$ va fi totodată apropiată de 1 (chiar dacă majoritatea dintre noi sunt prea neghiobi să sesizeze asta), iar informația istorică e_2 este irelevantă.

Dar să presupunem că nu există un model în aruncări. În acest caz, ceea ce „toată lumea cade de acord" că sunt probabilitățile este corect. Astfel, întrebăm de ce $P(h/e_1\&e_2\&k)$ este aproape de 1. Răspunsul este că *k* include informații istorice după care *h* a fost singura ipoteză avansată. Aceasta, laolaltă cu e_1 şi e_2 – faptul că predicțiile sale au fost atât de clare – este o dovadă foarte puternică potrivit căreia cel care formulează ipoteza are acces la informații cu privire la tendința din structură pe care noi nu le avem (fie prin unele dovezi observabile public sau prin unele intuiții private – poate că el are capacități de telekinezie). Aceasta pentru motivul, oferit de Howson [1988], pp. 383–384, după care $(e_1\&e_2\&k)$ ar fi foarte improbabilă dacă cel care formulează ipoteza nu ar deține această informație. Adică, avem încredere în această predicție datorită celor care au făcut-o, şi nu ținând cont de când a fost ea formulată. Că aceasta este explicația corectă a ceea ce se întâmplă aici poate fi văzut din faptul că presupunând că adăugăm la *k* dovezi irefutabile după care cel care formulează ipoteze nu are informații private, atunci trebuie să conchidem că predicția sa corectă a primelor 99 de aruncări a fost doar o ghicire norocoasă şi nu oferă vreun temei spre

a presupune că el va avea dreptate data viitoare. Concluzionez că dacă *k* nu include totodată dovezi istorice, simpla dovadă a noutății oferită de e_2 nu influențează probabilitatea unei ipoteze. În acest caz unde se arată dovada istorică, informații private constituie „metoda" prin care ipoteza este generată cu vreo importanță pentru probabilitatea sa. Maher ([1993], p. 335) afirmă că „introducerea conceptului unei metode este principala inovație conceptuală în explicația mea a valorii predicției". În general metoda prin care ipoteza a fost generată este irelevantă față de probabilitatea asupra dovezii. Fie că teoria lui Mendeleev a fost generată „prin metoda de a căuta modele în elemente", fie că nu, probabilitatea sa depinde de faptul dacă ea postulează *realmente* modele, nu cum s-a ajuns la aceasta. Teoria lui Kekule a inelului de benzen nu este nici mai mult, nici mai puțin probabilă asupra dovezilor sale întrucât i-a apărut lui Kekule într-un vis. Doar dacă dovezile sugerează că cineva are informații private devine important dacă ipoteza a fost generată după analizarea acelor informații. Atunci, dat fiind că (şi doar dat fiind că) avem motive să credem că cel care formulează ipoteza este un specialist în matematică acceptabil şi interesat să formuleze teorii corecte, ea a fost produsă prin orice metodă a avut succes până acum în privința relevanței. Dovezile cu privire la cum s-a produs o teorie sunt unele indirecte cu privire la dacă dovezile nepublice erau verosimile. Dar dacă avem dovezi pentru noi înşine, putem ignora toate acestea.

REFERINȚE BIBLIOGRAFICE

Howson, C., (1989), "Accommodation, Prediction, and Bayesian Confirmation Theory", în *Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings*, 2, pp. 381–392.

Howson, C. • Franklin, A., (1991), "Maher, Mendeleev, and Bayesiansim", în *Philosophy of Science*, 58, pp. 574–585.

Maher, P., (1993), "Discussion: Howson and Franklin on Prediction", în *Philosophy of Science*, 60, pp. 329–340.

Mayo, D.G., (1991), "Novel Evidence and Severe Tests", în *Philosophy of Science*, 58, pp. 523–552.

Musgrave, A., (1974), “Logical versus Historical Theories of Confirmation”, in *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 25, pp. 1–23.

Worrall, J., (1989), “Fresnel, Poisson, and the White Spot: The Role of Successful Predictions in the Acceptance of Scientific Theories”, în Gooding, D., (et al.), *The Uses of Experiment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SENSES OF COMPOSITIONALITY AND COMPOSITIONALITY OF SENSES

•

Dummett and Geach on the Sense of a Predicate

CHENG-CHIH TSAI
Aletheia University
cctsai@ntu.edu.tw

ABSTRACT. In *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics*, Dummett argues at length that Geach has been wrong in taking the *sense of a predicate* to be a function that sends the sense of a proper name to that of a sentence, and claims that it should instead be a means to determine the referent of the predicate, as is suggested by Frege's sense-determines-reference (SDR) principle. This disagreement between Dummett and Geach calls for a serious investigation into two of Frege's sense-related principles, namely the Compositionality thesis and the SDR thesis. By making precise both theses in terms of supervenience, we pin down a preferable sense of compositionality for senses, and resolve the debate in question.

Introduction

As remarked in Heim & Kratzer (1999), "Frege's work in the last nineteenth century marked the beginning of both symbolic logic and the formal semantics of natural language", and "Frege's idea on the semantic composition of sentences is and remains to be the guiding principle of the two subjects". However, fruitful as it might be, what exactly does the principle of compositionality say?

In Szabó (2000a), we are drawn to the interesting fact that in Gamut (1991a,b) there can be found at least four formulations[1] of 'the principle of compositionality', and none except one, according to Szabó, of which is, even after some revision, equivalent to the following commonly held principle

Compositionality Thesis: The meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its constituents and by its structure.

The fact that 'Gamut' fails to distinguish the four principles so as to put them all under the same heading "principle of compositionality" alone reflects the subtlety of the notion of compositionality. Moreover, the grasping of Frege's principle of compositionality (for sense and for reference respectively) is often further complicated by the following important principle of Frege:

SDR Thesis: Given how the world is, sense determines reference[2].

As remarked in Dummett (1991), "the principle … that sense determines reference, is one not always clearly held in mind, even by those with a deep insight into Frege's theory of meaning".

The intertwining complexity of these two principles is so great that, led by these two principles, Dummett and Geach even had a debate over a seemly elementary question – what after all is the sense of a predicate?

As both the Compositionality Thesis and the SDR Thesis involve a notion of 'determination', we shall in the next section, following the spirit of Szabó (2000a), make precise this notion in terms of supervenience, which, when applied to the sense-reference case, yields the SDR Thesis; and when applied to the parts-whole case, yields the Compositionality Thesis. In Section 2 we proceed to distinguish some versions of the Compositionality Thesis, and then, in Section 3, pin down a preferable Principle of Compositionality of Senses. In Section 4, the result is applied to resolve the debate between Dummett and Geach over what the sense of a predicate is.

1. Determination in terms of supervenience

We begin by recalling some opinions concerning the principle that sense determines reference. Two well-known problems that the Millian view of proper names[3] confronts, namely the identity-statement problem[4] and the opaque-context problem[5], drove Frege to propose that, a proper name has, in additional to a referent[6], a sense[7]. Sense and reference need to be distinguished as, on the one hand, to know the reference of an expression is to know more than its sense, and, on the other hand, to know the sense of an expression is to know more than its reference. In despite of this seemingly puzzling feature of the interrelation between sense and reference, Frege maintained that sense 'determines' reference. According to Dummett, the determination goes as follows[8],

> The sense of an expression determines its reference, inasmuch as its reference follows from its sense, taken *together with* relevant facts about extra-linguistic reality. (italic mine)

Note that in this Fregean sense of 'determination', neither the knowledge of the sense of an expression guarantees the knowledge of its reference, nor the other way around, as we have already mentioned.

However, it is surely ironic to say that '*S* determines *R* but we still have to consult *W* to see what her opinion is '. If *W* can also play a role in altering *R* then in what sense do we say *S* 'determines' *R*? We prefer to stick to a notion of determination that admits no qualification, even though people may not always use the phrase this way. For instance, in saying that *sense* 'determines' reference, what Frege actually has in mind is that *sense together with the state of the world* 'determine' (in our sense) reference. However, as firstly it is confusing to have two notions of determination hanging around in a paper, and secondly it is unrealistic to require Fregean scholars to refrain from using Frege's sense of 'determination', we shall rephrase our notion of determination in terms of supervenience[9].

For features *A* and *B*, our notion of '*B* determines *A*', will be rephrased as '*A* supervenes on *B*', where the latter just means that any difference in *A* implies a difference in *B*. In particular, the SDR Thesis becomes 'the referent of an expression supervenes on the sense of the expression and the state of the world', and the Compositionality Thesis can be made slightly more precise to be 'the meaning of a complex expression supervenes on the meaning of its constituents and its structure'.

2. Senses of compositionality

Given the sharp sense/reference distinction at our disposal, it would indeed be unimaginable not to distinguish between the compositionality of senses and the compositionality of referents. Let us start with two distinct principles discussed in Dummett (1991)[10], concerning the compositionality of senses and that of referents respectively,

> The sense of an expression is composed of the senses of its constituents[11].

> The referent of an expression is composed of the referents of its constituents.

As to what "is composed of" actually means, Dummett has the following to say[12]:

> To say that the sense of the whole is compounded out of the senses of the parts is to say, first, that we understand the complex expression as having the sense it does by understanding its parts and the way they are put together, and, secondly, that we could not grasp that sense without conceiving of it as having just that complexity[13].

The first thesis of compositionality is easy to come by, and there is indeed a general agreement to its acceptance (accepted by 'almost everyone', according to Dummett), while the second sense of compositionality is a more demanding one, as Dummett emphasizes:

The second of these two constituent theses is a very strong one. It is, in my view, correct; but it needs a very deep argument to support it, or, indeed, to refute it.

The two theses outlined here are, on the face of it, about senses, but they can be easily generalized to be theses about compositionality of other things as well. We shall now study the phenomena of forming the whole from the parts, with in mind two special cases that shall be of concern to us later, namely the compositionality of senses and that of referents.

Let us begin with two independent theses of compositionality.

P-to-W Thesis
The *S*-feature of the whole supervenes on the *S*-features of the parts together with the way they are put together.

W-to-P Thesis
The *S*-features of the parts and the way they are put together supervene on the *S*-feature of the whole.

Roughly speaking, the first thesis says that the grasping of the *S*-feature of the parts and their relational structure is sufficient for the grasping of the *S*-feature of the whole, while the second says that the grasping of the *S*-features of the parts and their relational structure is necessary for the grasping of the *S*-feature of the whole, and the two are the converse of each other. It is certainly possible that one can accept one of the two theses without accepting the other. Thus concerning the acceptance of these two theses, we have altogether *four* possible positions, namely, accepting both, rejecting both, accepting the first but not the second, and the other way around. The compositionality of linguistic expressions is a typical example for which both theses hold.

As few people challenge the P-to-W thesis for the compositionality of referents and that for senses, we shall

be concerned with only two senses of compositionality: the *weak* sense of compositionality is one that accepts only the P-to-W thesis, while the *strong* sense of compositionality is one that accepts *both* P-to-W and W-to-P theses.

To get from the weak thesis to the strong thesis, one asks whether, after the process of composition, the *A* of the whole contains as its parts the *A*'s of the parts and the way the parts are put together. Examples that fall short of the strong thesis are easy to come by. The color of a chemical compound clearly does not contain the colors of its constituent elements as its parts. Neither does the truth value of a compound sentence contain the truth values of the atomic sentences as its parts. Furthermore, the referent of "the capital of Sweden", namely the city of Stockholm, does not contain the referent of "Sweden", that is Sweden itself, as a part[14], and thus we settle for the following weak thesis for referents.

Compositionality of Referents: The referent of an expression supervenes on the referents of its constituents together with the way they are put together[15].

3. The compositionality of senses

Let's now turn to the compositionality of senses. I think Dummett is quite right, when commenting on the W-to-P thesis, in saying that "It is, in my view, correct; but it needs a very deep argument to support it, or, indeed, to refute it". However, I shall not be giving a 'very deep argument to support it' here. Instead, I think such an argument is possible only after we know what the compositionality of senses says precisely.

To make precise a thesis of compositionality for senses, it is essential to specify what the phrase "the way they are put together" means. The simplest way to make it precise is to say that it simply means the linear ordering of the constituents of the expression. However, unless there is indeed a syntactic-semantic one-one correspondence as

hypothesized by linguists such as Jacobson[16], this naïve reading is doomed to failure. I think, rather, what is called for here is a '*sense* of the surface structure' of an expression that a competent speaker grasps, which allows him/her to get the sense of a complex expression from that of its constituents. We shall term this 'sense of surface structure' the *phrase structure* of the expression.[17] A typical example of such a phrase structure is a phrase structure tree with the type of each of its nodes specified.

We now sum up our compositionality of senses, in the vein of Dummett, as follows:

Compositionality of Senses: The sense of an expression supervenes on the senses of its constituents together with the phrase structure of the expression and vice versa.[18]

Now we shall look at four criticisms that are likely to be brought up against this compositionality thesis for senses.

Firstly, one may claim that the thesis above is too strong, and this claim is supported by the fact that, though we normally understand "*reductio ad absurdum*" via grasping the senses of "*reductio*", "*ad*", "*absurdum*" and the way they are put together, it is possible that someone understanding no Latin may grasp its sense through a translation of it as a whole into his naïve language. The case of idioms poses similar threats. I consent that natural languages do admit such non-compositional instances. However, they can be regarded as merely anomalies to a language – ideally the function of a language respects the strong sense of compositionality.

Secondly, one may claim that it is not strong enough, and this claim is supported by the fact that one can, as suggested in Szabó (2000), imagine the existence of a language Crypto-English that interchanges the sense of synonyms of "Elephants are gray" and the sense of synonyms of "Julius Caesar was murdered on the ides of March", and the Compositionality Thesis seems to work for Crypto-En-

glish still, yet we would not normally think the language thus constructed is compositional[19].

How then are we to account for the fact that Crypto-English is *not* compositional? The answer lies in a more accurate interpretation of a 'phrase structure'. Recall that the reference of the pronoun "they" in the phrase "the way they are put together" is in need of clarification. The surprising fact is that "they" should neither co-refer with the "constituents" themselves, nor co-refer with the "senses of its constituents" as suggested by Szabó, but rather refer to the 'semantic types' of the constituents. In other words, a *phrase structure* merely tells us how the *semantic types* of the constituents are to be put together to yield a semantic type for the whole, rather than how the *senses* of the constituents are to be put together to yield a sense for the whole. It is a phrase structure *plus* the senses of its constituents that determine the sense of a compound expression. In this way, once we know the senses of "Elephants", "are" and "gray" and the phrase structure of "Elephants are gray" the sense of this compound expression is fixed and thus Crypto-English is *not* compositional.

Thirdly, the ambiguity of syntactical structure is alleged to be a threat to the Compositionality Thesis. Given a complex expression, there may not exist a unique function that sends the senses of the constituents to that of the expression. If there simply does not exist such a function, then we are encountering an ungrammatical expression, and there is no problem for that at all. If, on the other hand, there are more than one such functions, then we are encountering an ambiguous expression. Then, on the face of it, the senses of the constituents and the way they are put together *do not* determine the sense of the expression. Consider, for example, the expression "Japanese car dealer". However, as we have stressed, it is not 'the way that the *expressions* of the constituents are put together' (i.e. the surface structure) that we call for to determine a function from senses of the constituents to the sense of the whole, but rather 'the way that the *semantic types* of the

constituents are put together' (i.e. the phrase structure --- a *sense* of the surface structure). And if there are two possible phrase structures for an expression, let there be.

Finally, according to our version of compositionality, if in the expression $a_1a_2…a_i…a_n$ we replace the constituent a_i by a b_i that has the same sense as a_i, then, the sense of $a_1a_2…b_i…a_n$ should be identical to that of $a_1a_2…a_i…a_n$, as a_i and b_i, having the same sense (and thus the same semantic type), are virtually indistinguishable to the function determined by the phrase structure. Then how are we to explain the following challenge for the substitution principle due to Szabó: the phrases "is not related" and "is unrelated" presumably have the same sense, yet "John is not related to everybody" and "John is unrelated to everybody" apparently have different senses? Szabó's position was that the substitution *does* affect the structure of the sentence, but the failure of the substitution principle *does not* shake his compositionality principle (recall his substitution principle does not follow from his compositionality principle).

However, I claim that our Compositionality of Senses is unharmed by Szabó's example as well. First, despite that "is not related" and "is unrelated" *seemly* have the same sense, they, according to our version of compositionality, *do not* have the same sense, because evidently they have different *phrase structures*, and their respective phrase structures play an important role in determining the phrase structure of the resulting expression in which they appears. To be more precise, if the compositionality principle of senses is indeed in the strong sense, then, the sense of "is not related" would contain the senses of "is", "not", and "related" and a phrase structure as proper parts; while the sense of 'is unrelated' would contain that of "is" and "unrelated" and a phrase structure as proper parts. Thus Szabó's challenge can not start off from the very beginning --- "is not related" and "is unrelated" simply do not have the same sense as he suggests.

Second, one may suggest that, as the compositionality for referents holds only weakly, the referents of "is not

related" and "is unrelated" may not contain their respective phrase structures as proper parts, thus are indistinguishable, and therefore the substitution principle fails for referents at least. This, however, is not the case. By definition, the referents of "is not related" and "is unrelated" are two complicated functions that, together with the referents of some other phrases, such as that of "John" and "to everybody", and a phrase structure prescribing a relation between the semantic types of the phrases in concern, such as that of "John is not related to everybody" and "John is unrelated to everybody", yield for us a truth value. Now, if the is not related and is unrelated in question are of different semantic types[20], then the alleged threat to the substitution principle could not get off the ground in the first place; and if, on the other hand, they are of the same semantic type, then as the truth values determined by the two functions are likely to differ, the referents of "is not related" and "is unrelated" are not the same.

The fact that, when composed with "to everybody", the expression "is not related" encourages a quantifying-in-situ reading, while the expression "is unrelated", on the other hand, encourages a quantifier-raising reading, may indeed be annoying for non-competent speakers of English, but preferring one phrase structure over the others for a sentence that admits two or more possible phrase structure readings, does nothing to harm our compositionality principle. The compositionality principle may indeed grant the philosopher a couple of possible compositional readings, yet it is the business of the linguist, or the competent speaker, to choose from among them a preferred reading.

4. Dummett and Geach on the sense of a predicate

Now we are in a position to see what the debate between Dummett and Geach over the sense of a predicate is all about. In Chapter 6 of Dummett (1991), in the middle of a systematic sketch of the requirements for a meaning-theory, Dummett, somehow abruptly, begins his chapter on

"truth and meaning-theories" with his disagreement with Geach over what the sense of a predicate is. This lengthy discussion (pp.141-148) on the sense of a predicate can be regarded as a gateway toward a deeper reflection on the compositionality of senses.

Both Geach and Dummett acknowledge that there are works of Frege in which one finds that Frege asserts both that "the referent of an expression is composed of the referents of its constituents" and "the sense of an expression is composed of the senses of its constituents". They agree also on how "is composed of" is to be conceived -- they both understand compositionality in the strong sense that we define in the last section. Furthermore, both authors accept that the referent of a compound expression *does not* necessarily contain the referents of its constituents as parts, as is illustrated in example of "the capital of Sweden". Thus, Frege's assertion of "the referent of an expression is composed of the referents of its constituents" (understood in the strong sense) is simply wrong. As Frege himself later retracted the assertion above, the compositionality of referents in the strong sense can be regarded as but a blunder of Frege. So far listed are what Geach and Dumment agree upon.

We shall now see how different exegeses of Frege's more frequent assertion of the compositionality of senses have led Geach and Dummett to different interpretations of the sense of a predicate, or, rather, how different interpretations of the latter have led them to different exegeses of Frege.

Firstly, Geach regards the sense of a predicate as a function from the sense of a name to the sense of the sentence formed by inserting that name into the argument-place of the predicate. As the value of a function usually does not contain its argument as a part, Geach finds his conception incompatible with Frege's assertion of the compositionality of senses. He has to make a decision as to 'which is to go'. His own strong belief on what the sense of a predicate ought to be and the fact that Frege did have the

record of retracting his assertion on the compositionality of referents make Geach go for the easy option: regarding Frege's assertion on the compositionality of senses as a parallel blunder to that of referents, i.e. understanding the compositionality of senses in the weak sense. By doing so, Geach manages to keep his conception of the sense of a predicate unharmed.

Dummett, on the other hand, does not think Frege, who knows the distinction of sense and reference so well, is liable to have such a parallel blunder. He maintains that Frege's thesis on the compositionality of sense should not be given up. He reminds us however that the sense of predicate should comply with Frege's SDR Thesis as well. As the sense of a proper name is a means to determine its referent, and the sense of a sentence is a means to determine its truth value, the sense of a predicate, according to Dummett, has also to be a means to determine the referent of the predicate, namely a function from objects to truth values. He thinks that the incompleteness of the sense of a predicate that Frege perceives lies in the incompleteness of the referent rather than in its being a function between senses.

Dummett's criticism of Geach's view has two ingredients. One is that Geach's conception[21] violates Frege's thesis on the compositionality of senses. The other is that Geach's sense of a predicate is insufficient to provide us with a means to determine the referent of the predicate, which violates Frege's SDR Thesis.

Now these two philosophers disagree with each other. One holds that the sense of a predicate is a means to determine a function (Dummett), while the other holds that it is rather a function between senses (Geach). Who is right?

Strictly speaking, they are both wrong, because the 'sense of an expression', among other things, can by no means be identified with a particular functional role that it is capable of playing. A kettle can be employed to boil water, but it can also be used merely as a container for water. Given a context, a kettle can be said to be a water boiler;

while given another, a water container, but it should neither be identified with the former nor the latter. One can easily, by describing in terms of supervenience two essential functional roles that the sense of a predicate can play, reject the temptation to 'identify' this sophisticate entity with one of its functional roles.

Charitably interpreted, however, Geach and Dummett can both be right -- the two conceptions are by no means contradictory. After all, on what basis can we say that a means to determine a function from individuals to truth values necessarily cannot play the role of a function from senses of names to senses of sentences? Nothing prevents a sense of an expression to have two functional roles at a time (for instance, the sense of "*x* stammers" can, according to Geach, given a presumed phrase structure, map the sense of Mrs. Thatcher, say, to the thought that Mrs. Thatcher stammers, while, according to Dummett, determines, given a world, a function that maps peoples to truth values).

Why, then, do they disagree with each other? I think it is something they wrongly agree upon that gives them the false impression that the compositionality of senses is ever threatened, and which consequently leads Dummett to deny Geach's conception that the sense of a predicate is a function, and also leads Geach to maintain his position by interpreting the compositionality of senses in the weak sense. To be more precise, they both subscribe to the following entailment:

The value [the referent of "the capital of Sweden"] of the function ["the capital of"—function] does not contain the argument [the referent of "Sweden"] as a part,

therefore

The value [the sense of "Mrs. Thatcher stammers"] of the function [the "x stammers"—function] does not contain the argument [the sense of "Mrs. Thatcher"] as a part.

The following two passages from Dummett (1991) clearly illustrate this attitude:

> Geach concludes that we should regard the sense of a predicate as a function mapping senses of names onto thoughts (senses of sentences) …Geach recognizes that it is inconsistent with Frege's principle that the sense of a complex expression, including a sentence, is composed of the senses of the component parts of that expression. If the sense of '*x* shines' is a function which maps the sense of the phrase 'the sun' onto the thought that the sun shines, then that thought no more contains the sense of 'the sun' as a part than Stockholm contains Sweden as a part.[22]

and

> If Geach's interpretation were right, there would indeed be no more reason to say, with Frege, that the sense of the predicate was a constituent of the sense of the sentence in which it occurs than to say that the function which is the referent of the expression 'the capital of *x*' is a constituent of Stockholm; the function maps Sweden onto Stockholm but is no more a part of Stockholm than Sweden is, and so it is with the function that maps the sense of the name 'Mrs. Thatcher' onto the sense of the sentence 'Mrs. Thatcher stammers'..[23]

Indeed the capital of Sweden does not contain Sweden as a part, but this is by no means a general phenomenon for a function. For instance, the expression *P* can, in addition to being an expression, be seen as a function from *a* to *Pa*, and yet the strong thesis of compositionality for expressions remains true. Therefore, Dummett's first objection fails: the fact that the sense of a predicate is a function does not itself violate Frege's principle on the compositionality of senses.

As to Dummett's second objection[24] that Geach's function in general is unable to provide us with a means to determine the referent of a predicate, one can certainly try to spell out a determination process. One naïve trial is as follows: We are given the sense of a predicate *F* and a world, and we want to determine the referent (or extension) of *F*. Now, given an object of the world, we can assign a name, say *a*, to it. Then we can, by applying the predicate *F*, to it, obtain a sentence *Fa*. As the sense of F maps the

sense s(*a*) of *a* to the sense s(*Fa*) of *Fa*, while, s(*a*) determines the referent r(*a*) of *a*, i.e. the object we start with, and s(*Pa*) determines the truth value r(*Fa*) of *Fa*, which is either *true* or *false*, we obtain a pairing of the object with a truth value. Let the extension of *F* be the set of objects that are paired with the truth value *true* in the process above. We then determine the referent of *F*.

There are however flaws in this trial. Firstly, it may not be possible to name all objects in a world (words are countable yet objects may be uncountable). Secondly, to get the pairings (s(*a*), s(*Fa*)), we need to have the sense of *a* first, but what we actually have is just *a* and r(*a*)[25]. I doubt that one can overcome these two problems.

The key point here, however, is this: why bother with it? If Dummett asks nothing about how, given a world, the sense s(*Pa*) of *Pa* determines its referent r(*Pa*) then he should not demand to know about how the sense s(*P*) of *P* determines its referent r(*P*), because s(*P*) is actually a proper part of s(*Pa*) according to our Compositionality of Senses, and the determination of r(*P*) should by all means be more primitive than that of r(*Pa*).

In sum, concerning the sense s(*P*) of a predicate *P*, it has at least two functional roles. On the one hand, s(*P*) can act on a world *w* to yield a referent $||P||_w$, and on the other hand, it can, with the prescription of the phrase structure of *Pa*, map the sense of *a* to the sense of *Pa*. The former role receives the appreciation of Dummett, while the latter receives that of Geach, and furthermore both the Compositionality thesis and the SDR thesis are fully respected. These two functional roles not only are compatible, but go hand in hand to reveal for us the richness of the sense of a predicate[26].

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The four formulations are subsequently reformulated by Szabó as follows: (note in Szabó (2000), he even listed five.)

(1) The Compositionality Principle: The meaning of a complex expression depends only on the meanings of its constituents and on its structure.
(2) The Function Principle: The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its constituents and of its structure.
(3) The Building Principle: The meaning of a complex expression must be built up from the meanings of its constituents.
(4) The Substitutivity Principle: If two expressions have the same meaning, then substitution of one for the other in a third expression does not change the meaning of the third expression.

2. This is one of Frege's principles concerning sense listed in Dummett (1991), p. 137 and p. 148, namely (ii).

3. According to Devitt & Sterelny (1999), the Millian view is the view that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its role of designating its bearer.

4. Statements "Mark Twain is Mark Twain" and "Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens" convey different meanings to ordinary speakers of English, yet the two names involved denote the same person. If one is to regard the meaning of a name as consisting merely in its denotation (or reference), then one faces a problem of explaining the (epistemic, at least) difference of the two statements.

5. That of explaining the cognitive difference of statements like "Jane believes Mark Twain is a writer" and "Jane believes Samuel Clemens is a writer".

6. We distinguish "referent" and "reference" of an expression as follows. The former is the thing that an expression refers to, while the latter is its referring to that referent.

7. Similar stituation happens for sentences and predicates also, where it is for the sense of the latter that Dummett and Geach have a disagreement about.

8. Dummett (1991) p. 123. Actually Dummett does remark that there is a weaker sense of determination, which requires merely that two expressions with the same sense could not have different references, cf. Dummett (1991), pp. 143-4.

9. The *core idea* of supervenience, cf. Lewis (1986) and McLaughlin (1995), "is simple and easy: we have supervenience when there could be no difference of one sort without differences of another sort."

10. See p. 142.

11. This is basically principle (iv) in Dummett (1991) p. 137.

12. See p. 144. I take the phrase "is compounded out of" to mean the same as "is composed of".

13. In chapter 3 of Szabó (2000), Szabó elaborates on the interpretation of these two theses. He call the first thesis *Modest Principle of*

Understanding, which says "We understand a complex expression by understanding its constituents and the way they are combined", and the second *Strong Principle of Understanding*, which says "We understand a complex expression by understanding its constituents and the way they are combined, and we could not understand it in any other way." He emphasizes that the first principle is that "we *do* …" while the second is that "we *could not* do otherwise", and then proceeds to claim that the modest principle implies (1) If someone understands a complex expression, she also understands its constituents and the way they are combined, and (2) What someone grasps in understanding the constituents of a complex expression and the way they are combined determines what she grasps in understanding the expression; while the strong one implies the *converses* of (1) and (2). I think he is here confused about the factual-modal distinction and the distinction between a thesis and its converse, and has indeed mixed them up in the development of his subsequent thoughts. If, on the one hand, he thinks the difference between the two theses lies in that Dummett's second thesis is modal while the first one is not, then he should not claim that the first thesis implies (1), because (1) itself has a modal flavor. On the other hand, if he thinks the difference lies in the fact that the second one is the converse of the first one, then he should by all means associate (1) to the second thesis than the first one. In any case, (1) is not the cup of soup for the first thesis, and I think Dummett's first thesis amounts to saying Szabó's (2) only.

14. Dummett (1991) p. 144.

15. One needs to note that what the phrase "the way they are put together" means remains vague and needs to be straightened out in due course, in particular, what do we mean by "they"?

16. See Jacobson (1996) and Jacobson (1999) and the references therein.

17. Note that the phrase structure of an expression tells us what semantic types of each of its constituents are and how they are put together, but it need not in general grant us the access to the internal phrase structures of the constituents.

18. An interesting corollary to it is that the sense of a sentence is more than its truth condition.

19. According to Szabó, to catch the true spirit of compositionality, we have to re-interpret the notion of determination by strong supervenience quantifying over all possible languages

20. When two compound expressions, *A* and *B* say, are composed to form a larger compound, *AB* say, we can take up one of the two positions: 1) the phrase structure of *A* remains a part of the resulting phrase structure of *AB* --- compositionality in the strong sense for phrase structures 2) it does not --- compositionality in the weak sense for phrase structures. For 1), the substitution principle is clearly unharmed. For 2), it is unharmed as well, because, even though the phrase structure of $\boxed{A}$ $\boxed{B}$ may not contain the internal phrase structure of *A* as a proper part, the semantic type of *A* is determined by a possible overall phrase structure of *AB*. For instance, the

two phrases “is not related” and “is unrelated” may *seem* to be of the same semantic type, but, in the context of “is not related to everybody” and “is unrelated to everybody”, they may well be of *different* semantic types.

21. Dummett admits, however, that the function that Geach has in mind does exist, but that is *not* the sense of a predicate.

22. Dummett (1991), p. 142.

23. Ibid, p. 144.

24. Basically the argument goes as follows. Geach’s function plays with senses of names rather than objects in the world, while for the determination of the referent of a predicate one needs to play directly with objects. Therefore Geach’s sense determines no reference. See Dummett (1991), p. 141-p.148 for details.

25. Note r(*a*) and *a* alone are not sufficient to stipend the sense s(*a*) of *a*.

26. It shall have impact on our understanding of the sense of a sentence as well. Note that there is only one functional role outlined here for the sense s(*Pa*) of *Pa*, which allows it to act on *w* to yields rw(*Pa*). This on its own seems to support the slogan “the meaning (sense) of a sentence is its truth condition”. However, if we look at the consequence of the Compositionality of Senses that s(*Pa*) *contains* s(*P*) and s(*a*), we would realize immediately that, again, the above functional role alone does not exhaust the sense of *Pa*, or in other words, the truth condition does not exhaust the sense of the sentence. The grasping of s(*Pa*) involves the grasping of s(*P*) and s(*a*), and, of course, the phrase structure of *Pa* as well. That is, the sense of a sentence not only yields a truth condition but also prescribes a way toward the determination of the truth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Devitt, M. and Sterelny, K. (1999), *Language and Reality*, 2nd ed., Blackwell, Oxford.

Dummett, M. (1991), *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Frege (1892), *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* (On Sense and Reference), 1892.

Gamut, L. T. F. (1991a), *Logic, Language, and Meaning, vol. 1: Introduction to Logic*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Gamut, L. T. F. (1991b), *Logic, Language, and Meaning, vol. 2: Intensional Logic and Logical Grammar*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Hein, I. and Kratzer, A. (1998), *Semantics in Generative Grammar*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Jacobson, P. (1996), “The Syntax/Semantics Interface in Categorial Grammar”, in *Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory*, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 89-116.

Jacobson, P. (1999), “Toward a Variable-Free Semantics”, *Linguistics and Philosophy* 22, pp. 117-184.

Lewis, D. (1986), *On the Plurality of Worlds*, Blackwell, Oxford.

McLaughlin, B. P. (1995), “Varieties of Supervenience”, in *Supervenience: New Essays*, Savellos, E. E. and Yalcin, U. D., (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 16-59.

Szabó, Z. (2000), *Problems of Compositionality*, Garland Publishing, New York-London.

Szabó, Z. (2000a), “Compositionality as Supervenience”, *Linguistics and Philosophy* 23, pp. 475-505.

CONCEPTUAL IDEALISM

•

Twentieth Century Idealism and the Possibility of Metaphysics

MATTHEW J. DENSLEY
University of Sussex
matt@naughtybeagle.net

ABSTRACT. I describe a prevalent approach to philosophical theorising as being a form of idealism. Conceptual idealism is the philosophical approach that maintains that for something to be possible is for it to fall under a possible concept. Conceptual realism denies this, maintaining that reality may outstrip our possible conception of it. Both philosophies are approaches to metaphysical theorising, but differ with regard to the nature and justification of a metaphysical theory. A third position, quietism, rejects the possibility of metaphysical truths for a particular domain of philosophical discourse. In addition to these very general considerations, conceptual realism and conceptual idealism also clash on more particular matters when it comes to issues of subjectivity.

I would like to describe and discuss a general approach to philosophical theorising, which I shall call 'conceptual idealism', and in so doing I want to characterise a certain prevalent approach to philosophy as being roughly Kantian. Not that every aspect of transcendental idealism has an echo in conceptual idealism, or vice versa, but rather that the latter can be seen as an heir to Kant's philosophy. More precisely, conceptual idealism is an heir to the question 'How is metaphysics possible?' and to the 'Copernican revolution' that formed the basis of Kant's answer.

The assumption that Kant questions at the beginning of his critical philosophy is 'that our knowledge must conform to the objects'. Since nothing, Kant claimed, had been achieved on this assumption, it is worthwhile pursuing the path that starts with its converse: that objects must conform to our knowledge.[1] Given the linguistic-analytic turn of the twentieth century, this starting point becomes: 'things

must conform to our concepts'. This is the central tenant of conceptual idealism.

We are in immediate danger of several misunderstandings. Most importantly, the conceptual idealist shares Kant's aversion to any form of *empirical* idealism, such as Berkeley's immaterialism. Indeed, so averse are most conceptual idealists to any philosophy that implies that things are dependent on actually being perceived or thought about, that they eschew the label of 'idealism' completely. While this hides the debt that their philosophies owe to Kant, the move is understandable. Witness the difficulty that Kant himself had distinguishing his idealism from that of Berkeley's. And since the demise of both German and British 'Absolute Idealism', the label has fallen on even harder times. Nevertheless, we will call those philosophies 'idealist' just in case the 'fundamental idea of idealism'[2] can be discerned in them: a doctrine will be called idealist just in case it presupposes that reality is somehow constrained by, or corresponds with, our ability to conceive it. A doctrine will be awarded the title of '*conceptual* idealism' just in case it maintains that reality is somehow constrained by our publicly shared concepts. Different forms of this idealism can be differentiated by the sense they purport to give to the terms 'reality' and 'concept'.

A second point to note about conceptual idealism is that it is not committed to the claim that objects are necessarily perceivable, as Kant's idealism of time and space implies.[3] The claim is that things are necessarily conceivable, or better still, describable. The latter way of putting the matter has the advantage of making it clear that what is at stake here is not the ability of some individual at some point in time to be able to conceive of a thing (a claim of a kind with empirical idealism). The claim is that things must necessarily fall under some possible concept. How the phrase 'possible concept' is cashed out will determine how credible a particular version of conceptual idealism is.

1. Conceptualism

We can illustrate these issues by discussing a version of conceptual idealism that has been presented in an admirably clear and explicit form: the 'Conceptualism' of Michael Morris.[4] This is the conjunction of two (related) claims:

(A) There can be interesting metaphysical explanations.
(B) The nature of the objects, properties, and facts to which our concepts correspond is not fixed independently of the nature of the concepts which correspond to them.[5]

What does the phrase 'not fixed independently of' mean here? Morris rephrases (B) as 'there would not have been *those* objects, properties, and facts, if they had not corresponded to *those* concepts'. And he expands this a little further with 'It follows that the nature of the world we think about is at least partly determined by the thoughts we have about it.' Someone who denies (B) is labelled 'Platonist' by Morris, a term he borrows from discussions of Wittgenstein's views on meaning (that is, Platonism, in Fregean guise, is one of the views of meaning that Wittgenstein attacks in the *Investigations*[6]). The third major position is the No-theory view, which denies (A) for non-Platonic reasons. Since the conceptualist proposes (B) partly because she does not see how metaphysics is possible given the assumptions of Platonism, claim (A) is an important part of conceptualism. Above all else, conceptualism is a starting point for metaphysical theorising.

A couple of points about the dependence relation specified in (B) are worth stressing. Firstly, the connection between a concept and a fact is not to be seen as a completely determining relation from the former to the latter. (B) allows for an externalism that goes the other way. The natural kind that I refer to when I say "water", may partly determine what the word "water" means in my mouth. Secondly, there must be a gap between concept and object, on Morris' account, in order to allow for interesting meta-

physical explanations. He goes on to specify a condition for factual equivalence for expressions in order to constrain metaphysical reductions. If there was no "space" between fact and concept (if two concepts could not count as concepts of the same fact), the only condition for factual equivalence could be conceptual equivalence. But this would not allow for interesting reductions. Morris therefore wants to allow for different concepts to count as concepts of the same thing.

In order to avoid the charge of empirical idealism, Morris makes it clear that what he is talking about is not a connection between some psychological particular (a 'concept' or 'thought' that exists in some mind) and the nature of things. The world existed, and contained many of the things with which we are familiar (rocks, trees, etc.), long before anyone was around to think about it. Conceptualism avoids denying this truism by insisting on an *atemporal* notion of concepts. A particular concept, for Morris, is that which is common to anyone who possesses that concept. Someone possesses a concept just in case they can have a propositional attitude that involves that concept in its contents[7]. The timeless existence of concepts is then explained as 'a matter of there being something which it would be to possess that concept'.[8] One important consequence of this notion of timeless concepts is that the sense in which (B) suggests that our concepts 'determine' reality cannot be an 'empirical' one. In what sense, then, do concepts determine reality?

One answer[9] given by Morris illustrates most clearly what I mean by 'conceptual idealism':

> … if the world is capable of being thought about at all, it must be essential to the world that it is such as to be thought about… it is essential to the world that the world can be made sense of.[10]

Morris points out that this way of putting the matter suggests a link with (A) (the claim that there can be interesting metaphysical explanations) which he goes on to exploit. His understanding of (A) demands an operable con-

dition of adequacy for metaphysical explanations. This operable condition is given in epistemological terms: different concepts of the same object, property or fact are distinguished by different ways of knowing about that object (different 'modes of presentation'). All this is in line with the roughly Kantian nature of conceptualism that Morris emphasises.[11] However, I wish to pursue a different line of argument from (B) to (A) that replaces epistemological concerns with issues in the philosophy of language. This 'linguistic turn' is in line with the development of conceptual idealism in the context of twentieth century analytic philosophy. The idea that 'it is essential to the world that the world can be made sense of' can be then put like this: 'it is essential to the world that it can be described', where describing something means to bring it under a public concept. That is to say that the determining relation in (B) ('not fixed independently of') is to be taken in such a way such that the world is limited by our possible concepts. All objects, properties and facts necessarily fall under some possible concept, since to be an object, property or fact just is to fall under the relevant concept.

2. A topology of metaphysics

I would like to adapt the characterisation of approaches to metaphysics provided by Morris. Instead of the term 'conceptualism' I will make use of the label 'conceptual idealism' as the denial of the approach called 'conceptual realism'. Any approach that denies the possibility of metaphysical explanations or philosophical theories in one or more areas of philosophical reflection will be regarded as 'quietist' with respect to that area. I make this change in terminology in order to avoid any unnecessary commitments to the details of Morris's own philosophy. The positions are supposed to be quite general, since my aim is to reflect on the nature of philosophical theorising as generally as possible. I call this a 'topology' of metaphysics since I intend to map out some fixed points to which particular

theories can be seen as relative to, rather than strictly subordinated to. Any metaphysical system can be located on the map by examining how it attempts to deal with the problems of metaphysical theorising that one can identify at this general level.

A conceptual idealist approach to philosophical explanation maintains that

(i) there can be interesting metaphysical explanations;
(ii) there is a *necessary* correspondence between the concepts we use and the natures of the objects, properties and facts picked out by them; such that,
(iii) if something is possible it necessarily falls under some possible concept.

By 'interesting' in (i) I mean non-trivial and justifiable. That is to say, metaphysical explanations generate *knowledge*. A metaphysical explanation is one that explains the way things seem (or happen to be conceptualised) on the basis of the way things really are. While the conceptual idealist will help herself to such a distinction, she disregards the idea of a thing-in-itself that *cannot* be thought about or predicated in judgement. Conceptual realism denies (ii) and consequently (iii). While the conceptual realist maintains (i), he holds that the true nature of reality is described truly by mind independent concepts, such as platonic forms. It is therefore a contingent matter whether or not that description can be understood, or even recognised by us. Quietism denies (i) with respect to a particular area of philosophical discourse. Note that this might simply be a claim about the nature of the discourse, denying the possibility of philosophical explanation in terms of the nature of reality it purports to describe. It is not self-evidently refuting (in the way the verification principle is).

There is a certain conception of reality that does not fit neatly into the topology. According to Kant, the noumenal world, things-in-themselves, are necessarily beyond the reach of the understanding, and therefore knowledge. The

conceptual realist wants to maintain a contingent relationship between the understanding and things-in-themselves, the conceptual idealist a necessary one, whereas the Kantian position apparently denies any possible connection. One reason for not immediately granting this position a separate location on the topological map is that it is apt to strike one as nonsense. It is at least arguable that the idea of something of which we can necessarily have no knowledge whatsoever is not, as Kant claimed, intelligible. A second reason for denying it independent status is that, depending on further assumptions, the position collapses into one of the others. Such a position holds that the notion of 'being' is independent of our concepts in general, though the latter presumably presupposes the former. If, when pressed, the proponent of such a view wants to admit that, say, the progress of science or philosophy provides us with a glimpse of 'an actual, mind independent reality', then he is really being a conceptual realist. If, on the other hand, he maintains that nothing can be known of the thing-in-itself, but that we can nevertheless produce metaphysical explanations *within* our understanding of the phenomenal world, then the thing-in-itself plays no apparent role whatsoever, and he has turned to conceptual idealism. Finally, if he admits that metaphysical explanation must refer to the thing-in-itself, while maintaining that such a thing must remain mysterious to us, he has offered a general argument for quietism. But I do not wish to argue conclusively for the instability of a neo-Kantian position here. Whether or not it collapses into one of the other three positions under pressure of argument, transcendental idealism at least begins by staking a claim for the middle ground. I use the term transcendental idealism to mean any doctrine that maintains that the world that is knowable or representable at all is necessarily knowable or representable, and that anything else is necessarily beyond the reach of knowledge or representation. While Kant first advanced such a position in part to constrain free wheeling metaphysics, he did so also to defend the idea that certain philosophical justifications

are possible. In so far as these justifications involve metaphysical commitments, this position is distinct from quietism.

Conceptual realism denies (ii). This allows for considerable scepticism about our knowledge of Reality. If the connection our knowledge and conceptual scheme have with the true order of things is merely a contingent one, then there is always room for doubt as to the absolute validity of our metaphysical conclusions. If there is more than one conceptual scheme, and some of those conceptual schemes are inaccessible to us lowly humans, it remains a distinct possibility that we will never gain knowledge of the real, mind independent world. One attempt to contain this scepticism is to claim that the mind independent concepts that are manifest in the things we take ourselves to be talking about are involved in bestowing meaning on our words, albeit in a contingent manner. Such a conceptual realist theory of meaning holds that the meaning of our terms is given by the things they refer to. This idea introduces a further complication to our topology. The conceptual realist may make some concessions to conceptual idealism in order to give his thesis some justification. He may allow that certain general considerations (for example, about the nature of representation) will constrain both the shape of our propositions and the nature of those objects and facts he takes to be the referents of those propositions. The existence of internal, necessary relations between the form of propositions and facts is suggested to answer certain sceptical worries about how our thoughts can really be about a mind independent world. This produces the hybrid between conceptual realism and conceptual idealism that denies (ii) but accepts some correlate of (iii). On the one hand, such a theory of meaning will involve abstract objects that are beyond our conceptual reach, in the sense that they cannot be subordinated to our concepts (they cannot be described, other than perhaps by ostensive definition). The objects are *presupposed* by any description. On the other hand, the nature of those objects,

which necessarily coincides with representational form, limits the nature of the world. Such a hybrid would be a form of the transcendental idealism discussed above, and the most notable example is the theory of meaning in the *Tractatus*. That this particular attempt fails is evidenced by Wittgenstein's later rejection of it. But what is most significant about the metaphysics of the *Tractatus* is that it collapses into quietism.

There is one final point about the formulation of conceptual idealism given above that I would like to note. So put, (iii) is a fairly minimal way of disambiguating the dependence relation in (ii). It suggests only that there could be no object, property or fact that has no conceptual form. This is what rules out the given for the conceptual idealist: it doesn't have the richness of structure that (iii) requires. But the conceptual idealist may have something stronger in mind. She may want to suggest something along the lines of a formal dependence between (most of) our ordinary concepts and the objects they pick out. So (ii) can also be taken to imply that the essences of objects, properties and facts that we *normally* talk about are formally dependent on our *ordinary* concepts. Thus, if one holds that radical scepticism is misguided (and the idea that most of our ordinary terms fail to refer does seem intolerable, since it thereby makes language vacuous), conceptual idealism can use ordinary language as a source of metaphysics.

3. A conceptual idealist argument for the possibility of metaphysics

Conceptual realism allows for considerable scepticism about metaphysical theorising. For if it is merely contingent whether our concepts correspond to the true nature of reality, it remains mysterious how we could come to any firm conclusions about that true nature. Experience, at least on the empiricist conception, remains hopelessly ambiguous as a basis for our metaphysical judgements. (Humean scepticism, like all forms of empiricism, is a kind of con-

ceptual realism. Empiricism allows that experience can get between the world and our conception of it). Such considerations may motivate the advocate of (i) to accept (ii), and consequently (iii), in the search for some justification of (i). One argument from (ii) to (i) goes like this. The first step is to argue that the concepts that we use to describe the world are, by and large, the 'correct ones'. That is, there is no interesting conceptual relativism with regard to truth. This view goes naturally with conceptual idealism because it rejects a world that is independent of our concepts. The second step is to argue that the 'large features' of language, which embody our concepts, reveal the large features of reality. The task of metaphysics is thus to decide what those large feature of language are (and of course there is room for disagreement here). Both these steps can be found in the work of Donald Davidson.

Step 1: the rejection of conceptual relativism

Elsewhere I have argued[12] that the fundamental idea of idealism is the claim that "what there is must be possibly conceivable or describable by us". This claim can be given support with an argument to the effect that the notion of what *cannot* be thought about or described by us, or those like us, makes no sense. The kind of argument in question claims that if we try to make sense of the notion of what we could never conceive, we must use some general notion of something being true (or being the case, or existing etc.), where we could not in principle apply any further concept. The conceptual idealist objects that to conceive of something in such vague terms is not to conceive of it adequately at all. Hence, where we thought we could conceive of a notion that we could not understand, we discover we understand nothing by this empty conception.

Davidson, in rejecting 'the very idea of a conceptual scheme', presents an argument to this effect.[13] He asserts that we do not possess a general notion of truth that goes beyond the truth of all possible sentences in any language

that we could understand, or that could be translated into a language that we could understand.

> The criterion of a conceptual scheme different from our own now becomes: largely true but not translatable. The question whether this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we understand the notion of truth, as applied to language, independent of the notion of translation. The answer is, I think, that we do not understand it independently at all.[14]

Now Davidson's concern here is to reject conceptual relativism: the idea that we can make sense of there being a conceptual scheme that is not our own, to which truth would be relativised. His claim is not that our conceptual scheme is the only true conceptual scheme, for, as he put it, 'even monotheists have a religion'. If it does not make sense to talk of different conceptual schemes, it does not make sense of all conceptual schemes being one. Rather, Davidson would reject the very idea of a conceptual scheme at all: he argues against the idea of a conceptual scheme that is somehow separate and independent of the empirical content ('experience', 'the given') to which it is then applied:

> [C]onceptual schemes (languages) either *organize* something, or they *fit* it… As for the entities that get organized, or which the scheme must fit, I think again we detect two main ideas: either it is reality (the universe, the world, nature), or it is experience (the passing show, surface irritations, sensory promptings, sense-data, the given).[15]

Davidson describes the dualism of scheme and content as the third and final dogma of empiricism, and in rejecting it he sees himself as severing his ties with that tradition. But this dualism is also to be found in Kant ("the given"), so Davidson is also a long way from Transcendental Idealism. Indeed, we can see some important differences. From his denial that we can make sense of the concept of truth independently of the concept of translation, it seems that Davidson is committed to reject not only the given, but also the (Kantian) idea of the thing-in-itself. To speak of reality free of our conceptual scheme, however

generally, would be a misuse of language that returns to the dualism of scheme and content.

As already mentioned, the rejection of both the given and the noumenal world is an essential part of conceptual idealism. In the case of the latter, the rejection is explicit and straightforward. Conceptual idealism is committed to the idea that things are not independent of our concepts of them, and the Kantian idea of a thing-in-itself is just the notion of things considered independently of our concepts. The rejection of the given also follows from the rejection of things independent of our concepts, for the given is supposed to be that which enters our experience yet cannot be described. Davidson, in rejecting the given – that to which our conceptual scheme is supposed to be applied – is stating his conceptual idealist credentials.

Step 2: Spelling out the connection between language and reality

The second step in the argument from (iii) to (i) is to spell out the connection between language and reality to establish conceptual investigation as a method of metaphysics. Davidson's contribution to this debate is set forth in 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics'. The central idea is a simple one:

> In sharing a language, in whatever sense required for communication, we share a picture of the world that must, in its large features, be true. It follows that in making manifest the large features of our language, we make manifest the large features of reality. One way of pursuing metaphysics is therefore to study the general structure of our language.[16]

He then goes on to argue for the importance of such a method, before describing what he takes that method to be. Firstly, he has to erect the notion of a shared picture of reality to replace the 'very idea of a conceptual scheme' that he rejected earlier. The connection between the two notions can be easily discerned in his argument for a shared world-view. 'Those who understand one another's speech must share a view of the world' (correct or incorrect)

because 'we damage the intelligibility of our readings of the utterances of others when our method of reading puts others into what we take to be broad error.' In other words, the common picture is required to interpret others utterances, and it is assumed that another person's utterances can be translated into words that we understand. The salient difference between a conceptual scheme and a world picture would seem to be the fact that the latter can be considered (largely) true or false, rather than something to which truth must be relativised. But Davidson goes on to argue that we can make little sense of our shared picture being largely false[17]:

> [O]bjective error can occur only in a setting of largely true belief. Agreement does not make for truth, but much of what is agreed must be true if some of what is agreed is false… too much actual error robs a person of things to go wrong about.[18]

There follows the rather curious argument of the omniscient interpreter:

> [H]e attributes beliefs to others, and interprets their speech on the basis of his own beliefs, just as the rest of us do. Since he does this as the rest of us do, he perforce finds as much agreement as is needed to make sense of his attributions and interpretations; and in this case, of course, what is agreed is by hypothesis true. But now it is plain why massive error about the world is simply unintelligible, for to suppose it intelligible is to suppose there could be an interpreter (the omniscient one) who correctly interpreted someone else as being massively mistaken, and this we have shown to be impossible.[19]

I will not defend or dispute this argument here, though it is worth making a couple of comments on it. Firstly, the argument *assumes* that the omniscient interpreter can interpret the speaker. This is not adequately explained by merely pointing out that the interpreter is omniscient. By hypothesis, the interpreter does not use his 'all-seeing eye' to ascertain the beliefs of the speaker, for if he did that, there would be no need to interpret at all. The assumption is that the interpreter does not have a conceptual scheme that is incommensurable with the speakers. Thus this argu-

ment rests on the previous commitment (in step 1 above) that truth is not relative to a conceptual scheme. The second point worth making is that Davidson's view excludes the kind of radical scepticism that Descartes contemplated. It cannot be that our beliefs about the world diverge *en mass* from the objective order of things, for the notion of truth only has meaning for us against the background of the actual judgement that we make and in general agree on. If we are radically wrong about the meaning of our words, nothing we say can make sense, and hence Cartesian scepticism is not possible. This rejection of an objective order somehow beyond all our ordinary judgements about the world is, of course, just the rejection of conceptual realism that marks Davidson as a conceptual idealist. Conceptual realism on the other hand, to the extent that it allows for a notion of truth external to our conceptual scheme, allows that we might be massively in error. Hence brains-in-a-vat scepticism is a real problem for conceptual realists.[20]

4. An irresolvable dispute

Having made the case for the study of language as a method for metaphysics, Davidson presents his own slant on conceptual investigation. His method involves a theory of truth as a constraint on metaphysical theorising. Rather than using metaphysical considerations to decide issues in the philosophy of language, he suggests we do things the other way around: a 'comprehensive theory of truth', he says, 'makes its own unavoidable demands.' This should not blind us to the fact, however, that using such a method is based on some major metaphysical assumptions.

The central features of his philosophy of meaning and truth are well known, and for the most part they do not concern us. Conceptual idealism is not restricted to the kind of theory of meaning that Davidson favours. But there is one feature of this theory that is relevant to the discussion of conceptual idealism in general. Davidson argued in 'The

Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' that we have no notion of truth that goes beyond the sentence of our language that we take to be true. The notion of truth, he claims, is dependent on the notion of translation into a familiar idiom, and this is dependent on a theory of meaning. The most important restriction on this theory of meaning for Davidson is that it must be *learnable*.[21] It must explain how an infinite number of sentences can be potentially understood by a finite mind. The notion of truth is therefore tied to what is potentially learnable by finite minds like ours. This makes his philosophy somewhat more obviously idealistic. What is real for Davidson is restricted to what is learnable (in terms of competence, not performance based criteria). This can strike one as counter-intuitive, to say the least.

The intuitions this conflicts with are good old-fashioned conceptual realist ones. They are the intuitions that have been defended by the likes of Nagel and Williams. Nagel argues that we can easily imagine that there are minds that are superior to ours in an analogous fashion to the way our mature adult minds are superior to the undeveloped minds of twelve-year-olds. The vast majority of twelve-year-olds would not be able to grasp the concept of relativity as it features in theoretical physics. We could imagine a species of beings whose mental capacities were restricted in a similar way, and who could therefore not grasp sentences and concepts that we take to be meaningful. If one of these beings (Realist Junior) were to postulate that there were concepts and truths beyond their comprehension, we would have to agree with him. And if one of these beings (Idealist Junior) were to disagree, arguing that they had no notion of truth beyond what they could comprehend, we would be inclined to object. There are truths that are (by hypothesis) not understandable by the race of mentally-twelve-year-olds. So is it not comprehensible that we might be in the same position with regard to some superior alien minds? Might some alien race have concepts that were beyond our comprehension?

To be consistent with his anti-relativism, Davidson must allow that the sentence uttered by the junior idealist is translatable into a sentence in our idiom with the same truth-value. Since the sentence 'there are no truths beyond *their* comprehension' is clearly false in our idiom, Davidson cannot allow this as the correct translation while maintaining that the junior idealist is right. The possibility of claiming that the junior Platonist is right but conceptual idealism is correct in *our* idiom is merely chauvinistic given the possibility of the superior alien minds. The one plausible claim open to the conceptual idealist is that the meaning of the sentence 'there are no truths beyond our comprehension' is *exactly the same* whether spoken by a junior, a human or an intellectually superior alien. On this account, talk of 'comprehension' is somewhat misleading. Davidson is committed to claiming that all three groups have the same conceptual scheme (or rather, that there is no such thing as a conceptual scheme, but we shall put that point to one side as a mere terminological dispute). Admittedly, some of the concepts of this 'scheme' are not fully grasped by all members of this three-tiered group of language speakers, but that is just to point out a limitation in the relative performance of their minds, not their potential capacity. Furthermore, given the possibility of trustworthy communication between the groups, a member of one of the lower two tiers has epistemological access to the truths discernible by their intellectual superiors. Just as I can know the difference between gold and fool's gold by consulting an expert, so the race of twelve-year-olds can consult a theoretical physicist on matters pertaining to relativity. What prevents them grasping these matters more directly is merely their limited attention span, lack of general intelligence and mental acuity, and so on.

Davidson is already committed to the claim that any sentence used by the aliens is translatable into English, and into the language of the Juniors for that matter.[22] The translation maybe unbearably difficult to understand, but it must be possible. No doubt there are some theoretical concepts

understood by a small elite of actual humans. These concepts will be forever out of the grasp of the masses, but they are nevertheless, in *principle*, understandable. The defence of the conceptual idealist might be that at most our failure to grasp the concepts of an imaginary alien race is comparable to the failure of some of us to master the subtleties of theoretical physics.

While this response does just enough to meet the realist objection formally, it hardly settles the matter. The conceptual realist is going to continue to insist that the aliens could have concepts that we could not grasp in principle, and it is difficult not to feel some sympathy with the intuitions behind this thought. On Morris' account of concepts, a concept exists just in case there is something that there is to have a propositional attitude involving that concept. Could there not be something that there was to believe *p*, even though human minds could not instantiate those conditions? The matter seems irresolvable, since to prove his case the conceptual realist must come up with an example of a concept that we cannot understand, and this, by the very nature of the required example, he cannot do. For what is there to show that there is a concept at all there, if not that we understand it? Of course, the realist can complain that the idealist has not spelt out what it means to say that all concepts are 'in principle' understandable by us. But we can imagine possible answers. The Davidsonian response would presumably be that the concept is expressible in our language, allowing that the resulting sentence maybe so long as to render it practically ungraspable.[23] In any case the realist is no better off, for he cannot spell out what it would be for a concept to be 'in principle' ungraspable. He can merely gesture in the direction of other kinds of minds.

In any case the response I have proffered for the conceptual idealist does not go to the heart of his claim. His point is rather that what we take to be meaningful and concept-involving behaviour is bound up in our own use of concepts. The fact that we cannot make sense of some

behaviour would amount to evidence that the behaviour was not intelligent.

But what about the following situation: we come across a strange group of creatures, who appear to be communicating with each other, though all our best efforts fail to throw any light on *what* they are communicating. The noises they make seem to bear no consistent relation to the things they do. If we gag them however, their behaviour is thrown into confusion (as our behaviour might be if we were prevented from communicating). That is to say, we have evidence that they are indeed communicating in a language that we could not understand. Merely pointing out that nothing 'could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted into our language that was not at the same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech behaviour,' will not suffice, as Davidson admits. He concedes that to be convincing, this should be the result of an argument.

To the extent that Davidson does go on to present an argument, it involves rejecting the idea of a pre-conceptual 'something' that is independent of the conceptual scheme, the mysterious given or thing-in-itself. He claims that the various ways that have been proposed to make sense of the idea of interpreting or organising the world involve some notion of the world that is beyond comprehension. But this is just to restate the belief that there can be nothing beyond our conceptual scheme. So finally we come up against the intuitions that mark the fundamental distinction between conceptual realism and conceptual idealism. It would seem that the debate is irresolvable without recourse to the very assumptions that are issue.

5. A concession to relativism: human centred metaphysics

The 'argument' that Davidson offers against conceptual relativism crucially involved rejecting the pre-conceptual given. Since conceptual idealism is committed to rejecting this too, it would also seem committed to David-

sonian Absolutism. But is there not room for some concession to conceptual relativism that is compatible with conceptual idealism? By investigating such a possibility, we may discover a middle-way between conceptual realism and conceptual idealism. This possibility presents an attractive alternative to the irresolvable debate just discussed. But there may be a high price to pay: the very possibility of metaphysical explanation that conceptual idealism and conceptual realism attempt to justify.

The realist insists that Reality as it is 'in itself' (which we will indicate with capitalisation) is quite independent of our conception of it, and the insight of the conceptual idealist can be captured by pointing out that this Reality must remain quite meaningless to us. To talk about reality at all, we must talk about reality *as it is conceived* in some way. It is essential to reality that it can be conceived, described and made sense of. However, the conceptual idealist may avoid the criticisms aimed at absolutism by arguing the following way: it is possible that we might come across aliens that 'conceptualise the world' in such a different way to us that little or no mutual understanding is possible. That is to say, we can imagine the situation where the detailed study of creatures convinces us that whatever they are doing, they are not talking about the medium sized dry goods that we normally talk about, nor employing any other part of our ontology. What they are doing will remain, for all practical purposes, a matter of speculation. But we can say that *if* they are employing concepts that are fundamentally distinct from our own, *then* they must be talking about quite different things to the ones we talk about. No doubt our concepts are determined in part by our abilities and interests, and other creature may not share those abilities and interests. If we were so bold as to say that they 'had a different conceptual scheme to ours' (and we may well want to remain more cautious, but if we did so say), then we would also be forced to admit that they inhabited (i.e. thought about) a 'different world' to us. Since we can say little or nothing about this 'different world', it will (quite literally)

make no difference to us. The job of the metaphysician is to analyse the concepts *we* use in order to say some about the world *we* inhabit. This way of thinking is more in-line with Kant's transcendental idealism, if it is perhaps more cautious than he was (at times) about the notion of a noumenal Reality underlying our reality.[24]

The caution is well advised, for down that route lie the bogies of anti-realism and anti-metaphysics. If we are only in cognitive commerce with the world 'as it appears to us', we will be less inclined to celebrate any metaphysical results of conceptual analysis. Metaphysics is supposed to be fundamental in that it reveals the true nature of things, not just the way they are to us. To retain credibility and hold on to claim (i), the conceptual idealist must hold that the world really does contain the things that we tend to pick out: the everyday substances that we talk about (such as human beings, animals, trees, rocks and so on). One may say that these things exist relative to our conceptual scheme, but then in order to be true to conceptual idealism, one will have to insist that there is no more fundamental 'absolute' existence that we can talk about. Conceptual idealism is committed to rejecting a 'view from nowhere', a view uncontaminated by a particular conceptual framework.[25]

Such a cautious balance can be seen in the work of David Wiggins, who argues for a moderate essentialism.[26] He defines conceptualism[27] (or 'conceptualist-realism') as the conjunction of the following claims:

(1) 'that the possibility of singling out of an object in experience depends upon the possibility of singling it out as a *this such*;'

(2) 'that there is no surrogate or reductive level (for instance, the level of description of retinal stimulation or whatever),'

(3) 'that our cognitive access to reality is always through conceptions that are conceptions of what it is to be this or that sort of thing, these conceptions being a posteriori and at every point corrigible by experience, yet present in ad-

vance of the recognition of any particular object as a this such.'

Claim (2) serves to exclude the possibility that objects are reducible to mere stimuli of a kind that we do not normally take them to be (and phenomenalism and other kinds of empirical idealism are thereby excluded). Claim (3) is a way of expressing the moderate conceptual idealism under discussion, given its restricted applicability to 'our cognitive access to reality'. Note the explicit restriction to *a posteriori* concepts that are modifiable in the light of experience. This makes Wiggins' position compatible with certain realist and externalist conceptions of natural kind terms.[28] Claim (1) can be seen as an application of conceptual idealism for *de re* thoughts: the possibility of singling out an object depends on bringing that object under a concept – a 'this such'.

The balance between absolutism and anti-realism that Wiggins is seeking is not easy to spell out. He talks about a 'two-way flow' conception of singling out, acknowledging both the corrigibility of our concepts to experience, and the role these concepts have in deciding what is singled out. (One metaphor that he has used on more than one occasion in that of a fishing net, the size and mesh of which determine not which fish are in the sea, but which may be caught). At one point he puts it this way:

> The object is what it is, whether or not it is singled out: *but it does not simply individuate itself or, in and of itself, differentiate itself from other things*. There are no lines in nature (even though, after the imposition of lines, there are edges for us to find there).[29]

But he admits of the italicised sentence that he has yielded 'to the temptation to try and convey something by issuing the denial of something that is really nonsense.' (And surely the denial of nonsense is just more nonsense). He also urges a cognate criticism of the sentence that follows, which one might suspect of being anti-realist.

The result of this precarious balancing act, if Wiggins does indeed avoid the criticisms that can be levelled at anti-realism on the one hand and absolutism on the other, is a position that is supposed to yield a 'modest metaphysics' of essentialism. Whether or not one admits that the sortal concepts we use are relative to our (human) interests, one can still insist that the objects picked out by them are nevertheless real objects. Perhaps they are real 'relative to the human conceptual scheme', but since we cannot know of any other reality, this qualifier is of little consequence. If one maintains that it is nonsense (for us) to talk about Reality independent of our concepts (the denial of conceptual realism), then the analysis of *our* sortal concepts will still have the appeal of telling us about the essential nature of *our* world. The question as to whether there are 'other worlds' that correspond to conceptual schemes incommensurable to ours can be disregarded as idle speculation.

It is worth comparing this moderate conceptual idealism with Kant's defence of a modest metaphysics. At least in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant argued that nothing could be known about the thing-in-itself, considered in abstraction from the faculty of judgement. This leaves open the possibility of conceptual relativism, since we cannot know that minds very different from our own might conceive of things very differently. Nevertheless, the analysis of that faculty, and the faculty of intuition, still offered objective knowledge of the nature of reality. While it was in a certain sense relative knowledge, it could be rendered absolute and universal by qualifying it carefully. For example, in the Transcendental Aesthetic we find the following defence of knowledge of the phenomenal world:

> As to the intuitions of other thinking beings, we cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuition, and which for us are universally valid. If we join the limitation of a judgement to the concept of a subject, then the judgement will posses unconditioned validity.[30]

This suggests a general formulation of a 'modest' conceptual idealism that avoids the problems of the absolutist kind: that *our* reality is limited by *our* concepts. If something is to be considered possible for us, then it must correspond to some concept that we could have. In retrospect, this human centred modesty is compatible with the formulation of conceptualism given by Morris (that is, with claim (B)). But it is worth noting that permitting relativism to a conceptual scheme may endanger the commitment to substantial metaphysical claims. Putnam, for example, draws anti-metaphysical conclusions from just such a combination of positions.[31]

Putnam argues against Davidson's absolutism as follows. Imagine a world containing three atomic objects, x1, x2 and x3. How many objects does it contain? The most straightforward answer is 'three', but if you are of mereological bent, you will count 7: x1, x2, x3, x1 + x2, x1 + x3, x2 + x3 and x1 + x2 + x3. Call a language that only admits 3 objects CL (after Carnap's preferences) and a language that admits of mereological sums PL (after Polish logicians preferences). Imagine that at least one of x1, x2 and x3 is red and at least one is black. If one does not maintain (as the conceptual realist does) that these differing conceptual schemes can be assessed relative to a 'view from nowhere', then the question as to which is correct becomes problematic. It is also not clear how these two languages (with their corresponding conceptual schemes) relate to each other. Putnam argues (against Davidson) that the *question* as to whether statements in PL (such as there is an object that is partly red and partly black) correspond in both logical form and meaning to their 'translations' into CL ('There is an object that is red and an object that is black') is *itself* relative to a conceptual scheme. He may have a point, since such a question certainly cannot be answered in either PL or CL, since they cannot even be framed. The ontological commitments of one language can thus not be said to have any more metaphysical weight than the other.

The moderate conceptual idealist is thus caught between the opposing alternatives of quietism and absolutism.

I will not argue conclusively for the view that moderate conceptual idealism collapses into quietism here. It suffices for our present purposes to see that it a possibility. Moreover, this possibility shows how someone who held a moderate form of (ii) and (iii) might consequently come to reject (i).

6. The problem of subjectivity

Now, let us suppose that one turns to conceptual idealism because the sceptical problems of conceptual realism prevents one from doing metaphysics. Conceptual idealism is a refuge for those metaphysicians that do not see how the more traditional picture of conceptual realism allows one to establish reliable and justifiable metaphysical results. But even if moderate conceptual idealism maintains some credibility as an approach to metaphysics, there is a simple objection to conceptual idealism that applies to both. Put simply, it is this: there are some things with which we are acquainted, that necessarily evade any effort to fully conceptualise them, namely, sensations. The traditional Cartesian view is that sensations are inherently private in a philosophically significant sense. Since my sensations are only known to me, and are known only by 'acquaintance', they remain forever beyond the reach of public discourse. There is something 'ineffable' about them. No matter how sophisticated my descriptive (public) language, nothing I say seems to capture the true essence of 'the way things feel to me'. Of course, it comes as no surprise that conceptual idealism is incompatible with the Cartesian view of experience. Transcendental idealism involves a rejection of this picture of the mind, and conceptual idealism reinforces that rejection. Cartesian philosophy is a form of conceptual realism, and it is the apparent insolubility of Cartesian and Humean scepticism that lends the first support to conceptual idealism. But the notion of sensations being private and

ineffable is a very hard one to shake off. Surely it is true that I can only know how something feels by actually feeling it, and no mere concept can stand in place of that direct acquaintance. So is there not something very real which I could never conceptualise in a public manner? Does this not show conceptual idealism to be wrong?

This is not the traditional 'problem of privacy'. The traditional problem is a sceptical problem in the philosophy of mind. It comes about by reflecting on the nature of experience with the thought that 'you can't see what I can see'. This leads one into philosophical problems that it is hard to free oneself from. It leads to scepticism about other minds, or even about mind-independent reality in general. Whatever the difficulties involved with such philosophical reasoning, they are not the problems faced by the conceptual idealist. The traditional problem of privacy is set up using something like the Cartesian conception of mind. It presupposes that the world is distinct from my impression of it. The problem for the conceptual idealist is that this traditional problem, while it seems to make sense at least as a philosophical problem, cannot even be expressed without making concessions to conceptual realism. Conceptual realism makes sense of scepticism about other minds, while conceptual idealism simply denies there is a problem.

The problem for conceptual idealism can be made vivid by considering two related questions in the philosophy of mind that lead one to believe that the world necessarily outstrips our conception of it. Nagel raised the first question when he asked, "What is it like to be a bat?"[32] Simply contemplating the mind-boggling difference between a bats form of life and our own can bring one to the conclusion that such a different form of subjectivity must be completely alien to us. And this is such that it suggests that the bat's subjectivity must necessarily be missed out of our objective world-view. The point is not that we do not yet have the relevant objective facts about the bat's perceptual and nervous systems. The intuition that is invoked by this example is that there are some facts (some 'subjective facts') that

are fundamentally inaccessible to creatures that do not navigate by sonar. Call this the 'inter-species problem of subjectivity'. This is only a problem for the absolute conceptual idealist, of course. Moderate conceptual idealism avoids such issues by restricting its claims to that which is within *our* experience. But the problem of subjectivity can apply to both the absolute and moderate forms of conceptual idealism.

The problem that privacy presents to the conceptual idealist might be called the 'inter-personal problem of subjectivity'. For while considering alien forms of life may vividly demonstrate the limits of our conceptual scheme, the problem arises much closer to home. My conception of what it is like to experience, say, red, has been learned through my own experience: by looking at red things. But nothing about those experiences demonstrates that they are just like the way other people experience red. Sure, we may agree on what things are to be called 'red', and have similar reactions to its presentation (e.g. the tendency to describe it as a 'warm' colour and to act more aggressively in red environments). But how do I know that it feels the same for you as it does for me? I only have my own experience to go on. (The answer that I have the same reactions does not settle the matter: for how do I know that it feels the same way to have those reactions). And nothing that we say about our experience will settle the matter. For what we say will eventually be rooted in our experience, and any amount of agreement will always leave room for a systematic difference between the way it seems to me and the way it seems to you. And this is because there seems to be something missed out of our inter-subjective ways of describing things. It seems that, contra to the claims of the conceptual idealist, there does indeed seem to be something that is missed out by our conceptual scheme. And that is the very thing that makes that conceptual scheme possible: subjectivity.[33]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. BXV.

2. See Densley, M., 'The Fundamental View of Idealism', in *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*, 7, 2008.

3. I take it this is a consequence of the the idealism of the Transcendental Aesthetic: to exists as phenomenon is to be in time and space, and since these are “forms of intuition”, phenomena are necessarily possible objects of perception.

4. See his *The Good and the True*, Oxford University Press, 1992. See especially chapters 1 and 2. Morris borrows the term ‘conceptualism’ from Wiggins, and though he stressed its Kantian nature, he is avoids the term ‘idealism’. In personal correspondence, however, he has since rejected conceptualism precisely because of its idealist nature.

5. Ibid., pp. 15–16.

6. The term ‘Platonism’ is not meant to imply all of the doctrines that were advanced by Plato. It is important, however, that in order to maintain the distinction between conceptualism and Platonism, the timeless existence of concepts is not conflated with Platonic forms. The latter, and not the former, are mind independent. Morris is committed to the existence of abstract objects (i.e. atemporal concepts), though he reduces them to what is involved in having a belief involving them.

7. Cf. Peacocke, Ch., *A Study of Concepts*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992, p. 5.

8. Morris, op. cit., p. 18: “the existence of a concept is a matter of there being some condition which would have to be met by anyone for her to count as having a belief involving that concept. And that there is such a condition in the case of any given concept is timelessly true.”

9. Another answer to this question that Morris has to offer is a reformulation of (B) as the statement that there would not have been *those* objects, properties and facts if there had not been *those* concepts. Given the notion of concepts as timeless, however, Morris also concedes that conceptualism (and its denial, Platonism) is thereby committed to the view that there can be subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents that are nonetheless non-vacuously true. Even if one could make good on this claim, I do not think this way of putting the matter is most helpful to our current purposes.

10. Morris, op. cit., pp. 16 – 17.

11. Although Morris is keen to distance himself from some aspects of Transcendental Idealism that he associates with empirical idealism, for example that ‘the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle *nature*, we ourselves introduce.’ (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A125). He also rejects the idea that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. (Op. cit. p. 68.)

12. Densley, op. cit.

13. See Nagel's critical discussion of Davidson's views in chapter V of *The View From Nowhere*, where he characterises Davidson's argument in a similar way. The view that Nagel advocates is what I am calling conceptual realism.

14. Davidson, D., 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', reprinted in *Inquires into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford: OUP, 1984, p. 194.

15. Ibid., pp. 191–192.

16. Davidson, D., 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', reprinted in *Inquires into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford: OUP, p. 199.

17. One worry here is that if we cannot talk of it being largely false, we cannot talk of it being largely true, either. But perhaps it does make sense to say that a world picture is 'largely true' in the following respect: it consists of a number of truths, rather than concepts. The later cannot be considered true or false apart from their application in judgement. Davidson's point is that most of our beliefs must be true.

18. Ibid., p. 200.

19. Ibid., p. 201.

20. A point made by Hilary Putnam in his arguments against 'external realism'. 'Two philosophical perspectives', in *Reason, Truth and History*.

21. See, for instance, 'Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages', (1965), reprinted in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*.

22. It follows that Davidson would have to claim that any language that does not have the expressive power of English cannot be considered a fully-fledged language.

23. We might note that Davidson's general restrictions on a theory of meaning (namely, learnability) apply with no greater or lesser force to the language of the 12-year-olds.

24. On this version of concetual idealism, (iii) becomes 'insofar as a thing can be thought about at all (by us), it necessarily falls under some possible concept (of ours)'.

25. Although the absolute conceptual idealist may choose to put the matter this way: the *only* way to view the world is (translatable into) the view from nowhere.

26. See chapter 4 of his *Sameness and Substance*.

27. 'On Singling out an Object Determinately', in Pettit, P. and McDowell, J., (eds.), *Subject, Thought, and Context*, pp. 169–180, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986.

28. One might think that it was somewhat unnecessary as a general restriction however, particularly for artefact kinds – unless one takes seriously the possibility that all pencils may turn out to be, say, aliens posing as artefacts, and that this eventuality could cause us to revise our concept 'pencil'.

29. Ibid.

30. A26/B43. The problem with this, it might be argued, is that if we cannot understand the conditions of alternative forms of intuition, we can

neither understand the uniqueness of our own, nor the 'unconditioned validity' gained by adding the subject to the judgement. Like the transcendental solipsist of the *Tractatus*, we our trapped within the only form of intuition we have.

31. Putnam, H., 'Truth and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism,' *Dialectica*, 41, 1987, pp. 69 – 77.

32. Nagel, Th., 'What Is It Like To Be A Bat?', *The Philosophical Review*, 83, 1974.

33. The tempting answer for the conceptual idealist to give is that Wittgenstein has already dealt with the illusion of privacy, most famously in the 'private language argument'. But it is easier to pay lip service to a philosophy as subtle and complex as Wittgenstein's than to demonstrate its validity or persuasive power. I have argued elsewhere that Wittgenstein's remarks on privacy can only be understood (and are therefore only persuasive) as part of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole, and that philosophy is not idealist, but quietist ('Wittgenstein on Privacy', in *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*, 6, 2007).

FROM CAUSALITY TO RIGIDITY

HILLA JACOBSON
Ben-Gurion University
hillaj@bgu.ac.il

ABSTRACT. Kripke has argued that names are rigid designators, and that a name's reference is determined by a causal chain of a certain kind that connects an object with the name's use, thus making the name this object's name. He has not shown that there is a logical connection between these two theses of him. The purpose of the paper is to establish such a connection. It argues that on the assumption that names refer to objects in possible worlds other than the ones in which they are used, the causal theory of names entails the thesis that names are rigid designators.

Saul Kripke (in *Naming and Necessity*)[1] has argued for two theses about the reference of names. The first is that names are rigid designators, that is, they refer to the same object in every possible world. The second is that a name's reference is determined by a causal chain of a certain kind that connects an object with the name's use, thus making the name a name of this object. Kripke has not argued that there is a logical connection between these two theses, and this is what I intend to do in this paper. I shall try to show that, given a plausible assumption, the claim that the reference of a name is determined by a causal chain linking the name's use with its referent entails that names are rigid designators.

I shall assume what I call "the assumption of inter-world reference", that is, that when a name is used in a certain possible world – let's suppose for simplicity that this is the actual world – it may refer to objects also in other possible worlds. Anyone who accepts that names can function as the grammatical subjects of *counterfactual conditional sentences* such as "Had George Bush born in England, he would not have been the president of the United States", must accept this assumption. This assumption is different from the claim that the objects the name refers to in other possible worlds are identical with the object it refers to in the actual world. I

am not assuming this latter claim, of course – assuming it would amount to assuming that names are rigid designators and thus to begging the question. (Note also, that the assumption of inter-world reference does not even presuppose that one object can inhibit different possible worlds. I shall refer to this point below.)

Now the causal relation that determines the name's reference is – like any other causal relation – a *non*-trans-world-relation: there is no causal relation the relata of which are members of different possible worlds.[2] Hence, there cannot be a causal relation between a use of a certain name in one possible world, and an object in another possible world. Such a causal relation cannot therefore determine a name's reference in possible worlds other than the actual one.

This consideration might seem to lead to the conclusion that causal theories of reference for names must be rejected, for it seems to show that no causal theory can explain a name's reference in possible worlds other than the one in which the name is used. But this is not so. The assumption that the causal theory of reference is correct is compatible with the assumption of inter-world reference. Only the conjunction of these two assumptions and a third assumption, namely the one that names may refer to *different* objects in different possible worlds, is inconsistent. If this third assumption had been correct, we would have had to supplement the causal theory by somehow connecting the actual world's referent with the other possible worlds' referents. In that case reference would be determined by means of a combination of two ways, and we would not have a pure causal theory of reference determination.

If indeed we want a *pure* causal theory of reference with no supplementation, and we accept the evident assumption of inter-world reference, then adhering to the claim that names are rigid designators is unavoidable. If this claim is true, then the name's referent is picked out only once (in the actual world) for every possible world (the actual as well as the non-actual ones), so no inter-world causal connection is needed to endow it with referents in possible worlds other

than the actual one: the causal relation of the actual world performs this task, as the object it picks out is the referent for every possible world.

Kripke's view that names are rigid designators has been part of his case against the description theory of names. In fact, this view opposes a specific component of the description theory, namely the satisfaction model. According to this model, what makes an object in a given possible world the referent of an expression is the fact that this object satisfies in this world a certain condition.[3] The satisfaction model, in itself, is not committed to descriptivism. That is, it is not committed to the idea that a speaker has to (explicitly or implicitly) associate with the name a description that expresses the condition in question. But the satisfaction model is incompatible with a pure causal approach to reference determination, precisely for the reason that a causal relation is a non-trans-world relation. A causal relation can connect the use of a name in one possible world only to an object in the same possible world. The condition of being causally connected to the use of a name is a condition that can be satisfied by an object in the world which this object inhabits only if the object inhabits the same world in which the name is used. The claims that, on the assumption of cross-world reference, the satisfaction model is incompatible with a causal theory of reference and the claim that the causal theory of reference entails the claim that names are rigid designators, are, of course, the two sides of the same coin.

Kripke's specific conception of rigidity presupposes his conception of possible worlds, on which one and the same object can inhabit different possible worlds. David Lewis' conception of possible worlds denies this.[4] But this is not to say that Lewis' counterpart approach leaves no room for inter-world reference of names. It is possible to account for inter-world reference of names in the framework of such an approach in a way that is similar to the way it is possible to account for it in the Kripkean framework. The idea is to take names to be "rigid" designators in essence – to be "Lewis-rigid" rather than "Kripke-rigid". That is, whereas "Kripkean

rigidity" is the thesis that a name refers to the same object in all possible worlds, "Lewisian rigidity" is the thesis that a name that is used in the actual world refers in any possible world to that object of that possible world that is the counterpart of its actual world's referent. On such a conception too, there is no need to appeal to inter-world *causal* connection for fixing reference in non-actual worlds. The counterpart relation does the work.

There is, though, a significant difference between the ways in which non-actual worlds' reference is determined in terms of Kripkean rigidity and in terms of Lewisian (counterpart) rigidity. An account in terms of Lewisian (counterpart) rigidity does appeal to a certain connection between the actual world's referent and the other possible worlds' referents. In the framework of a Kripkean approach, on the other hand, no such connection is needed at all, since there are no *other* referents to be connected to the actual world's referent, as there is no difference in reference among the worlds. This point is sometimes blurred by defining "a rigid designator" (within a Kripkean conception of possible worlds) as one that refers to the same object in every possible world *in which this object exists*. The impression is thus created that whether or not a rigid designator refers to something in some non-actual possible world depends on the ontological furniture of that world. But according to the interesting sense of rigidity, a rigid designator refers to the same object in every possible world, *whether or not this object exists in this possible world*.[5] (One possible way to realize this is to notice that we may speak counterfactually of a world in which, say, George Bush *does not exist*.) Under this sense of 'rigidity', it is clear that it is the referent of the rigid designator in the actual world that may serve as the referent of this designator in other possible worlds, regardless of any characteristic of these worlds, and, *a fortiori*, regardless of any connection between the actual world's referent and any of these worlds' objects. If names are rigid designators in this sense, then a causal theory of the reference of names does not need any supplementation by assuming such a connection.

In sum, I hope to have shown that given the assumption of inter-world reference of names, the causal theory of reference for names is tenable only if names are rigid designators in either the Kripkean sense or the Lewisian sense. Since that assumption (I believe) is true, – it is a constraint that any theory of the semantics of names must respect, this means that the causal theory of reference for names entails that names are rigid designators in either of those senses.[6]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Kripke, S., *Naming and Necessity*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.

2. This claim is not in clash with the idea (endorsed by some interpreters of quantum mechanics), that parallel universes causally effect events in our universe, for our world and worlds that allegedly causally interact with it are ex hypothesi part of the same world.

3. On the satisfaction model see, e.g., John Searle's discussion in his *Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.

4. See e.g. Lewis, D., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", in *Journal of Philosophy*, 65, 1968, pp. 113–126.

5. Kripke expressed his commitment to this conception of the rigidity of names. In a private correspondence with Kaplan he denies that he has ever endorsed the first (this correspondence is reported in fn. 8 of the 'Afterthoughts' of Kaplan, D., 1989, "Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals", in Almog, J. et al., *Themes from Kaplan*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 481–563) he denies that he has ever endorsed the first.

6. I believe that the argument of this paper can be extended so as to apply to natural kind terms, but showing this would have to await another occasion.

INDIVIDUALISM AND NARROW CONTENT

AMIR HOROWITZ
The Open University of Israel
amirho@openu.ac.il

ABSTRACT. The view that psychological explanations cannot but be individualistic (i.e., shared by duplicates) and the view of semantic externalism (i.e., that mental contents are not determined by individualistic features) seem to jeopardize the idea of intentional psychology. Introducing the notion of narrow content (as a function from environment to broad, referential, content) is supposed to defend the possibility of intentional psychology, and to reconcile it with both psychological individualism and semantic externalism. The introduction of narrow content is necessary to defend intentional psychology from the externalist threat. My argument to this effect will also shed light on the sense in which narrow content is semantic and indeed deserves to be called "narrow content". Though content ascriptions are, on their face value, ascriptions of broad content, they also have narrow readings that capture individualistic features.

Let us suppose that individualism in psychology is true, i.e., that molecular duplicates necessarily share their psychological properties. Let us suppose, further, that externalism is true, i.e., that the content of beliefs and desires is individuated broadly or non-individualistically, so that molecular duplicates may differ with respect to the content of their beliefs and desires. Does it follow that psychological explanations are not intentional explanations? According to some philosophers, it does not. As Fodor put it, psychological explanations are intentional if an individualistic notion of 'intentional state' can be constructed (Fodor 1991, p. 7). Fodor, like others (e.g. White 1982), believe that such a notion can be constructed; that mental states have individualistic 'narrow contents'.[1]

Externalism denies that individualistic features of intentional states determine content by their own. A more specific (and radical) view is that such features play *no role* in the determination of content. This view entails that no individualistic features are captured by content-ascribing sen-

tences, and, taken psychological individualism for granted, there seem to be no room for such sentences in psychology. What is really striking about this possibility is that the main reasons in favor of psychological individualism have to do with psychology being the science that explains and predict behavior. It is impossible to explain one's behavior, so the arguments for psychological individualism go, by appealing to facts external to one's body which are not reflected in one's body. The conjunction of externalism and psychological individualism thus seems to threaten the status of belief-desire psychology ((see Fodor 1987, Stich 1978 and 1983).[1]

Narrow content proponents suggest a way to reconcile externalism and psychological individualism with the assumption that explanations in terms of content may be legitimate psychological explanations. Individualistic features of intentional states, they claim, determine content in collaboration with environmental factors. By virtue of their individualistic features mental states have 'narrow contents', that determine reference only relative to context, and are thus said to be functions from context to broad (referential) contents (see Fodor 1987, chapter 2).[2] Though they are not strictly semantic (for lacking reference and truth-conditions), narrow contents – and hence individualistic features – play an important semantic role.

Not much attention is usually paid to the fact that in order for narrow content to defend content psychology in face of the externalist threat, the semantic (or quasi-semantic) interpretation it is supposed to have should be such that it enables content ascriptions to capture individualistic features of intentional states. Otherwise – if psychological individualism is taken for granted – it would be wonder how such ascriptions could be used to explain and predict behavior. But assuming the truth of externalism, why should we think that mental states – individually considered – play such a semantic role? Why should we think that individualistic features of mental states bear *any* semantic (or quasi-

semantic) interpretations? Why, in other words, should we believe that there are narrow contents?

I think that some reasons can be given in favor of the existence of narrow content. Here I shall discuss the route leading from individualism to narrow content. In section I I shall discuss and criticize Fodor's argument for narrow content (Fodor 1991). Fodor's argument consists of two stages, the first is an argument for psychological individualism (or, as he puts it, "*against* arguments against individualism"), while the second stage purports to show that the individualistic conclusion leads to a vindication of narrow content. I shall try to show that Fodor's argument for narrow content is guilty of equivocation, and that the exposition of this equivocation opens the door for externalist-based objections to content psychology (belief-desire psychology), such as the ones raised by Stich and Schiffer. In section II I shall suggest an argument that attempts to bridge the gap between individualism and narrow content in a way that blocks objections of that kind, and thus removes the threat that externalism poses to content psychology. I believe that this argument will also shed light on the sense in which narrow content, which lacks reference and truth-conditions, is nevertheless semantic and indeed deserves to be called "narrow *content*". This contention will be strengthen in section III, where I shall try to show that, though content ascriptions are, on their face value, ascriptions of broad content, they also have a narrow reading that captures individualistic features.

I

For the sake of his argument for narrow content, Fodor accepts that molecular duplicates may differ with respect to the (broad/referential) contents of their identical (non-intentionally described) thoughts. For example, my duplicate's "water" thoughts can fail to be about water but be about another liquid – twater – due to environmental differences.[3] Then Fodor argues (convincingly, in my opinion),

that identical (non-intentionally described) intentional states *of molecular duplicates* have the same causal powers. From this he infers that intentional content is individuated narrowly (that is, in a way according to which molecular duplicates necessarily share it):

> We have seen that twater thoughts and water thoughts are not different causal powers. So, for the psychologist's purpose, they are the same intentional state. But they cannot be the same intentional state unless they have the same intentional content. And they cannot have the same intentional content unless intentional content is individuated narrowly. Now it is an argument for narrow content. (Fodor 1991, p. 25)

I believe that the argument is not valid, since it equivocates on the phrase "the same intentional state". Let us have a look at two of Fodor's contentions:

(1) Thoughts which have the same causal powers are the same intentional state for the psychologist's purpose.

(2) Thoughts which are the same intentional states must have the same intentional content.

Fodor does not justify contention (2), and I believe that he takes it to be self-evident: being the same intentional state simply is having the same intentional content, for what makes an intentional state the intentional state that it is is its intentional content. So 'being the same intentional state' *means* 'having the same intentional content'. I would like to claim that under this interpretation of 'being the same intentional state', contention (1) is not warranted. Why must thoughts which share causal powers share also intentional contents? This is true only under the assumption that a thought's intentional content supervenes on its causal power. But this assumption, which Fodor seems to take here for granted, is very controversial, and further, taking it for granted as a premise of an argument for narrow content has a strong odor of question-begging.

Fodor, as I said, accepts for the sake of the argument the externalist idea that molecular duplicates may

differ with respect to the (broad/referential) contents of their identical (non-intentionally described) thoughts, so that those contents do not supervene on psychological causal powers.[4] Stich, for example (Stich 1978 and 1983), takes this claim (which he endorses) to undermine content psychology. That is, psychology, according to him, should be individualistic, and if content is not individualistic, then it cannot play a role in psychology.[5] Fodor may react to this move by claiming that indeed *broad* content – for being non-individualistic – is irrelevant for the psychologist's purpose, but this is exactly the reason why there must be narrow individualistic content, which supervenes on the thought. But why should we assume that thoughts have such a semantic (or quasi-semantic) feature in addition to broad content? Why, in other words, must the individualistic features of mental states bear semantic (or quasi-semantic) interpretations, if, as Fodor himself accepts, they lack broad referential contents?

We may analyze content sentences such as "Ralph believes that water quenches thirst" thus: "Ralph is ???, and this state is related in an appropriate way to water" (more precisely, to water quenching thirst), while '???' is a certain non-semantic characterization of (the individualistic feature of) Ralph's intentional state. (We may say that ??? is a belief-state.)[6] According to such a suggestion, the individualistic feature of an *intentional* state, which is of interest to the psychologist, is characterized non-intentionally. On the other hand, the feature that is responsible for the intentionality of this state is not individualistic but depends solely on environmental matters. The very possibility of such an analysis of content sentences blocks Fodor's argument. So why do we have to posit narrow contents? What's wrong with that analysis?

I believe that the point I made will be better understood in the light of Schiffer's words, when he expresses his wonder why Fodor did not ignore narrow content and argued as follows:

The properties of belief state-tokens utilized in laws of commonsense psychology are of the form *being a belief that such and such*. But these properties cannot be used by cognitive psychology, because in violating mind/brain supervenience they are irrelevant to the causal powers of the states having them. In fact, cognitive psychology is solipsistic and needs only properties that ascribe non-semantically specified computational roles to Mentalese expressions – properties, so to say, of the form *having in the belief-box a Mentalese sentence with such and such computational role*. At the same time, common sense's proposition-involving belief properties, although *causally* irrelevant, are properties that belief states have... Indeed, what accounts for the propositional content of a belief state is not any theory of cognitive psychology (they are 'syntactic') but the sort of causal theory developed in chapter 4 (Schiffer 1990, pp. 91-2).[7]

In short, Schiffer thinks that the notion of narrow content plays no role (Schiffer 1990, p. 94). On the one hand, what plays causal role in psychology is *syntactic* or *computational*; on the other hand, an account of propositional contents of belief states need not involve narrow contents. It seems, then, that an argument for individualism in psychology is not an argument for narrow content: perhaps there can be only computational or syntactic *individualistic* psychology, as Stich suggested. Fodor's contention (1) (Thoughts which have the same causal powers are the same intentional state for the psychologist's purpose.) is warranted only if 'being the same intentional state' does not mean 'having the same intentional content', but rather something like 'being intentional states with the same individualistic feature'. But under this interpretation contention (2) (Thoughts which are the same intentional states must have the same intentional content.) is not warranted: Fodor's argument suggests no reason to think that among these *individualistic* features there must be something like narrow *content*. So this argument is not an argument for narrow content. The exposition of its equivocating on 'the same intentional state' invites objections of the kind raised by Stich and Schiffer. In order to avoid such objections, we need, therefore, to bridge the gap between individualism and narrow content in a different way.

II

I would like to suggest an argument from individualism to narrow content. In addition to Fodor's assumption that identical thoughts of molecular duplicates must have the same causal powers (the assumption of psychological individualism), the argument assumes also that content ascriptions are ascriptions of, *inter alia*, psychological causal powers; that is, that when a content ascription truly applies to one, one has a mental state with determinate causal powers (so that when the same content sentence truly applies to *two* subjects, both of them have mental states that – *ceteris paribus* – will have identical effects).[8] The sentence "Content ascriptions are ascriptions of psychological causal powers" should, of course, be read transparently: I do not mean to suggest that content ascriptions are identical *in meaning* to ascriptions of psychological causal powers. It is just that, as a matter of psychological lawfulness, a mental state with a specific content has specific causal powers.[9] This assumption may be called 'the assumption of psychological intentional realism'. Fodor, of course, endorses this assumption, but does not use it in his argument. The assumption of psychological intentional realism is not equivalent to the thesis that a thought's intentional content *supervenes* on its causal power. Rather, it is only implied by this supervenience thesis. In order for Fodor's argument to work he needs that stronger assumption, but using it in an argument for narrow content has the odor of question-begging.

The assumptions of my argument, then, are (1) that identical thoughts of molecular duplicates must have the same causal powers (the assumption of psychological individualism), and (2) that content ascriptions are ascriptions of, *inter alia*, psychological causal powers (the assumption of psychological intentional realism). From these two assumptions it follows immediately that content ascriptions are ascriptions of, *inter alia*, individualistic psychological features, features which molecular duplicates share. Such

ascriptions, in other words, describe, *inter alia*, what goes on in the head. I shall now contend, further, that this conclusion leads to a vindication of the concept of narrow content.

Let us look again at the explication of the sentence "Ralph thinks that water quenches thirst" as "Ralph is ???, and this state is related in an appropriate way to water" (more precisely, to its quenching thirst). The notation '???' refers also to the mental state of Ralph's *duplicate*, a mental state which is not related in a similar way to water. (That's why Ralph's duplicate is said not to think of water, and the content sentence in question does not apply to him). The above content sentence, which does ascribe to Ralph a *water* thought (i.e., a thought *about* water), cannot apply to him only by virtue of the (individualistic) nature of this state (namely the state that is referred by '???'), for it is not the (individualistic) nature of this state that makes the thought a water thought and endows it with its content. But further, according to the analysis in question, the individualistic nature of ??? does not even participate in making the thought a water thought: it is simply the appropriate relation to water that fulfills this function. Thus, ??? could be individualistically completely different from what it is, and still be a water thought. In other words, a mental state's content is independent of its individualistic nature, so that it can have the same content no matter what individualistic features it has.[10] This result is in a strict conflict with the above conclusion that content ascriptions are ascriptions of, *inter alia*, individualistic psychological features, and that they describe, *inter alia*, what goes on in the head.

If we are not willing to give up the assumption that content ascriptions are, *inter alia*, ascriptions of psychological causal powers, nor the assumption of psychological individualism, we have no choice but to reject the presupposition that underlies the above analysis of content sentences, namely that the individualistic feature of an intentional state can be such that no intentional (or quasi-intentional) characterization is applicable to it, or, in other words, that it plays no role in the determination of content. The

meaning of this rejection is that there must be narrow (individualistic) contents.

The rationale of the above argument is, in short, this: If content ascriptions are ascriptions of psychological causal powers, then (according to the assumption of psychological individualism), they must refer to individualistic features. And the meaning of the claim that *content* ascriptions refer to individualistic features is that individualistic features are (at least part of) what make such sentences true, or, in other words, that they play a semantic role.

Assuming that externalism is true, then, individualistic features determine content (only) in collaboration with environmental features. No defender of narrow (non-referential) content claims for more,[11] and this is by no means trivial: the above ??? suggestion rejects it, for according to it only the relation to the environment plays a semantic role, while the individualistic feature itself plays only a psychological role. I tried to show that such a suggestion gives no room to realistic content psychology, which requires that individualistic features play both roles. So there must be a *narrow reading* of content ascriptions of non-individualistic thoughts, a reading according to which they can be taken to refer to individualistic features.

III

Is narrow content really content? In an important sense, the answer must be negative, for it lacks reference and truth conditions. Block, a strong proponent of narrow content, claims that whether a theory of narrow content is properly called 'semantic' is a question of ordinary language philosophy applied to technical terms like 'semantics' (Block 1986, p. 626), and Fodor admits that his theory of (narrow) content is really "a 'no-content' account of narrow content" (Fodor 1987, p. 53).

But I believe that the question whether narrow content is semantic has an important sense in which it transcends questions of ordinary language. In face of the sug-

gested argument for narrow content, it might legitimately be asked *what* the narrow content that a content ascription ascribes is. As I said, in order for narrow content to defend content psychology in face of the externalist threat, the semantic (or quasi-semantic) interpretation it is supposed to be should be such that it enables content ascriptions to capture individualistic features of intentional states. Otherwise – if psychological individualism is taken for granted – it would be wonder how such ascriptions could be used to explain and predict behavior. To say that content ascriptions capture individualistic features of intentional states is to say that content ascriptions must have a narrow reading. But what, it might be asked, is the narrow reading of content ascriptions? If (and only if) content ascriptions have a narrow reading by virtue of which they can capture individualistic features of mental state, then narrow content can be said to be content in an important sense, and thus fulfill the psychological function it is supposed to fulfill.

So do content ascriptions have such a narrow readings? This question arises because content ascriptions on their face value are ascriptions of broad contents, and their readings are broad as well. We can say that ascriptions of 'external' thoughts (thoughts whose content determination involves facts external to the subject's mind) take context as given, so, in a sense, they are ascriptions of hybrid states. They are, in other words, ascriptions of narrow contents *in a context*, a context which the ascriber takes as given. When we 'subtract' the context component from such ascriptions, what is left is the solipsistic narrow content component.

I believe that this reply cannot suffice. A narrow content proponent must show how that 'remainder' is indeed semantic, and how it is possible for the individualistic features to bear semantic interpretation. He must show, in other words, that we can ascribe non-referential narrow contents *regardless* of context. Fodor, for example, thinks that we cannot. According to him, narrow (non-referential) contents are inexpressible because language is referential in nature (see Fodor 1987, Ch. 2). Had this been correct,

we would have had no justification for saying that mental states – individually considered – have narrow *content*. Though, as my argument attempts at showing, there *must be* narrow contents if psychological individualism and psychological intentional realism are correct, it would thus have been the case that there *cannot be* narrow contents.[12]

Fortunately, however, Fodor's contention that narrow (non-referential) contents are inexpressible is false. Narrow (non-referential) contents *are* expressible because they denote *properties* (in contrast to *instantiations* of properties). Think of an indexical concept like 'this', whose extension, as Putnam says, varies "from context to context or token to token" (Putnam 1975, p. 234). But in spite of its extension variations, 'this' always (i.e., in any context) refers to the thing in front of the speaker or the thinker (or something along these lines), whatever it is.[13] Similarly, on the assumption that Putnam's Twin Earth story indeed exemplifies external determination of content, though 'water' undergoes extension variations (my and my Twin Earthling duplicate's 'water' differ in extension), it always refers to bulks of liquid which have the same microstructure as that of the transparent (etc.) local (relative to the speaker or thinker) liquid, (or something along these lines). So we can ascribe non-referential narrow contents to subjects by means of describing those properties.[14] For example: what is the narrow content that maps my Twin Earthling duplicate's 'water'-thought onto XYZ on Twin Earth? We cannot express this narrow content by appealing to water, since this would be broadly-speaking. And Fodor is right to claim, we cannot as well appeal to 'water', since, as Earthlings, 'water' *in our language* means H_2O (see Fodor 1987, pp. 49-51, and Fodor 1986, p. 8). But we can express the narrow content in question by expressing the property in virtue of which it, 'together' with the appropriate external fact, refers to its referents. We can express that narrow content of my duplicate's (or my) 'water' concept by 'What has a microstructure like that of the transparent... liquid of the thinker's environment, whatever this environment is'.[15]

These examples also show the sense in which narrow contents can be said to be interpretations of individualistic features: they relate these features to properties.

IV

I hope to have shown the route leading from psychological individualism to narrow content. But we must bear in mind that my argument *assumes* that content ascriptions are ascriptions of psychological causal powers, the assumption of psychological intentional realism. So philosophers who reject intentional realism will not be persuaded by that argument. But such an argument is nevertheless important, I believe, for two reasons: first, because many philosophers accept (and, in my opinion, for good reasons) psychological intentional realism; second, because the argument shows that psychological intentional realism is not defeated by externalist arguments.

NOTES

1. In *The Elm amd the Expert* (Fodor 1994) Fodor downplayed the importance of narrow content.

2. Philosophers are still arguing for and against psychological individualism. I do not discuss this debate since in this paper I am taking this thesis for granted.

3. Narrow content can be said to be narrow either for being individualistic or for being non-referential. But in a discussion that takes the truth of externalism for granted there is no need to distinguish between these two senses of 'narrow'.

4. See Putnam 1975. According to Putnam's well-known story, there is a planet (Twin Earth) where a liquid that is called 'water' and is perceptually indistinguishable from water is not H_2O but XYZ. Putnam claims that 'water' in the mouth of a Twin Earthling duplicate of mine refers not to water (namely, to H2O) but to twater (namely, to XYZ). I discuss Putnam's Twin Earth argument in my 1996, 2001 and 2005.

5. According to Burge, externalism with respect to content does not entail that content does not supervene on psychological causal powers. It is possible for him to hold this view, for he rejects individualism not only with respect to content but also with respect to psychological causal powers (see Burge 1986, and especially Burge 1989). In the present paper I take it

for granted that individualism with respect to psychological causal powers is true.

6. Stich (1983) offers various other reasons against content psychology.

7. McCulloch (1986) raises (with skepticism) such a possibility.

8. In chapter 4 of *Psychosemantics* (Fodor 1987) Fodor develops a naturalistic account of intentionality.

9. The identity criterion of the effects must be intentional and not, say, physical. For example, beliefs-states whose contents are identical will, *ceteris paribus*, cause linguistic acts which are semantically, but not necessarily physically, identical (think of same-thinkers who speak different languages). This issue involves some complications. (There must be also a *narrow* intentional characterization of behavior; the *ceteris paribus* clause itself must be construed intentionally, etc.). It is neither necessary nor possible to deal with these complications in the present paper.

10. A theory of mental content, that is, a theory that specifies what endows mental states with their content, should be able to account for this semantical/psychological relation. See my 1992.

11. Perhaps the phrase "no matter" makes this claim an exaggeration, since it is reasonable that some constraints are put upon the individualistic nature of a mental state by the fact that it is causally related to water. But it is possible to argue for the exsitence of such constraints only on empirical grounds.

12. As I said at the outset of this paper, individualistic features may either determine content (i.e., by themselves), or determine content only in collaboration with something else, or fail to play any role in the determination of content. According to internalists the first of these options is the correct one, but externalists deny this. So if externalism is taken for granted, one who denies the third option must endorse the second one, and thus accept narrow content.

13. Note also, that characterizing narrow contents as functions from context to broad content is not enough to endow narrow contents with semantics. For narrow contents thus characterized and contexts are equal contributors to broad content, so the former can be said to be semantic by virtue of satisfying this characetrization no more than the latter.

14. It is possible to argue that 'this' is rigid and that in possible worlds other than the actual one (the world in which it is used) it may refer to objects which do not possess the ptoperty of being in front of the speaker. Its referent in such worlds is simply its actual world's refernt. But if this is so, we only need to make a minor change in specifying the property denoted by 'this': it is the property of being identical to the object which is in front of the speaker in the actual world (see my 1996 and 2001).

15. Of course, subjects usually do not intend to refer to such properties. They intend to refer to actual objects and to instantiations of properties. We take the concepts in question to be non-referential in the sense that they do not refer to actual objects.

16. Were there 'Russellian thoughts', it seems to me, their ascriptions would not have narrow readings. Russellian thoughts are thoughts whose intentional objects are constitutive of their content, so that if there is no such object the thought lacks content (see, e.g., McDowell 1977). Such thoughts seem to be inexpressible, because the object itself, and not any concept that applies to it, is part of the proposition in question. I think that there are no Russellian thoughts, but I cannot discuss this issue in the present paper (see my "Putnam, Searle, and Externalism").

REFERENCES

Burge, T., 1986, “Individualism and Psychology”, in *The Philosophical Review*, 95, pp. 3–45.

Burge, T., 1989, “Individuation and Causation in Psychology”, in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 70, pp. 303–322.

Fodor, J., 1986, “Banish DisContent”, in Butterfield, J., (ed.), *Language, Mind and Logic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–23.

Fodor, J., 1987, *Psychosemantics*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Fodor, J., 1991, “A Modal Argument for Narrow Content”, in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 88, pp. 5–26.

Fodor, J., 1994, *The Elm and the Expert*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Horowitz, A., 1992, “Functional Role and Intentionality”, in *Theoria*, 58, pp. 197–218.

Horowitz, A., 1996, “Putnam, Searle and Externalism”, in *Philosophical Studies*, 81, pp. 27–69.

Horowitz, A., 2001, "Contents Just Are in the Head", in *Erkenntnis*, 54, pp. 321–344.

Horowitz, A., 2005, "Externalism, the Environment, and Thought-Tokens", in *Erkenntnis*, 63, pp. 33–38.

McCulloch, G., 1986, "Scientism, Mind, and Meaning", in Petit, P. and McDowell, J., (eds.), *Subject, Thought, and Context*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 59–94.

McDowell, J., 1977, "On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name", in *Mind*, 86, pp. 159–185.

Putnam, H., (1975), "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", in his *Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 215–271.

Schiffer, S., 1990, "Fodor's Character", in Villanueva E., (ed.), *Information, Semantics, and Epistemology*, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 77–101.

Stich, S., 1978, "Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis", in *The Monist*, 61, pp. 571–591.

Stich, S., 1983, *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

White, S., 1982, "Partial Character and the Language of Thought", in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 63, pp. 347–365.

IN WHAT DOES MUSICAL UNDERSTANDING CONSIST?

LUMINIȚA POGĂCEANU
Spiru Haret University

ABSTRACT. Collins Judd contends that the oxymoron "aural image" highlights the special nature of musical exemplarity and notational representation. According to Hamilton, there is a non-musical soundart which involves hearing sounds as sounds in some distinct non-musical sense. Posner maintains that interpretation is a chameleon. On Scruton's reading, in our most basic apprehension of music, there lies a complex system of metaphor, which is the true description of no material fact.

Collins Judd contends that the oxymoron "aural image" highlights the special nature of musical exemplarity and notational representation: music disrupts the discourse, halts its progression, and interrupts the rhythm of words (by means of the visual representation, the reader takes control of the sounds represented). Music examples function simultaneously as visual image and aural trace. "The meaning of the example may be apprehended through a synoptic reading or by means of a glance. Notation allows the writer to speak of music as 'sound' within the confines of the printed page, offering a specific point of reference which serves as the only potential guarantee of the possibility of shared understanding of abstractions of sounding moments in the context of music both as it sounds and as it is written about."[1] Rosen writes that pianists do not devote their lives to their instrument simply because they like music, as "that would not be enough to justify a dreary existence of stuffy airplanes, uncomfortable hotel rooms, and the hours trying to get the local piano technician to adjust the soft pedal. There has to be a genuine love simply of the mechanics and difficulties of playing, a physical need for the contact with the keyboard, a love and a need which may be connected with a love of music but are not by any means totally coincident with it. This inexplicable and almost fetishistic need for the physical contact with the combination of metal,

wood, and ivory that make up the dinosaur that the concert piano has become is, indeed, conveyed to the audience and becomes necessarily part of the music."[2] Posner maintains that interpretation is a chameleon. "When a performing musician 'interprets' a work of music, is he expressing the composer's, or even the composition's, 'meaning', or is he not rather expressing himself within the interstices of the score?"[3] On Scruton's reading, in our most basic apprehension of music, there lies a complex system of metaphor, which is the true description of no material fact. "And the metaphor cannot be eliminated from the description of music, because it is integral to the intentional object of musical experience. Take this metaphor away and you take away the experience of music."[4]

Goehr holds that musical works are currently viewed as "structurally integrated wholes that are symbolically represented by composers in scores."[5] Kahn says that there was an historical unwillingness to allow certain characteristics of sound into compositional practice "that contradicted the transgressive rhetoric of noise and the emancipatory claims of an openness to the world of sound. The banishment of these characteristics was due primarily to the fact that they *signified*."[6] Scruton points out that what we understand, in understanding music, "is not the material world, but the intentional object: the organization that can be heard *in* the experience."[7] According to Hamilton, there is a non-musical soundart which involves hearing sounds as sounds in some distinct non-musical sense. The acousmatic thesis is a claim about how musical sound is experienced and not about how it is known to have that cause. Attending to sounds as part of the human and material worlds is a genuinely musical part of musical experience. Reduced listening should not be equated with listening without seeing. Hamilton argues that sound phenomena which are not music or soundart have acousmatic aspects (such as the rhythm of a train engine or the melody of speech patterns). Characterising timbre in terms of the instrument or voice that produces it is just a matter of convenience or

convention. The complexity of timbre makes it implausible that one could conceptualise it in terms of wave-form pattern. The recognition that timbre can have structural status both in modernist and non-Western music helps the acousmatic thesis. Hamilton remarks that the plasticity of the sounds and the vividness of sound projection can generate a brilliant impression of their propulsion across the soundstage. The fundamental aesthetic concern with a particular piano is that it allows the performer to make good music.[8] Davies suggests that the individual art forms are no easier to define than is the general category of art. "There are sonic and visual artworks that do not count as music."[9]

Young states that tuned to its grandest level, music, like light, "reminds us that everything that matters, even in this world, is reducible to spirit."[10] Shaw-Miller notes that it is useful to consider the difference between music and the visual arts "as a matter of *degree*, not of *kind*."[11] Parker claims that one of the main ideas that has come across to him about creative music is that every musician draws from the same well of sound. "From this well, each musician develops his or her own relationship with sound and silence. From these individual relationships, systems of improvisation/composition are born; schools of thought about aesthetics are created and recreated; extended, they eventually evolve into newer systems or routes. A system is a path to the sound stream; it is always a way of life."[12] Bailey asserts that although some improvisers employ a high level of technical skill in their playing, to speak of 'mastering' the instrument in improvisation is misleading. "The instrument is not only a means to an end, it is a source of material, and technique for the improviser is often an exploitation of its natural resources."[13] Corbett claims that improvisation does not simply mean the death of language. "In the place of the dead language (the disfigured or defiled codes) a new one emerges, more vibrant than the last. Improvisation involves the permanent play of threshold and transgression."[14] Small observes that, at its best, free improvisation celebrates a set of informal, even loving relationships which can be

experienced by everyone present, “and brings into existence, at least for the duration of the performance, a society whose closest political analogy is with anarchism whereby each individual contributes to the wellbeing of the community.”[15]

As Borgo puts it, as in musical improvisation, one draws on a lifetime of experience and training, “but all in service of that elusive and often fleeting moment when an idea or connection is newly forged or a creative direction presents itself for further exploration. From one perspective, the dialogic process of scholarship happens at a far slower pace than that of improvised music, but both involve formative experiences with mentors, considerable time spent exploring and internalizing the work of others, and the lengthy and ongoing process of developing one’s own approach or expertise. Like the excitement of a good improvised performance, some of the most fortuitous and mysterious moments during the research process can happen without warning or explanation.”[16] Scruton emphasiezes that if we take away the metaphors of movement, of space, of chords as objects, of melodies as advancing and retreating, as moving up and down, “nothing of music remains, but only sound.”[17] Karbusicky holds that thought in music occurs primarily in asemantical shapes and formulas. “The popular definition of music as a kind of language or as auditive communication, which has all too often been taken for granted even in scientific essays, is nothing more than a metaphor”[18]

REFERENCES

1. Collins Judd, C., *Reading Renaissance Music Theory: Hearing with the Eyes*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 8.

2. Rosen, Ch., "On Playing the Piano", in *The New York Review of Books*, October 21, 1999.

3. Posner, R., *The Problems of Jurisprudence*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990, p. 271.

4. Scruton, R., "Understanding Music", in *Ratio*, 25 (2), 1983, 97–120.

5. Goehr, L., *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 2.

6. Kahn, D., *Noise, Water, Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts* MIT Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 17.

7. Scruton, R., *The Aesthetics of Music*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1997, p. 221.

8. Hamilton, A., "The Sound Of Music", in Nudds, M • O'Callaghan, C., (ed.), *Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, forthcoming.

9. Davies, S., "Trying to Define Art as the Sum of the Arts", in *Pazhouhesh Nameh-e Farhangestan-e Honar (Research Journal of the Iranian Academy of the Arts)*, 8, 2008, pp. 12–23.

10. Young, Al., *Kinds of Blue*, Donald S. Ellis, San Francisco 1984, p. 132.

11. Shaw-Miller, S., *Visible Deeds of Music: Art and Music from Wagner to Cage*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002, p. 4.

12. Parker, W., *Who Owns Music?*, Buddy's Knife, Cologne, 2007, p. 60.

13. Bailey, D., *Improvisation: Its Nature and Practice in Music*, Da Capo, New York, 1992, p. 99.

14. Corbett, J., "Ephemera Underscored: Writing Around Free Improvisation", in Gabbard, K., (ed.), *Jazz Among the Discourses*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1995, p. 224.

15. Small, C., *Music of the Common Tongue*, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, 1987, p. 307.

16. Borgo, D., *Sync or Swarm: Improvising Music in a Complex Age*, Continuum, New York-London, 2005, p.xiii.

17. Scruton, R., "Understanding Music", in *Ratio*, 5 (2), 1983, p. 106..

18. Karbusicky, V., "'Signification' in Music: A Metaphor?", in Sebeok, T.A. • Umiker-Sebeok, J., (eds.), *The Semiotic Web*, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 1987, p. 431.

MUSIC AS THE OBJECT OF METAPHORICAL PERCEPTION

VIORICA BARBU-IURAŞCU
Spiru Haret University

ABSTRACT. According to Zbikowski, metaphor seems to be an inescapable part of musical descriptions. What makes music special is its relationship to language. Hamilton observes that music is a human activity grounded in the body and bodily movement and interfused with human life. Vickhoff claims that music seems to move us emotionally even if there is no such obvious reason. Feature imprinting is important for our ability to recognize voices and instrumental sounds.

According to Zbikowski, metaphor seems to be an inescapable part of musical descriptions. What makes music special is its relationship to language. The notion that music is a language is the basis for some of the most prevalent metaphors used to describe music. Music makes reference to the interior world of emotions or physiological states. “Although musicology is the most comprehensive term, it is currently used to refer to those whose research concentrates on music viewed as a historical practice; ethnomusicology, by contrast, tends to focus on the social and cultural contexts of musical practice, with an emphasis on non-western music; music theory is concerned, by and large, with developing systematic perspectives on musical organization and on close readings of individual musical works based on these perspectives.”[1] Zbikowski explores a theoretical framework for analyzing how the domain of music correlates with other conceptual domains, including that of language. Relationships between similar but structurally (or conceptually) distinct musical entities have long been recognized by musicians. Text painting is a matter of complex process through which music represents the image-schematic structure of some event or situation. Text painting points to the basis for metaphorical descriptions of music. “When we describe a musical passage as “obstinately

plodding" or a chord as "sour and biting" we are making connections between one domain of experience (having to do with the ways bodies can move through space, the sense of taste, or the physical actions accomplished by teeth) and the domain of music. The domain of music includes various musical events as well as ways of understanding their relationships to one another; these relationships are in part structured by image schemata."[2]

Zbikowski claims that the notion of music as an independent domain with its own properties and relationships invites two extensions of the discussion of metaphor and music. First, mappings within music are a logical entailment of this perspective; second, concepts from the musical domain may combine with concepts from another conceptual domain to create a conceptual blend. The cultural practice of music is largely non-linguistic and non-referential. Zbikowski points out that one of the primary functions of music is to manipulate the emotions of others. Music can manipulate the emotions through the way it shapes ritual, dance, and the rendering of a text. Music, as an expressive medium distinct from that of language, can offer interesting possibilities for thinking about metaphorical processes. "The participation of music in conceptual integration networks offers possibilities for meaning construction that blends concepts from music and other domains. Conceptual blends that involve music and some other domain also provide an opportunity to study the structural features of each domain, given the assumption that blends require a uniform topography between the mental spaces involved in the conceptual integration network."[3]

Hamilton argues that the tonal basis of music has been clarified by sound-art's embracing of noise and electronic and mechanically reproduced sound: an aesthetic conception of music regards music as "a practice involving skill or craft whose ends are essentially aesthetic and which is the necessary object of aesthetic attention with sounds regarded as tones."[4] Improvisation is intrinsic to the musical result. Hamilton observes that music is a human activity

grounded in the body and bodily movement and interfused with human life. Rhythm is order-in-movement or movement-in-sound that involves discontinuity, “and is perceived through the senses; it involves the imposition of accent (whether by the performer or merely by the listener) on a sequence of sounds or movements, giving rise to a ‘feel’ or pattern in which performers and listeners participate.”[18]

Vickhoff claims that music seems to move us emotionally even if there is no such obvious reason. We do not always, in everyday listening, analyse what we hear, but perceive it directly. Vickhoff sees a pendulum movement between two positions in the view of music: one holds that music is *representative* and the other that music is pure *form*. If music is representative there are two options: it could represent emotions or it could represent an object that we can react to emotionally. If music is just form it is hard to see why it moves us emotionally at all. Every perspective of perception entails the integration of an egocentric perspective. As Vickhoff puts it, music listening activates the whole brain, and this indicates the complexity of music. The functions of the brain areas involved in music processing are not clear. Arousalism locates the emotion in the listener rather than in the music. Persona theory connects music expressiveness to some imagined person. Emotional contagion implies a low level of consciousness (the emotion is felt but not thought of). We cannot rule out that the emotional state of the composer does affect the composition. Vickhoff points out that we are able to perceive the emotion of somebody from facial expression, tone of voice and body movement patterns. The *perspective theory of music perception* steers the choice of content (this selected content affects the perception of form). Musical associations, since they depend on memories, evoke emotion. Vickhoff holds that music can create explicit cognitively conscious meaning. “Playing music is procedural knowledge. Knowing everything in a declarative sense does not make a good performer. It takes practice. And when we know how to play the piece, it is in our fingers and we do

not have to take conscious decisions how to play the next tone. Playing is a movement pattern and once it is established this memory is very robust."[6] Vickhoff writes that feature imprinting is important for our ability to recognize voices and instrumental sounds. When the meaning is implicit, it cannot be separated from the phenomenally perceived object. The perception of space and perspectives is fundamentally different in hearing. Music listening engages pre-motor centres in the brain. Music does not have any obvious survival value. We enjoy music with a perception apparatus "designed" for basic use purposes. Prosodic expression reveals emotion, intention, style and personality. "My understanding of *form* in music is *a recognizable musical structure*, since some sort of recognition is needed to perceive it. And the *content* in music is *the implicit or explicit understanding that makes the musical structure recognizable.* According to this theory the perception of music is not in everyday listening an interpretative process where we draw conclusions about the content from the form."[7]

According to Vickhoff, the most obvious example of music imagery occurs when music is suddenly muted. Some people can hear melodies in their heads even if there is no external source. It is possible to sequence and cue a whole concert to a real time inner performed and heard experience. "Music imagery can be clearcut imagination as when we 'hear' music in our heads without an external source, it can be elicited by sounding music, by lyrics, movements, and in the case of experienced musicians it can be triggered by music scores."[8] Vickhoff points out that as the music proceeds, the body takes part actively or latently. Familiarity to the music might be a condition for our ability to imitate. The same form can be perceived differently depending on the content (meaning). There are indications that pre-motor areas are active during imagination. Imagery is what we consciously perceive. The proposition that perception is perspective dependent is Vickhoff's motivation for a perspective theory of music perception. We have a capacity to perform procedurally without paying at-

tention to it. The perception of music usually refers to the case when music is in the focus of attention. Music can be figure, frame of reference, or irrelevant to the perception of the figure. Since music changes over time, there is an experience of movement even if the source is stationary. Vickhoff claims that imagery is a continuum from perception, via complementary imagery to clear-cut imagery. Music as figure of perception is charged with meaning. The perception of sound has implicit meaning and sounds can affect us emotionally. Music does not begin until the sounds are connected to structures. The sound colours the whole experience of music. “Through unitization (or pattern completion), we tend to see wholes instead of parts, situations instead of details, affordances instead of objects etc. The implicit meaning is induced. The brain automatically combines relevant information to create a situation understanding. In music we perceive sounds as their sources (the instruments, or the singers). The sound of an acoustic guitar may act as a cue to perceptive memories in all modalities of a guitar such as shape and colour, and even the smell of spruce wood, as well as the feeling of holding it and playing it, not to mention all the memories from former listening. This unified perception, multi-modal in character, creates invariance.”[9] Vickhoff observes that any sound consists of a combination of overtone frequencies (a spectrum). The tones in consonant chords are the strongest frequencies in most natural sounds and voices. Music is a trigger of *episodic memories*. A tune could trigger an imagination of a place where it was first heard. Music really can evoke “strong oceanic longing to a paradise lost.” The musical context affects the direct emotional perception of the chord. “The mere musical sound triggers emotions in the listener. It does so as a primary reinforcer (loud sounds, consonant or dissonant sounds), and as secondary reinforcers depending on the unitization effect in perceptual learning which connects the sound to implicit associations or explicit associations such as episodic memories. Most emotional reactions to sound are direct and pre-attentive.

Such emotional reactions on the sound cannot be explained by the appraisal theory of emotion which suggests that we judge the perception and then react to it, unless we allow judgement to mean implicit judgement."[10]

REFERENCES

1. Zbikowski, L.M., "Metaphor and Music Metaphor and Music", in Gibbs, R.W., Jr., (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 504.
2. Ibid., p. 516.
3. Ibid., p. 520.
4. Hamilton, A., *Aesthetics and Music*, Continuum, London-New York, 2007, pp. 10–11.
5. Ibid., p. 129.
6. Vickhoff, B., *A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion*, PhD diss., University of Gothenburg, 2008, p. 45.
7. Ibid., p. 55.
8. Ibid., p. 61.
9. Ibid., p. 86.
10. Ibid., p. 92.

MUSIC AS A MANIFESTATION OF HUMAN COGNITIVE CAPACITIES

LUMINIȚA POGĂCEANU
Spiru Haret University

ABSTRACT. Hamilton says that recording has transformed the nature of music as an art by reconfiguring the opposition between the aesthetics of perfection and imperfection. Parker notes that there are many systems of improvisation/composition: each system has a medium through which it is introduced into the world. Borgo writes that in relating group improvisation to complexity theory the dynamic complexity that informs, and can be generated by, an individual improviser is immense. On Braxton's reading, notation as practised in black improvised creativity is not viewed as a factor that only involves the duplication of a given piece of music.

Desain and Honing maintain that without rhythmic categorisation there would be no reference against which to judge the expressive duration of a note: one would not be able to appreciate the difference between a deadpan and an expressive performance, and that too much and too strict categorisation would cause a loss of timing information and the difference between a deadpan and an expressive performance would not even be noticeable.[1] On Hanslick's reading, to understand of a piece of music as a work of art one must adopt "the voluntary and pure act of contemplation which alone is the true and artistic method of listening."[2] Scruton states that every emotion requires an object. "We can distinguish emotions and classify them only because we can distinguish and classify their (intentional) objects; and we can do this only because we can identify the thoughts through which these objects are defined. In this case, it is difficult to see how a nonrepresentational art like music can really have a genuine expressive content. It would be impossible to describe that content, since its [intentional] object could never be defined.[3] According to Subotnik, the medium is a historical parameter "signifying the ongoing relationship of any composition to a public do-

main of sound and culture, from the time of its presentation up to the present, […] defined principally through the presentation of sounds, organized by conventional or characteristic uses as objects of a physical yet culturally conditioned perception."[4] Hamilton claims that the visual arts include painting, sculpture, photography, video, and film, and attempts a characterization of music, contrasting acoustic, aesthetic, and acousmatic accounts. Music is an art with a small 'a' (a practice involving skill or craft whose ends are essentially aesthetic, that especially rewards aesthetic attention) whose material is sounds exhibiting tonal organization. Hamilton concludes that acoustic and acousmatic accounts help to distinguish between music and non-musical soundart, since music must have a preponderance of tones for its material.[5] Hamilton says that recording has transformed the nature of music as an art by reconfiguring the opposition between the aesthetics of perfection and imperfection: imperfectionist approaches to recording are purist in wanting to maintain the diachronic and synchronic integrity of the performance, which perfectionist recording creatively subverts through mixing and editing. As Hamilton puts it, a purist transparency thesis cannot evade the fact that the recorded image is crafted. Against creative editing, however, the imperfectionist ideal of the 'complete take' is humanistic and anti-mechanistic. Hamilton contrasts the possibility of a non-acousmatic sound art with the essentially acousmatic art of music.[6] Levinson defines music as sounds temporally organized by a person for the purpose of enriching or intensifying experience through active engagement with the sounds regarded in significant measure as sounds.[7]

On Braxton's reading, notation as practised in black improvised creativity is not viewed as a factor that only involves the duplication of a given piece of music. "Notation has been used as both a recall factor as well as a generating factor to establish improvisational coordinates. [. . .] Notation in this context invariably becomes a stabilising factor that functions with the total scheme of the music rather

than a dominant factor at the expense of the music."[8] Parker notes that there are many systems of improvisation/ composition: each system has a medium through which it is introduced into the world. "The mother of any system is always the creative spirit; the medium is the receptive creative being that is open to the creative spirit. […] What I like about playing creative music is the increased possibilities of what can be used in the music. When it is working, I can play almost any melody, rhythm, harmony, or sound at any time for however long or short a duration. I can superimpose layer upon layer of sound, change keys as I feel it necessary, in order to bring the music to life."[9] Parker claims that musical instruction should consist of training the students to act as a filter or conduit for sound, to know how to react to music that flows through us, to learn to manipulate a musical instrument "in order to turn sound into tone, not in a serendipitous way, but through an exact intuition that is bursting with reason, purpose, and knowledge, allowing one to play the right sounds at the right moment to tap into an inspiring magical music."[10]

Lewis holds that it should be axiomatic that, both in our musical and in our human, everyday life improvisations, "we interact with our environment, navigating through time, place, and situation, both creating and discovering form. On the face of it, this interactive, form-giving process appears to take root and flower freely, in many kinds of music, both with and without pre-existing rules and regulations."[11] The tension and the possibility of failure which are part of an improvised performance have no place in modern concert life.[12] In contrast with compositional music, the problems involved with making improvised music are solved within performance (the music is made real by the creative input of the players).[13] Attali says that there is no communication possible between men any longer, "now that the codes have been destroyed, including even the code of exchange in repetition. We are all condemned to silence—unless we create our own relation with the world and try to tie other people into the meaning we thus create. This is what com-

posing is."[14] Prévost states that within a meta-music, the working of the market economy, and its high art/educational corollaries, "have first to be understood, then superseded. Mechanistic hierarchy has to be replaced by more mobile social thought systems, where interchange of roles and moral authority are part of individual growth."[15] Borgo writes that in relating group improvisation to complexity theory the dynamic complexity that informs, and can be generated by, an individual improviser is immense. "Mind and body, moment and place, emotion and intellect, preparation, experience, and spontaneity all collide, collude, and (in the best of moments) cooperate to create a compelling performance. When the complexities of individual improvisation are combined and amplified in a group setting—particularly those settings without an overriding "composition" or a shared harmonic or rhythmic framework—the sheer volume and variety of interactions, influences, intentions, and potential (mis)interpretations that come into play would seem to preclude the possibility for anything meaningful to emerge. Yet these freer settings for group improvisation challenge us to engage with the complexities of collective dynamics and decision-making and with the emergent qualities of ensemble performance."[16]

Scruton points out that what we hear, in hearing Stockhausen's *Gruppen*, "is precisely what we do not hear in a Beethoven Symphony: a series of sounds, produced by many different sources in physical space, as opposed to a movement of tones which summon and answer one another in a space of their own."[17] Goehr states that within German Romanticism the purely musical served as a general metaphor for all that was unknowable by ordinary cognitive or rational means.[18] On Jankélévitch's reading, the musical mystery is not "what cannot be spoken of", the untellable, but the *ineffable*.[19]

REFERENCES

1. Desain, P. • Honing, H., *Perception of Time: The Formation of Rhythmic Categories and Metric Priming, Music, Mind and Maschine Group*, Nijmegen, NICI, 2002, p. 54.

2. Hanslick, E., *On the Musically Beautiful*, Payzant, G., (tr.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1986, p. 97.

3. Scruton, R., "Analytical Philosophy and the Meaning of Music", in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 46, 1987, p. 172.

4. Subotnik, R., "Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: A Critique of Shoenberg, Adorno, and Stravinsky," in Narmour, E. and Solie, R., (eds.), *Explorations in Music, The Arts, and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B. Meyer*, Pendragon Press, Stuyvesant, NY, 1988, p. 88.

5. Hamilton, A., "Music and the Aural Arts", in *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 47 (1), 2007, pp. 46-63.

6. Hamilton, A., "The Art of Recording and the Aesthetics of Perfection", in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 43 (4), 2003, pp. 345-362.

7. Levinson, J., "The Concept of Music", in *Music, Art, and Metaphysics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, 267-78.

8. Braxton, A., *Tri-Axium Writings*, Vol. 3, Synthesis Music, Lebanon, 1985, pp. 35-36.

9. Parker, W., *Who Owns Music?*, Buddy's Knife, Cologne, 2007, p. 61.

10. Ibid., p. 66.

11. Lewis, G., "Improvised Music after 1950: Afrological and Euro- logical Perspectives", in *Black Music Research Journal*, 16 (1), 1996, p. 117.

12. Small, Ch., *Music of the Common Tongue: Survival and Celebration in Afro-American Music.* New York: Riverrun Press, 1997, p. 284.

13. Prévost, E., *No Sound is Innocent: AMM and the Practice of Self-Invention, Meta-Musical Narratives and Other Essays*, Copula/ Matchless Recordings, Essex, 1995, p. 172

14. Attali, J., *Noise: The Political Economy of Music*, Massumi. B., (tr.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, p. 134.

15. Prévost, E., [13], p. 69.

16. Borgo, D., *Sync or Swarm: Improvising Music in a Complex Age*, Continuum, New York and London, 2005, p. 62.

17. Scruton, R., *The Aesthetics of Music*, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 1999, p. 281.

18. Goehr, L., *The Quest for Voice: Music, Politics, and the Limits of Philosophy*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1998, p. 18.

19. Jankélévitch, V., *Music and the Ineffable*, Abbate, C., (tr.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2003, p. 72.

MUSIC AS A RICH AND COMPLEX PRODUCT OF CULTURE

VIORICA BARBU-IURAŞCU
Spiru Haret University

ABSTRACT. Bribitzer-Stull seeks to define the dual function of the cadenza. Schonberg argues that today the conductor, more than any one musical figure, shapes our musical life and thought. As Zangwill puts it, it is essential to music to be somehow related to real emotion. Vickhoff holds that we can perceive music from a dyadic perspective.

Scruton contends that there lies, in our most basic apprehension of music, a complex system of metaphor, "which is the true description of no material fact, not even a fact about sounds, judged as secondary objects. The metaphor cannot be eliminated from the description of music, because it defines the intentional object of the musical experience. Take the metaphor away, and you cease to describe the experience of music."[1] Guck observes that if perceived musical structure is indivisible from physical and emotional response, then metaphors may offer an embryonic structural interpretation reinforced by physical-emotional responses. "If a structural interpretation is not understood by itself, experiencing the responses may be another avenue to understanding the structure. Equally, metaphors offer a physical-emotional experience reinforced by – explained through – an embryonic structural interpretation."[2] Boorman claims that the arrangement of printed volumes of polyphony in partbook format means that the titles were useless to anyone except a complete set of performers. "The act of silently studying the music from such books was, if not impossible, very tedious. [. . .] This makes implicit what is implied by format, that the sort of use-for-reference that characterizes, say, legal printing, is an impossibility for almost all printed music. Thus until the appearance of these volumes in score, one cannot say that there was a *reading*

public for musical printing but only a *using* public."[3] As Bribitzer-Stull puts it, conventional wisdom holds that the cadenza is a musical parenthesis: like linguistic parenthetical remarks, cadenzas may be engaging, illuminating, and insightful, but they are not regarded as intrinsic to structural coherence. The cadenza tradition stands as one endowed with great musical richness, worthy of further analytic investigation. Bribitzer-Stull seeks to define the dual function of the cadenza. Specifically, the cadenza is heard simultaneously as a local, harmonic event and as a global, formal event. On the local level, it may either prolong one harmony or progress from one to another. On the global level, it can serve a variety of formal functions: highlighting salient cadences; opening a space for virtuosic display; and developing, relating, and rehearing elements of the concerto movement proper. Bribitzer-Stull maintains that the cadenza's dual function grants it a potential far exceeding the simple characterization as parenthesis: skillfully composed cadenzas exploit the tension between local and global functions and can initiate subtle yet profound rehearings of music outside cadenza space—rehearings that give us pause to reconsider both the cadenza-as-parenthesis metaphor and the artificial boundaries we construct among composer, performer, and analyst.[4]

Schonberg argues that today the conductor, more than any one musical figure, shapes our musical life and thought: that may not be how things should be, but it is the way they are. "In a future, fully automated age, it may be that the conductor, along with all performing musicians, will be obsolete. Musical creators are working toward that day, assembling electronic scores that, once put on tape, never vary. […] But until that unfortunate day is here, let us be thankful that there still remain interpretive musicians to synthesize the product of the composer. For without the interplay between the minds of the creator and interpreter, music is not only stale, flat and unprofitable. It is meaningless."[5] Schonberg concludes that musical notation is an inexact art, no matter how composers sweat and strive to

perfect it: symbols and instructions on the printed page are subject to various interpretations, not to one interpretation. Scruton writes that the jazz performer is, in a sense, also the composer, or one part of a corporate composer. “But to describe free improvisation in that way is to assume that composition is the paradigm case, and improvisation secondary. It would be truer to the history of music, and truer to our deeper musical instincts, to see things the other way round: to see composition as born from the writing-down of music, and from the subsequent transformation of the scribe from recorder to creator of the thing he writes. Jacques Derrida has famously criticised Western civilisation as ‘logocentric’ – privileging speech over writing, as the purveyor of human intention. The criticism is the opposite of the truth: writing has been so privileged by our civilisation, in religion, law, and politics, as well as in art and literature, that we tend to lose sight of the fact that written signs owe their life to the thing which is *written* down.”[6]

On Zangwill’s reading, it is essential to music to be somehow related to real emotion. The most obvious explanation of why we describe music in emotion terms is that emotions are part of what music is. Zangwill argues for a particular nonliteralist view of linguistic descriptions of music in terms of emotion: emotion descriptions are metaphorical descriptions of aesthetic properties. Music has the function of sustaining aesthetic properties. Emotion descriptions of music are only appropriate to absolute music. Emotions may sometimes be among the further effects of the experience of music. *Primary* musical experience and creation does not involve ordinary emotion. “The aesthetic theory of music is certainly comfortably compatible with formalism. It is also compatible with many anti-formalist views. Either way, the aesthetic theory of music can embrace the aesthetic metaphor thesis and say that the aesthetic properties of music are often metaphorically described in emotion terms. The formalist will say that the aesthetic character of music is internal to the sounds, and that is what is described metaphorically in emotion terms. Although we

may need training and acculturation in order to appreciate those formal values, that does not mean that *what* we appreciate, armed with that training and acculturation, is not internal to the sounds we hear."[7] Zangwill states that the emotions we feel when we appreciate music are not the ordinary emotions that are usually referred to by the words used in emotion descriptions of music. Some music has positive aesthetic value *because* it is angry or proud or serene. The ordinary musical listener typically thinks of emotion descriptions of music as describing something that is of aesthetic value in itself. The issue of negative emotion in music should be firmly distinguished from issues about negative emotion in representational arts. Primary musical experience involves various experiences, such as *perceptual experiences of the music* and *experiences of pleasure in the music*. Our pleasurable experiences of music prompt us to describe the music metaphorically in emotion terms. "Perhaps speaking of mere *pleasure* does not do justice to the rapt and intense and ecstatic nature of some of our experience of music. Some of our experience of some music has a peculiar intensity. Of course, much musical experience is disappointingly mundane; but some is not. What about musical ecstasy? When we are listening intently to music—when we are rapt and ecstatic—what exactly is going on in us? That is, what is the nature of these special and intense experiences of the music?"[8]

Vickhoff holds that we can perceive music from a dyadic perspective: the music is perceived *as the other* – as the emotional expression of a musician, say, and that we take the perspective of this other being. We feel the movement in the music and this movement affects us. When we listen to music from a dyadic perspective, the other will be in the frame of reference. Musical elements participate in the process of communicative development very early. In symphonic performances the conductor takes on the soloist's role to impersonate the music. Most styles of music have their own body expression. "Even if music is not movement in a spatial sense, *something* is moving, namely the

musician. Music is produced by bodies in motion. The sound mirrors the musician's movements vis-à-vis the instrument. Musicians move their entire bodies to sing, or to blow wind or brass instruments. In fact, if we were to invent a device to register in sound how a person is moving her fingers over a table, we would end up with something like the piano. The piano registers the attack, the direction (left-right), the intervallic leaps, number of fingers used, the spread of the fingers and the speed as sounds. Every subtle nuance in tempo and touch is heard. Every heard change in pitch and dynamics corresponds to a movement by the player."[9] Vickhoff points out that music is, in a concrete sense, heard movement. Of the basic functions of music is to guide movement. We cannot claim that there is general relation between music and movement. We can take dyadic perspectives as we listen to music. The music is the expression of the other. It is not the music but the musician that moves us. The listener is moved by the music from cognitive consciousness to phenomenal consciousness. The key to understand music and emotion must be the understanding of emotional expression. One dimension in music is the vitality affect. "The perception process is to a large extent preattentive. This means that we do not have to be aware of the other to be emotionally affected. It is thus not critical that we perceive the other in the music consciously. In other words we do not have to think or experience the music as the expression of the other to be affected by it – the movement of the other affects us anyway. The emotion does not result from the appraisal of the other; it does not result from conscious judgements."[10] Vickhoff concludes that composers must work in real time when they create music. The composer, having the procedural knowledge of music, starts a real time imagery of music.

REFERENCES

1. Scruton, R., *The Aesthetics of Music*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 92.

2. Guck, M.A., "Musical Images as Musical Thoughts: The Contribution of Metaphor to Analysis", in *Theory Only*, 5 (5), 1981, p. 42.

3. Boorman, S., "Early Music Printing: Working for a Specialized Market," in Tyson, G. • Wagonheim, S., (eds.), *Print and Culture in the Renaissance: Essays on the Advent of Printing in Europe*, University of Delaware Press, Newark, DE, 1986, p. 222.

4. Bribitzer-Stull, M., "The Cadenza as Parenthesis. An Analytic Approach", in *Journal of Music Theory*, 50 (2), 2006, pp. 211–251.

5. Schonberg, H., *The Great Conductors*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1967, pp. 23–24.

6. Scruton, R., *The Aesthetics of Music*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 439.

7. Zangwill, N., "Music, Metaphor, and Emotion", in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 65 (4), 2007, p. 395.

8. Ibid., p. 398.

9. Vickhoff, B., *A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion*, PhD diss., University of Gothenburg, 2008, p. 108.

10. Ibid., p. 132.

MENTAL STATES, LANGUAGE, AND COMPOSITIONALITY

MĂDĂLINA NICOLOF
University of Piteşti

ABSTRACT. Barker and Jacobson examine the hypothesis of "direct compositionality", which requires that semantic interpretation proceed in tandem with syntactic combination. Braisby notes that the nature of complex concepts has important implications for the computational modelling of the mind, as well as for the cognitive science of concepts. According to LePore and Fodor, compositionality is the following aspect of a system of representation: the complex symbols in the system inherit their syntactic and semantic properties from the primitive symbols of the system. Prinz maintains that prototypes are very important components of concepts, components that play a privileged role in our mental lives.

Barker and Jacobson examine the hypothesis of "direct compositionality", which requires that semantic interpretation proceed in tandem with syntactic combination: the syntax-semantics interaction is often seen as a process in which the syntax builds representations which, at the abstract level of logical form, are sent for interpretation to the semantics component of the language faculty. Barker and Jacobson consider that direct compositionality is not after all a simpler and more effective conception of the grammar than the conventional account of the syntax-semantics interface in generative grammar.[1] Braisby notes that the nature of complex concepts has important implications for the computational modelling of the mind, as well as for the cognitive science of concepts, and outlines the way in which RVC (a Relational View of Concepts) accommodates a range of complex concepts, cases which have been argued to be non-compositional. On Braisby's reading, RVC attempts to integrate a number of psychological, linguistic and psycholinguistic considerations with the situation-theoretic view that information-carrying relations hold only relative to background situations (the central tenet of RVC is that the con-

tent of concepts varies systematically with perspective): the analysis of complex concepts indicates that compositionality too should be considered to be sensitive to perspective, and such a view accords with concepts and mental states being situated. Braisby discusses the implications for theories of concepts and for computational models of the mind.[2] Butler addresses the question of whether mental representations are compositional. The data do not show that mental representations are noncompositional, and that there are significant problems with the suggested interpretations of connectionist encoding schemes.[3]

According to LePore and Fodor, compositionality is the following aspect of a system of representation: the complex symbols in the system inherit their syntactic and semantic properties from the primitive symbols of the system. Fodor and LePore argue that compositionality determines what view we must take of the nature of concepts.[4] Fodor and LePore point out that compositionality is the idea that the meanings of complex expressions (or concepts) are constructed from the meanings of the less complex expressions (or concepts) that are their constituents. Compositionality implies that, if you are given the syntax and the lexical content of an expression, you have all the information that's relevant to what it means. Compositionality, together with the systematicity of complex meanings, places a context-independence constraint on the properties of lexical meanings. Fodor and LePore say that people who think it matters to the lexicon whether complex meanings are compositional have it in mind to deploy arguments whose premises also include many other premises about the semantics of such expressions. Considerations of learnability dictate that meaning must be compositional: the meanings of all sentences are determined by the meanings of a finite number of primitive expressions and a finite number of operations on them. Meaning must be "reverse compositional" as well: the meanings of the primitive expressions of which a complex expression is composed must be determined by the meaning of that complex expression plus the

manner of its composition.[5] Dummett writes that any theory of meaning which was not, or did not immediately yield, a theory of understanding, "would not satisfy the purpose for which, philosophically, we require a theory of meaning."[6]

Fodor and LePore observe that compositionality is the sovereign test for theories of lexical meaning. "So hard is this test to pass, we think, that it filters out practically all of the theories of lexical meaning that are current in either philosophy or cognitive science. Among the casualties are, for example, the theory that lexical meanings are statistical structures (like stereotypes); the theory that themeaning of a word is its use; the theory that knowing the meaning of (at least some) words requires having a recognitional capacity for (at least some of) the things it applies to; and the theory that knowing the meaning of a word requires knowing the criteria for applying it. Indeed, we think that only two theories of the lexicon survive the compositionality constraint: viz., the theory that all lexical meanings are primitive and the theory that some lexical meanings are primitive and the rest are definitions."[7] Fodor and Lepore contend that according to prototype theory, to have a concept is to have its prototype together with a measure of the distance between the prototype and an arbitrary object in the domain of discourse. "*Prima facie*, however, the distance of an arbitrary object from the prototypical pet fish *isn't* a function of its distance from the prototypical pet and its distance from the prototypical fish."[8] Fodor and Lepore maintain that the whole point of assuming compositionality is to explain "how somebody who understands the vocabulary and the syntax of a complex expression is *thereby* able to understand the complex expression itself; viz., *without relying upon further information from the world*."[9]

Davidson states that when we can regard the meaning of each sentence as a function of a finite number of features of the sentence, we have an insight into what there is to be learned and we understand how an infinite aptitude can be encompassed by finite accomplishments. "For suppose that a language lacks this feature; then no matter how

many sentences a would-be speaker learns to produce and understand, there will remain others whose meanings are not given by the rules already mastered. It is natural to say that such a language is *unlearnable*. This argument depends, of course, on a number of empirical assumptions: for example, that we do not at some point suddenly acquire an ability to intuit the meanings of sentences on no rule at all; that each new item of vocabulary, or new grammatical rule, takes some finite time to be learned; that man is mortal.[10] Fodor asserts that compositionality requires that host concepts receive their semantic properties solely from their constituents, "*and also that constituent concepts transmit all of their semantic properties to their hosts.*"[11] Szabó holds that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its constituents and by its structure, and distinguishes between a Modest Principle of Understanding: We understand a complex expression by understanding its constituents[12] and the way they are combined, and and a Strong Principle of Understanding: We understand a complex exppression by understanding its constituents and the way they are combined, and we could not understand it in any other way. The same meaning operations define semantic functions in all possible human languages, not just for all sentences in each language taken by itself.[13]

Fodor and LePore ask us to consider the meaning of the phrase 'brown cow': it depends on the meanings of 'brown' and 'cow' together with its syntax, just as compositionality requires. "But now, prima facie, the inferential role of 'brown cow' depends not only on the inferential role of 'brown' and the inferential role of 'cow', *but also what you happen to believe about brown cows*. So unlike meaning, inferential role is, in the general case, not compositional. Suppose, for example, you happen to think that brown cows are dangerous; then it's part of the inferential role of 'brown cow' in your dialect that it does (or can) figure in inferences like '*brown cow → dangerous*'. But, first blush anyhow, this fact about the inferential role of 'brown cow' does not seem to derive from corresponding facts about the

inferential roles of its constituents. You can see this by contrasting the present case with, for example, the validity of inferences like '*brown cow → brown animal*' or '*brown cow → non-green cow*'. 'Brown cow' entails 'non-green cow' because 'brown' entails 'non-green'. But it does not look like either 'brown' or 'cow' entails 'dangerous', so, to this extent, it does not look like the inference from 'brown cow' to 'dangerous' is compositional."[14]

Prinz maintains that prototypes are very important components of concepts, components that play a privileged role in our mental lives. Prototypes are our default conceptual representations. Concepts are *usually* prototypes. Compositionality can be defined as a property that a system of representations has if the content of a compound representation is determined as a function of the contents of its component parts. Prinz holds that emergent features come from somewhere other than the prototypes corresponding to the parts of a compound. Prototypes *can* be combined compositionally, even if they are not always combined that way. Three things can contribute to the composition process: compositional mechanisms, memories of exemplars, and background knowledge. All knowledge we have of a category, including stored exemplars and theoretical beliefs, count as conceptual.[15] Janssen says that the most valuable arguments for compositionality are those concerning the elegance and power of the framework, its heuristic value and the lack of a mathematically well defined alternative. "I expect that problematic cases can always be dealt with by means of another organisation of the syntax, resulting in more abstract parts, or by means of a more abstract conception of meaning. The principle only has to be abandoned if it leads too often to unnecessarily complicated treatments."[16]

REFERENCES

1. Barker, De C. • Jacobson, P.I., *Direct Compositionality*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

2. Braisby, N., "Compositionality and the Modelling of Complex Concepts", in *Minds and Machines*, 8 (3), 1998, pp. 479–507

3. Butler, K., "Content, Context, and Compositionality", in *Mind and Language*, 10 (1–2), 2007, pp. 3–24.

4. Fodor, J. • LePore, E., *The Compositionality Papers*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.

5. Fodor, J. • LePore, E., "Why Compositionality Won't Go Away: Reflections on Horwich's 'Deflationary' Theory", in *Ratio* 14 (4), 2001, pp. 350–368.

6. Dummett, M., *The Seas of Language*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p.4.

7. Fodor, J. and Lepore, E., [4], pp. 43–44.

8. Ibid., p. 35.

9. Ibid., p. 38

10. Davidson, D., *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1984, pp. 8–9.

11. Fodor, J., "Language, Thought and Compositionality", in *Mind and Language* 16, 2001, p. 9.

12. Lăzăroiu, G., "Wittgenstein and Reality", in *Multimedia, Cyberjournalism, and the Texture of Reality*, Denbridge Press, New York, 2008, pp. 113–188.

13. Szabó, Z., "Compositionality as Supervenience", in *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 23, 2000, pp. 475–505.

14. Fodor, J.A. • LePore, E., "Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role", in Villaneuva, E., (ed.), *Science and Knowledge*, Ridgeview, Atascadero, 1993, p. 23.

15. Prinz, J., "Regaining Composure: A Defense of Prototype Compositionality", in Werning, M. et al., (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

16. Janssen, T., *Foundations and Applications of Montague Grammar*, PhD thesis, Department of Mathematics, University of Amsterdam, 1983, p. 39.

ON THE COMPOSITIONALITY OF MEANING

ADRIAN CONSTANTINESCU
CSA-AAP, New York

ABSTRACT. Horwich claims that the compositionality of meaning imposes no constraint at all on how the meaning properties of words are constituted. Pagin and Westerståhl maintain that compositionality is the property that the meaning of any complex expression is *determined* by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together. Stanley and Szabó put it that an indefinite number of composition rules that vary not just according to linguistic context, but also according to extra-linguistic context, seems in tension with learnability considerations. Partee maintains that if the syntax is sufficiently unconstrained and meanings are sufficiently rich, there seems no doubt that natural languages can be described compositionally.

Horwich claims that the compositionality of meaning imposes no constraint at all on how the meaning properties of words are constituted. "Understanding one of one's own complex expressions (non-idiomatically) is, by definition, nothing over and above understanding its parts and knowing how they are combined. […] Once one has worked out how a certain sentence is constructed from primitive syntactic elements, and provided one knows the meanings of those elements, then, automatically and without further ado, one qualifies as understanding the sentence."[1] Horwich argues that the length and complexity of expressions whose structures we are able to discern are constrained by psychological factors. "The deflationary account fails to do justice to the intuition that we *figure out* the meanings of complex expressions on the basis of our *knowledge* of what their parts mean. [...] It's not just that the *facts* about the meanings of primitives determine the *facts* about the meanings of the complexes. It's rather that our *knowledge* of the basic facts must lead by some inferential process to our *knowledge* of what the complexes mean."[2] As Horwich puts it, although there may be *some* language whose complex

expressions are understood as a product of explicit inference, “such inferences would have to take place in a more basic language whose complexes would themselves already have to have some content or meaning; and if inferences are required for this, then a yet more basic language would be needed in which to conduct them. […] It is all very well to refuse to speak of ‘understanding’ and ‘possession’ of meaning in connection with the language of thought, and thereby to hope to retain the idea that when a complex is, properly speaking, ‘understood’, inference is invariably involved.”[3] Dummett says that if language is to serve as a medium of communication, “it is not sufficient that a sentence should in fact be true under the interpretation placed on it by one speaker just in case it is true under that placed on it by another; it is also necessary that both speakers should be aware of the fact.”[4] Dummett concludes that all that is essentially presupposed for the understanding of a complex sentence is the understanding of the subsentences.[5]

Pagin and Westerståhl maintain that compositionality is the property that the meaning of any complex expression is *determined* by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together. The meaning (value) of a compound expression is a *function* of certain other things (other meanings (values) and a ‘mode of composition’). The function version of compositional semantics is given by recursion over syntax. Pagin and Westerståhl observe that basic (first-level) compositionality takes the meaning of a complex expression to be determined by the meanings of the *immediate* subexpressions and the top-level syntactic operation. In standard possible-worlds semantics the role of meanings are served by *intensions*: functions from possible worlds to extensions. The most common argument for compositionality is the argument from *learnability*: Pagin and Westerståhl hold that a natural language has infinitely many meaningful sentences. It is in the spirit of radical contextualism to minimize the contribution of semantics (literal meaning) for determining expressed content. Belief sentences

offer difficulties for compositional semantics.[6] Pagin thinks that there is an underlying conflict between the view on meaning that is associated with the rule-following considerations and that associated with the justification of compositionality. The rule-following considerations provide a *reductio ad absurdum* of the normativity assumption itself. Pagin speaks both of rule explanations, which are instructions for proceeding in accordance with a rule, and also of theoretical explanations, in particular of the success of instances of linguistic communication. The association of a rule formulation with a rule is something that each rule follower must effect by him/herself. Pagin remarks that the understanding of a rule, as a private phenomenon, or mental state, must determine what the correct applications of the rule are. The principle of compositionality is to be understood as part of a *theory* about speakers.[7]

Block writes that there can be a many-one relation between thought contents and meanings, and a many-one relation between meanings and truth conditions.[8] According to Stanley and Szabó, what the phenomenon of quantified contexts shows is that, assuming standard treatments of binding, quantifier domain restriction must be treated with the use of variables. "We must associate variables with some part of quantifier expressions, such as 'every bottle'. Distinct nonmetalinguistic [semantic] treatments of the problem of quantifier domain restriction correspond to different ways of associating variables with quantifier expressions."[9] Stanley and Szabó put it that an indefinite number of composition rules that vary not just according to linguistic context, but also according to extra-linguistic context, seems in tension with learnability considerations. "If contextual variables were allowed to occur in non-terminal nodes, then the semantic theories required to interpret the resulting structures would violate compositionality in this quite drastic manner. Therefore, the distribution of contextual variables should be restricted to terminal nodes."[10] Fodor and LePore state that there are two great traditions in philosophy of language. "The atomistic tradition proceeds from the likes of

the British empiricists, via such of the pragmatists as Peirce and James. […] The contemporary representatives of this tradition are mostly model theorists, behaviorists, and informational semanticists. Whereas people in this tradition think that the semantic properties of a symbol are determined solely by its relations to things in the nonlinguistic world, people in the second tradition think that the semantic properties of a symbol are determined, at least in part, by its role in a language. […] This second tradition proceeds from the likes of the structuralists in linguistics and the Fregeans in philosophy. Its contemporary representatives are legion. They include Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Dennett, Block, Devitt, Putnam, Rorty, and Sellars among philosophers; *almost* everybody in AI and cognitive psychology; and it may be that they include absolutely everybody who writes literary criticism in French."[11]

Prior argues that it is one thing to define 'conjunction-forming sign', and quite another to define 'and'. "We may say, for example, that a conjunction-forming sign is any sign which, when placed between any pair of sentences P and Q, forms a sentence which may be inferred from P and Q together, and from which we may infer P and infer Q. Or we may say that it is a sign which, when placed between any pair of sentences P and Q, forms a sentence which is true when both P and Q are true, and otherwise false. Each of these tells us something that could be meant by saying that 'and', for instance, or '&', is a conjunction forming sign. But neither of them tells us what is meant by 'and' or by '&' itself."[12] Concepts are temporary constructions in working memory, rather than fixed and enduring entities in long-term memory.[13] Partee maintains that if the syntax is sufficiently unconstrained and meanings are sufficiently rich[14], there seems no doubt that natural languages can be described compositionally. "Challenges to the principle generally involve either explicit or implicit arguments to the effect that it conflicts with other well-motivated constraints."[15] Weiskopf states that there are good reasons to think that natural languages are compositional: compound

nominals (CNs) are largely productive constructions that have proven highly recalcitrant to compositional semantic analysis. Weiskopf evaluates two proposals to treat CNs compositionally, claims that they are unsuccessful, and articulates an alternative proposal according to which CNs contain covert indexicals: features of the context allow a variety of relations to be expressed using CNs, but this variety is not expressed in the lexicon or the semantic rules of the language. This proposal accounts for the diversity of contents CNs can be used to express while preserving compositionality.[16]

REFERENCES

1. Horwich, P., "Deflating Compositionality", in Kotatko, P. • Segal, G., (eds.), *Interpreting Davidson*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 155.

2. Ibid., p. 171.

3. Ibid., pp. 172–173.

4. Dummett, M., *Truth and Other Enigmas*, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London,1991, p. 132.

5. Dummett, M., *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991, p. 258.

6. Pagin, P. • Westerståhl, D., "Compositionality", forthcoming in Heusinger, K. von et al., (eds.), *Semantics. An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning*, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.

7. Pagin, P., "Rule-Following, Compositionality and the Normativity of Meaning", in Prawitz, D., (ed.), *Meaning and Interpretation*, Konferenser 55, Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitetsakademien, Stockholm, 2002, pp. 153–181.

8. Block, N., "Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality", in *Mind and Language*, 8, 1993, p. 16.

9. Stanley, J. • Szabó, Z., "On Quantifier Domain Restriction", in *Mind and Language*, 15, 2000, p. 251.

10. Ibid., p. 256.

11. Fodor, J. • LePore, E., *Holism: A Shopper's Guide*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, p. 7.

12. Prior, A.N., "Conjunction and Contonktion Revisited", in *Analysis*, 24, 1964, p. 191.

13. Barsalou, L.W., "The Instability of Graded Structure: Implications for the Nature of Concepts", in Neisser, U., (ed.), *Concepts and Conceptual Development: Ecological and Intellectual Factors in Categorization*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.

14. Lăzăroiu, G., “Wittgenstein and Reality”, in *Multimedia, Cyberjournalism, and the Texture of Reality*, Denbridge Press, New York, 2008, pp. 113–188.

15. Partee, B., “Compositionality”, in Landman, F. and Veltman, Fr., (eds.), *Varieties of Formal Semantics*, Foris, Dordrecht, 1984, p. 281.

16. Weiskopf, D., “Compound Nominals, Context, and Compositionality”, in *Synthese*, 156 (1), 2007, pp. 161–204.

BRENTANO: IMMANENT REALISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF INTENTIONAL REFERENCE

OANA GHERMAN
PhD C., University of Bucharest

ABSTRACT. Smith maintains that Brentano conceives his own theory of substance as a refined and perfected version of the Aristotelian theory. According to Mulligan and Smith, Brentano argues that a range of different habits and training are necessary preconditions of noticing. McDonnell observes that, for Brentano, our consciousness contains a structural unity of its own. Zahavi emphasizes that, according to Brentano, all mental states are characterized by their intentional directedness, they are all conscious of objects. Albertazzi points out that Brentano's doctrine tries to conciliate the presence of an often *irreducible transcendent foundation* of perception with its *immanent and equally irreducible categorization* by the intentional acts.

Smith maintains that Brentano conceives his own theory of substance as a refined and perfected version of the Aristotelian theory. All putative cases of relational accidents are capable of being divided, without remainder, into non-relational accidents of their respective bearers. Many of the elements of consciousness can be cut loose or separated from one another in that the part that earlier existed with the second part in the same real unity continues in existence when that other part has ceased to exist. Mental acts fall into the categories of fundamental or basic acts. The relation between wish and presentation or between fear and presumption is like the relation all these acts bear to the *subject* who has them. As Smith puts it, Brentano conceives the accident as the substance itself *augmented* in a certain way. There is a sense in which, when I have a mental act, then the subject of this act is present as a part of the act. The act is the self momentarily augmenting itself, mentally, in a certain way. Brentano regards the accident as existing only with the support of its substance. Brentanian accidents may themselves serve as the bearers of further

accidents. Brentano treats location in time as a substantial determination. There is only *one* temporal determination, which all things share in common. Brentano sees space as one-sidedly dependent on (inseparable from) time.[1]

Brentano states that every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, "and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing) or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on."[2] Brentano remarks that the phenomena of light, sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion which the natural scientist studies are not things which really truly and exist: they are signs of something real, which, through its causal activity, produces presentations of them. "They are not, however, an adequate representation of this reality, and they give us knowledge of it only in a very incomplete sense. We can say that there exists something which, under certain conditions, causes this or that sensation. We can probably also prove that there must be relations among these realities similar to those which are manifested by spatial phenomena of shapes and sizes. But this is as far as we can go. We have no experience of that which truly exists, in and of itself, and that which we do experience is not true. The truth of physical phenomena is, as they say, only a relative truth."[3]

Brentano asserts that to feel pleasure or delight is an emotional act, a taking pleasure or a loving. "It always has an object, is necessarily a pleasure in something which we perceive or imagine, have an idea of. For example, sensual pleasure has a certain localised sense quality as its object."[4] Brentano holds that there are two senses in which a man may be said to be pleased with an object, or to take pleasure in it, and two senses in which he may be said to

be displeased with an object or to take displeasure in it. “In the first case, he may simply find the object to be agreeable, or disagreeable. In the second, he finds the object to be agreeable, or disagreeable, and then, because of this fact, he takes pleasure or displeasure in another object.”[5]

According to Mulligan and Smith, Brentano argues that a range of different habits and training are necessary preconditions of noticing. It is comparisons, amongst other things, that make up the processes in the life of every mature individual that must be called primordial. The relationship between wish and presentation is like the relation both have to the subject who has the wish and presentation. A spatial extension only exists to the extent that there are space-filling qualities which this extension is the extension *of*. The relation of logical parts to their whole is distinct from the relations manifested in cases of one-sided separability and of distinctive parts. Every object of sensation has a perceptual *quality* and this occupies a perceivable space. The source of our concept of time is an experience of original association which accompanies all perception but is distinct from it.[6]

McDonnell observes that, for Brentano, our consciousness contains a structural unity of its own (a ‘real unity’ of multiplicity): the starting point for Brentano’s new science of descriptive psychology is the particular experiencing of consciousness of a “mentally active subject”. The object-relatedness of all conscious acts (the “intentionality of consciousness”) is one such discernible structure that is true of the nature of psychical-act experiences themselves. The object-relatedness or directedness towards objects in consciousness is an intrinsic feature of consciousness *itself*. There are two classes of phenomena, namely, physical and psychical phenomena given to corresponding acts of outer and inner perception. Our everyday normal acts of outer sense perception of physical phenomena are inherently and naturally misleading because they take their objects to be existing “out there” as it were. The intentional inexistence of an object is *exclusively* a defining feature of the psychical-

act experiences of a mentally active subject. Intentional objects of outer sense perception (colours) are “signs”. “From about the mid-1880s to 1905, Brentano held two theses of intentionality, one concerning the immanence of objects in consciousness and the other depicting the directedness of the acts of consciousness towards those immanent objects. After 1905, he abandons the thesis of the immanence of objects in consciousness but retains the directedness of the activity of the acts of consciousness as his thesis.”[7]

Albertazzi points out that Brentano’s doctrine tries to conciliate the presence of an often *irreducible transcendent foundation* of perception with its *immanent and equally irreducible categorization* by the intentional acts. “For Brentano, that which *exists in the strict sense* is only the *psychic act* of the *concrete presentation* in the actual present: that is actual processes.”[8] Albertazzi notes that, as Brentano puts it, “physical” phenomena are nothing but “the object of intentional reference.” They are objects internal to the field of the presentational continuum. “Immanent realism seems to be one of the few ways out of reductionism upwards (representationalism) or downwards (neurophysiology), in which research on consciousness today” could progress.”[9]

Zahavi emphasizes that, according to Brentano, all mental states are characterized by their intentional directedness, they are all conscious of objects. A mental state is conscious not by being taken as an object by a further mental state, but by taking itself as object. The perception of the sunset is united so intrinsically and intimately with the aware ness of the perception of the sunset, that they only constitute one single psychical phenomenon. The experience is in principle incapable of observing itself thematically. The feature that makes a mental state conscious is located within the state itself. Every conscious intentional state takes two objects, a primary (external) object, and a secondary (internal) object.[10] On Soldati’s reading, Brentano introduces the idea of mental phenomena as being constitutively intentional, necessarily directed onto an object. An act can be intentionally directed on itself just as

much as it is directed on any other object. Mental acts are necessarily given to inner perception[11] and only contingently presented in inner observation. Brentano's notion of evidence depends on his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. A definition of truth in terms of correspondence is epistemologically flawed. A specific kind of mental state is more intimately connected to truth than others. Whatever is presented to the mind can be the content of one's judgement. Mental phenomena have the acceptance character *by necessity*.[12]

REFERENCES

1. Smith, B., "The Substance of Brentano's Ontology", in *Topoi*, 6 (1), 1987, pp. 39–49.

2. Brentano, F., *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, originally published in 1874; English edition by McAlister, L., Routledge, London, 1973; reprinted with an introduction by Simons, P., Routledge, London, 1995, p. 88.

3. Ibid., p. 19.

4. Brentano, F., *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics*, Schneewind, E.H., (trans.), Routledge, London, 1973, p. 164.

5. Brentano, F., *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, Chisholm, R.M. • Schneewind, E.H., (trans.), Routledge, London, 1969, pp. 154–55.

6. Mulligan, K. and Smith, B., "Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 45, 1985, pp. 627–644.

7. McDonnell, C., "Brentano's Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality into a Root-Concept of Descriptive Psychology", in *Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society*, 2006, p. 166.

8. Albertazzi, L., *Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano*, Springer, 2006, p. 214.

9. Ibid., p. 338.

10. Zahavi, D., "Back to Brentano?", in *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11 (10–11), 2004, pp. 66–87.

11. Lăzăroiu, G., "Wittgenstein and Reality", in *Multimedia, Cyberjournalism, and the Texture of Reality*, Denbridge Press, New York, 2008, pp. 113–188.

12. Soldati, G., "Brentano on Inner Perception, Intrinsic Truth and Evidence", in Reicher, M.E. • Marek, J.C., (eds.), *Experience and Analysis*, HPT & OBV, Wien, 2005, pp. 63–73.

THE NEW ROLE OF THE INTERNET IN MAINTAINING AND INCREASING SOCIAL CAPITAL

GEORGE LĂZĂROIU
Spiru Haret University

ABSTRACT. Reese claims that the global audience's most crucial feature is that it has been reconfigured in its denationalized spatial and synchronized temporal relationships. Barnhurst claims that news stories have become generally longer, more analytical, and focused on interpretation. Sassen observes that powerful corporate actors and high performance networks are strengthening the role of private digital space and altering the structure of public digital space. Rasmussen contends that the use of the Internet contributes to the diversity of views and broadening participation, that the public sphere should be seen as consisting of two epistemic dimensions or "faces".

Reese claims that the global audience's most crucial feature is that it has been reconfigured in its denationalized spatial and synchronized temporal relationships. The emergence of global systems requires a global awareness (a process of *identification* to be kept distinct from the existence themselves of global institutions and networks). At the organizational level, global *media* may be the most easily defined and described, particularly in economic terms. Reese uses "global journalism" to refer to that newsgathering practice that orients beyond national boundaries in a deterritorialized fashion (it is a concept and not a category that embraces a variety of specific cases). "Much of the news circulating globally is coordinated by a handful of large corporate organizations based in a few 'global' cities, raising the logical concern that these firms operate with implicitly narrow and commercialized frames as to what constitutes appropriate news stories."[1] Reese remarks that many major media firms have moved to leverage their brand globally (*Time*, *Newsweek*, and *USA Today* exploit their newsgathering resources by providing international editions of their product). The appeal of the publication derives in large part from the presumed prestige of its parent company. Global inter-relationships are

forming among news organizations and the professionals working within them in ways not traced directly by ownership. “Like the predictable reliability of well-known franchise restaurants, the audience of expatriated North Americans for papers such as the International Herald Tribune no doubt appreciates having an English-language paper, but also one that takes a familiar Western-style journalistic perspective on world news. And European readers value it as a gatekeeper for the American view on world events. Emerging technologies in multimedia Internet and satellite television have led to further advances in a globally distributed journalism controlled by a single firm. Traditional print and broadcast news organizations alike have gone online with their work, making it available around the world. Broadcasting organizations such as the BBC, CNN and ABC News have done the same.”[2] Reese holds that decision-makers in core countries have significant influence over news distributed to the periphery. Globalized journalism takes on a less-centralized quality when examined as a web of mutually beneficial relationships among news producers. An emergent professional model comes about in the gravitation toward consensual values and norms in a globalized world. The disseminator role has become increasingly important to journalists. Emphasizing speed of dissemination equips journalists to avoid the value implications of news they produce within transnational organizations. “The global standardization of news through widely recognized name brands and formats would on the surface suggest that news is an unproblematically defined commodity, but the definitions of news at the global level are just as problematic as at the national level. By interacting with their colleagues journalists develop consensual professional values and outlook as to what news should look like – we need not call it standardization, but shared outlook serves a practical need in allowing this system to function.”[3]

Barnhurst claims that news stories have become generally longer, more analytical, and focused on interpretation. The contrasts between the print and on-line editions do not always exploit on-line capacities or make reading easier for

viewers; the on-line newspapers add a few multi-media options (their principal benefit is archival, giving access to stories for retrieval). An important advantage of the Web is its instantaneous transmission, without the processes required to manufacture and distribute print on paper. By giving readers access to its suppliers of information, a newspaper site dilutes its own monopoly control over a geographical market. The impact of the Internet has been felt in the processes of production, involving the transfer of print reports into electronic storehouses. The rise of Internet news has had little impact on news content. The presence of the Internet has begun to affect how journalists think about news.[4]

Reese et al. write that the globalization process has brought greater transnational connectedness, and that the emerging world of blogs must be understood within the larger context of a changing global news arena. The Internet undermine the historic relationship between the press system and the national community. The range of sources and perspectives permitted by professional news gatekeepers establishes the limits of the public sphere they manage. Globalization and technology have produced a broader and more fluid journalistic conversation. “The most important conceptual boundary highlighted in the blogosphere is that between ‘professional’ media and more informal, citizen-based, non-traditional forms. The blogosphere is often regarded as set apart from traditional ‘mainstream’ journalism, but it may also be seen as enveloping both professional and citizen ‘amateur’ journalism in a larger network.”[5] As Reese et al. put it, the professional, traditional media draw their institutional authority and value from their casting of their work within the norms of journalism. Internet use for news and information is still dominated by the traditional media. News providers are now taking steps to enhance their currency by making their stories available to news summaries and blogs that point to it. Bloggers compete for “authority”, not so much in destroying what was closely held by professionals but by redeploying it across a broader area. The online world supports the creation of balkanized subgroups that form around any idea of

interest. “Citizen-based media originate from individuals and public interest groups seeking to express an idea or position within the public discourse. Its producers need not adhere to a professional journalistic code as a requirement for participation. By definition, these non-professional media command less commercial viability and may be based on a non-profit, subsidy, or no-revenue business model. They only require a motivated individual or group willing to speak to a public.”[6]

Kotkin holds that by abolishing the need for face-to-face contact, “the Internet increases loneliness and social isolation, expanding virtual networks that lack the intimacy of real relationships nurtured by physical proximity. Reliance on electronic communication can lead, research suggests, to too much disengagement from real life.”[7] Mills points out that one can upload pictures and stories and histories that might contribute to a feeling of connectedness and nationhood. “But, until full immersive virtual reality technologies are implemented, these tokens will pale in comparison to actually seeing the real thing, feeling the presence.”[8] Bechmann Petersen affirms that the Internet plays a more nuanced role in actual media organizations than a mere starting or vantage point for the specific productions taking place. The overlap of broadcast, computer and printing industries is far from a reality. Cross media towards the users includes focuses on creating cross promotion and cross media storylines.[9] Berners-Lee says that we ought to be able not only to find any kind of document on the Web, but also to create any kind of document easily. “We should be able not only to follow links, but to create them between all sorts of media. We should be able not only to interact with other people, but to create with other people. *Intercreativity* is the process of making things or solving problems together. If *interactivity* is not just sitting there passively in front of a display screen, then *intercreativity* is not just sitting there in front of something ‘interactive.’”[10]

Sassen observes that powerful corporate actors and high performance networks are strengthening the role of private digital space and altering the structure of public digital

space. The particular features of the Internet are in part a function of the early computer hacker culture which designed software that strengthened the original design of the Internet. Electronic space is embedded in actual societal structures and is internally segmented. Sassen regards the Internet as a space produced and marked through the software that gives it its features: the Internet has emerged as a powerful medium for non-elites to communicate, support each other's struggles and create the equivalent of insider groups at scales going from the local to the global. "The growth of global corporate actors has profoundly altered the role of government in the digital era, and as a consequence has further raised the importance of civil society in electronic space as a force through which a multiplicity of public interests can, wittingly or not, resist the overwhelming influence of the new global corporate world."[11] Sassen states that many of the dramatic features attributed to the Internet's power to neutralize sovereignty are features of private digital networks. Private digital networks are making possible forms of power other than the distributed power made possible by public digital networks. Digital space is partly embedded in actual societal structures and power dynamics (its topography weaves in and out of non-electronic space). Private digital space has had a far sharper impact on questions of sovereignty than the Internet. "Many of the dramatic features attributed to the Internet's power to neutralize sovereignty are actually features of private digital networks, such as those used in international finance. Similarly, the key about many of the current transformations and their potential to limit sovereignty may not be the elimination of sovereignty but its unbundling and partial relocation to other supra-, sub- and non-national institutions."[12]

Rasmussen says that the use of the Internet contributes to the diversity of views and broadening participation, that the public sphere should be seen as consisting of two epistemic dimensions or "faces", each oriented towards different solutions and problems, and that an updated understanding of the public sphere would benefit from a network-

analytic approach. The mass media functions as centralized filters of public communication. The Internet-based structures of communication represent deviations from the mass media model. Digital forums of various sorts have the capacity to create engagement. “The standardized, narrowed and centralized agenda of the mass media enables the political system to mirror their own deliberation in the public sphere and become visible for the citizens. The problem with the mass mediated platform is not the mass media structure itself, but that this structure have only been complemented by place-bound, face-to-face interaction.”[13] Rasmussen maintains that in order for a blogger or a group on the Internet to have political impact, their message must in almost all cases be picked up by the mass media. Substantial parts of the Internet interaction amounts to hasty, unfocused and inconsistent chat. The diversity of the Internet communication is larger than in the mass media. With the Internet, the collective nature of the hitherto mass mediated public sphere become more in tune with individualization of modern society. The Internet offers new forms of access to public authorities, new channels of coordination and influence for social movements. “In contrast to the public sphere once entirely dominated by public encounters and the mass media, the Internet and personal media propels a more differentiated public sphere, both in terms of topics, styles, as well as with respect to the number and variety of participants. The current public sphere are more niche-oriented, both because of a more diverse media-scape, and because of a more ethnically and culturally pluralistic society in general.”[14] Rasmussen writes that the Internet takes actively part in the current dramatic differentiation of the public sphere. The Internet and personal gatherings underline the individualization and segmentation of modern societies (the digital dimension of the public sphere offers less guidance for politics, but more possibilities for expression). The mass media works toward conformity and common denominators (the Internet is more oriented towards particular interests). The political system examines the possibilities of the Internet as a forum for political will formation

and deliberation. The heterogeneity of Internet communication stands in a dynamic relationship to the homogeneity of the mainstream mass media. Substantial information and communication on the Internet are produced and consumed by culturally, demographically and politically segments of the public. “As topics move interferensically and transcontextually between the presentational and representational dimensions of the public sphere, increasing complexity from new topics, styles and participants are kept under control through its ability to concentrate the wide audience among some focused themes. And *vice versa*, the focused and generalized agenda of the public sphere continuously receives fresh meaning from the open-ended, partly non-institutionalised diversity of Internet media and small mass media.”[15]

Abbate points out the Internet’s flexibility and diversity in technical design as well as in organizational culture.[16] Initially the features of information networks did not fully coincide with the basic needs of journalistic publishing.[17] Pavlik argues that new media are transforming journalism in four ways. “First, the nature of news content is inexorably changing as a result of emerging new media technology. Second, the way journalists do their work is being retooled in the digital age. Third, the structure of the newsroom and news industry is undergoing a fundamental transformation. And, fourth, new media are bringing about a realignment of the relationships between and among news organizations, journalists, and their many publics, including audiences, sources, competitors, advertisers and governments.”[18] Castells emphasizes that the Internet supports networked individualism, fosters specialized communities, and enhances the capacity of individuals to rebuild structures of sociability from the bottom up.[19]

REFERENCES

1. Reese, S.D., "Theorizing a Globalized Journalism", in Löffelholz, M. • Weaver, D., (eds.), in *Global Journalism Research*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2008, p. 246.
2. Ibid., p. 248.
3. Ibid., p. 250.
4. Barnhurst, K.G., "The Form of Reports on U.S. Newspaper Internet Sites", JSC RWP, 2002, pp. 3–17.
5. Reese, S.D. et al., "Mapping the Blogosphere: Professional and Citizen-Based Media in the Global News Arena", in *Journalism*, 8 (3), 2007, p. 238.
6. Ibid., p. 239.
7. Kotkin, J., *The New Geography: How the Digital Revolution Is Shaping the American Landscape*, Random House, New York, 2000, p. 169.
8. Mills, K., "Cybernations: Identity, Self-Determination, Democracy and the 'Internet Effect' in the Emerging Information Order", in *Global Society*, 16 (1), 2002.
9. Bechmann Petersen, A., "Internet and Cross Media Productions: Case Studies in Two Major Danish Media Organizations", in *Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society*, 4 (2), 2006, pp. 94–107.
10. Berners-Lee, T., *Weaving the Web*, Orion Business Books, London, 1999, p. 183.
11. Sassen, S., "The Impact of the Internet on Sovereignty: Unfounded and Real Worries", in Engel, C. • Heller, K.H., (eds.), *Understanding the Impact of Global Networks in Local Social, Political and Cultural Values*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 201.
12. Ibid., p. 207.
13. Rasmussen, T., "The Internet and Differentiation in the Political Public Sphere", in *Nordicom*, 4, 2008, p. 75.
14. Ibid., p. 76.
15. Ibid., pp. 79–80.
16. Abbate, J., *Inventing the Internet*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999, p. 6.
17. Heinonen, A., *Journalism in the Age of the Net: Changing Society, Changing Profession*, PhD diss., Acta Universitatis Tamperensis, Tampere, 1999, p. 69.
18. Pavlik, J.V., *Journalism and New Media*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. xiii.
19. Castells, M., *The Internet Galaxy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 132.

HOW DOES THE INTERNET AFFECT PEOPLE'S SENSE OF ONLINE COMMUNITY?

GEORGE LĂZĂROIU
Spiru Haret University

ABSTRACT. Machill and Beiler report how journalists integrate online research procedures into the overall research process, how they assess the Internet and search engines, and how highly developed their competences are in using search engines. Quan-Haase et al. claim that as the Internet is incorporated into the routine practices of everyday life, social capital is becoming augmented and more geographically dispersed. Chen et al. write that lack of appropriate content is a reason why the digital divide looms in both developed and developing countries.

On Kollock and Smith's reading, email lists are typically owned by a single individual or small group: since all messages sent to the list must pass through a single point, email lists offer their owners significant control over who can contribute to their group. "List owners can personally review all requests to be added to a list, can forbid anyone from contributing to the list if they are not on the list themselves, and even censor specific messages that they do not want broadcast to the list as a whole. Even open lists can be selectively closed or controlled by the owners when faced with disruption. Most email lists operate as benign dictatorship sustained by the monopoly power that the list owner wields over the boundaries and content of their group. As a result, email lists are often distinguished by their relatively more ordered and focused activity."[1] Baudrillard claims that we are threatened on all sides by interactivity (video, interactive screens, multimedia, the Internet, virtual reality). "The typewriter is an entirely external object. The page flutters in the open air and so do I. I have a physical relation to writing. I touch the blank or written pages with my eyes – something I cannot do with the screen. The computer is a true prosthesis."[2] Castells defines Internet culture as the culture of the creators of the Internet. "Without the techno-meritocratic cul-

ture, hackers would simply be a specific counter cultural community of geeks and nerds. Without the hackers' culture, communitarian networks would be no different from many other alternative communes. Similarly, without the hacker culture, and communitarian values, the entrepreneurial culture cannot be characterized as specific to the Internet."[3]

Machill and Beiler report how journalists integrate online research procedures into the overall research process, how they assess the Internet and search engines, and how highly developed their competences are in using search engines. Journalists employ computer-aided research tools more frequently but for shorter periods than classical, non-computer-aided research tools, and the telephone remains the most important research tool. Machill and Beiler remark that search engines, in particular Google, dominate the source-determination process and thereby have a decisive influence on the entire course of journalists' research. The surveyed journalists exhibit a pragmatic attitude towards the Internet and search engines as a research tool, even though they are aware of possible problems. The Internet gains in significance in those tasks which it helps to fulfil more efficiently, but the increased self-referentiality in journalism and the "Google-ization" of research represent a cause for concern.[4] Debord maintains that all *real* activity has been forcibly channeled into the global construction of the spectacle. Alienated consumption is added to alienated production as an inescapable duty of the masses. The spectacle is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images. "Spectators are linked only by a one-way relationship to the very center that maintains their isolation from each other. The spectacle thus unites what is separate, but it unites it only in its separateness."[5] Castells says that as computer use is ever less a lifestyle option, ever more an everyday necessity, "inability to use computers or find information on the web is a matter of stigma, of social exclusion; revealing not only changing social norms but also the growing centrality of computers to work, education and politics."[6]

Seiter emphasizes that that the World Wide Web is a more aggressive and stealthy marketeer to children than television ever was, “and children need as much information about its business practices as teachers and parents can give them.”[7] Stern point out that the ability to repeatedly reinvent oneself is particularly appealing “since home pages and blogs can be updated as often as desired and because they may be produced anonymously.”[8] Facer et al. maintain that digital content was often seen as originating not from people, organisations, and businesses with particular cultural inclinations or objectives, “but as a universal repository that simply existed ‘out there’.”[9] Drudge and Phillips say that in this post satellite-dish era (when individuals can broadcast their wet dreams with neither a license nor a handbook of regulations issued by Government), “the Elites, fearing loss of power, see chaos and anarchy. I see only sunshine.”[10] Gillmor argues that there is a mistrust among traditional editors of a genre that threatens to undermine what they consider core values, “namely editorial control and ensuring that readers trust, or at least do not assume there is an absence of, the journalists’ objectivity and fairness.”[11] Boczowski notes that innovations in newsrooms unfold in a gradual and ongoing fashion and are shaped by combinations of initial conditions and local contingencies.[12] Seib proposes that “distance” may turn out to be meaningless in the era of cybercommunication.[13] Ewen holds that media literacy cannot simply be seen as a vaccination against PR or other familiar strains of institutionalized guile. “It must be understood as an education in techniques that can democratize the realm of public expression and will magnify the possibility of meaningful public interactions.”[14] Manovich says that every visitor to a Web site automatically gets her own custom version of the site created on the fly from a database. The language of the text, the contents, the ads displayed – all these can be customized.[15] As Castells puts it, a new communications system, increasingly speaking a universal, digital language “is both integrating globally

the production and distribution of words, sounds and images of our culture, and customising them to individuals."[16]

Quan-Haase et al. claim that as the Internet is incorporated into the routine practices of everyday life, social capital is becoming augmented and more geographically dispersed. The Internet's ubiquity has raised questions about whether its use is increasing or decreasing social capital. The Internet is a stimulating positive change in people's lives by creating new forms of online interaction and enhancing offline relationships. Most relationships formed in cyberspace continue in physical space, leading to new forms of community characterized by a mixture of online and offline interactions. The possibilities of the Internet lie beyond their facilitation of interaction. Quan-Haase et al. state that the Internet has the potential to reverse the decline in social capital by providing a medium for younger generations to increase their social contacts, civic engagement, and sense of community. The Internet may compete with other activities for time in an inelastic 24-hour day. One-way broadcast television is quite different from socially interactive email and chatting online. Obtaining political and organizational information from the Internet is affordable and convenient. The Internet provides a convenient, affordable, and powerful supplement to telephone and face-to-face contact. The Internet supplements other forms of organizational involvement, rather than increasing or decreasing them. The Internet supplements political activities but does not change people's levels of involvement.

Quan-Haase et al. point out that television is a solitary activity that decreases social involvement. Exposure to the Internet leads towards perceiving online space as a positive medium for creating and sustaining community. Internet use is associated more with behavior than with social status. The Internet is a tool for solitary activities that keep people from engaging with their communities, and not all online activities compete with offline interactions. Using the Internet frequently does not substantially decrease using other communication media for contact with far-away friends

and relatives. Email use increases network capital by supplementing existing levels of face-to-face and telephone contact. Quan-Haase et al. emphasize that the Internet is a new and viable form of managing social life. The Internet provides a new sphere for those already civically involved to pursue their interests in an additional way. The Internet provides a viable alternative for acquiring political information and becoming politically active. Involvement in the Internet is the best predictor towards having a positive attitude towards community online. The Internet provides a sphere for social interaction, for people to meet others with similar interests, and for the creation of social cohesion. Quan-Haase et al. conclude that frequent Internet use is not associated with either an overall sense of community or feeling alienated and the more people use the Internet, the more positive their sense of online community. The Internet is neither fulfilling the utopians' dreams of greater community euphoria nor evoking the dystopians' nightmares of greater alienation. The Internet is increasing social capital, civic engagement, and developing a sense of belonging to online community. People are incorporating the Internet into their everyday lives even as the Internet is quietly fostering the changing composition of social capital.[17]

Chen et al. contend that as the Internet evolves, its users and uses grow and diversify globally. There are substantial differences in Internet use within countries as well as between them. The global digital divide reflects the broader context of international social and economic relations. The percentage of Internet users in developing countries is far lower than in developed countries. International differences in the Internet's development are social as well as technological and commercial. Developing countries have large segments of the population whose poverty and lack of literacy make Internet access unthinkable. Chen et al. write that lack of appropriate content is a reason why the digital divide looms in both developed and developing countries. The length of Internet experience may play a critical role in users' online behavior and their evaluation of the In-

ternet. The digital divide may be wider and deeper within developing countries than within developed countries. High costs in developing countries may mean that users have less of the experience needed to use the technology to their advantage. The embedding of the Internet in everyday life can enhance and deepen power relations underlying existing inequalities. On Chen et al.'s reading, the Internet may be modestly increasing interaction with friends and relatives at a distance, has mixed local effects, and may be diverting people from household interactions. Respondents with higher educational attainment make the most instrumental use of the Internet while those with less education make the most recreational use. High Internet users have a strong sense of online community in general and with kin.[18]

REFERENCES

1. Kollock, P. • Smith, M.A., *Communities in Cyberspace*, Routledge, London, 1999, p. 5.

2. Baudrillard, J., *Screened Out*, Verso, London, 2002, p. 180.

3. Castells, M., *The Internet Galaxy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 36.

4. Machill, M. • Beiler, M., "The Importance of the Internet for Journalistic Research", in *Journalism Studies*, 10 (2), 2009, pp. 178–203.

5. Debord, G., *The Society of the Spectacle*, Nicholson-Smith, D., (tr.), Zone Books, New York, 1994, p. 22.

6. Apud Livingstone, S. (2003). The Changing Nature and Uses of Media Literacy, London School of Economics RWP, London, p. 6.

7. Seiter, E., *The Internet Playground: Children's Access, Entertainment, and Mis-Education*, Peter Lang, London, 2005, p. 100.

8. Stern, S., "Growing Up Online", in *Telemedium: The Journal of Media Literacy*, 52 (1 & 2), 2005, p. 57.

9. Apud Buckingham,D. (2005)."The Media Literacy of Children and Young People: A Review of the Literature", Centre for the Study of Children Youth and Media Institute of Education RWP, University of London, London, p. 18.

10. Drudge, M. • Phillips, J., *The Drudge Manifesto*, New American Library, New York, 2000, p. 22.

11. Gillmor, D., *We the Media*, O'Reilly Media, Sebastopol, CA, 2004, p. 114.

12. Boczowski, P., *Digitizing the News: Innovation in Online Newspapers*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004, p. 4.

13. Seib, P., *Going Live: Getting the News Right in a Real-Time, Online World*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, MD, 2001, p. 100.

14. Ewen, S., *PR: A Social History of Spin*, Basic Books, New York, 1996, p. 414.

15. Manovich, L., *The Language of New Media*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, p. 42.

16. Castells, M., *The Rise of the Network Society. Vol. 1, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Blackwell, Cambridge, MA, 1996, p. 2.

17. Quan-Haase, A. et al., "Capitalizing on the Net: Social Contact, Civic Engagement, and Sense of Community", in Wellman, B. • Haythornthwaite, C., (eds.), *The Internet in Everyday Life*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pp. 291–324.

18. Chen, W. et al., "The Global Villagers: Comparing Internet Users and Uses around the World", in Wellman, B. • Haythornthwaite, C., (eds.), *The Internet in Everyday Life*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pp. 74–113.

THE DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

ION RISTEA
University of Piteşti

ABSTRACT. Blackwell and Cunningham write that pretrial incarceration is the most punitive form of procedural punishment imposed by the lower courts. Ashworth and Zedner remark that some longstanding assumptions about the role and the place of the criminal trial and, it follows, the criminal law are under challenge. Green says that it seems surprising that procedural protections are not allocated proportionally, so that, the more serious the offense charged, the more extensive the process due. Barrozo claims that one of the effects of the focus on deviation is the overlegitimation of the norm, of the mainstream of our punitive practices.

Hampton holds that the *retributive* motive for inflicting suffering "is to annul or counter the appearance of the wrongdoer's superiority and thus affirm the victim's real value."[1] Stephen puts it that the sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax. "It converts into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a transient sentiment."[2] The criminal law represents an objective ethics which must sometimes oppose individual convictions of right.[3] Blackwell and Cunningham write that pretrial incarceration is the most punitive form of procedural punishment imposed by the lower courts. Lower numbers of releases correlate with higher costs to taxpayers that result from full to overflowing jails. Restorative justice has become a global movement, with applications in highly varied settings. Most defendants need restoration to a different or larger community than one defined as those harmed by the crime. Blackwell and Cunningham contend that the defense lawyer is likely the only person the defendant can speak to freely without risking criminal liability. Public discourse about whether to spend more resources on the lower criminal courts, particularly on indigent defense, tends to get stuck on "left v. right" dis-

tinctions. If the punishment is taken out of the process, and the processes of criminal justice become effective at restoration that would be a result both the “left” and the “right” (and everyone in between) would embrace.[4]

Ashworth and Zedner remark that some longstanding assumptions about the role and the place of the criminal trial and, it follows, the criminal law are under challenge. The shifting nature of the criminal law is bound up with certain changes in the nature and use of criminal trials. The purpose of criminal law is to provide for the censure and sentencing of those who commit wrongs that have been (justifiably) criminalised. Ashworth and Zedner reflect on the changing role of the criminal law in the modern state; this is partly bound up with growing scepticism about the fitness of the criminal trial to fulfil its purposes. Ashworth and Zedner assess whether there is increased resort to the particular strategy, what its implications are for the role of the criminal law and the purpose of the criminal trial, and what reasons lie behind its greater use; and whether the development is to be applauded or not. Whereas the system of reprimands and warnings for youths replaces police cautions, the conditional caution for adults has not replaced police cautions. “The practice of diversion compromises the right of defendants to be presumed innocent, relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving guilt, and may bring intolerable pressure to bear upon those eager to escape the police station or fearful of the prospect of prosecution to admit an offence they may not have committed. Where this admission is followed by further burdensome consequences, be it participation in rehabilitation programmes or restorative justice conferences, the costs of diversion are even greater.”[5] Ashworth and Zedner affirm that the difference between fixed penalties and diversion itself is that the former may have penal consequences. A new arrival in English law is what may be termed the hybrid civil–criminal process. Hybrid orders like the ASBO are intended to lead to the decline of the criminal trial, by taking some cases away from that procedure and placing them in this hybrid cate-

gory. Strict criminal liability should be regarded as exceptional and in need of strong justification, particularly where the offence is serious. In relation to sex offences there is little evidence of the efficacy of preventive orders. What might be termed a fulldress criminal trial is increasingly regarded as an expensive luxury. “Economic analysis affects thinking about crime itself, regarding it less as a moral wrong than as a calculable cost to be averted, whose losses can be recovered through restitutionary payments or otherwise amortised. Thus where diversion has a greater likelihood of enabling offenders to make good the losses they have inflicted, and where this can be done more cheaply and without a higher reconviction rate, it is to be preferred over conventional punishment. This managerialist tendency is particularly dominant at the lower end of the tariff where the claim to normality is most plausible. Here, censure and hard treatment become less appropriate than the manipulation of costs or disincentives (hence penalty notices for disorder).”[6] Ashworth and Zedner argue that penalty notices for disorder and the greater use of strict liability are prime examples of the privileging of pace over process. The coercive provisions of an ASBO may be imposed without convicting the person of an offence. The paradigm of the criminal law and the criminal trial is being eroded by the state. Minor wrongdoing and other anti-social conduct should be dealt with outside the criminal law. There is public disquiet about the economic benefits to the criminal justice system being traded off too cheaply. The pressure that the system creates on innocent defendants or those with an arguable case is too great. “Conviction of an individual for an offence is the strongest form of condemnation of conduct that the state can muster. Conviction for an offence also opens the possibility of a coercive sentence, ordered by a court within the limits of what legislation permits. To justify the creation of a certain crime is therefore to justify the imposition of the censure of conviction and the imposition of a punishment. It is the special significance and gravity of these consequences, with all their legal and

social implications, that supports the argument for safeguards in the shape of the procedural requirements of human rights law—the presumption of innocence, the need for proper notice of the charge, adequate time and facilities for preparing a defence, state-funded legal assistance, the right to confront witnesses, the free assistance of an interpreter, the privilege against self-incrimination and various other rights."[7] Ashworth and Zedner reason that at the level of justification, there is a necessary link between the censure of conviction, liability to punishment, and the need to respect the dignity of the individual defendant through the upholding of rights.

Green says that it seems surprising that procedural protections are not allocated proportionally, so that, the more serious the offense charged, the more extensive the process due. The interest that citizens have in avoiding state incarceration is so great that certain basic procedural protections seem an imperative. Defendants charged with capital offenses are entitled to additional protections not generally available to defendants in non-capital cases. Procedural rights are allocated proportionally, varying according to the seriousness of the charge brought. Green maintains that offenders are diverted from the criminal justice system proper into rehabilitative or restorative programs of various sorts. By adhering to a one-size-fits-all approach to criminal procedure, and by insisting that defendants receive the full panoply of expensive procedural rights even in cases in which they face relatively minor penalties, we run the risk that these rights might be lost.[8] Grabosky and Sutton point out that regulation is essentially a charade, with businesses allowed to do largely as they please. "Case after case suggests that regulatory authorities have failed in their role of protecting the public. […] In some, the law is unable to address harmful corporate conduct. In others, the penalties available at law may have been inadequate. In others still, the legal apparatus may be sufficient but the enforcement agency may be co-opted by the industry which it oversees. Alternatively, the agency may be crippled by

inadequate resources, by administrative incompetence, or by political forces."[9] Murphy observes that repentance is the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one's wrongful and harmful actions, "the repudiation of the aspects of one's character that generated the actions, the resolve to do one's best to extirpate those aspects of one's character, and the resolve to atone or make amends for the [wrong and] harm that one has done."[10]

REFERENCES

1. Jean Hampton, "Punishment as Defeat", in Murphy, J.G. • Hampton, J., (eds.) *Forgiveness and Mercy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 124–132.

2. Stephen, J.F., *A History of the Criminal Law of England*, MacMillan, London, 1883, p. 80.

3. Hall, J., *General Principles of Criminal Law*, 2nd ed., Bobbs-Merill, Indianapolis,1960, p. 385.

4. Blackwell, B.S. • Cunningham, C.D., "Taking the Punishment out of the Process: From Substantive Criminal Justice through Procedural Justice to Restorative Justice", in *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 67, 2004, pp. 59–86.

5. Ashworth, A. • Zedner, L., "Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, and Sanctions", in *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, 2, 2008, p. 25.

6. Ibid., p. 39.

7. Ibid., p. 48.

8. Green, S.P., "Rationing Criminal Procedure: A Comment on Ashworth and Zedner", in *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, 2, 2008, pp. 53–58.

9. Grabosky, P. • Sutton, A., *Stains on a White Collar*, Federation Press, Sydney, 1990, pp. 240-247.

10. Murphy, J.G., "Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy", in Etzioni, A. • Carney, D.E., (eds.), *Repentance: A Comparative Perspective*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 1997, p. 147.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, CRIMINAL LIABILITY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEGAL SANCTIONS

ION RISTEA
University of Piteşti

ABSTRACT. Richards holds that the tasks of criminal law theory appear to be both explanatory and normative, concerned with both understanding and recommendations for change. Richards views both the criminal law and the remedies of the civil law as means of enforcement (certain moral rights relating to keeping informal promises and the like may not be appropriately enforced either by the criminal or civil law). Cruft says that a view that is closer to the moral truth will accept that whenever a crime is committed, we all bear some communal responsibility for it, because the crime has been committed by one of 'us'. Cruft maintains that individualistic liberalism lends support to the authoritarian view that being concerned for the perpetrator, or seeing her as one of us, will necessarily result in implausibly lenient punishments.

Richards holds that the tasks of criminal law theory appear to be both explanatory and normative, concerned with both understanding and recommendations for change. The jurisprudence of rights directly challenges the existing state of constitutional theory and practice in the United States. The jurisprudence of rights takes seriously fundamental normative concepts of human rights. Certain human rights are convergently enforced by several legal institutions. The criminal law must be compatible with and express respect for basic human rights. The idea of human rights takes a normative attitude expressing respect for the capacity of persons, *as such,* for rational autonomy. Richards holds that the idea of human rights expresses a normative point of view that puts an equal weight on each person's capacity for autonomy. The basic principles of political right must treat all persons as equals. To express equal respect for personal autonomy is to guarantee the minimum conditions requisite for autonomy. The criminal law rests on the enforcement of public morality. Both the criminal and civil law rest on the moral foundations of the

moral principles of obligation and duty. Criminal sanctions must satisfy the underlying purpose of affording an effective symbolic statement of minimal moral standards of decency. The great virtue of a just legal system is that the distortions of judgment and execution, found with an individual in the state of nature, are significantly reduced. Richards views both the criminal law and the remedies of the civil law as means of enforcement (certain moral rights relating to keeping informal promises and the like may not be appropriately enforced either by the criminal or civil law). Richards examines how the proposed account of the moral foundations of the criminal law may be deployed in clarifying the substantive criminal law and cognate constitutional law doctrines, discussing *seriatim* the contribution this theory can make to understanding (a) decriminalization and the limits of the criminal sanction, (b) *actus reus* and the distinction between actions and omissions, (c) *mens rea* and excuses, including the novel idea of an excuse of socioeconomic deprivation, (d) legality, (e) the nature and place of justification, notably self-defense and necessity, (f) vexed issues relating to inchoate crimes, in particular, attempts, and (g) proportionality and the death penalty. The idea of human rights secures the minimum conditions which enable persons, with the dignity of freedom and rationality, to design their lives. Rights are defined independently of the good, and define the boundary constraints within which people on fair terms are free to define their own good. An autonomy-based ethics takes the normative attitude that the capacity is not only to be encouraged.

Richards contends that the principles of justice play a role in clarifying the place of the *actus reus* requirement as a predicate of criminal liability. The criminal law is the way in which basic rights of moral decency, defined by ethical principles of obligation and duty, are enforced. The derivation of the moral principles of obligation and duty clarifies the proper interpretation of the action-omission distinction in the interpretation of *actus reus.* To limit the range of our moral duties to actions is a failure of moral reasoning

and imagination. Defenses of justification are those which show that certain conduct, that is, *prima facie,* criminally wrong, is, in fact, justified (for example, on the ground of reasonable self-defense). Defenses of excuse are based not on the claim that the conduct is justifed, but on the claim that the conduct, albeit unjustifed, is not blameworthy or culpable. Forms of mental state would be required as necessary moral conditions of just punishment. The principle of legality does not go the whole way of supplying advance warning. “From the point of view of an original position which expresses the idea of treating persons as equals, rational people would agree to or universalize certain coercively enforceable standards of conduct which, at little comparable cost to the agent, secure substantial interests of others, for example, a principle of nonmaleficence (not killing, harming, or inflicting gratuitous cruelty). For reasons of justice, once a centralized legal system exists, the use of coercion to enforce these principles would be monopolized by the state. A principle of justified self-defense would be agreed to or universalized, however, as an exception to non-maleficence 'and the prohibition of private coercion, in circumstances where such coercive force is necessary to preserve the substantial interests of an agent from an attack which he has not occasioned and where the use of force is both necessary and proportional to the harm inflicted; the duty of retreat might, within limits, be an application of necessity and proportionality.”[3]

Richards emphasizes that the general ground for criminal liability is to uphold the minimal standards of conduct defined by the moral principles of obligation and duty. Causally eccentric cases of attempt liability should be subject to *prima facie* attempt liability. In contemporary circumstances, the death penalty appears to be an unjustly inappropriate criminal sanction. The evidence that the death penalty marginally deters better than less severe penalties appears to be weak. The death penalty is in excess of appropriate moral principles of just punishment. The substantive criminal law rests on a structure of moral principles that

express ideas of human and moral rights rooted in an autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as equals. “The principles underlying the substantive criminal law are enforced, for example, by legislators in defining criminal liability by statute, by judges in assessing the constitutionality of such statutes or in imposing sentences under them, by prosecutors in exercising prosecutorial discretion, by police in their investigative and other work, by administrative boards in exercising parole discretion, and the like. Before one can rationally assess issues of institutional competence relating to which principles are best enforced by what institution, one must get clear about the prior question of what the underlying principles are which these institutions have a common responsibility to enforce.”[4]

Cruft says that a view that is closer to the moral truth will accept that whenever a crime is committed, we all bear some communal responsibility for it, because the crime has been committed by one of ‘us’. Any action of an individual within our community is always in some morally relevant respect also our action, as it is an action done by one of us. We should not be willing to adopt the managerial stance that views crime simply as a problem created by external others, that has been lumped on us to be solved. “Someone who takes too individualistic a view might end up thinking that concern for the well-being of the perpetrator and concern for the well-being of the victim and the wider community must necessarily be opposed. But a properly rounded communitarian moral outlook will reject the claim that there is necessarily a tension here. Instead, concerns for the well-being of perpetrator and of victim and community can generate identical requirements: requirements that the perpetrator be tried fairly, publicly, and if found guilty, be subjected to genuinely hard treatment in the form of punishment. In particular, concern for a perpetrator’s well-being will recognize the very great importance for that perpetrator, of punishment including full hard treatment.”[5] Cruft maintains that individualistic liberalism lends support to the authoritarian view that being concerned for the perpetrator,

or seeing her as one of us, will necessarily result in implausibly lenient punishments. The use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), and the extension of strict liability, can be seen in part as attempts to extend state control into areas that were previously left to non-state actors. Much of the behaviour at which ASBOs and fixed penalties etc. are targeted is already criminal. Liberal views of morality allow that sometimes an agent can be held morally responsible for an act, even if the agent did not know all the relevant facts, the act was not reckless and the wrongdoing was not intentional. Cruft puts it that a given individual will share some moral responsibility for the actions of members of her group, simply due to their being members of her group. People should obviously not be held criminally responsible for everything for which they are morally responsible. The liberal model should draw the indicators of criminal responsibility much more tightly than those of moral responsibility. Especially important is the need for a shift towards more communitarian ways of thinking, a shift necessary in civil service language and cost-benefit analyses, as much as in public discussions. A full understanding of the appropriate role of the criminal law also requires a complementary normative understanding of non-criminal and non-governmental sanctions.

REFERENCES

1. Richards, D.A.J., “Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law”, in *Georgia Law Review*, 13, 1979, p. 1436.

2. Ibid., p. 1446.

3. Cruft, R., “Liberalism and the Changing Character of the Criminal Law: Response to Ashworth and Zedner”, in *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, 2, 2008, p. 60.

4. Ibid., p. 63.

5. Ibid., p. 65.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATE SOCIALISM AND THE ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF COMMUNIST SUCCESSOR PARTIES IN POST-1990

ŞTEFAN PĂUN
Politehnica University

ABSTRACT. Kuzio discusses the fate of successor Communist parties within the parameters of previous regime type, political opposition in the Communist era and the nationality question. Bojkov analyses the process of EU enlargement with reference to the progress that Bulgaria and Romania have made within it. Pop-Eleches analyzes the reasons for the remarkable adaptability and electoral success of Communist successor parties in post-1990 Romania. Bunce and Wolchik assert that, over the past decade, a number of elections in postcommunist regimes perched between democracy and dictatorship have led to the triumph of liberal oppositions over illiberal incumbents or their anointed successors.

Kuzio outlines four paths undertaken by Communist parties in former Communist states: those countries that rapidly transformed Communist parties into center-left parties; countries that were slower at achieving this; countries with imperial legacies; and Eurasian autocracies. Kuzio discusses the fate of successor Communist parties within the parameters of previous regime type, political opposition in the Communist era and the nationality question.[1] Pop-Eleches analyzes the reasons for the remarkable adaptability and electoral success of Communist successor parties in post-1990 Romania. Pop-Eleches develops a three-dimensional classification scheme to identify Communist successor parties on the basis of their institutional, personnel and ideological continuity with the defunct Communist Party, traces the political evolution of Communist successor parties, and argues that their remarkably strong and consistent electoral performance is primarily due to their ability to appeal to voters beyond the traditional base of East European ex-Communist parties on the left of the ideological spectrum. The continued electoral appeal of Communist

successor parties in Romania is due neither to Communist nostalgia or lack of democracy but to the complicated legacy of the Ceauşescu regime and the 1989 revolution.[2]

Baylis emphasizes that in a period in which "strong" and even "presidential" prime ministers have become more the rule than the exception in the major states of Western Europe, most prime ministers in the new democracies of East Central Europe appear to have been relatively weak figures. Baylis investigates the reasons for that relative weakness in the ten East Central European countries, which together have had 87 prime ministers since the fall of Communism, evaluating several possible explanations: party system weakness, the institutional structure, elite recruitment patterns, and policy constraints, seeking to explain several notable exceptions to the prime ministerial weakness rule.[3] Bunce and Wolchik assert that, over the past decade, a number of elections in postcommunist regimes perched between democracy and dictatorship have led to the triumph of liberal oppositions over illiberal incumbents or their anointed successors. The international diffusion of these electoral revolutions reflects the interaction among five factors: the long term development of civil society, expanded opportunities for democratic political change, the rise of collaborative networks among international democracy promoters, regional exporters of democracy and local oppositions, and, finally, careful application of an electoral approach to regime transition. Bunce and Wolchik hold that the cross-national diffusion of the electoral model in this region may have run its course, largely because of less supportive local and international conditions.[4]

Lane says that while theories of global capitalism have added a new dimension to our understanding of the dynamics of the modern world, a 'globalisation' approach to the transformation of the state socialist societies is relatively underdeveloped. Lane studies the role of international and global factors under state socialism and the world system in the pre-1989 period, considers traditional Marxist approaches to the transition to capitalism, and criticises the model of

state capitalism as well as the world system approach. Lane identifies social actors (the 'acquisition' and 'administrative' social strata and the global political elite) as playing a major role in the fall of state socialism. The transformation of state socialism had the character of a revolution rather than a shift between different types of capitalism.[5] Using information supplied to international agencies, Groth compares communication and transportation patterns of Communist and Post-Communist European states with those of non-communist Europe. East European states under Communist rule tended to emphasize public—more easily "scripted," observed and controlled media and conveyances—over private ones. This emphasis was substantially grounded in obsessive political security concerns among communist regimes. The performance of Post-Communist states indicates a significant shift toward the patterns of non-communist Western Europe and coincides with political regime changes moving East Europe closer to the pluralist West.[6]

Hug notes that the political effects of referendums should vary according to the institutional provisions that allow for direct involvement of citizens in decision-making. Relying on extant theoretical models, Hug proposes initial tests of some implications for the newly democratized countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The constitutions of these countries distinguish themselves by a wide variety of institutional provisions for referendums. Hug demonstrates effects of different institutional provisions on policy outcomes, which have only been demonstrated at the sub-national level, for example, in the United States and Switzerland.[7] Roper examines how education, linguistic and citizenship policies have influenced the development of Moldovan identity and relations with the breakaway region of Transnistria, exploring the influence of three specific education policies (Russian language instruction, an integrated history course and Romanian language school closures in Transnistria) on the debate concerning Moldovan identity and ultimately Moldovan statehood. On Roper's reading, the Romanian language school closures in Transnistria de-

monstrate that education is not only an important agent of identity formation, but also that such crude political tactics as school closures ultimately affect other education policies, reinforce negative stereotypes and make meaningful dialogue impossible. Roper reasons that the larger issue than the school closures in Transnistria is whether devolution of authority on issues such as education policy is possible no matter how autonomy is granted.[8]

To understand institutional change in transition economies, Kyriazis and Zouboulakis propose a game theoretic model that combines economic changes with changes in the social values system, in a mechanism where the two changes are interdependent and influence one another in a repeated game. The speed of change in this dynamic model is the result of two rates, the "learning rate", how fast agents are learning to play the new "capitalist" game and the so-called "going-over rate", the mix in every time period of economic agents playing according to the "old" communist values and those playing according to the "new" capitalist values.[9] Bojkov analyses the process of EU enlargement with reference to the progress that Bulgaria and Romania have made within it: leaving them out of the wave of accession finalised in May 2004 for ten of the candidate states, has placed them in a situation of double exclusion. Firstly, their geographical belonging to the region of Southeast Europe has been rendered non-essential by their advanced position within the EU enlargement process. Secondly, their achievement in economic and political transition has been removed from the progress of the ten states, which joined the EU in May 2004 by delaying the time of their accession. Bojkov remarks that any efforts in regional cooperation and integration between Bulgaria and Romania on one hand, and other Southeast European states on the other, have been effectively cancelled. In current European politics, the two countries have come to serve the unenviable role of exemplifying on the part of the European Union how progress is being awarded and hesitation punished.[10]

REFERENCES

1. Kuzio, T., "Comparative Perspectives on Communist Successor Parties in Central-Eastern Europe and Eurasia", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 41 (4), 2008, pp. 397–419.

2. Pop-Eleches, G., "A Party for All Seasons: Electoral Adaptation of Romanian Communist Successor Parties", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 41 (4), 2008, pp. 465–479.

3. Baylis, T.A., "Embattled Executives: Prime Ministerial Weakness in East Central Europe", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 40 (1), 2007, pp. 81–106

4. Bunce, V.J. • Wolchik, S.L., "International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39 (3), 2006, pp. 283–304.

5. Lane, D., "From State Socialism to Capitalism: The Role of Class and the World System", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39 (2), 2006, pp. 135–152.

6. Groth, A.J., "East and West: Travel and Communication under Alternate Regimes. A Research Note", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39 (1), 2006, pp. 121–133.

7. Hug, S., "The Political Effects of Referendums: An Analysis of Institutional Innovations in Eastern and Central Europe", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 38 (4), 2005, pp. 475–499.

8. Roper, S.D., "The Politicization of Education: Identity Formation in Moldova and Transnistria", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 38 (4), 2005, pp. 501–514.

9. Kyriazis, N.C. • Zouboulakis, M.S., "Modeling Institutional Change in Transition Economies", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 38 (1), 2005, pp. 109–120.

10. Bojkov, V.D., "Neither Here, Not There: Bulgaria and Romania in Current European Politics", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 37 (4), 2004, pp. 509–522.

EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING AND LOW INTEREST MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS

GEORGE HODOROGEA
Wales University

ABSTRACT. Nanto et al. say that the origins of the financial crisis point toward three developments that increased risk in financial markets. te Velde asserts that the global financial crisis is already causing a considerable slowdown in most developed countries. Taylor shows that monetary excesses were the main cause of that boom and the resulting bust, and that the excessive risk taking and the low interest monetary policy decisions are connected.

Nanto et al. say that the origins of the financial crisis point toward three developments that increased risk in financial markets. The first was the originate-to-distribute model for mortgages. The second development was a rise of perverse incentives and complexity for credit rating agencies. The third development was the blurring of lines between issuers of credit default swaps and traditional insurers. The plunge downward into the global financial crisis was triggered by the bursting of the housing bubble and the ensuing subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. An immediate indicator of the rapidity and spread of the financial crisis has been in stock market values. Declines in stock market values reflected huge changes in expectations and the flight of capital from assets in countries deemed to have even small increases in risk. “Dramatic declines in stock values coincided with new accounting rules that required financial institutions holding stock as part of their capital base to value that stock according to market values (mark-to-market). The capital base of banks shrank and severely curtailed their ability to make more loans (counted as assets) and still remain within required capital-asset ratios. Insurance companies too found their capital reserves diminished right at the time they had to pay buyers of credit default swaps.”[1] Nanto et al. observe that the rising rate of

defaults and bankruptcies created the prospect that equities would suddenly become valueless. Currency exchange rates serve both as a conduit of crisis conditions and an indicator of the severity of the crisis. For a country in crisis, a weak currency increases the local currency equivalents of any debt denominated in dollars and exacerbates the difficulty of servicing that debt. The global credit crunch that began in August 2007 has led to a financial crisis in emerging market countries. As Nanto et al. put it, the ability of emerging market countries to borrow from global capital markets has allowed many countries to experience high growth rates. Global trade and finance linkages between the emerging markets and the industrialized countries have continued to deepen over the past decade. Slower economic growth in the industrialized countries may impact less developed countries through lower future levels of bilateral foreign assistance. Latin America is experiencing two levels of economic problems related to the crisis. "First order effects may be seen in the sudden volatility in the financial sector. All major financial indicators fell sharply in the third quarter of 2008, as capital sought safe haven in less risky assets, many of them, ironically, dollar denominated. Currencies in many Latin American countries depreciated suddenly from flight to the U.S. dollar, reflecting a lack of confidence in local currencies and portfolio rebalancing, as well as the fall in commodity import revenue related to declining global demand and terms of trade. In at least two countries, Mexico and Brazil, large speculative derivative positions in the currency markets exacerbated the depreciations, compounding losses."[2]

te Velde asserts that the global financial crisis is already causing a considerable slowdown in most developed countries. Leading indicators of global economic activity are declining at alarming rates. te Velde discusses recent growth performance in developed and developing countries, the channels through which the global crisis affects developing countries, which countries might be most at risk, and possible policy responses. Growth performan-

ces vary substantially among developed and developing countries. Several Asian countries have built up healthy government reserves. Latin American countries are currently in a much better fiscal and external position compared to the 1990s. “The magnitude of the crisis will depend on the response of the USA and EU. Trillion dollar rescue packages are launched around the world, but while the markets may eventually respond, the UK is already in a recession. Its magnitude will depend, in part, on how accommodative monetary policy can be, with the recent interest rate cut a sure sign the authorities are concerned more about the financial crisis than recent inflationary pressures. There is less scope for expansionary fiscal policy – in fact these rescue measures have increased public debt.”[3] te Velde holds that the current financial crisis affects developing countries in two possible ways. First, there could be financial contagion and spillovers for stock markets in emerging markets. Second, the economic downturn in developed countries may also have significant impact on developing countries. Banks under pressure in developed countries may not be able to lend as much as they have done in the past. Capital adequacy ratios of development finance institutions will be under pressure. The impact on developing countries will depend on the response in developed countries to the financial crisis and the slowdown, and the economic characteristics and policy responses, in developing countries. South Africa cannot afford to reduce interest rates as it needs to attract investment to address its current account deficit. The current macro economic and social challenges posed by the global financial crisis require a much better understanding of appropriate policy responses. “There will be limits to financial solutions if the problems lie in the real economy, but development finance institutions may be able to take some risks and support investment flows to developing countries, counteracting reductions in other financial flows. Whether DFIs can take higher risks might be informed by past experience, for example by looking at what happened during the Asian financial crisis of

the late 1990s. During this period DFI portfolios were riskier, loan losses higher and returns lower than they are at present. And yet this poorer financial performance has not had an adverse affect on institutional credit ratings."[4]

Taylor observes that monetary excesses were the main cause of that boom and the resulting bust. The actual interest rate decisions fell well below what historical experience would suggest policy should be. There is evidence that there were monetary excesses during the period leading up to the housing boom. Taylor uses regression techniques to estimate a model of the empirical relationship between the interest rate and housing starts, providing an empirical proof that monetary policy was a key cause of the boom and hence the bust and the crisis. The monetary policy followed during the Great Moderation had the advantages of keeping both the overall economy stable and the inflation rate low. Long term interest rates remained low for a while even after the short-term federal funds rate started increasing. The positive saving gap outside the United States was offset by an equal sized negative saving gap in the United States. Interest rates at several other central banks deviated from what historical regularities, as described by a Taylor rule, would predict. Within Europe the deviations from the Taylor rule vary in size because inflation and output data vary from country to country. "A sharp boom and bust in the housing markets would be expected to have had impacts on the financial markets as falling house prices lead to delinquencies and foreclosures. These effects were amplified by several complicating factors including the use of sub-prime mortgages, especially the adjustable rate variety which led to excessive risk taking. In the United States this was encouraged by government programs designed to promote home ownership, a worthwhile goal, but overdone in retrospect."[5]

Taylor contends that the excessive risk taking and the low interest monetary policy decisions are connected. There is an interaction between the monetary excesses and the risk-taking excesses. The rapidly rising housing prices

and the resulting low delinquency rates likely threw the underwriting programs off track and misled many people. The financial crisis became acute on August 9 and 10, 2007 when the money market interest rates rose dramatically. The market turmoil in the interbank market was not a liquidity problem of the kind that could be alleviated simply by central bank liquidity tools. Taylor points out that the increased spreads in the money markets were seen by the authorities as liquidity problems rather than risk. The most noticeable effects at the time of the cut in the federal funds rate were the sharp depreciation of the dollar and the very large rise in oil prices. "Government actions and interventions caused, prolonged, and worsened the financial crisis. They caused it by deviating from historical precedents and principles for setting interest rates, which had worked well for 20 years. They prolonged it by misdiagnosing the problems in the bank credit markets and thereby responding inappropriately by focusing on liquidity rather than risk. They made it worse by providing support for certain financial institutions and their creditors but not others in an ad hoc way without a clear and understandable framework. While other factors were certainly at play, these government actions should be first on the list of answers to the question of what went wrong."[6] Taylor says that policy makers could discuss global goals for inflation[7] and the impact that one central bank might have on global inflation; developing exceptional access frameworks for central banks and finance ministries could be done in each country without a global structure.

REFERENCES

1. Nanto, D.K. et al., "The U.S. Financial Crisis: The Global Dimension with Implications for U.S. Policy", CRS Report for Congress, November 25, 2008, p. 17.

2. Ibid., p. 27.

3. te Velde, D.W., "The global financial crisis and developing countries", RWP ODI, October 2008, p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 5.

5. Taylor, J.B., The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong, RWP, 2008, p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 18.
7. Tudorescu, N. et al., “The Evolution of Globalization”, in *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*, 8, 2009, pp. 240–245.

POSTCOMMUNIST ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND THE TRANSITIONAL RECESSION IN COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

ŞTEFAN PĂUN
Politehnica University

ABSTRACT. Stan remarks that transitional justice in post-communist Romania has made little progress since the Council for the Study of Securitate Archives was set up in early 2000. Bodenstein et al. present new measures of foreign economic openness in the transition countries that allow them to distinguish between non-tariff barriers to trade and capital controls. Aligica discusses the conceptual model behind the widespread belief that in post Communist societies, once the democratic and market institutions are introduced, the emerging values and beliefs engendered by those very institutions will create the conditions for the consolidation and reproduction of democracy and market economy. Fodor et al. discuss changes and new directions in the gendered nature of the welfare state in three post-state socialist societies: Hungary, Poland and Romania.

Stan remarks that transitional justice in post-communist Romania has made little progress since the Council for the Study of Securitate Archives was set up in early 2000, discussing several factors that might explain the failure of giving citizens access to the files compiled by the communist-era secret political police and of publicly identifying the former political police agents and informers.[1] Turcescu and Stan's focus is the relationship between the reestablished Bessarabian Orthodox Metropolitanate and the government of the post-Soviet Republic of Moldova. The Moldovan government refused recognition to the nascent church until 2002 primarily for two reasons: first and foremost, the Moscow Patriarchate opposed the idea of another Orthodox Christian church in Moldova outside of its jurisdiction; second, the government feared that the newly independent Republic of Moldova would fall under the influence of neighboring Romania, whose Orthodox Church offered patronage to the Bessarabian Metropolitanate. After

a historical overview of the Orthodox Church in the Republic of Moldova, Turcescu and Stan first present and analyze the history of the conflict between the Bessarabian Metropolitanate and the post-Soviet Moldovan government, and second, the European Court of Human Rights verdict ordering the government to recognize the Metropolitanate, before verdict's implementation, and reactions to it.[2]

Using secondary data from 21 post-communist countries, Johannsen produces a map of urban–rural cleavages. While persistent cleavages exist with respect to attitudes toward the state, the market and traditional institutions, these cleavages have yet to be institutionalized within the political system. Deviations from the generalized pattern can typically be explained by the intrusion of the state-building process into the urban–rural cleavage structure. The lack of institutionalization has led to a situation in which state and political elites have gained increased autonomy.[3] Bodenstein et al. present new measures of foreign economic openness in the transition countries that allow them to distinguish between non-tariff barriers to trade and capital controls. This distinction is important for the analysis of foreign economic relations in the post-communist world. While most states lowered barriers to trade since 1993, they increased the number of capital controls, which had been low at the beginning of the transition process. The ELITE (Economic Liberalization in the Transition Economies) data set, which is based on the IMF statistics on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions and encompasses 24 transition countries, further demonstrates important exceptions to this trend. The comparison of the ELITE indicators with alternative measurements of economic openness indicates the need to move towards more refined analyses of the political economy of the transition process.[4]

Aligica discusses the conceptual model behind the widespread belief that in post Communist societies, once the democratic and market institutions are introduced, the emerging values and beliefs engendered by those very institutions will create the conditions for the consolidation

and reproduction of democracy and market economy. Aligica subjects the model to a double assessment: a critical theoretical review followed by an empirical test conducted through a case study. Both raise questions regarding the realism of the model and show that the direct relationship between institutional structures, institutional learning and the emerging values and beliefs, a key relationship on which the model is based, is difficult to establish and substantiate. Aligica points out the necessity to further elaborate the initial model in order to accommodate problems such as the emergence of institutional rigidities and learning blockages, and the emergence of dysfunctional values (values and beliefs that do not support and reproduce but undermine the institutional structures that shaped them initially), and to incorporate a theory of institutional change in which the evolution and change of beliefs, ideas and values play a much more preeminent place.[5] Popova compares poverty and income distribution among gender subgroups in Russia and four East European countries—Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland—in 2000, and adopts equivalent expenditure as a measure of economic welfare of households with different gender ratios, defining the gender gap as the degree of distance between the economic welfare of households dominated by women and households dominated by men, and calculating headcount poverty and average poverty shortfalls using relative poverty lines.[6]

Fodor et al. discuss changes and new directions in the gendered nature of the welfare state in three post-state socialist societies: Hungary, Poland and Romania. Relying on an analysis of laws and regulations passed after 1989 concerning child care, maternity and parental leave, family support, unemployment and labor market policies, retirement and abortion laws, Fodor et al. identify the differences and the similarities among the three countries, pointing out not only their status in 2001, but also their trajectory, the dynamics and timing of their change. There are essential differences between the three countries in terms of women's relationship to the welfare state. Fodor et al. specify

some of the key historical and social variables which might explain variation across countries.[7] Beyer argues that because of the scarcity of capital the attraction of FDI became an objective which was followed with topmost priority in many post-socialist countries. In spite of the advantageous effects of FDI on the transition process, the introduction of tax concessions appears to be of little value. No significant relationship between tax incentives and the level of FDI could be found. Beyer holds that the way in which privatization took place had a big impact and a comparatively low general level of taxes influenced investments positively (the general success of transformation was of importance for the attractiveness of a country).[8]

Kolodko observes that the transitional recession in countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has lasted much longer than expected: the legacy of the past and recent policy mistakes have both contributed to the slow progress. As structural reforms and gradual institution building have taken hold, the post-socialist economies have started to recover, with some leading countries building momentum toward faster growth. On Kolodko's reading, there is a possibility that in the wider context of globalization several of these emerging market economies will be able to catch up with the more advanced industrial economies in a matter of one or two generations.[9] Ganev examines the relations between postcommunist states and the powerful economic groups that dominated the early stages of postcommunist economic restructuring. The strategic actions of "winners" systematically undermine the capacity of state institutions and the organizational coherence of administrative agencies. Against the background of a detailed study of one particular story of "postcommunist success", the rise of Multigroup in Bulgaria, Ganev explores the concrete manifestations of "state weakness" in postcommunism, the nature of redistributive conflicts the former socialist societies, and the historical specificity of the processes undermining the organizational bases of governance in the former Soviet world.[10]

REFERENCES

1. Stan, L., "Spies, Files and Lies: Explaining the Failure of Access to Securitate Files", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 37 (3), 2004, pp. 341–359.

2. Turcescu, L. • Stan, L., "Church–State Conflict in Moldova: the Bessarabian Metropolitanate", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 36 (4), 2003, pp. 443–465.

3. Johannsen, L., "The Foundations of the State: Emerging Urban–Rural Clevages in Transitions Countries", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 36 (3), 2003, pp. 291–309.

4. Bodenstein, T. et al., "Two Sides of Economic Openness: Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade and Capital Controls in Transition Countries, 1993–2000", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 36 (2), 2003, pp. 231–243.

5. Aligica, P.D., "Operational Codes, Institutional Learning and the Optimistic Model of Post-Communist Social Change: Conceptual Criticism and Empirical Challenges from a Romanian Case Study", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 36 (1), 2003, pp. 87–99.

6. Popova, D., "The Impact of the Gender Composition of Households on Inequality and Poverty: A Comparison across Russia and Eastern Europe", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 35 (4), 2002, pp. 395–409.

7. Fodor, E. et al., "Family Policies and Gender in Hungary, Poland, and Romania", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 35 (4), 2002, pp. 475–490.

8. Beyer, J., "'Please Invest in Our Country'—How Successful Were the Tax Incentives for Foreign Investment in Transition Countries?", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 35 (2), 2002, pp. 191–211.

9. Kolodko, G.W., "Globalization and Catching-up: From Recession to Growth in Transition Economies", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 34 (3), 2001, pp. 279–322.

10. Ganev, V.I., "The Dorian Gray Effect: Winners as State Breakers in Postcommunism", in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 34 (1), 2001, pp. 1–25.

INTERNAL AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING RELIABILITY

LUMINIȚA IONESCU
Spiru Haret University

ABSTRACT. Selim et al. write that changes to the definition of internal auditing have increased the scope of internal audit by explicitly including consulting activities. Arena and Azzone attempt to understand the organizational drivers of internal audit effectiveness in the light of recent changes in the 'mission' of internal auditing and its central role in corporate governance. Bhimani maintains that concepts like risk and governance become operationalisable and actionable.

Selim et al. write that changes to the definition of internal auditing have increased the scope of internal audit by explicitly including consulting activities, providing a comparison of the nature, extent and consequences of the definitional change on internal audit consulting activities undertaken by a sample of IIA members in the UK/Ireland and Italy. A comparison of the results of the two self-completion questionnaire surveys reveals a significant rise in the levels and scope of activities in consulting in both countries but this has been greater in the UK/Ireland. While there are similarities between the countries, more UK/Ireland members are involved in change management and project management, while a majority of Italian members are involved in model design and implementation. In both countries, internal auditors are experiencing both benefits and drawbacks.[1] Abdolmohammadi says that chief audit executives (CAEs) are required to use and comply with *The International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing* (*Standards*). 13.5 percent of CAEs in Anglo-culture countries do not use the *Standards*; of those who use the *Standards* a significant number fail to comply with specific standards. 'Length of IIA membership' and 'Internal auditing certification' are positively associated with use. Other signi-

ficant variables are 'Superseded by local/government regulations or standards,' 'Not perceived as value added by management/board' and 'Compliance not expected in the country' that are inversely related to use. Abdolmohammadi associates positively the length of training with compliance, while other significant variables are internal audit certification, 'Standards are too costly,' 'Not perceived as value added by management/board' and 'Inadequate internal audit staff' that are negatively associated with compliance.[2]

Arena and Azzone attempt to understand the organizational drivers of internal audit effectiveness in the light of recent changes in the 'mission' of internal auditing and its central role in corporate governance. On the basis of data from 153 Italian companies, their survey shows that the effectiveness of internal auditing is influenced by: (1) the characteristics of the internal audit team, (2) the audit processes and activities, and (3) the organizational links. Internal audit effectiveness increases in particular when the ratio between the number of internal auditors and employees grows, the Chief Audit Executive is affiliated to the Institute of Internal Auditors, the company adopts control risk self-assessment techniques, and the audit committee is involved in the activities of the internal auditors.[3] Holt and DeZoort write that governance disclosure requirements include reports from management, the audit committee, and the external auditor. However, despite internal audit's prominence as a critical governance mechanism, external stakeholders lack information about the function. Holt and DeZoort evaluate the extent that a descriptive Internal Audit Report (IAR) affects investor confidence and investment decisions. Participants provided with an IAR had more confidence in financial reporting reliability and higher perceived company oversight effectiveness than participants without access to an IAR. The IAR effect on confidence in financial reporting reliability is particularly evident for high fraud risk companies. Tests for mediation reveal that the IAR effect on confidence is mediated by perceptions of oversight effectiveness. Holt and DeZoort find that confidence in finan-

cial reporting reliability and perceived oversight effectiveness mediate the IAR-investment recommendation relation. The IAR was perceived to be as useful as several currently required disclosures.[4]

Spekle et al. remark that, in recent years, the scope of internal auditing has increased the importance of internal auditing as part of the organization's management control structure. This expanding role has changed the demands being put on internal auditors. Their new role requires different skills and competencies, and many organizations now need to face the choice whether to develop these broader competencies internally or to outsource internal auditing to outside service providers. Spekle et al. study the factors associated with organizations' internal audit sourcing decisions, using newly collected data from 66 companies headquartered in the Netherlands. Spekle et al. find asset specificity and frequency (both individually and in interaction) to be significantly associated with sourcing decisions in a regression model that explains 65% (adjusted R2 = 0.63) of the variance in outsourced internal auditing. Additional analyses reinforce the importance of these TCE variables in explaining organizations' internal auditing sourcing behaviour.[5] Sarens and de Beelde encompass the broader nature of internal auditing that is evolving in practice and confirmed by the revised definition of internal auditing and the new Professional Practices Framework, both issued by the IIA in 1999. Sarens and de Beelde study contemporary internal auditing practices in Belgium (assurance and / or consulting oriented), refining the influence of three predefined variables (reporting relationship, organisational support and internal control system) and determining other important influencing variables. Most internal auditing activities could be classified as a combination of assurance and consulting services. Sarens and de Beelde recognise a limited proportion of pure assurance activities and a sometimes quite extensive proportion of pure consulting activities. On the one hand, a strong administrative reporting relationship with management, a strong organisational sup-

port, a weak internal control system and a relatively young internal auditing department are in most cases associated with relatively higher proportion of consulting oriented activities. On the other hand, a strong functional reporting relationship with the audit committee, a weak organisational support, a strong internal control system and a more mature internal auditing department are linked with a relatively higher proportion of assurance oriented activities.[6]

Bhimani contends that, like management accounting, the potential of risk and governance concepts to be made managerially actionable rests on their capacity to be interpreted in technical, analytical and calculable terms. It is these dimensions which lend risk and governance concerns prescriptive appeal that is continually being reassessed in the light of economic changes. Enterprises seek not only to adopt risk controls but also to make the deployment of such controls transparent and visible to engender greater organisational legitimacy (this makes management accounting, risk management and corporate governance increasingly and inextricably interdependent). The notion of risk, like corporate governance, has extensively influenced many aspects of managerial endeavours. “Perhaps it is the uncertainty around what constitutes risk which lends it the capacity to alter, define, and reshape management activities in particular ways. The lack of precise definitional characteristics endows concepts such as risk and governance with possibilities for effecting organizational changes. This is because ambiguities render viable amultitude of plausibilities and interpretations and confer legitimacy on redefined boundaries which delimit organizational actions and objectives in novelways. The ability to reduce the contestability of specific objectives by appealing to managerially grounded concepts of risk is not independent of the looseness and ambiguity of the term risk itself in that it permits the pursuit of diverse goals by different organisational participants without manifesting a lack of centrality of purpose.”[7] Bhimani maintains that concepts like risk and governance become operationalisable and actionable because they can be forma-

lised and rendered technical. Technical reductionism can underpin the prescriptiveness of organisational management practices. Industrial control structures are often aligned with particular managerial strategies. Normative strategies for dealing with risk management will continue to witness changes in the pursuit of enhanced relevance. Corporate boards should be overseeing the quality of the internal management and strategic decisions of their companies. "The control process is definitionally typified by the intent to monitor the degree of alignment between organisational activities and precepts of desirable managerial outcomes. Placing boundaries on risk taking and organisational functioning by identifying acceptable variances from predefined parameters of action is fully part of the definition of management control for most modern organisations."[8]

REFERENCES

1. Selim, G. et al., "Internal Auditing and Consulting Practice: A Comparison between UK/Ireland and Italy", in *International Journal of Auditing*, 13 (1), 2009, pp. 9–25.

2. Abdolmohammadi, M.J., "Factors Associated with the Use of and Compliance with the IIA Standards: A Study of Anglo-culture CAEs", *International Journal of Auditing*, 13 (1), 2009, pp. 27–42.

3. Arena, M. • Azzone, G., "Identifying Organizational Drivers of Internal Audit Effectiveness", in *International Journal of Auditing*, 13 (1), 2009, pp. 43–60.

4. Holt, T. • DeZoort, T., "The Effects of Internal Audit Report Disclosure on Investor Confidence and Investment Decisions", in *International Journal of Auditing*, 13 (1), 2009, pp. 61 – 77.

5. Spekle, R.F. et al., Sourcing of Internal Auditing: An Empirical Study, *ERIM Report Series No. ERS-2005-046-F&A*, June 2005.

6. Sarens, G. • de Beelde, I., "Contemporary Internal Auditing Practices: (New) Roles and Influencing Variables", in *International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation*, 3 (4), 2006, pp. 452–470.

7. Bhimani, A., "Risk Management, Corporate Governance and Management Accounting: Emerging Interdependencies", in *Management Accounting Research*, 20 (2009), p. 3.

8. Ibid., p. 5.

THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBALIZATION

NICOLAE TUDORESCU
IOANA ZAHARIA
CONSTANTIN ZAHARIA
University of Craiova

ABSTRACT. Moshirian analyses some of the underlying global financial forces and the process by which the international institutions have evolved and their present contributions to global financial issues in the 21st century. Koujianou Goldberg and Pavcnik discuss recent empirical research on how globalization has affected income inequality in developing countries. Nuti states that the achievement of liberalization of capital flows in all their forms has not been accompanied by that of labour migration. Alli et al. hold that the globalization process is characterized by challenges such as environmental degradation, over-population, over-consumption, public health, and education.

Benegas Lynch Jr. and Jackisch explain that the acceleration of globalization, understood as a technological phenomenon especially in the fields of telecommunications, led to significant transformations in the capital markets of the world, particularly during the last decade of the 20th century. "New investment alternatives arose, such as the so-called 'emerging markets,' and the flexibility and speed of access and exit of the diverse financial markets increased [...] Foreign trade, on the other hand, has not managed to globalize to the same extent. Despite the moderation of the exacerbated protectionism experienced between World War I and II, the world is still far from the free trade standards that dominated most of the 19th century. Conspiring against commercial globalization, we have first of all a firmly rooted anti-liberal mentality which has plagued international trade with military terms. Thus '*exportation*' becomes '*conquer of markets*'; '*importation*' is viewed as '*an invasion of products*'; duty increases are seen as '*in retaliation*' to similar increases previously sought by the other country, etc."[1] Fujita and Thisse focus on two distinct facets of globalization: decrease in the trade costs of goods and

the decline of communication costs between headquarters and production facilities. When the unskilled have about the same wage in two regions, decrease of these costs fosters the agglomeration of plants in the core accommodating headquarters. Fujita and Thisse say that when the wage gap is significant, process of integration eventually triggers the relocation of plants into the periphery. When this process of relocation is driven by falling communication costs, the welfare of all workers in the core falls whereas that in the periphery rises.[2]

Moshirian analyses some of the underlying global financial forces and the process by which the international institutions have evolved and their present contributions to global financial issues in the 21st century. Moshirian highlights the key principles that are necessary for further global financial market integration and the process of globalization, and claims that a holistic approach is needed in order to ensure that the process of globalization leads to international financial stability and global security, emphasizing the dynamic effects of a global system, including the way multinational corporations can increase their investment and business activities with greater international capability in their contribution to the process of financial market integration.[3] Koujianou Goldberg and Pavcnik discuss recent empirical research on how globalization has affected income inequality in developing countries, beginning with a discussion of conceptual issues regarding the measurement of globalization and inequality, and presenting empirical evidence on the evolution of globalization and inequality in several developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Koujianou Goldberg and Pavcnik examine the channels through which globalization may have affected inequality, discussing theory and evidence in parallel.[4] Tixier writes that a main stake of the communication strategy of companies, Internet sites convey a concern for adaptation and seduction of a complex Internet user. Between globalization and localization, whatever the sector of activity, many companies opt for the third path, that of glocalization, an intermediary that makes

it possible to combine worldwide unity of the brand image and a perfect adaptability to the specificities of national expectations.[5]

After considering the evolution of globalization since the late 19th century and the specific features of the current round, Nuti claims that such process is just as notable for its incompleteness as it is for its progress. The growth of global governance institutions may or may not be feasible and desirable, but constrains the continued growth of globalization. Trade and factor movements would be totally unimpeded by policy measures. Globalisation progress has exceeded the progress of global governance. "In spite of the progressive reduction in trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff) in the last thirty years of the 20th century, there is still widespread protectionism. Developed countries have low average tariffs, but these are concentrated exactly in the areas in which less-developed countries have a comparative advantage, as in agriculture and in highly labour-intensive manufactures. Rich countries' protectionism costs less-developed countries more than $100bn a year, which is twice the flow of aid from the North to the South. At the same time in less-developed countries the level of protection is three times higher than in OECD countries and is an obstacle mainly to trade with other less-developed countries; it is estimated that its elimination would bring about another $50bn net benefits."[6] Nuti states that the achievement of liberalization of capital flows in all their forms has not been accompanied by that of labour migration. Instead of moving towards being a borderless area, the world has been segmented into fenced compartments. There is an official tendency to stress the political objectives and the non-economic dimensions of regional agreements. Nuti emphasizes that a greater integration requires an agreement on the distribution of its advantages. There remains a very substantial risk that the formation and enlargement of trade blocs might stop much sooner than universal liberalisation. there is a massive gross turnover in foreign exchange markets, but small net flows. "Markets are necessary and irre-

placeable mechanisms for automatic adjustment, for the mobilisation of entrepreneurship and for efficient and innovative change. They also have associated costs in terms of 1) inter-temporal inefficiency, in the form of associated unemployment and fluctuations; 2) adverse impact on the distribution of income and wealth, and 3) possible divergence of market prices from public values (understood as government valuations). The global market is no exception."[7]

Hayek explains that although cultural evolution, and the civilisation that it created, brought differentiation, individualisation, increasing wealth, and great expansion to mankind, its gradual advent has been far from smooth. "We have not shred our heritage from the face-to-face troop, nor have these instincts either "adjusted" fully to our relatively new extended order or been rendered harmless by it."[8] Alli et al. hold that the globalization process is characterized by challenges such as environmental degradation, over-population, over-consumption, public health, and education (a growing inter-independence through technology is bringing people together). Globalization creates an environment that reduces state regulation of the market promoting a more dominant role for large multinational corporations. More countries are adopting the political model of democracy in combination with the free market approach of economics. On Alli et al.'s reading, multinationals now have more freedom and are more dominant in the international business environment then ever before. The convergence of information and communication technologies has resulted in a lower cost for information, furthering globalization. Globalization implies that there are forces that are global, objective and universal which restrict diversity and the scope for national governments' policy formulations. "The globalization of markets is one of the most important developments of this century. Its impact on the economic transactions, processes, institutions, and players is dramatic and wide ranging. It challenges established norms and behavior and requires different mindsets. Yet, globalization creates opportunities for the well-prepared participants who are visi-

onary and have insight. The globalization of markets reflects the growing interdependency among the economics of the world and the multinational nature of sourcing, manufacturing, trading, and investment activities. It also reflects the increasing frequency of cross-border transactions and financing and the heightened level of competition. These phenomena are fueled by advances in information, communication, and transportation technologies with increased global economic growth."[9] Alli et al. point out that the globalization of markets has led to the formation of irreversible economic linkages among countries. Business activity flows freely to places best equipped to perform it most economically and efficiently. No business or industry is totally immune from international competition. Partnerships are established to seek synergy in various value-adding activities including manufacturing, research and development marketing. Multinational companies are under tremendous scrutiny for any potentially damaging impact to their host country environments. "As global economic connections intensify, the focus of attention among researchers and public policy makers has shifted from trade relationships among nations to activities of the individual enterprise. The increased role of individual enterprises required increased attention from the legal, strategy, and operations professionals of those firms. Globalization calls for greater input from legal professionals in formulating strategic directions for the enterprise. The legal profession will be under growing pressure to value, promote, and protect intangible assets such as customer franchise, know-how, creativity, and corporate culture."[10]

REFERENCES

1. Benegas Lynch Jr., A. • Jackisch, C., *Librecambio y división de poderes*, Fundación Friedrich A. von Hayek y Ediciones Lumiere SA, Buenos Aires, 2002, p. 126.

2. Fujita, M. • Thisse, J.-F., "Globalization and the Evolution of the Supply Chain: Who Gains and Who Loses?", in *International Economic Review*, 47 (3), 2006, pp. 811–836.

3. Moshirian, F., "Globalization and Financial Market Integration", in *Journal of Multinational Financial Management*, 13 (4–5), 2003, pp. 289–302.

4. Koujianou Goldberg, P. • Pavcnik, N., "Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries", in *Journal of Economic Literature*, 45 (1), 2007, pp. 39–82.

5. Tixier, M., "Globalization and Localization of Contents: Evolution of Major Internet Sites across Sectors of Industry", in *Thunderbird International Business Review*, 47 (1), pp. 15–48.

6. Nuti, D.M., "Governing Incomplete Globalisation", paper at the 4th International Conference, *Globalisation and Catching-up in Emerging Market Economies*, the TIGER Institute, the Leon Kozminski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management, Warsaw, 16–17 May 2002, p. 11.

7. Ibid., p. 17.

8. Hayek, F.A. von, *The Fatal Conceit. The Errors of Socialism*, Bartley III, W.W., (ed.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p. 17.

9. Alli, A.M. et al., "Globalization: Its Effects", in *International Business and Economics Research Journal*, 6 (1), 2007, p. 91.

10. Ibid., pp. 93–94.

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS

MĂDĂLINA ANDREI
Spiru Haret University

ABSTRACT. On Nanto et al.'s reading, Brazil entered the financial crisis from a position of macroeconomic and fiscal strength. Blundell-Wignall et al. claim that the current financial crisis is caused at two levels: by global macro policies affecting liquidity and by a very poor regulatory framework. Baker asserts that the central element in the current financial crisis is the housing bubble, and describes the circumstances under which the bubble began to grow. Ivashina and Scharfstein note that global financial markets are in turmoil.

On Nanto et al.'s reading, Brazil entered the financial crisis from a position of macroeconomic and fiscal strength, and has a large internal market and is wellpositioned on macroeconomic and fiscal fronts. Argentina is in poor shape to deal with the crisis compared to other Latin American countries, and its currency has not fallen significantly, largely due to strong management of the exchange rate. Russia's banking system remains immature, and high interest rates prevail. Financial markets in the United States and Europe have become integrated as a result of cross-border investment by banks, securities brokers, and other financial firms. Great Britain has proposed a plan to rescue distressed banks by acquiring preferred stock temporarily. "As creditworthiness problems in the United States began surfacing in the subprime mortgage market in July 2007, the risk perception in European credit markets followed. The financial turmoil quickly spread to Europe, although European mortgages initially remained unaffected by the collapse in mortgage prices in the United States. Another factor in the spread of the financial turmoil to Europe has been the linkages that have been formed between national credit markets and the role played by international investors who react to economic or financial shocks by rebalancing

their portfolios in assets and markets that otherwise would seem to be unrelated. The rise in uncertainty and the drop in confidence that arose from this rebalancing action undermined the confidence in major European banks and disrupted the interbank market, with money center banks becoming unable to finance large securities portfolios in wholesale markets."[1] Nanto et al. observe that mortgage markets vary starkly across Europe, depending on national laws and local mortgage practices. Japan was part of the early moves among major economies to flood markets with liquidity. The extent of China's exposure to the current global financial crisis is mixed but is believed to be relatively small. South Korea has been deeply affected by the crisis, with both the South Korean stock market and the won tumbling. Many countries have seen trade volumes fall, because of slowing global demand, and because domestic banks have been wary of issuing trade finance. "So far, the actions of the United States and other nations in coping with the global financial crisis have been primarily to contain the contagion, minimize losses to society, restore confidence in financial institutions and instruments, and lubricate the wheels of the system in order for it to return to full operation. There is considerable uncertainty, however, over whether the worst of the crisis has passed, how nations will cope with second phase of the crisis (global recession and the spread of the crisis to emerging markets), and whether the current crisis is an aberration that can be fixed by tweaking the system, or whether it reflects systemic problems that require major surgery."[2]

Blundell-Wignall et al. claim that the current financial crisis is caused at two levels: by global macro policies affecting liquidity and by a very poor regulatory framework that, far from acting as a second line of defence, actually contributed to the crisis in important ways. The crisis itself originated from the distortions and incentives created by past policy actions. "Many of the reforms underway focus on securitisation, credit rating agencies, poor risk modelling and underwriting standards, as well as corporate govern-

ance lapses, amongst others, as though they were causal in the above sense. But for the most part these are only aspects of the financial system that accommodated a new banking business model in its drive to benefit from the incentives that had been created over time, and were unleashed by time-specific catalysts. The rapid acceleration in RMBS from 2004 suggests these factors were not causal in the exogeneity sense – that would require that they had been subject to independent behavioural changes."[3] Blundell-Wignall et al. say that the originate-to-distribute model and the securitisation process is a key part of the process to drive revenue, the return on capital and the share price higher. Banking began to mix its traditional credit culture with an equity culture. A lower capital weight raises the return on capital for a given mortgage asset. The riskiness of an asset like a mortgage is independent of how much of the asset is added to the portfolio. "If mortgage securitisation could be accelerated and pushed into off-balance sheet vehicles, banks could raise the return on capital right away without waiting for the new regime. It would be quite rational to do this to the point where the proportion of on-balance sheet mortgages (with a 50 per cent capital weight) and off-balance sheet mortgages (with a zero capital weight) equated the (higher) return likely to emerge for a Basel II mortgage (where capital weightings would apply regardless of whether assets were on or off the balance sheet)."[4]

Baker asserts that the central element in the current financial crisis is the housing bubble, and describes the circumstances under which the bubble began to grow, discusses how financial innovations and the lack of a proper regulator structure allowed the bubble to grow to ever more dangerous levels and eventually to crash in a way that has placed unprecedented strain on the country's financial system, and outlines key principles for reform of the financial system. The housing bubble in the United States grew up alongside the stock bubble in the mid-90s. The stock wealth induced consumption boom also led people to buy bigger and/or better homes, since they sought to spend some of

their new stock wealth on housing. By 2002, house prices had risen by nearly 30 percent after adjusting for inflation. The run-up in prices in both the ownership and rental markets was having a substantial supply-side effect. “If the course of the bubble in the United States had followed the same pattern as in Japan, the housing bubble would have collapsed along with the collapse of the stock bubble in the years 2000-2002. Instead, the collapse of the stock bubble helped to feed the housing bubble. The loss of faith in the stock market caused millions of people to turn to investments in housing as a safe alternative to the stock market. In addition, the economy was very slow in recovering from the 2001 recession. It continued to shed jobs right through 2002 and into the summer of 2003.”[5] Baker points out that the run-up in house prices had the predictable effect on savings and consumption. The bubble began in burst in 2007, as the building boom led to so much over-supply that prices could no longer be supported. Just as the bubble created dynamics that tended to be self-perpetuating, the dynamics of the crash are also self-perpetuating. The voluntary foreclosures take place when people realize that they owe more than the value of their home. By forcing more foreclosures, lower prices were leading to an increase in the supply of housing. “During the run-up of the bubble, lending standards grew ever more lax. As default rates began to soar in 2006 and 2007, banks began to tighten their standards and to require larger down payments. The most severe tightening took place in the markets with the most rapidly falling prices. With lenders in these markets requiring down payments of 20 percent or even 25 percent, many potential homebuyers were excluded from the market. These thresholds not only excluded first-time buyers, but even many existing homeowners would have difficulty making large down payments, since plunging house prices had destroyed much of their equity.”[6]

Ivashina and Scharfstein note that global financial markets are in turmoil. Share prices have fallen drastically, the cost of corporate and bank borrowing has risen sub-

stantially. Ivashina and Scharfstein describe bank lending during the financial crisis through October 31, 2008, and show that there has been a steep decline in new loans to large corporations. The decline started a year ago as the credit bubble deflated, and has accelerated in the last three months, during the peak period of the financial crisis. Revolving credit facilities have fallen more than term loans, and non-investment grade lending has fallen more than investment grade lending. The rise in C&I loans on bank balance sheets comes in good measure from an increase in drawdowns on pre-existing revolving credit facilities ("revolvers"). Banks may be holding back on new loans to protect against flood of draw-downs if the economy continues to deteriorate. New lending to large corporate borrowers peaked in the period, May-July 2007. bank loans fell from $667.4 billion in May-July 2007, the peak of the credit boom, to $414.8 a year later, and then to $264.7 billion three months later in the August-October 2008 period. a reduction in lending for restructuring purposes might be less troubling than a reduction in loans for real investment. Restructuring loans and real investment loans track each other quite closely.[7] It is not surprising that there has been a bigger drop in the longer term facilities. Outstanding loans will increase more if there are more new loans, more drawdowns, or fewer loan retirements. "Firms may be insuring themselves both against an economy-wide credit drought and a bank-specific credit drought. They may also be concerned that if other firms draw down their revolvers, banks will not be able to meet their revolver commitments. Just as depositors and lenders may rush to pull their money out of a troubled bank, borrowers may be doing the same with their revolver drawdowns. The effects of revolver drawdowns on the economy are mixed. The main benefit is that they provide a measure of protection to vulnerable firms, helping them forestall financial distress."[8]

REFERENCES

1. Nanto, D.K. et al., “The U.S. Financial Crisis: The Global Dimension with Implications for U.S. Policy”, CRS Report for Congress, November 25, 2008, pp. 32–33.

2. Ibid., p. 53.

3. Blundell-Wignall, A., et al., “The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues, Financial Market Trends“, OECD, 2008, p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 6.

5. Baker, D., “The Housing Bubble and the Financial Crisis”, in *Real-World Economics Review*, 46, 2008, p. 74.

6. Ibid., p. 75.

7. Tudorescu, N. et al., “The Evolution of Globalization”, in *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*, 8, 2009, pp. 240–245.

8. Ivashina, V. • Scharfstein, D., “Bank Lending during the Financial Crisis of 2008“, RWP, November 5, 2008, p. 8.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SHAPE OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

IOANA ZAHARIA
NICOLAE TUDORESCU
CONSTANTIN ZAHARIA
University of Craiova

ABSTRACT. Niemi and Kola maintain that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU is not the most efficient means of addressing an increasing number of policy objectives. Koning says that the EU simply harmonized and integrated the existing farm policies of its member countries. Kryn states that the Common Agricultural Policy is the largest area of EU expenditure. Rudloff points out that the EU agricultural budget in the framework of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 will exert further pressure for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.

Niemi and Kola maintain that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU is not the most efficient means of addressing an increasing number of policy objectives. The logic of remunerating the multifunctional role of agriculture calls for better consideration of factors like the rural territory, the environment, the landscape, rural communities and rural employment. Renationalization implies a shift of competence back from EU institutions to national ones. The CAP of the EU represents a concentrated, supranational decision making. International economic integration can be defined as a state of affairs or a process which involves the amalgamation of separate economies into larger free trade regions. “Concerning the structural funds and regional policy of the EU, they have better reasons and goals than the CAP as they contribute positively to the more balanced economic development in the EU by helping poorer, remote regions. The CAP often does just the opposite, as (according to the notorious rule) 20 % of farmers of the best agricultural regions receive 80 % of CAP subsidies. Common regional policy serves at least some of the defined purposes of economic integration; the common agricultural

policy does not. Renationalization should seriously be considered in this kind of situation and conditions."[1] Niemi and Kola claim that spending on the CAP has been the main component of the EU budget for many years. Member states know that the more they produce internally the more they internalize the financial flows of the CAP. Macroeconomic policy for ensuring economic stability is implemented at the national level. The CAP as a whole has become very complex and bureaucratic, and some of its methods of governance rather obsolete. "Moving policies back from the EU institutions to the national level is politically very sensitive, however. Advocates of the traditional approach suggest that increasing Member States' influence could turn out to be a dangerous path unless the EU institutions are given sufficient powers to ensure that basic principles of the CAP are not put at risk. Supporters of the gradual renationalization, however, believe in a streamlined, political Commission with fewer managerial functions, and the creation of a raft of semi-autonomous bodies to deal with the finer details of day-today policymaking."[2]

Koning notes that, in 2005, the Economic Union of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to create a common agricultural policy (ECOWAP). The EU is pressuring the ECOWAS countries to open their markets within the context of a European Partnership Agreement. Koning surveys the history of the common agricultural policy of the EU so that farmers and policy makers of the ECOWAS can draw their own conclusions. To understand the farm policy of the EU one has to start with the origins of agricultural protection in Europe. Once a country produced more than its domestic consumption, it was left with a surplus that could only be disposed of in the world market. "The new fall in agricultural prices in the 1920s-30s was coupled to a great depression that squeezed the domestic demand for farm products. As a consequence, several countries were left with increased surpluses that they could no longer sell in their own markets. The fall in world market prices also raised the costs of dumping these surpluses, the more so

because dumping itself drove world market prices down even further. To moderate the resulting cost increase, several countries introduced supply management to reduce their export surpluses. Thus France controlled the production of wheat, and the Netherlands that of livestock and vegetables. On the other side of the ocean, the US did the same with cotton and tobacco."[3] Koning says that the EU simply harmonized and integrated the existing farm policies of its member countries. The implementation of structural policies lagged behind that of price policies. a basic flaw of the common agricultural policy was the lack of supply management. The common agricultural policy included no effective instrument for supply management. The introduction of a similar policy in cereals was impeded by the grain trade and a minority of big grain farmers. The EU is trying to use European Partnership Agreements to make ACP countries open their markets for its surpluses. "The EU has made a serious error of judgment. Direct payments support is more expensive for governments than price support, which is largely paid for by the consumers. Therefore, direct payments support is only feasible for countries with rich treasuries where farmers are no longer more than 2 or 3 percent of the population. The US is such a country and Western Europe too, but in 2004 the EU was enlarged by ten Eastern European countries where small farmers are a significant part of the population. EU politicians had thought that direct payments could be withheld from Eastern European farmers by reforming the common agricultural policy before East European countries joined the Union. East European farmers would then have no right to direct payments, because these were a compensation for the reduction of supported prices that they had never had."[4]

Kryn states that the Common Agricultural Policy is the largest area of EU expenditure. The political interests are extremely important when it comes to the making of and the reform of the CAP. As agricultural production stabilized and Europe became a net exporter of agricultural goods, the CAP price-support mechanism created problems. The

EU has been able to sustain the CAP thanks to the consumers and taxpayers who have paid to maintain the policy. "The process of EU integration appears to offer great opportunities, but also significant threats to Polish agriculture. There will be access to the EU market, the expansion of the agro-food sector, and the availability of free capital flow and financial support. At the same time, there will be enormous costs of adaptation and of modernization of the sector in order to meet the conditions for operating in the EU and minimize the gap in the level of development between Polish agriculture and the more modernized agro-food sector in the EU. People talk increasingly of two Polands, urban and rural. In fact, there are more than two because the countryside itself is divided. In the north and the west, large former state farms are holding their own."[5] Rudloff points out that the EU agricultural budget in the framework of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 will exert further pressure for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. Simulation results on sustainability of the EU agricultural budget reveal the necessity for future agricultural reform. The European Union's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was defined as part of the Common Market back in 1957 in the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). Since its inception, the CAP has had a crucial impact on the EU budget, in terms of both revenues and expenditures. Income-supporting price instruments led to comparatively high EU prices relative to the world market. The share of agricultural spending in the total budget has always been high. "The funds that flow back to each individual member state from the agricultural budget are determined by the production-related character of the expenditures. Since the amount of key agricultural expenditures was defined product-specifically (e.g. intervention prices and direct payments), the flowback from the agricultural budget under the first pillar to a member state depends on that country's internal production structure. The funds for the second pillar are distributed according to set criteria characterising the importance of the rural area (proportion

of agricultural land, relevance of the farm sector for employment etc.)."[6] Rudloff concludes that the budgetary benefit from the CAP influences countries' fundamental attitude to agricultural policy reform. Nobuhiro emphasizes that agriculture in Northeast Asian countries, including Japan, Korea, and China, has several common characteristics such as small-scale rice farming: it is important for these countries to jointly establish an international food trade rule which enables their agricultural sustainability in the future against the severe free trade pressure from exporting countries with large-scale farms. Forming a Northeast Asian Free Trade Area is a way to strengthen cooperative relationships among these countries. Nobuhiro asserts that there are huge differences in agricultural productivity among these countries: we should seek possibilities of a common agricultural policy that adjusts imbalance of FTA gains among the countries by creating a common fund collected in proportion to the GDP level of each country just like the EU budget.[7]

REFERENCES

1. Niemi, J. • Kola, J., "Renationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: Mission Impossible?", in *International Food and Agribusiness Management Review*, 8 (4), 2005 p. 26.

2. Ibid., p. 34.

3. Koning, N., "Agriculture, Development and International Trade: Lessons to be Learned from the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union", paper at the Forum on Food Sovereignty, Niamey, 7–10 November 2006, p. 5.

4. Ibid., p. 9.

5. Kryn, J., "A United Front: European Union Enlargement, the Common Agricultural Policy, and Polish Agriculture", CIPE RWP, June 2003, p. 5.

6. Rudloff, B., "New Budget Priorities for the Common Agricultural Policy", DBR RWP, November 30, 2006, p. 9.

7. Nobuhiro, S., "Possibility of a Northeast Asian Common Agricultural Policy", in *Noringyo Mondai Kenkyu*, 41 (4), 2006, pp. 365–372.