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A SOLUTION BASED ON ORDINARY LANGUAGE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTION

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ABSTRACT. Contemporary accounts of linguistic content usually do not take account of the relevance that the speaker intention (as well as other related psychological elements) has in the determination of the content of the sentences uttered in our ordinary life. This has as a consequence a psychological unrealism about natural languages. This paper analyzes the contemporary debate between some of these accounts and proposes a more realistic view of linguistic meaning. First, we will expound how minimalism and contextualism understand the psychological nature of language and how their positions could be defended against criticism on this matter. Second, we will claim that both positions fail to account for the psychological realism required to understand the nature and structure of the linguistic content of our natural language. Third, we shall propose an alternative solution to this problem based on a new interpretation of ordinary language theory.

Keywords: literalism, contextualism, meaning, psychological objection, passionate utterance, semantics, pragmatics

One interesting controversy in the contemporary debate between contextualists and semanticists (some times called literalists) is the polemic regarding the determination of the content of a sentence. According to the defenders of semanticism (for instance, Cappelen and Lepore 2004, C&L from here), to determine the meaning of a particular utterance we only need to determine 'what is said' by the sentence uttered; in other words, what the sentence *literally* says. According to some defenders of contextualism (as, for example, Recanati and Carston), the content of this particular sentence will depend on all the different utterances that any speaker may perform. In other terms, it will depend of 'what is meant' by a particular utterance of that sentence.[1]

Literalism, in a broad sense, holds that "sentences represent the world as being this and so and are true or false depending on how the world actually is. The task of semantics is to assign truth conditions to sentences in a compositional form" (Recanati 2006, 69). It claims that "we may legitimately ascribe truth conditions to natural language sentences, quite independently of what the speaker […] means" (Recanati 2004, 3). On the other hand, contextualism holds that "natural language sentences *per se* do not have truth conditions; they only have conventional meanings in virtue of which they can be *used* to say things that are true or false. What it has content primarily is the speech act and only derivatively the sentence used in performing the speech act" (Recanati 2004, 3).

Literalism has evolved into new forms that are, let us say, less literalist. One of these new forms is minimalism, which basically admits that the content of a sentence incorporates contextual ingredients, but only when the meaning of the sentence requires it (Recanati 2006, 71). Criticism still distinguishes, at the level of the context of utterance, between the content of the speech act and the content of the sentence, so it can keep its analysis on this last level; that is to say, at the semantic level.

But then, as Carston (1988, 2002 and 2004) has remarked, if content is always present (though hidden and codified) in the very same sentence as it is uttered, why should we appeal (even just minimally) to contextual factors for the determination of the content of a sentence? What did the speaker really meant when she uttered her words? Here Carston is clearly pointing to the fact that what according to minimalism determines 'what is said' bears no relation whatsoever to the speaker's psychological content. Recanati (2004) endorses a very similar objection.

C&L responds to this criticism by saying that: a) The semantic content has a psychological role, and b) The semantically uttered content is enough to guarantee the success of communication beyond any possible mistake the speaker might make, avoiding wrong interpretations by the audience. Therefore, according to them, semantic minimalism has a response to this psychological difficulty, but contextualism does not have one because according to the contextualist framework: a) No participant knows all the relevant factors involved in the determination of both the meaning and the possible factors that the whole audience is involved in, and b) Since there are no reasons to assure that the content of a sentence is represented in an intrapersonal way from the utterance of this particular sentence, a direct access to the implicature supposedly included in this sentence is not allowed. Consequently, contextualism defends a very unrealistic psychological notion of the content of sentences. (We will analyze carefully these broad claims below).

In the contemporary debate between semantic and pragmatic accounts about the meaning of an utterance, and if the previous claims are correct, we can say that both positions can be identified with the following general principle:

(PO) The Psychological Objection: The mental condition of speakers is irrelevant to determine the content of a sentence when it is uttered.

The fact that (PO) can be a problem for both minimalism and contextualism means, for us, that the determination of the linguistic content transcends the level of semantics and pragmatics.[2] This paper will advocate for a possible alternative that takes into account (PO). This possible solution avoids institutional situations and means a more realistic approach to the content of our ordinary utterances. Before aligning oneself with contextualism or literalism, more attention should be paid both to the truth conditions of utterances and to the felicity conditions of the speech acts.

Keeping this in mind, we will explore the implications of the notion of the so-called passionate utterances in our analysis of the linguistic content. These are a good example of how ambiguity, indetermination, and the like are not the only pragmatic factors for the determination of the content of 'what is said'. Furthermore, they highlight the important role that speaker's intentions (and other mental factors) have in the process of determination of the linguistic content. And this role will be crucial in the explanation of the psychological realism of our ordinary language, a realism that both contextualism and minimalism cannot account for.

1. Psychological Objection and Minimalism

In this section, we will analyze the version of the Psychological Objection endorsed by the minimalist account of linguistic content:

(PO1) The Psychological Objection, version 1 (as endorsed by Minimalism): if we only pay attention to the semantic content of a sentence, the speaker's mental conditions are irrelevant to determine the content of a sentence when it is uttered, because every relevant element which determines the meaning of a sentence is just semantic, and none of them depends of the speaker.

1.1. Problems of PO1: Carston's Version

According to Carston, the Gricean analysis amounts to a distinction between 'what is said' (which tells that the content of a sentence is semantically implicit in its utterance and therefore it could play a causal role in the speaker's mental life) and implicatures, where the latter can often play the very same role. Hence, the Gricean view of 'what is said' will often be cognitively redundant. From here, she says, if the only thing that Grice can offer is a dichotomy between sentences whose content is implicit and sentences whose content is redundant, then in many cases it seems implausible that the Gricean 'what is said' could really play a role in the speaker's mental life (Carston 1988, 156–168). A framework that only offers this sort of 'what is said' – one that plays no role at all in the speaker's mental life- should be rejected because it, in her own words, "ignore[s] the nature of communication and of cognition in general in the interest of a formal principle which has absolutely no bearing on human psychology" (Carston 1988, 165).

In order to defend her own view, Carston analyzes a certain sort of sentences in which small shading permits a different approach to the Gricean version of 'what is said'. She reformulates the sentences by making explicit the content, and this would allow for the construction of a proposition that might work as a Gricean implicature. Thought this way, according to Carston following the Gricean 'what is said', the sentence

(1a) The park is some distance from where I live

would mean the following:

(1b) The park is some distance (whatever this distance is) from where I live.

Since (1b) is a superfluous and trivial (and also quite vague, odd, and bizarre) sentence in regard to some contexts, according to Carston, it is instead more probable that what we should understand when the speaker utters (1a) is really something like

(1c) The park is far away from where I live.

Hence, from her point of view, (1c) is a pragmatically enriched proposition. That is to say, it will be equivalent to what Grice calls an implicature, which appears when the conversational maxims are applied over the 'what is said'. Since the fact that the established relation (by Grice) between the implicatures and the explicatures has been traditionally showed to be weak and forced, she says, we should understand them as functionally independent. But even though the implicatures could play an outstanding role in the speaker's mental conditions, but it is nothing compared to the role played by the explicatures.

Therefore, according to Carston, either we keep the Gricean 'what is said' or we keep the explicatures (which, again, makes the role of the content cognitively redundant). But, we think, it is also possible to reject both and accept instead the implicatures because, according to our view, there is nothing that can be done by 'what is said' that cannot be done by implicatures. From this view, the Gricean 'what is said' neither plays any role at all to determine the content of a sentence nor has any special function that implicatures in fact cannot also play. Thought this way, everything that can be carried out by an explicature could also be carried out by an implicature, becoming absolutely irrelevant whatever the Gricean 'what is said' can enact. Therefore, we can concluded that Grice's minimalism is redundant.[3]

According to Carston, if the semantic content of a sentence is cognitively redundant, then it seems implausible that it could play a distinctive role in the speaker's mental life. Besides in her criticism she only had in mind the Gricean analysis of the content of utterances (Carston 1988), more recently she has extended her objections to the current minimalist analysis of the content of a sentence (Carston 2002). But again if, on one hand, the content of a proposition plays some role that the semantic content may also play, then the semantic content does not have a distinctive function at all in the speaker's mental life. Therefore, it cannot play a role in the determination of the linguistic content of an utterance, as minimalists claim. Therefore, we have to conclude that it is cognitively irrelevant.

In the same way, on the other hand, if the content of a sentence plays a role that could also be played by the semantic content, it will be cognitively redundant. In other words, it will be implausible that the semantic content plays any role in the speaker's mental life at all. Hence, Carston concludes, again this renewed version also "ignore[s] the nature of communication and of cognition in general in the interest of a formal principle which has absolutely no bearing on human psychology" (Carston 2002, 40).

1.2. Problems of PO1: Recanati's version

In agreement with his criticism of the semanticist account of the linguistic content, Recanati holds that "there is a central role for rich pragmatic processes to play in determining the correct analysis of the literal meaning of an utterance of a given sentence […] in addition to there being a role for such processes in determining the contextual implicatures of the utterance." In other words, according to Recanati we should focus on pragmatic factors rather than in semantic elements to determine the linguistic content of the sentences that speakers utter. As summarized by a minimalist, the contextualist believes that "the proper focus of theorizing here must be the pragmatically enriched *explicature*" (Borg 2004, 45).

(PO1) is formulated by Recanati as a criticism that can be identified as a concrete difficulty for any minimalist theory (Recanati 2004 Chapter 1, section 4). Suppose a sentence like the following:

(2) "Mr. Jones has three children."

According to minimalist theories, 'what is meant' by (2) would coincide with 'what is said' by it. In other words, according to semanticist explanations we should reduce the meaning of the sentence uttered to, and just to, its literal content. Consequently, the proposition expressed by (2) will be "Mr. Jones has at the least three children (but he maybe has more)." But ordinary language philosophy first, and contextualism afterwards, have both shown that, it is also true that in certain contexts the literal meaning corresponds exactly to 'what is meant,' in certain other cases the speaker can mean something else completely different to the literal meaning of the sentence uttered. The kind of contextualism advocated by Recanati is based on the supposed obvious fact that what the speaker means is "an expanded version of the sentence's semantic content and is identified by a process of *free enrichment*, free because the sentence already expresses a proposition, not the one [the speaker] means but merely a *minimal* proposition" (Bach 2007, 487). According to Recanati, when somebody asks how many children Mr. Jones has, what the speaker means by (2) is the proposition "Mr. Jones has exactly (no more, no less) three children". But it seems that it is not the only proposition uttered by (2). Depending of the context of utterance, a sentence like (2) can have a number of different meanings. What helps to determine the meaning in each case is the number of contextual factors available. For instance, appealing both to the speaker intention and to a process of free enrichment should give the audience some chance to recognize what the speaker really means by her utterance of the particular sentence in this concrete situation.

Recanati also borrows the distinction between primary and secondary processes of recognition: "[R]ecognition of what is said is the result of *primary* processes [that operate on an item which is not consciously accessible to the agent and yield an item which is available to consciousness], and implicatures are recognized by means of *secondary* processes" (Bach 2007, 488). This differentiation allows for an item that is already available to be taken, and it yields a further consciously accessible item. The former will be both mandatory and optional, even though it is reduced to intuition and introspection that are not normal conscious processes. The later is inferential and, therefore, conscious.

Indeed, for the minimalist there is just literal meaning, and it is determined by just a few pragmatic contextual factors. But, according to Recanati, examples such as (2) show that there are available at least two different cases. On the one hand, there will be cases where a meaning is implicatured by a sentence. This is to say, cases where the speakers are at the same time aware of 'what is said' and of 'what is meant,' just as minimalist holds. But, on the other hand, there are also cases where the speaker is more conscious of 'what is said' than of 'what is meant.'

So then, minimalism seem to "respect the intuition that the constituents of 'what is said' correspond to constituents of what the sentence used to say, except that when the sentence is semantically incomplete" (Bach 2007, 489). If this is the case, according to our view, minimalism mixes pragmatics and semantics. Furthermore, as Recanati holds, all sentences will require some availability constraint to have meaning. This is to say, 'what is said' should be "determined by the *intuitive truth condition* of the utterance, even if it departs dramatically from what is predictable from the semantics of the uttered sentence" (Bach 2007, 489). 'What is said' seems to be always consciously available to the participants in a linguistic exchange and, since according to Recanati what it communicates ('what is meant') does not belong to a different level, both can become unified, making this unit fully accessible to the speaker consciousness (as Recanati 2001, 79–80 points out). And this is possible only because the speaker's conscious intuitions in regard to 'what is said' really depend on the common knowledge of the conditions that would make a sentence true.

For Recanati, this identification would be basic and previous to all indirect speech acts that the speaker intention could explain (Recanati 2004, 25). Against those who consider that the only way of explaining these intuitions about 'what is said' consists in some kind of appeal to the opinions uttered by the speaker in an indirect style about the corrections performed, such as 'He said that...' or 'What he meant is…' (as Cappelen & Lepore 1997 claims), Recanati defends that we have an alternative way to explain the intuitions of the speaker in regard to the truth-conditions of a sentence. This alternative offers different images of certain scenes and it requests that the speaker identifies the uttered proposition as true or false. This presupposes that the very same evaluative constraint will be chosen by every speaker since it depends on a conscious level of linguistic understanding that both 'what is said' and 'what is meant' share. What this clearly shows is that, according to him, the requirement of availability elucidates the meaning of the utterance of a sentence.

An Availability Principle is, then, according to Recanati required. It establishes that "'what is said' should always be available in an intuitive way to the participants of a conversational exchange (unless something does not work adequately and the participants will not be considered as 'normal interpreters')" (Recanati 2004, 31). The reasons to defend this principle are clear for Recanati:

1. Minimalists show the aspects of meaning like conversational implicatures, as if these would just have the role of contextual ingredients from the utterance and were not the conventional meaning of the sentence. Hence, since we eliminate them from the intuitive meaning of the utterance, the proposition becomes unavailable to the participants in a communicative exchange. This fact shows how the contextual characteristics of the utterance of a sentence become a constitutive element of 'what is said' by this sentence.

2. These elements are necessary because if they were optional as minimalists defend in order to reach their propositional character one should leave aside the context of utterance, and our expectations will often be truncated. Therefore, the contextual elements of any utterance of a particular sentence are required for the determination of its linguistic content.

3. Pragmatic processes (as saturation, free enrichment, and so on) are often necessary to determine the meaning of a particular utterance of a certain sentence because the character of the processes of interpretation of its truth is shown, basically, as pragmatic.

This way, and according to Recanati, it is highly recommended to abandon minimalism and accept the reasons for defending the Availability Principle.

2. Cappelen and Lepore's Objections

In order to recover the psychological realism in regard to 'what is said' and to 'what is meant,' Cappelen and Lepore respond to the previously sketched proposals. They defend minimalism from any possible accusation of psychological unrealism and try to show how, in fact, contextualism overcomes its own criticism about these intuitions. So, we will now analyze the following version of the Psychological Objection that, according to our point of view and following C&L criticism, contextualist accounts of linguistic meaning endorses:

(OP2) The Psychological Objection, version 2 (as endorsed by contextualism): if we pay attention only to the pragmatic content of a sentence, the speaker's mental conditions are irrelevant for the determination of the content of a sentence when it is uttered because all the relevant elements for the determination of the meaning of a sentence are already available in the context, and none of them depend on the speaker.

2.1. C&L against Carston

According to Cappelen and Lepore, Carston's criticism of Gricean semanticism does not affect minimalism. They give two different reasons in favor of this claim. First, they think that Carston's conception is a misinterpretation of semantic minimalism and, second, C&L's view has some similarities with Carston's account.

First, in relation to Carston's erroneous image of minimalism, C&L attacks Carston's Relevance Theory. For her, as we saw, semanticism would consider that in any linguistic exchange the speaker communicates only the content of its speech act. This is to say, the only thing the speaker does is transmitting 'what is said' by means of the sentence uttered, asserted, claimed, stated, suggested, asked, and so on. As we have already said, according to her, the semantic content of the sentence can never be completely understood because the only meaning expressed is always hidden into the semantic content of the sentence itself.

For C&L, the first thing that needs to be done in order to counteract Carston's criticism is to reformulate this mistake and then offer a more accurate notion of the semantic content. They show that Carston's theory presents the same problems than radical contextualism (that is how they refer to the Theory of Relevance of Sperber and Wilson). That is to say, contextualism will not be able to pass Carston's own tests of contextual sensibility. According to them, both theories disable the communication and, hence, are internally inconsistent (see C&L chapters 7–9 for details).[4] According to C&L, radical contextualism denies that there is a minimal semantic content expressed in any well-formed utterance of a sentence (in English, at least). On the contrary, this content is an indispensable part for the correct realization of all communicative exchange since it plays an outstanding role in the cognitive life of the speaker. Hence, any theory that does not recognize the existence of this minimal semantic content, as the Relevance Theory and Carston's theory (Recanati's theory too) do, is empirically inadequate and internally inconsistent.

On the other hand, according to C&L, semantic minimalism would agree with Carston about how shall the content of a sentence be determined. For them, the literal content of 'what is said' is determined by the contextually implicatured elements of the sentences beyond 'what is meant,' because a contextually shared content is required in order to be able to recognize implicatures (as the cases chosen by Carston show). Furthermore, the notion of minimal semantic content is not identical to 'what is meant' as introduced by Grice because it does not play the same cognitive role. The content semantically expressed (the proposition), therefore, "is our minimal defense against confusion, misunderstanding, mistakes and it is that which guarantees communication across contexts of utterance" (C&L 185). The reason is that the proposition semantically expressed in every uttered sentence would be the safe-conduct that protects the speaker and her audience against every possible mistake or misunderstanding in any communicative exchange. This is to say, it is the content which the speaker and the audience know and share what will be communicated by using the appropriate words, independently of the context of utterance of these words. In other terms, 'what is said' is what we communicate. Therefore, the notion of semantic content that Carston criticizes in Grice is not the same notion of minimal semantic content that C&L defends. If this is correct, Carston's criticism is inaccurate.

2.2. C&L against Recanati

According to C&L, the factors that determine the content of 'what is said' (the propositional content of an explicature) in Recanati's theory presuppose that the information which the speaker and the audience share should be previous to any communication. In this view, any available information will be acquired from the speaker's and the audience's own perceptions and shared context, although often they depend on the capacities of the particular speaker and of her audience (or of their adequate disposition to the communicative exchange or, even, of their sincerity). If this is so, as Recanati insists, all participants in a communicative exchange should always be aware of all the factors that determine the content of 'what is said.'

As C&L (2004, 187) reminds us, due to the great variety of situations allowed by ordinary language, these requirements are not always achieved. In a certain moment, for instance, the speaker can utter a proposition about her own beliefs (for instance, "I believe that he is guilty") even though the conditions that make somebody guilty might be unknown. In other words, sometimes we cannot determine the truth-values that make the sentence true because it could be the case that the speaker is, for instance, telling lies. The same would be the case in other contexts where, for instance, the Gricean condition of sincerity is not satisfied or where, quite simply, the speaker sees the world from a different perspective. In these cases, the speaker would not share any information with the audience at all. Therefore, C&L holds, since it is not possible to guarantee the awareness of every factor that is required to determine the content of 'what is said' defended by Recanati, it seems that no agent would have direct access to the explicature. Even worse, the very same requirement of psychological access would be never satisfied. In other words, appealing to an awareness requirement when ordinary language produces situations in which the communicative exchange is allowed without the speaker been conscious of what is communicated,[5] extremely unrealistic.

According to C&L, therefore, the Availability Principle is defective. For Recanati, as we have seen, 'what is said' should always be present in a conscious way in the process of understanding an utterance of a particular sentence because it corresponds to the information shared by the intuitions of the speaker and the audience in any possible linguistic exchange under normal conditions. But, like C&L (2004, 188) points out, what size should anything have in order for the speakers to have psychological access to it? Furthermore, is it really necessary that something normal (in terms of awareness) has to be present in the speaker's mind in order to understand for her the utterance of a particular sentence? Counterexamples exist. There are cases where the conditions of speech are abnormal, even if the speaker thinks that these conditions are normal. There are cases in which the speaker could know that something is not completely normal and, nonetheless, it is normal. There are cases in which the speaker believes that she is not normal and, nonetheless, she is normal after all. There may be cases in which, although the conditions of speech are normal, the speaker could still not be aware of the factors required to make a particular linguistic situation an adequate one. If to know what is normal in these cases is something required for the determination of 'what is said,' it does not seem possible to say what situation is linguistically normal. Therefore, it also seems as if a speaker cannot always correctly represent 'what is said' because it would not be accessible to every possible participant in the communicative exchange at all. In short, "Recanati's 'what is said' is not psychologically real" (C&L 2004, 189). So, again, we have seen that both theories have good reasons to criticize each other. From our point of view, this means that neither semantics nor pragmatics by themselves can determine the meaning of our natural language.

3. A Second Attempt to Overcome the Psychological Objection: Cappelen and Lepore's Speech Act Pluralism

Chapter 13 of C&L presents the so-called Speech Act Pluralism (SPAP). SPAP is claimed not as a *systematic theory* of speech act content, but a as collection of instructions to guarantee that speakers communicate some information when they utter a proposition. This is to say, SPAP is a *general theory* about the relation that there exists between the semantic content of sentences (as uttered) and the content of the speech act that they perform. We suspect that the main idea behind SPAP is that what an utterance says, asserts, claims, asks, and so on, corresponds to what it semantically expresses. So, according to C&L, when a speech act is made, the content of this particular speech act changes with every new utterance of that particular sentence, but the semantic content of the proposition uttered remains the same.[6] Therefore, the main idea behind SPAP (what C&L calls 'the Central Observation') is that any uttered proposition will express a plurality of different contents in regard to the different speech acts that the different utterances perform. But these are not the content. The content of these speech acts will depend on the logical relation between the semantic level of the proposition uttered and the conversational level of utterances and other logical implications that they may compose (as, for instance, the facts of the world or the truth-conditions of the proposition). However, it does depend neither on context-sensitivity nor on contextual elements (C&L 193, 199–200; see also Cappelen and Lepore 2006a).

In sum, according to SPAP, any time someone utters a proposition, the speech act she makes will have a different content. Emphasis is put on all possible interpretations that are required to determine the content of an utterance. Anyway, all possible speech acts will share the same semantic content expressed by the uttered proposition.[7] The content will be available to any possible participant in the communicative exchange. Because the truth conditions of the different speech acts that any speaker can make are intuitively accessible to them. It would be so even if the speaker has neither a privileged access to the content of the utterance (C&L 202) nor a necessary, sincere belief about what she says (C&L 203). Therefore, these minimally semantic propositions seem to be psychologically relevant under all possible scenarios.

In our view, this theory faces some problems. It confuses the truth conditions of propositions with the felicity conditions of speech acts. If what we are taking into account are propositions, then we have to point out whether a proposition is true or false. If it is speech acts what we have in mind, it is not enough to appeal to its truth conditions. And this is because even though the proposition uttered in a speech act could be false, the speech act could still be achieved. This is to say, we must appeal both to the truth conditions that tell us whether an utterance is true or false and to the conditions under which a certain speech act determines the content of a certain sentence in a performative way. Therefore, from our point of view, what C&L defends is that the only way in which the participants in the communicative exchange would be aware of the content expressed by the utterance of a particular sentence is that which determines the truth conditions of the particular content of the different speech acts performed from the different utterances of a particular sentence. In our opinion, this has a consequence that we call 'the Semantic Fallacy':[8]

(SF) If the content of a certain expression fulfills certain semantic truth conditions, then the semantic truth conditions must also characterize the semantic function of all possible speech acts performed, independently of the illocutionary purpose of the speaker and the felicity conditions of these speech acts.

Hence, it is because C&L defends the existence of certain truth conditions, that what determines the content of the speech acts performed when we utter a sentence are those truth conditions. It seems that these truth conditions could never fulfill the conditions under which a participant in the communicative exchange would recognize the way in which certain speech acts can be achieved. And then, the speaker and her audience will not be able to recognize the felicity conditions of any speech act at all. So, in case we have to agree with this view, we would also have to accept that the truth conditions of a sentence could not always be psychologically relevant for the speaker and her audience because they will leave aside the pragmatic elements required for establishing its felicity conditions. And, as the examples that we have seen above show, sometimes these conditions are derived from the different utterances of the particular sentence the speaker has made, or they may as well depend on elements such as the speaker intention, the illocutionary force, the context of utterance, and others.

4. How Can the Passionate Utterances Help Us in Our Contemporary Analysis of the Content of Linguistic Meaning?

According to our view, speakers play a relevant role in the determination of the meaning of the sentences of our natural language. Neither semantic nor pragmatic accounts take adequate care of this role. Hence, it becomes necessary to analyze a renewed version of the Psychological Objection that can be applied to both literalist and contextualist approaches to the linguistic content:

(POR) The Psychological Objection Revisited: Literalists as well as contextualists face some problems when trying to show the relevant role played by the speaker intention (and other mental conditions) in the determination of the content of the utterances of a particular sentence. Appealing only to either the truth conditions of a sentence or to the pragmatic processes is not enough for the determination of the content of the sentences of our natural language.

In this context, and in spite of not being a philosopher that would normally be mentioned in this sort of debates, we would like to turn our attention to Cavell's review of the Austinian theory of performative utterances. Since this analysis takes into account the speaker's emotions and passions (Cavell 2005, 157), we think that it can provide a plausible solution to (POR).

According to Cavell, "it is not news that moral and other judgments of values are the causes […] of 'hatred and anger.' What should have seemed news, if true, is that the expression of passion, where appropriate, is a separate feature of the judgment, to be ‘added’ at the discretion of the utterer” (Cavell 2005, 163). For example, an inappropriate tone can make an utterance unintelligible. But, as we have seen, this is something that a minimalist account, as the one defended by C&L, does not accept.

In a way that resembles some of Recanati’s comments, Cavell says the following about perlocutionary acts: “[they] make room for, and reward, imagination and virtuosity” (Cavell 2005, 173). Contrariwise, illocutionary acts do not transcend the conventionalisms on which they are grounded. But “the urgency of passion is expressed before and after words. Passionate expression makes demands upon the singular body in a way illocutionary force (if all goes well) forgoes” (Cavell 2005, 163).

Then, what Cavell proposes is an articulation of what we can call *the region of perlocutionary acts* in such a way that it determines the effects and sensations when we talk or act. Cavell appeals to examples from our ordinary live, examples that are neither institutionalized nor officially sanctioned. They are the following:

(3) I’m bored.

(4) You know he took what you said as a promise.

(5) Monster, felon, deceiver (Doña Elvira to Don Giovanni).

(6) Heinrich, what have you done to me? (Said – through singing – by Elizabeth to Tannhäuser).

(7) Only in its enjoyment do I know love (Sung by Tannhäuser to the other contestants in the song contest).

(8) Carmen, I love you (End of Don José’s Flower Song).

(9) They say I (or: Perhaps I; or: I would not wish to) anger, mortify, charm, affront, encourage, disappoint, embarrass, confuse, alarm, offend, deter, hinder, seduce, intimidate, humiliate, harass, incite, to you.

(10) You (or: Are you attempting to…?) anger, mortify, charm, affront, encourage, disappoint, embarrass, confuse, to me.

Cavell adds some comments to these examples:

A) Their focus is not illocutionary in force and they are not meant to inform their addressee of something, even though most of them (in statement form) are true or false.

B) “Encourage” is, for some reason, in a halfway region between illocutionary and perlocutionary.

C) As for “I’m bored”, the example that Ayer claims in regard to the primacy of expression over assertion where statements of emotion are in question, hence it is the ethical assertions what is here in question. Cavell thinks that the fact “that expressions of emotion excite emotion is an important fact about the working of passionate utterance, which needs developing” (Cavell 2005, 179). Furthermore, if “I’m bored” need to be said, it may also be obvious, perhaps should be obvious, without saying it. Then saying it would place a requirement that one can acknowledge as obvious and redundant.

D) The final pair of examples (those that use disclaiming functions to introduce all perlocutionary verbs in this picture) illustrate why the first-person pronoun cannot be used unprotectedly with perlocutionary verbs in the present tense. This may indicate the first definitive difference of the perlocutionary from the illocutionary, and “the interpretation must turn on the fact that the claim to my having embarrassed or harassed you by saying something must come primarily from you, not me” (Cavell 2005, 179). In the case of illocutionary acts, as Cavell remember us, Austin insisted “the ‘I’ who is doing the action does… come essentially into the picture” (Cavell 2005, 180). In the perlocutionary acts, Cavell adds, “the ‘you’ comes essentially into the picture” (Cavell 2005, 180), even if this ‘you’ doubts about what this difference amounts to or how the second person is established.

E) The four examples “from the world of opera […] are there to invoke that world in which passionate utterance has its cultural apotheosis”. These utterances, once issued, appear “as deeply characteristic and revelatory of both the utterer and his or her addressee” (Cavell 2005, 180).

Finally, Cavell proposes a list of analogous conditions for the successful functioning of these perlocutionary/passionate utterances. He pairs them with Austin’s conditions for the illocutionary acts.

Austin’s Illocutionary Condition 1: There must be an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, […] to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.
Analogous Perlocutionary Condition 1: There is no accepted conventional procedure and effect. The speaker is on his or her own to create the desired effect. (This is as far as Austin goes into differentiating the perlocutionary effect from the illocutionary force. The following conditions are essentially working out the consequences of this difference).

Austin’s Illocutionary Condition 2: The particular person and circumstances must be appropriate for the invocation of the procedure.
Analogous Perlocutionary Condition 2a: Appropriateness is to be decided in each case. It is an issue in each. I am not invoking a procedure but inviting an exchange.
Analogous Perlocutionary Condition 2b: I therewith *single you* out (as appropriate) in the given case.

Austin’s Illocutionary Condition 3: The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

Austin's Illocutionary Condition 4: Completely.
(There are not analogues for conditions 3 and 4 with no antecedent procedure in effect).

Austin's Illocutionary Condition 5: Where, as often happen, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential behavior from any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend to behave themselves accordingly.

Austin's Illocutionary Condition 6: The participants must actually behave subsequently. (The speaker's perlocutionary invocation, backed on no conventional procedure, is grounded in her being *moved* to speak, hence to speak in, or out of, passion).

Analogous Perlocutionary Condition 5a: The speaker must be 'suffering' the relevant passion (condition of sincerity) if she would like that the wished effect will be recognized, here and now.
Analogous Perlocutionary Condition 5b: We require from the listener a response *in kind (accordingly),* one response that she is in turn *moved* to offer, and moreover,

Analogous Perlocutionary Condition 6: Now.

Cavell adds one more condition:

Perlocutionary Condition 7: Any of the previous steps can be unsatisfied (not accomplished) at any time and still the act can be successful in regard to the wished effect (or, on the contrary, all steps could be accomplished and the act could be unsuccessful).

The refusal on the seventh condition is different from the kind of refusals that Austin conceived for the conventional procedures (for instance, I can refuse to recognize the legitimacy of a divorce or to accept a slap as a duel challenge, each of them as the end of the matter). But in the realm of the perlocutionary, Cavell says, "refusal may become part of the performance […] [i]n the mode of passionate exchange there is no final word, no uptake or turndown, until a line is drawn, a withdrawal is effected, perhaps in turn to be revoked" (Cavell 2005, 183). Interpretations are an essential part of the passionate exchange. And for that reason Cavell asks himself: "Who does have the last word?" (Cavell 2005, 183).

Maybe, when Austin asserted that ordinary language is not the last word but is the first word what he means was, precisely, that even though we depend on our ordinary words to say what we mean (basically to express some intentional facts), the recognition of our intentions would be the last word. Now, as we have argued, the question is: in what sense could we say that the existence, at least in the relevant utterances, of these mental elements is necessary in order to determine the content of the sentences of our natural language? Here is where Cavell takes Austin's theory of language to go beyond the performance as a ritual because, according to his view, from performative utterances

> [F]ailures to identify the correct procedures are characteristically reparable […]. Whereas failure to have singled you out appropriately in passionate utterance characteristically puts the future of our relationship, as part of my sense, of my identity, or of my existence, more radically at stake […]. A performative utterance is an offer of participation in the order of law […]. A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire […]. In each utterance of revelation and confrontation, two paths spring: that of the responsibilities of implications; and that of the rights of desire [and therefore] we shall not stop at what we should or ought to say, nor at what we may and do say, but take in what we must and dare to say, or have it at heart to say, or are too confused or too tame or wild or terrorized to say or to think to say (Cavell 2005, 184–5).

Thought this way, Cavell seems to follow one of the most ambitious statements made by Austin about our methodological aim: "the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating" (Austin 1962, 22). As we will defend below, we also endorse this claim in our conclusion about how to determine the content of the sentences of our natural language. Our conclusion is going to take the speaker intention (and other related mental conditions) as a necessary requirement.

5. Can the Analysis of the Linguistic Content Still Retain Certain Psychological Realism?

Our main purpose, as we said above, in this paper is to find some plausible answer to the next question: in what sense is the existence of an intention (a sincere one), or any other psychological element, required for the determination of the content of a sentence of our natural language? Our answer to that question will follow some contextualist antecedents. As it is well known**,** contextualism is reminiscent of the view held by the ordinary language philosophy in the sense that both stand for a distinction between the content of a sentence and the content of the speech act that its different possible utterances make (in Recanati 2007 terms, we should distinguish between the *lekton* and the Austinian proposition). We claim, in accordance with this view, that linguistic content is the content of the particular speech act that a concrete utterance of a particular sentence performs, in the sense that what a particular sentence express is some content from the very moment in which it is uttered.

It follows from our agreement with the Austinian theory the assumption of the existence of psychological elements as a requirement for the determination of our linguistic content. And this is important for at least two general reasons. Firstly, the existence of certain mental elements *colors* what the speaker means. This is to say, it permits that our acts acquire the same *tonality* expressed by our words. Secondly, the audience establishes the way for the determination of the meaning of what has been said, because the audience recognizes what the speaker meant when she expresses her own states.

To exemplify our point, suppose the next scenario. In a real context (a real ordinary life scenario, excluding theater plays, representations, performances, and so on) where two persons are having some intimacy, a speaker utters the following sentence:

(11) I love you.

We suppose that the semantic content by itself is not always enough for the determination of the proposition expressed by the particular utterance. We can imagine a number of situations in which this proposition does not remain the same. Suppose the case where someone ‘loves’ cheese sandwiches. Can we say that the speaker means the same when utters both sentences? According to our view, this kind of utterance requires the existence of a coherency between the speaker’s mental life and the act’s felicity conditions that express the performer’s emotion or passion in this act (see *Tractatus* 6.43). For a correct approach to (11), therefore, we have to appeal both to the speaker’s psychological elements that determine the felicity conditions of the speech act performed by the particular utterance, and to the semantic content (the truth conditions) of the proposition uttered for the correct determination of the content of the particular sentence.

6. Conclusion

The main aim of this paper was to solve the negative claim established by what we called the Psychological Objection: speaker’s psychology is irrelevant for the determination of the linguistic content of sentences of our natural language. As we saw, contextualists as well as semanticists accounts to linguistic content face some problems when they try to explain the consequences of this claim. On the one hand, according to contextualist, we should appeal to an awareness requirement that makes possible to say when the content that the speaker would like to communicate is available. As C&L criticizes, since this consciousness requirement is not always achieved, speaker's psychology will be irrelevant for the determination of the content of our natural language sentences. Therefore, we should refuse contextualist solutions.

On the other hand, semanticist approaches to linguistic content hold that we should take care only of the truth conditions that allow to specify what semantic elements are relevant for the determination of the content of a sentence of our natural language. As Carston and Recanati have pointed out, since what can be said about the determination of the linguistic content depends only on semantic elements of these sentences, then the role of speaker's psychology is irrelevant. Hence, we should also refuse semanticist solutions.

We have considered SPAP as a possible new solution to (PO). Because it is impossible to establish a relation between both the content of a sentence in terms of its truth conditions and the felicity conditions of the speech act performed by the utterances of this particular sentence, we have concluded that SPAP also denies a role of speaker's psychology in the determination of the content of our natural language sentences. As we have also said before, since it is a fact that some of our sentences express some subjective-embedded content, we advocate that, as the case of passionate utterances have shown, the speaker intention to communicate this content determines, first, the words that she will use to communicate it and, second, the concrete speech act that these words will perform in order to communicate the content that she has the intention to express.[9]

NOTES

1. Beyond this broad distinction between contextualism and minimalism, which we admit as a partial and incomplete classification, we would like to say that contextualism could be also divided in different accounts according to their particular understanding of the determinative role of the pragmatic processes involved in our natural language. Thus, as we will point out below, we can differentiate between a moderate contextualism (defended by Recanati, for instance) and a radical contextualism (defended by Carston, for example, and based in the Relevance Theory). We have to clarify that minimalism is just one among the various approaches that can be found which explain the linguistic meaning in literal or semantic terms. We can refer to them as semanticism or literalism. Among these approaches we should distinguish between, for instance, the truth conditions semanticism defended by King

(2007), Collins (2007), Stanley (2007), Szabó (2006), among others, the expression-conditions semanticism advocated by Nathan Salmon, Predelli (2005)'s "formal" semanticism and the "tinge" minimalism hold by Manuel García-Carpintero (2007), Manuel García-Carpintero and Pérez Otero (2009) and Emma Borg (2004 and 2012), but we can also find other accounts. This differentiation, of course, is also a general and debatable characterization.

2. We are not trying here to give an accurate account of the comparison between semantics and pragmatics because this topic will exceed our main purpose (which is solving a certain problem that semanticist as well as pragmatist accounts of linguistic content have to face when they explain the meaning of any utterances. But we would like to emphasize that this comparison is a trending topic. This topic has been dealt by Bianchi (2004), Szabó (Ed.) (2005), and Ezcurdia and Stainton (Eds.) (2012), among others.

3. Indeed, according to Grice, we should differentiate inside the complete meaning of an utterance between 'what is said' and 'what is implicatured.' But, in turn, into 'what is implicatured' we should distinguish between what we implicature conventionally and what is conversationally implicatured. Instead, inside the latter category we must differentiate between implicatures that are generalized (GCI) and implicatures that are particularized (PCI). According to Grice, GCI are inferences that gather the speaker's intuitions about what she is concerned (what Grice called normalized interrelation), which would be interpreted as a kind of standardized utterance that already includes what it is implicatured, something that everyone could understand adequately if involved in these inferences.
Example: (Question) "Have you a cigarette?"

(Response, as GCI): "I am sorry, but I do not smoke" (to imply that you do not have any cigarette, though you have said seemingly something else about your healthy condition).

On the other hand, PCI are sentences that do not share this normalization.
Example: (Question) "Would you like to come to the cinema with me?"

(Response, as PCI): "Bite me!" (as a negative answer to the question, absolutely saying something unexpected that should be interpreted differently from the usual meaning of the mere words).

As we know, Grice's analysis of implicatures was not concerned with the conversational comprehension but with the sense in what an analysis of the GCI and its normalized interpretations allows to differentiate between the semantically established aspects of the meaning of (at least) certain linguistic sentences and the elements required by a pragmatic process of enrichment. In other words, according to our view, he seems to be concerned with the elements required for the specification of the linguistic content. For a development of the Gricean theory of implicatures, see Levinson (2000). For an analysis of the recent developments of the Gricean position about conversational implicatures, see Carston (2004).

4. C&L also expands this objection to some other contextualist accounts, as for example Travis (2006)'s approach and Bezuidenhout (2006)'s radical contextualism.

5. What we have in mind is a particular case introduced by Austin. Suppose a bridge player that raises a bet not being conscious that she cannot win. We cannot say that the fact that she was not aware of what she was doing does not mean that she did not what she did, because she indeed did it.

6. In other words, C&L reunites what Salmon have differentiated as two different notions of semantics. On the one hand, he advanced an expression-based notion of semantics according to which the semantic features of propositions are intrinsic to the expressions and do not depend of their possible utterances. On the other hand, he also advanced a speech act-based notion of semantics according to which the semantic features of propositions are acquired when they are expressed in a certain speech act. The mistake of putting together the two notions of semantics distinguished can be claimed as a criticism against Cappelen and Lepore's theory. (See Salmon 2004 and 2005 for additional details). If this is true, and this seems to be the case if we follow the advices claimed by C&L, this theory does not seem to be different from contextualism (Stainton 2006). Cappelen and Lepore, of course, do not accept this assimilation (Cappelen and Lepore 2006b, 487–491).

7. Bach (2006, 437–438) points out that, if this is the case, then C&L falls for propositionalism. This is to say, C&L defends the thesis that when we express a proposition we always express a thought because this expression always appeals to some extra-element (which is different than the purely semantic elements in the sentence itself) to determine the meaning of the proposition as uttered. And this because, as C&L accepts, to determine 'what is said' by a proposition we need to reconstruct all the allowed utterances by the particular proposition in order to determine the thought that is transmitted, and this task can be done in very different ways (C&L 192). Anyway, according to our view, it seems as if Bach had paid attention just to the first part of the theory proposed by C&L. Although Cappelen and Lepore radically deny this propositionalism, when they state that the semantically expressed content of an utterance is just one of the many possible asserted propositions (C&L 200), it gives the impression that C&L are accepting the idea (shared also by Bach) that is not necessary to appeal to the contextual sensibility to determine the content of the propositions expressed by our utterances (Cappelen and Lepore 2006b, 469–473). In other words, the semantic content of a proposition is the content that all possible utterances of the same sentence share, independently of the context of utterance (Bach 2006, 442).

8. 'The Semantic Fallacy' is the correlate of what has been called 'the Pragmatic Fallacy':

(PF) If the use of a particular expression fulfills a certain illocutionary purpose of the speaker, then that purpose must also characterize the expression's semantic function with respect to the speaker's context (Salmon 1991, 306).

We accept (PF) for our main purpose here, but we think that this fallacy is also problematic (at least in its actual form).

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THE LAST POST? POST-POSTMODERNISM AND THE LINGUISTIC U-TURN

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ABSTRACT. This paper adopts an autobiographical tone to review the linguistic turn and its demise at the hands Richard Rorty. Rorty, along with Continental philosophers like Lyotard rescued us from a philosophical delusion that we might achieve a neutral analysis resulting in linguistic and conceptual hygiene. This view became the basis of a highly influential doctrine in philosophy of education during the 1970s under R. S. Peters and the London school. I review the Wittgenstein-inspired movement and its conceptual affinities with postpositivism, postmodernism and postcoloniality as the dominating motifs of the age we have now passed beyond.

Keywords: linguistic turn, postmodernism, philosophy of education

1. Introduction: The Ends of History

I remember the intellectual excitement when I first discovered Jean-François Lyotard's (1984) *The Postmodern Condition.* I read the book the year it was translated into English while finishing a PhD in philosophy of education on Ludwig Wittgenstein with a thesis entitled 'The problem of rationality.' Earlier after completing an MA in philosophy at the University of Auckland I had been warned off the late Wittgenstein as too 'unphilosophical'. The early Wittgenstein was fine but the later Wittgenstein evidently was not. I persisted in my own philosophical tastes and preferences and eventually found a philosopher of education, Jim Marshall, who was willing to supervise my work on Wittgenstein, which initially focused on the question of cultural relativism.

Lyotard's reading of Wittgenstein while playful, imaginative and a 'creative misappropriation', as I have argued (Peters, 1999), nonetheless struck me as a thunderbolt from the blue. It provided a political interpretation of

Wittgenstein's philosophy of language that I thought both necessary and warranted. I translated for myself into bad English his essay 'Wittgenstein "After"' (Lyotard, 1993) about the 'mourning' of the loss of language that I found insightful and that helped to historically locate Wittgenstein's attempt to deal with the problem of nihilism that is strongly influenced and prefigured in Nietzsche.

At that very moment I became 'poststructuralist' in my interests and 'postmodern' in my sensibilities, finding ways to reinterpret Wittgenstein in the light of a broadly postmodernist canvas – both the content and structure of his thought, especially the *Investigations*, and also his *style* of philosophizing (Peters & Marshall, 1999; Peters, Burbules, & Smeyers, 2010). This was I now realize a process of fictionalizing the past, a kind of creative historiography of philosophy that grew out of the postmodern emphasis on language and the crafting of historical narrative. My postmodernist reading of Wittgenstein was assisted enormously not only by Lyotard's influential adaptation of 'language-games' as a method in *The Postmodern Condition* but also by the early account of Alan Janik and Stephen Toulmin (1972) of Wittgenstein in terms of Viennese modernism. These texts were not based on close or accurate readings of Wittgenstein but they were inspired speculations that led to new horizons and applications.

I was enabled through this new awareness of textuality – new forms of reading and writing the text, hypertextuality, metatextuality – that gelled with both philosophical hermeneutics and also with at least one significant direction that post-analytical philosophy took with Richard Rorty after the 'death' of Kantian-styled analysis. Rorty's linguistic turn had finally collapsed into a kind of philosophical hermeneutics he called 'conversation' that was in reality a combination of Michael Oakeshott's emphasis on liberal learning and Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. In philosophy it represented a move away from epistemology-centered philosophy and forms of foundationalism and representationalism. Its popularization in philosophy led to the slow decline of analysis as a form of conceptual analysis or conceptual clarification. The latter view of philosophy as clarification does hold a place in Wittgenstein's thought but nothing like the obsession with a magical method and 'linguistic hygiene' that characterized the depiction of Wittgenstein proposed by R. S. Peters of the London School, which had taken the linguistic turn. As philosophers of education R. S. Peters and the London School argued that 'we' philosophers had the metalinguistic task of clarifying our concepts and thoughts, making sure that teachers, policy practitioners and educational researchers had 'clean' and well-ordered concepts to go about their business with. It's a view that does find some echoes in Wittgenstein, perhaps less in the later than in the early Wittgenstein, but quickly became doctrinaire and ideologically dangerous because it was associated with the view both in philosophy and philosophy of education that this was/is the only true description of philosophy – a meta-activity that made sure our concepts and language was in order, or a form of analysis that depicted our conceptual schema.

The linguistic turn was an unassailable and wholesale sea-change in twentieth-century philosophy that captured two fundamental insights: the claim that all knowledge is dependent upon its expression in language (all thought is language-dependent) – as Wittgenstein suggested 'what can be said can be said clearly' and 'that we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence' – and the goal of philosophy is to provide an understanding of our conceptual schema in order to resolve problems that arise from the misuse of words. This is not an investigation of the world but rather a step removed – a meta-activity that seeks agreement to resolve conceptual confusions that arise in our use of concepts. 'The linguistic turn' was a phrase popularized by Richard Rorty in 1967 with a collection of the same title – *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method*. He adopted the term from the Austrian philosopher Gustav Bergmann. The notion of 'the linguistic turn' while originally used to describe the rising influence of logical positivism, especially the work of Rudolf Carnap and others, Wittgenstein-inspired phases in the history of analytic philosophy also came to represent and provide a description for a range of very different intellectual movements that for want of better descriptors I have christened *postpositivism*, *postmodernism*, *poststructuralism* and *postcolonialism* – four compassing but very different intellectual movements dominating the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in science and the humanities. Wittgenstein helped inaugurate and in part was responsible for the linguistic turn in its various phases of the history of analytical philosophy and I have argued that he demonstrated certain affinities with themes of the other three movements. He was also, and partly, as a consequence of the linguistic turn, responsible for inspiring the cultural turn and the associated turn to practice and space that presently characterizes the social sciences.

This personal intellectual trajectory that mirrors developments and movements in theory in part accounts for why I wrote a book called *The* Last *Book on Postmodernism* (Peters, 2011). The title for me echoes Nietzsche's 'last man' and the kind of eschatology that goes with much postmodern thinking: the end of history, the end, of ideology, the end of philosophy etc. As an ironical title I wanted to clearly signal that we are now in an era removed from these movements; that these movements while significant and powerful in shaping our sensibilities and understandings have passed their peak and are now waning, even if their interests and effects will continue to be felt widely in the arts, humanities, and social science for many years to come. Also I have to say that this was *my* last book on postmodernism/poststructuralism. I do not have anything more to say about the topic – some might argue that I have already said too much. Now I want to move on with this intellectual heritage as a basis for approaching new geopolitical and philosophical questions no longer in the shadow of the ubiquitous ‘post’ – essentially a negative and reactive rhetorical strategy – but in the light of the ‘inter’– ‘intercommunication’, ‘interculturalism’, ‘Internet.’

2. The Linguistic Turn: Ideal and Oxford Language Philosophy

In *The Linguistic Turn* Richard Rorty (1967) wrote of the metaphysical difficulties of linguistic philosophy associated with the thought of Wittgenstein and that led to the revolutionary attempt to turn philosophy into a science through the adoption of a new ‘presuppositionless’ method. By ‘linguistic philosophy’ Rorty (1967) meant the ‘view that philosophical problems are problems that can be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use’ (p. 3). This revolution like others in the history of philosophy has been inspired by the search for a neutral standpoint that rested on the understanding that philosophical questions are questions of language – the metaphilosophical presupposition that united both ideal language philosophy (ILP) and ordinary language philosophy (OLP). The thrust of Rorty’s argument developed further in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) was that there are no criteria or test for successful analysis in either ILP or OLP.

Rorty offered detailed and technical arguments that need not detain us here. The original collection of *The Linguistic Turn* included 28 essays by prominent analytical philosophers including classic statements on the notion that philosophical questions are questions of language, sections devoted to statements concerning ILP and OLP, and a final section on the future of analytic philosophy. The 1992 edition included also two essays by Rorty reflecting on the original collection ten and twenty five years later. Writing in 1990 reflecting on the original essay written in 1965 he comments that the assertion ‘the problems of philosophical are problems of language’ seems confused on two counts: first, philosophy no longer is an ‘activity’ for him and second, there is ‘no such thing as language in any sense which makes it possible to speak of “problems of language”’ (p. 371). He refers to Donald Davidson’s (1975) paper ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’ that gives up on the dualism between scheme and world and therefore also on the concept of representations about which post-Kantian philosophers were concerned to find out what made them true or false. No longer can we hold that analytical philosophy is born out of a linguistic turn establishing the study of language as the foundation of the discipline.

P. M. S. Hacker (2005) provides a more elaborate picture of the history of analytic philosophy. He suggests it 'originated in Cambridge in the late 1890s with the revolt, by the young Moore and Russell, against the neo-Hegelian Absolute Idealism that had dominated British philosophy in the last third of the nineteenth century' (p. 1) and describes Wittgenstein's logical atomism of the *Tractatus* as the culmination of the first phase and the primary source of the next two phases that he gives as Cambridge philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s under Ramsey, Braithwaite and Wisdom, and the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. The second phase was short-lived and the third, with a focus on the logic of scientific language, was interrupted by the Nazis. The leading members of the Circle including Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach, Hempel, Frank, Tarski, Bergmann, Gödel, 'fled to the USA, where they played a major role in the post-war years in transforming American pragmatism into logical pragmatism' (p. 2).

Hacker (2005) suggests that the fourth phase was OLP led by Ryle and Austin, 'with Berlin, Hampshire, Hart, Grice, and after 1959, Ayer (influenced by the Vienna Circle), and among the postwar generation Strawson and Hare' (p. 3). Interwoven with postwar Oxford philosophy was a strand based on the *Investigations* including the work of von Wright, Wisdom and Anscombe. The fourth phase, Hacker suggests declined in the 1970s and gave way to American logical pragmatism in the work of Quine, Davidson, Putnam and (in Britain) Dummett.

In making this assessment Hacker (2005) like Rorty looking back acknowledges that there is a great deal of confusion over what constitutes the linguistic turn. He writes:

> Rorty sensed, rightly I think, that a deep and important change had occurred in analytic philosophy in the 1930s and 1940s – a shift in the conception of the problems and methods of philosophy that to some extent bridged the gulf that separated the Vienna Circle and affiliates (with all the differences there were between the Schlick/Waismann wing, on the one hand, and the Neurath/Carnap wing, on the other) from Oxford philosophers and affiliates and followers of Wittgenstein (with all the differences between *them*). Despite these great differences both within and between these two streams, a sea-change had occurred (p. 10).

Hacker goes on to state:

> With the benefit of another thirty eight years' hindsight, I myself should wish to elaborate Rorty's account. The linguistic turn, I suggest, was taken when it was proposed

> 1. That the goal of philosophy is (a) the understanding of the structure and articulations of our conceptual scheme, and (b) the resolution of the problems of philosophy (to be specified by paradigmatic examples), which stem, *inter alia,* from unclarities about the uses of words, from covert misuses, and from misleading surface grammatical analogies in natural languages.
> 2. That *a* primary method of philosophy is the examination of the uses of words in order to disentangle conceptual confusions.
> 3. That philosophy is not a contribution to human knowledge about reality, either superior to or on the same level as scientific knowledge, but a contribution to a distinctive form of understanding.
>
> This turn had been initiated by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. It could be completed only when the metaphysical doctrines of the *Tractatus* were jettisoned and the logical doctrines accordingly modified. This was effected by Wittgenstein himself in the 1930s, and, partly under his influence, by the Vienna Circle (p. 11).

At the same time Hacker acknowledges Dummett's (1978, 458) view and then disagrees with each of his propositions of characterization. Dummett's statement here is important because it typifies, even if wrongly, the fundamental attitude of the era that saw philosophy's main task as analyzing the structure of thought via language.

> Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of *thought*; secondly that the study of *thought* is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of *thinking*; and, finally, that the only proper method for analyzing thought consists in the analysis of *language*. ... The acceptance of these three tenets is common to the entire analytic school.

Hacker then also portrays Williamson as arguing that the representational turn has displaced the linguistic turn in that both thought and language are part of the more general category of representation and the analysis of representation ought to be the goal of philosophy as they are both manifestations of mind, and against Williamson Hacker, invoking Kant, maintains that philosophy is the proper understanding of the structure of our conceptual structure.

The culmination of a historicist movement in philosophy of science that began to impact on crude forms of empiricism: Quine's 'two dogmas of empiricism'; Popper's critical rationalism; Feyerbend's epistemological anarchy in *Against Method*; and Kuhn's sociology of science that opened the flood gates (even if he protested against the radical interpretation of his work), to cultural studies of science, the anthropology of the laboratory, the strong Wittgensteinian program with Bloor and others at Edinburgh. Positivism was on skid row and post-positivism began its unsteady rise to paradigmatic status, even if its intellectual status was short-lived and its practices that were quickly institutionalized outlived their intellectual usefulness as they began to be cemented into an acceptable consensus. Post-positivism was soon challenged by postmodernism in its different forms, including poststructuralism. Postpositivist philosophers of education had difficulty in particular accepting the challenge of the concept of power as it came down to them in the form of Foucault's 'power/knowledge' and later concept of 'governmentality.' The debates concerning methodology after Foucault soon became entrenched – scholars took sides, polemics ensued and open intellectual debate was stultified. In some ways this was a repeat of the history of the debate that took place between Habermas and Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida.

Yet, the development of an ethos of flexibility to a textual approach to the past to me seemed liberating. The Cambridge interpretation of Wittgenstein, that became a place-holder in the history of contemporary philosophy, did not seem possible or palatable any longer, even though there are Cambridgean influences, continuities and overlaps. The black cat of rhetoric had been let out of the bag of factual empirical history and there was no going back. Even if the past is all that is the case, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, unvarnished facts by themselves did not provide the framework of intelligibility for establishing an unambiguous narrative – if facts are theory-laden and multiple narratives can be made to square with the facts then any view of scientific history was let off the hook and the openness of the past became permanently established. History, historiography, metahistory of everything including philosophy seemingly reduced everything to a text and narrative.

Wittgenstein's antifoundationalism and antirepresentationalism in philosophy of language and epistemology seems only to make sense against early modernism in philosophy based on the Cartesian search for certainty that the later Wittgenstein rallied against. The anticartesian reading of Wittgenstein's *Investigation* and *On Certainty* is now well established with his attack on essentialism and the attempt to give firm foundations to knowledge through the strategy of subjectivity and focus on the lonely 'cogito.' His style of Lichtenbergian composition based on notebooks that recorded flashes of insight as 'raw data' to be 'composed' (musically or operatically – with many voices) later and his use of metaphor and narrative rather than systematic argumentation still only resonate for me against the background of formal experimentation that characterizes the high point of literary or poetic modernism with its beginnings in the historical moment of Russian formalism and its extension by means of the European avant-garde.

3. Structuralism, Post-structuralism and Post-poststructuralism

For me the accidental discovery of Lyotard was accompanied by a reading of Althusser, as was ritualistically demanded as part of critical culture in the 1970s' Western university especially by my neo-Marxist colleagues. Actually I enjoyed Althusser's emphasis of 'reading' and interpreting Marx, although I had difficulty with the view that there was one correct reading on the argument that if one can establish new readings then the process of interpretation must be endless especially with rich and complex texts and thinkers (like Marx) that permit and encourage multiple readings. With Althusser, and with many others of like mind I went on to rediscover the canon that comprises structuralist linguistics and poetics focusing on Roman Jacobson's circle, Bakhtin's circle, structuralist anthropology centered on Claude Levi-Strauss, structuralist epistemology based on Gaston Bachelard, Michel Foucault and others, including neo-Kantians, such as Konrad Lorenz and Jean Piaget as well as the Kantian constructivists in philosophy of mathematics such as the Burbaki group. The process was also motivated by the attempt to come to terms with 'poststructuralism' in the very different works of Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida and the coterie of French feminist structuralists like Luce Irrigaray, Helene Cixious and others. This reading progression demanded as well the reading of predecessors, Nietzsche and Heidegger in particular, and a study of the Heidegger-Nietzsche nexus that assumed such significance in French thought during the 1960s with the first Nietzsche conferences led by Gilles Deleuze in the early 1960s.

The later Heidegger's philosophy of language that finds its phenomenological roots is not in the structure of *Dasein* but in the original clearing into which *Dasein* is already thrown. In a strong sense Heidegger and Wittgenstein are the instigators of the linguistic turn – Wittgenstein for analytic and post-analytic philosophy, Heidegger for Continental philosophy (and especially phenomenology and hermeneutics) – a turn which is for both symptomatic of philosophy's failure to come to terms with itself. Karl-Otto Apel (1979) and Katherine Rudolph (2006) attempt to show that the 'turn' to language in the twentieth century is governed in both traditions by an Augustinian heritage. And as Rudolph (2006) points out Jacques Derrida in *Speech and Phenomena* interrogates Husserl's *Logical Investigations* – the radical irreducibility of language as the condition for sense and meaning. In this sense Derrida's project is also aimed at a critique of a certain picture of language embodied by Augustine that accepts the privileged concept of 'presence' that sanctions the entire Western philosophical project. Remember Wittgenstein's *Investigations* begins with a critical reception of the Augustinian picture theory of language and a reference to Augustine's *Confessions*

– ‘When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.’ And as Wittgenstein (1972: para 1) goes on to observe:

> These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects – sentences are combinations of such names. –In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. The meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

Poststructuralism and its intellectual antecedents also seemed to play into a wider canvas that from the first origins of European formalism tracked the developments of high modernism in art and literature as parallel and intersecting conversations. Yet after the death of Foucault in 1984, even though he remains the most cited author in the social sciences and humanities, and thereafter the deaths of Deleuze, Lyotard and Derrida, poststructuralism seemed to be on the wane. Its highpoint came in the 1980s with largely rhetorical battles with Habermas, doctrinaire Marxism, and, of course, cultural conservativism, over allegations of relativism and the like. Certainly, postmodernism as a movement in architecture and the arts was the first to fall victim to the university cycle of intellectual fashion and commodity-fetish in criticism. As the critic Charles Jencks noted, postmodernism quickly moved through the cycle from rebellion and resistance to institutionalization and acceptance, as witnessed by the anthologies that began to flourish in the 1980s in a variety of fields. The canon had been identified, the terms of debate had been stabilized and the life had been drained from any residual movement of resistance that still remained.

In some ways education had been slow to respond to postmodernism and poststructuralism. Principally, Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, Doug Kellner, Joe Kincheloe, Colin Lankshear, Patti Lather, Jim Marshall, Tom Popkewitz and myself were among the first to respond and engage with these movements in the early to mid 1980s. Some like Henry Giroux remained within the realm of cultural studies in interpreting the broad implications of postmodernism; others like Jim Marshall and Tom Popkewitz focused on Foucault; and scholars like Patti Lather interrogated the movements for what they meant for feminism and educational research. Peter Mclaren renounced postmodernism for Marxism, leading the Left charge against postmodernism. By the nineties there were scholars who could be identified in education who were involved in the *explication de text* of Lyotard, Foucault, Derrida, Irigaray and others (Peter Trifonas, Gert Biesta). And of course there were those who sought to dethrone French theory from the perspective of one existing branch of education and educational research, most often positions that comprised a combination of liberal politics and liberal epistemology of science – Denis Phillips and Wally Feinberg come to mind

At the same time, postcolonial criticism from its origins in Hegelian phenomenology and originary statements in Fanon and Cesaire received a strong impetus from phenomenology, structuralism, and later poststructuralism and began to accompany and then take over from poststructuralism as the dominant paradigm of cultural criticism, supplemented by the whole gamut of a range of critical movements and methodologies in feminist, psycho-analytical, and neo-Marxist thought. But postcoloniality, and in so far as it drew systematically on wider theoretical insights from poststructuralism and poststructuralist and cultural Marxism, also seems to have reached a kind of intellectual stasis that followed the hiatus of Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) and *Cultural Imperialism* (1991). It feels as though the main elements of the program have been identified and now most of that required is the working over of full case-study detail in all their historical complexity and particularities. In some ways postcoloniality readily mapped onto existing concerns in studies of racism, gender and class in educational theory and yet its theoretical trajectory now seems more wedded to global studies of education, to globalization, and to neoliberalism in education policy, than simply to the critique of Western imperialism. In this regard we witness the beginnings of new studies of post-Occidentalism, a speculative hue of thought about the end or the decline of the West and the rise of the Rest, to use the terms of both Oswald Spengler and Stuart Hall.

I was recently greatly encouraged in this reading when I discovered the essay by Nancy Partner (2009) called 'Narrative Persistence: The Post-Postmodern Life of Narrative Theory' in an edited collection *Re-figuring Hayden White* (Ankersmit et al, 2009). Partner asks what is left behind after postmodernism and the linguistic turn apart from the social constructedness of knowledge. She quotes Michael Roth in this regard indicating that he thinks after the 'massive tide of language...has receded' the next waves of theory might be ethics, intensity, postcolonialism, empire, the sacred, cosmo-politanism, trauma, animals – Partner herself adds 'memory, experience agency, religion and the sublime. Yet these seem to be little more than tropes, themes, issues that could easily come from the theoretical wellspring of postmodernism. Partner then continues to document the fact that 'sometime around 1990 or thereafter, or maybe a little later, the linguistic turn has succeeded in turning everything into a text' (p. 83) and while the textuality and language-embeddings of history and just about everything else is not reversible, 'semantic analysis, large-scale structural analysis, rhetoric, and tropes' and critical modes of discourse analysis, have reached their shelf life, which is to say that they have quickly become methodologized and institutionalized so that the critical life has been drained from them. I am more than sympathetic with this view except that it is strange for a historian to embark on a rhetorical historiography of philosophy (as it affects history) without recognizing the context nature of that history and the political nature of its descriptions. It seems only narrative and narrative analysis persist.

Partner (2008, 827) makes the case in an earlier paper:

> The whole point (to put it reductively) of postmodernism was to challenge the authority of authority, with special attention to the production and presentation of knowledge in the humanistic disciplines: history, literature, and anthropology. Narrative theory was introduced to most of the humanities as part of the postmodern linguistic-turn repertoire dedicated to exposing the textuality, the constructedness, and unacknowledged ideological freight of narrative form, a cultural artifact made of language. Narrative theory denaturalized the story form in its central function of imposing intelligible form on time. This move, the pivotal postmodernist move of destabilizing the linguistic forms of knowledge-presentation, was most problematic for professional historians. The other humanities disciplines recognized immediate postmodernist benefits. Unpacking and exposing the instability of verbal meanings, of all modes of representation whether at the single word/world level or the more interesting ambiguities of whole narrative accounts, mainly enriched literary study, arming critics with yet sharper instruments for uncovering the suppressed and denied secrets of canonical texts.

And Partner (2008, 830–831) also deftly explains the pedagogical consequences for historians:

> As we more and more clearly enter the post-postmodern moment, whatever cultural form that eventually takes, most of the linguistic turn's instruments, including narrative theory, seem assimilated to routine academic purposes, ideologically tamed to ordinary seminar room use. Narrative should have sunk well below the surface of visible cultural ferment, along with deconstruction, social constructionism, semiotics, and the like. Professional historians, and literary/cultural critics, seem hardly to have noticed that narrative, as a self-consciously deployed weapon for making real claims on the real world, had escaped its university precincts to gain traction and accelerate through the world of post-cold war resurgent nationalisms. Every instance of this neonationalist self-assertion (examples force themselves on our attention daily) comes to its most intense expression around the story, "our story," in classic narrative form. The formulation and defense of the national narrative is a central feature of every new assertion

> of national claims in every part of the world where state structures are fluid or unstable, and every such narrative is constructed to meet and counter another version which must be denied.

She goes on to discuss the status and role of narrative construction in public settings and in constructing public memory as a collective narrative form that speaks to older forms of belonging and recounting and the reality of imagined communities that are constructed from 'human intention, aspirations, and a deep sense of collective identity and are thus real and persistent over time' (p. 832). Again, I am sympathetic to this call for stock-taking and I too have a sense of the moment of postmodernism being 'over' – its highpoint has passed us by and while remaining as part of the theory archive it seemingly has lost its critical edge. Isn't this what 'institutionalization' consists in – reading lists, courses, shortcuts, anthologies – actually the heart of historiography itself in creating an archival memory. Yet I also need to register a protest against the method of argument because narrative has never been the same after narratology, after the application and refinement of structuralist and linguistic methods, first with the Russian formalists and then, partly as consequence, with Paul Ricoeur, Tzvetan Todorov, Algirdas Greimas, Roland Barthes, and, of course, Hayden White who derives his distinctive synthesis from Giambattista Vico and Erich Augerbach, with apologies to Leopold von Ranke, Jules Michelet, Alexis de Tocqueville, Jacon Burckhardt, and almost the entire canon of nineteenth century philosophers of history. Barthes (1975) argues that every narrative is interwoven with multiple codes and these help comprise its multiple meanings. Through the hermeneutic, proairetic, semantic, symbolic, cultural codes we imposed historical order, stabilized meanings at least temporarily in order to assert interpretations.

In these terms narrative analysis and narratology grow out of structuralism and are subject to all the refinements and continuing debate that postmodernism puts on the agenda. If I was forced to say simply what comes *next*, crudely speaking, then I would respond: ***returns*** – the return to ontology (Badiou), the return to Marxism (Ranciere), the critical return to Marx and Freud (Deleuze); ***circulations*** – second generation cybernetics and systems theory as applied to globalization and global systems including global knowledge and learning systems, the pervasiveness of the new biology and ecological models of all descriptions, the emergence of digital theory, digital materialism, immaterial labor, 'cybernetic' understandings of capitalism (cybernetic political economy), mathematics of complex systems, topology; ***interdisciplinaries*** – biology and history, biology and education, and…; ***historiographies*** – encouraging the greater awareness of the constructedness of disciplinary history and their ability to wrongfoot us; ***interculturalities*** – with an emphasis on cultural practices of everything, interculturalism; ***spatialities*** – almost done, but reinterpreted and reintegrated with temporal studies after the spatial turn; ***integrations*** – intersections, internationalisms, interactions; ***differences*** – perhaps, enough said already?

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THE EXTENDED SELF, FUNCTIONAL CONSTANCY, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

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ABSTRACT. Personal indexicals are often taken to refer to the agent of an expression's context, but deviant uses (e.g. 'I'm parked out back') complicate matters. I argue that personal indexicals refer to the extended self of the agent, where the extended self is a mereological chimera incorporating whatever determines our behavioral capacities. To ascertain the persistence conditions of personal identity, I propose a method for selecting a level of description and a set of functional properties at that level that remain constant over a lifetime. I argue for functional constancy, and against continuity, as the central determinant of diachronic identity.

Keywords: functionalism, extended mind thesis, personal indexicals, personal identity, psychological continuity theory

1. Introduction

There are two investigations of personal identity that need interrelating. The first is the linguistic study of what personal indexicals ('I', 'me', etc.) refer to; that study's goal is a theory that systematizes as many uses of these terms as possible. The default view is that 'I' just refers to the utterer, but that can't be the whole story: witness deviant uses like 'I'm parked out back.' Such uses suggest that 'I' can refer to something other than a mind-body conjunct – i.e. the default composition of the self. If that's right, then semantic theories that ground personal indexicals in the self have, at best, passed the buck, not clarified the de facto meanings of these terms. The second investigation, to which the first relates closely, is the effort to discern a reasonable set of conditions for how selves are individuated and how they persist over time. Linguistic clues betray assumptions of both unity and persistence: 'I refers to *the* utterer.' This second investigation encounters its own set of obstacles, like how to deal with compositional (e.g. somatic) changes, smooth functional variation, psychological discontinuities, and more.

My purpose in this paper is to tie these two investigations together by probing the implicit philosophy of identity that hides behind some of the things people say. Most of the recent literature on personal identity considers rather exotic thought experiments involving brain transplants and the like in order to – supposedly – shed light on our intuitions. I will depart from this practice and consider more everyday scenarios because I don't think that such scenarios figure in to the common understanding of personal identity.

As a disclosure of my overall stance, let me say that I agree with Derek Parfit (1995) that many of the problem cases surrounding personal identity, including some of the cases I discuss here, are merely decision problems in the sense that their primary impact is in exposing personal judgments about whether two entities (at different times, let us suppose) deserve to be regarded as the same person. Here's Parfit:

> Some conceptual questions are well worth discussing. But questions about personal identity…are like questions that we would all think trivial. It is quite uninteresting whether, with half its components replaced, I still have the same audio system. In the same way, we should regard it as quite uninteresting whether, if half of my body were simultaneously replaced, I would still exist. As questions about reality, these are entirely empty. Nor, as conceptual questions, do they need answers. We might need, for legal purposes, to give such questions answers. Thus we might decide that an audio system should be called the same if its new components cost less than half its original price. And we might decide to say that I would continue to exist as long as less than half my body were replaced. But these are not answers to conceptual questions; they are mere decisions. (Parfit, 1995, p. 302)

On this view, most of the discussion around personal identity just assumes that personal identity is a natural kind, and that our philosophical project is properly taken to be figuring out what that kind consists in. I reject both assumptions: I just don't think there is any reason to regard personal identity as 'being' anything other than an idiosyncratic concept whose rough-and-ready machinery is practicable for many ordinary uses but which breaks down in some mildly unusual problem cases like persistent vegetative states, and some downright exotic ones, like tele-transporters, fission, and brain-state transfers. This is not at all to say, however, that this popular philosophical project is a waste of time: by exploring the structure of concepts – as exposed by language – we reveal the consistency, entailments, and groundedness of our models of the world and of ourselves, and I think that is a perfectly reasonable undertaking for philosophers (and cognitive scientists).

I will defend two main claims. These will be that (1) our de facto use of personal indexicals implies that we normally think of personal identity as being *extended* in the sense of Clark & Chalmers (1998), and (2) functional *constancy*, not continuity, provides the better foundation for diachronic self-identity, despite there being no normative criterion for the functional traits that matter.

The structure of the paper will be as follows: In the first section, I'll review Kaplan's (1989) account of personal indexicals, present some challenges to it, and end up defending it in a form modified to include the extended self. After that, I'll discuss the ways I think functionalism can and should bear on this inquiry. That will lead to a discussion of Shoemaker's psychological continuity thesis and Nozick's theory of the closest continuer. I'll argue against both of those positions and describe how the functions that constitute selves can remain constant, and thereby form the basis for diachronic persistence.

2. Kaplan's Model, Deviant Uses, and the Extended Self

Some words seem to refer to the same thing no matter who says them: 'Mt. Everest' always refers to the same mountain. Other words, like 'I,' as in 'I climbed Mt. Everest,' mean different things at different times: it means Mary when she says it and it means John when *he* says it. That shifting meaning is what makes a term an indexical. Kaplan's (1989) systematizes this by asserting that linguistic expressions have *contexts*, where a context is a tuple $\langle w, a, p, t\rangle$, and *w* is a world, *a* an agent, *p* a place, and *t* a time. Some indexicals, which Kaplan calls *true demonstratives*, use extra-linguistic behavior from the speaker to fix their meaning, as when a speaker, pointing to a donut, says 'I want *that*.' In contrast, *pure indexical* terms like 'I' require no special behavior from the speaker. Personal indexicals are exemplars of this category: they always refer to the agent of the context and therefore to the whomever the utterer happens to be.

Kaplan's semantics, then, have foundations based on the agent. One of my concerns is that unless we understand what agents are – or, more specifically, unless we understand how they are individuated – Kaplan's model isn't enough to fully understand what 'I' means. Why would we be confused about how agents are individuated? Change over time, for one. As I'll discuss in detail later, expressions like 'I'm not the man I once was' suggest *two* identities, one former and one present. More exotically, split brain personality and multiple personality disorder challenge the unitariness of agents. Or suppose we started removing neurons from a person's brain, one by one. Eventually we would find ourselves empty-handed: when did the collection of remaining cells stop being *the agent*? (This particular example has the disquieting property of having practical application, as when brain cells slowly die off. I'll be discussing this in some detail later.) What happens when the psycho-functional properties of an agent vary through learning? Absent answers to such questions, Kaplan's grounding on *the agent* could refer to any number of different things. Which one?

Before I try to answer that, I want to explore a bit more thoroughly what ought to be a simpler question. Suppose we just posit that we know what agents are – suppose people never changed, never had multiple personality disorder, etc. Under those simplified conditions, would 'I' always refer to the agent? If so, then the agent is stranger than is typically supposed, as shown by non-canonical uses of 'I' in locutions like the following (from Mount, 2008 and Krasner, 2006):

- 'I'm parked out back' (where 'I' here refers to my car);
- 'I am on a purple square' (where 'I' refers to a player's Monopoly game piece);
- 'I killed a woman yesterday. Naturally I want to deflect suspicion,' (where the speaker here is a detective trying to put himself into the mind of a murderer, and 'I' refers to that person).

On their face, these seem to trouble Kaplan's model because in each case 'I' fails to refer to (what is typically regarded as) the agent of the utterance.

A conventional response is to distinguish between semantics and pragmatics. Kaplan's model concerns the former, and is aimed at systematizing the formal structures of linguistic reference. The latter concerns the ways in which competent speakers use a language to communicate. Theories of implicature in particular are concerned with explaining how speakers communicate meanings that differ from the literal content of their utterances (as, for example, in using the phrase, 'Yeah, right!' to mean 'Absolutely not.'). Deviant uses of 'I,' on this view, would fall under the umbrella of implicature.

This solution makes me uneasy. It sets a precedent of abdication, wherein semantic theories push off onto pragmatics whatever they can't explain. Suppose, therefore, that one thinks that deviant uses need to be included semantics per se. Mount (2008) thinks that they do. The examples above, on her view, are not social conventions or illustrations of artful expression, but straightforward applications of 'I' and therefore reflections of its formal role in language proper. Her proposed solution is to include the *intentions of the utterer* in semantics itself. This allows a shifting of reference, even for pure indexicals, that stands in clear contrast to Kaplan's theory, where 'I' has a fully automatic meaning in every expression. Here is Mount's summary:

> I have argued that the automatic indexical theory fails to capture how indexical reference works, and that discretionary speaker intentions can affect the reference of all indexicals in some way or other. In other words, there are no 'pure' indexicals. This conclusion is compatible with various conceptions of how indexical reference works, but it is not compatible with any theory according to which indexicals refer automatically and invariably based on a certain specifiable feature of the objective utterance situation.…[S]peaker intentions play a role in the *meaning* of indexicals. While I don't think that speaker intentions themselves *determine* what an indexical refers to, they do have a predictable sort of influence. (p. 208) [Emphasis is original.]

Thus, on Mount's view, 'I' is a *discretionary* indexical lacking invariant reference, in contrast with Kaplan's theory, which makes 'I' an *automatic* or *pure* indexical that invariantly refers to the agent of a context. In the next few paragraphs I'll formulate my response to Mount and defend a modified form of Kaplan's theory. The first part of my response rests on our tendency to construct an 'extended self' in our cognitive representations, so my immediate purpose is to talk about what that means.

The *extended mind thesis* was proposed by Clark & Chalmers (1998) as a way to accommodate our use of external artifacts as cognitive accessories. Using their example: if Otto, who has Alzheimer's disease, uses a notebook to store the address of a museum which he could not otherwise remember, the typical view is that Otto knows that he can use the notebook to retrieve that information. Without such use, Otto himself does not know the information. The extended mind thesis, on the contrary, says that Otto does know the information – it's just that some of the information Otto knows is contained not in his brain, but in the notebook. The corollary *extended self thesis* (EST) goes one step further, saying that the extended mind thesis pushes us to conclude that *Otto's self includes the notebook*, not just the biological material comprising his animal body. Our selves spread out, beyond our skin. I am going to take *the self* to be the same thing as *the agent*. Agents, then, spread out beyond the skin.

Now I want to use the EST to address the problem cases discussed by Mount. One of these is the parking example, as in 'I'm parked out back' or even 'I'm out back.' The EST can clarify what's happening here by asserting that the car, like the notebook, is a bearer of self-extension. That is, the person making this utterance has a conception of the self that includes not just their own mind and body, but their car as well. (I am well aware that this rather a different sort of extension than Otto and his notebook; I'll address this different use in a moment.) Consider some related utterances that seem to support the assertion that people think of their cars as part of their selves. Fender-bender victims say things like 'Hey, he hit me!' When parallel parking, I ask my passenger, ‘Can I fit in that space?’ Damage to the car I am driving (think of scraping its underside on a parking ramp) elicits wincing and other expressions of pain, even though no damage is done to my animal body. These examples reflect the degree to which physical proxies, especially those whose movements we can control precisely and whose physical interactions have consequences for us, are regarded by us *as* parts of us. As reflections of our cognition, then, they underwrite utterances like, ‘I am out back’ as meaning ‘I (the mereological sum of my body and my car) am out back.’

These examples offer circumstantial support for my claim that the car acts as a bearer of self-extension, but some may object that this application of the EST overextends it by including an external object that, unlike Otto’s information-containing notebook, does not participate in cognition. This objection rests on an unnecessarily narrow view of the EST. The central feature of the EST is the posit that a coupling between two or more systems can produce a new entity that can be regarded as a (composite, but so are ‘merely animal’ human beings) system in its own right, with its own new behavioral capacities. In the Otto example, the information in the notebook is what provides those capacities. The notebook encodes information which, when coupled to the rest of Otto, comprises a composite system with behavioral capacities that neither the notebook nor Otto-minus-the-notebook has alone. The encoded information is not an abstraction: it is embodied in the arrangement of ink molecules on the notebook’s pages. We are really dealing here with a coupling of two physical systems. Although the car does not encode information in the same way, this difference does not bear upon its satisfaction of the central feature of the EST. It (the car) extends the behavioral capacities of a driver just when the two interact in certain ways. To accommodate and make use of this behavioral extension, the composite system is represented as an extended self by the self-representing parts of the system (i.e. the brain).

All of this goes to show that Mount’s first example ‘I’m parked out back’ / ‘I’m out back’ does not require speaker intentions to fix the meaning of personal indexicals. They can still refer to the agent, so long as the agent is understood under the umbrella of the extended self thesis.

Mount’s second example is Monopoly, as in the utterance ‘I am on a purple square.’ The EST can be applied here by noting the coupling between the player and the game piece. The player can move the game piece, but, per the rules of the game, there are constraints on these movements. Certain fates for the game piece, like landing on a purple square, compel certain behaviors on the part of the player. This is very much like the coupling between car and driver, and satisfies the structural conditions of the EST. The end result for cognition is that the game piece, like the car, becomes, in the player's mind, a part of their extended self. All the attendant statements then make sense: 'I am the little dog,' 'Please don't put me in jail,' etc.

Now, semantically, this kind of extension might cause a problem: How is a listener to know which *part* of the extended self I mean when I use personal indexicals? Consider Mount's example (p. 208):

Player 1: Hooray! I'm finally on a purple square.
Player 2: Yeah, but the blue square I'm on is better.
Player 1: I've had an annoying song stuck in my head all day. [Rolling the die] Good, now I'm on another purple square.

Mount thinks, again, that this under-determination requires speaker intentions to fix the reference. In other words, she thinks that in Player 1's first utterance, 'I' refers to the game piece, while in first part of Player 1's second utterance ('I've had an annoying song stuck in my head'), 'I' refers to the (non-extended) human animal player. Finally the reference goes back to the game piece. To resolve this ambiguity, says Mount, requires the additional switching mechanism of speaker intention. Those intentions are received somehow by hearers, and the combined effort resolves the ambiguity.

I think Mount is probably right that this effortful perspective-sharing often plays a critical role in allowing hearers to discern speakers' intentions, but I don't think that this applies more forcefully to personal indexicals than other terms. At least, we do not need to assume that it does, because vagueness concerning which part of a multi-part entity is meant is common in references even to the *non*-extended self: 'I hurt my hand' needs something more to fix which part of the hand is meant, but we don't wonder about the meaning of 'hand' or say that something special is required to determine what that term refers to. 'Hand' is a vague term and so is 'I'. My account of the Player1 / Player 2 example above, therefore, is that 'I' refers to the multi-part human-animal-plus-game-piece entity, i.e. the extended self of the agent. Under-determination is unproblematic because the content of each statement unambiguously picks out which part of the extended self is meant, even *without* effortful perspective-sharing. Unless the speakers themselves are sitting on a floor with colored squares, Player 1's first utterance ('I'm on a purple square') can only refer to the game piece part of the extended self, while the first part of Player 1's second utterance ('I've had an annoying song…') can only refer to the human animal part. Moreover, in the earlier parking example, 'I'm out back' is literally true under the auspices of the EST: As a mereological sum, I can be both here and out back at the same time. In none of these cases does the reference actually shift: 'I' always refers to the extended self, and rest of the content of the utterance clarifies – to the extent needed for pragmatic communication –

which part of that self is meant. Therefore we don't need Mount's speaker intention or hearer effort to fix the meaning. If, on the other hand, 'is on a purple square' could have been reasonably predicated of both the human animal *and* the game piece, then something more than the automatic meaning would be required. Even then, however, the semantic situation would be no more confusing than in statements having nothing to do with personal indexicals, and therefore outside the purview of the EST and my proposal.

What about the last example with the detective ('I killed a woman yesterday…')? One account of this expression, which I like but Mount does not, is that it is pretense. The speaker is pretending to be someone else. This pretense will be clear in the context of a detective speaking to a colleague, so that the colleague will understand what the detective means by 'I'. Mount dislikes this account because it lacks scope by not applying in other situations, including the car example (no one *pretends* to be a car), and presumably she is hoping for a semantic theory that encompasses all uses. My response to this is that, first, Mount's own proposal of speaker intention does not provide a theory that encompasses all uses. It is merely a wildcard that allows personal indexicals to mean all sorts of different things. Thus her own account does no better with respect to explanatory scope. Second, I just don't see why Kaplan's model doesn't work here. Yes, the detective is pretending to be the killer. When he speaks, 'I' refers to the agent, as always – but the agent, under the pretense, *is* the killer. For that matter, the detective could have said, 'I'm parked out back for privacy while moving the body,' thus referring to the part of himself that is the killer's car, per the EST.

3. Functionalism and the Constancy of the Agent

So far I have been focusing on deviant uses and extension, ignoring the important question about whether and/or how selves can change over time. It is to that question that I turn now.

By themselves, neither the extended self thesis nor Kaplan's model say anything about the persistence of agents. They would both apply equally well to a world so volatile that agents flickered in and out of existence, reborn with different properties each time. In such a world, there would still be linguistic contexts, and agents could still utter things. But that possible world is not our actual world. When I say 'I read the newspaper yesterday,' I mean that the agent uttering the sentence is the same agent as the one who read the newspaper. On the other hand, the idiom 'I am not the man I once was' suggests a break: the agent uttering the idiom is asserted to be, in some important way, a different agent than the one from the past. Indeed, the signaling of a deviation from the default assumption of agential constancy is the canonical purpose of the idiom: it implies that something unusual has happened, that I have changed in ways significant enough so as to interrupt the default diachronic constancy of my identity.

If people *think* that their selves are ordinarily constant over time, then that is what they mean when they refer to themselves, and our semantic theory of personal indexicals ought to capture that meaning. This brings me to the next phase of my argument. To this point, I have augmented Kaplan's theory by suggesting that personal indexicals refer to the extended self of the agent of a context. My next step is to reframe the extended self itself so that it can persist in the way we need it to for our expressions to carry our intended meaning.

The biological variability of our bodies and the psychological variability of our minds ought to be enough to give serious pause to proposals that a persistent personal identity consists just in the constant composition of the body or the function of the mind, and these have been important motivations for proposals that focus on (a) (usually non-branching) continuity rather than constancy (Shoemaker, 1984; Parfit, 1984); (b) causal inheritance; and (c) sufficient but not necessary conditions (Davis, 1998). Bucking this trend, I'll be arguing that there *is* something necessarily constant about selves, and that that something grounds our notions of agential persistence. Given our tolerance for morphological changes (I can lose all my limbs, triple my weight, and get a face transplant and still be regarded by most people as still me), I think it's obvious that something about the mind is the de facto basis for commonsense views of self persistence. The abstract nature of that something, and additional concerns like the desire to avoid substrate chauvinism, leads quickly to functionalism, so I should say what I mean by that term.

By *functionalism* I mean the thesis that minds are fully characterized by the set of causal relations between mental states. A mental state, in turn, is a vector, each component of which is a degree of freedom for the mind. Such vector spaces can be constructed at many levels of description – a degree of freedom could be as concrete as a neuronal firing rate or as abstract as the level of emotional arousal – a fact I'll be making use of below.

Under this definition, functionalism is a thesis just about minds, but it can easily be generalized to work for other phenomena that we normally construe as discrete and durable despite their supervenience on volatile substrates. The more general functionalist thesis could then be framed as the assertion that entities are fully characterized by the causal relations between their states. A Leibniz's Law-like version would look something like this:

$$(x)(y)[(x = y) \leftrightarrow (C)(i)(j)(x_i C x_j \leftrightarrow y_i C y_j)]$$

where C is a causal relation, x and y are entities, and $x_i \in X$ is a state of x (similarly for y and j). It will be easiest just to think of C as deterministic causation; in that case two things are identical just when their state spaces are the same and they always flow the same way through them.

With that foundation, denote by F the collection of all the inter-state causal relations for a particular entity, i.e. the function that maps $x_i \rightarrow x_j$. Together, F and X define a *type* of thing; any entity satisfying the relations of F is a token of that type. Note that if two entities are identical under this criterion, their overall input/output relation with the world will be identical because their identical flow through state space will necessarily result in their identical reaction to a given set of external circumstances.

Applying this to the present context of personal identity yields something like the following. First we define the state space. This just means listing out all the degrees of freedom for a mind, at some level of granularity. In common practice, this will include many of the posits of folk psychology: levels of belief in propositions, levels of hedonic value assigned to different experiences, etc. Then we define F by describing the way that mental states evolve over time. This will include mundane inter-state relations like eating when hungry to specific rules that uniquely characterize individuals: when I see *this* photograph I am put into such-and-such mnemonic / emotional state. To tell what constitutes my personal identity – to say what makes me me – I pick out the portions of F which, in my judgment, matter the most.

Suppose I have done all that. If I then say, 'I read the newspaper yesterday,' what I mean is that the functions that I regard as *constituting* myself – the part of F that I picked out as mattering – has not changed since yesterday. I am aware that some other parts of F *have* changed. I might have (knowingly or not) a slightly worse recall for some tidbit of current events. By saying that I am the same person who read the newspaper yesterday while acknowledging that my memory for this tidbit has faded, I assert implicitly that that memory is not one of the psychological features that defines me. The same goes for many other incidental changes. My opinion of another person has changed slightly since yesterday. That opinion, though it is a functional relation between mental states (specifically, it is a relation between (a) the state of exercising my concept of the person and (b) a certain judgmental or emotional state) does not belong to the set of relations that I take to define me.

When I say 'I am not the man I once was,' something in the idiomatic subtext suggests that I am referring to a functional relation that *is* important enough to me so as to constitute a change in agent. This would typically be taken to be a personality-level change: a core value, motivation, broad-based behavioral disposition, etc. Inasmuch as some definitional set of those relations held once but no longer, I am not the same man.

It will always be possible to choose some set of functions – some parts of F – that remain constant over a lifetime despite lower level variability. That set of functions, says the functionalist, can serve as the referent of personal indexicals and thereby satisfy the persistence conditions that I usually endorse implicitly when I talk about myself.

Let me say this one last way. I can describe my mind at many levels of abstraction. With relatively low abstraction, I can talk about my brain's sub-neuronal constitution. This constitution gives rise to particular functional properties for my mind. At that level, some functional properties will be difficult or impossible to pin down precisely: I probably cannot give a spike-for-spike account of how an individual neuron will react to a given stimulus and expect that relation to hold for many years. At higher levels of abstraction, though, I probably *can* give functions that are constant over spans of decades – for example, a generally pleasurable response to certain types of natural scenes. It is in sets of higher-level functional abstractions like this that we can find a self that is constant over time.

This clearly means that there could be, in principle, multiple instances of the same mind. This implication is no more troubling, I think, than the uncontroversial idea that there can be multiple instances of the same book. At least, that is uncontroversial when books are defined in terms of their informational content. A book defined more deeply, e.g. in terms of its physical constitution, is soon embroiled in the same identity and persistence questions as those found in the philosophical discussion of persons and selves. It is an accidental feature of the world that, in the way we typically define them, minds are *sui generis*: created by processes that produce just a single token, while books and electrons are not. There is nothing strange in saying 'I have ten copies of the same book'; it is mere happenstance that we are less comfortable with 'My brother is in ten countries right now.' (Incidentally, that expression would make conventional sense if the brother were the host of a syndicated radio show; but in that case, the semantics suggest that the referent of 'my brother' includes the radio show – a use sanctioned by my application of the extended self thesis.)

Another potential concern with my constancy account is that we might be mistaken about what has remained constant about us, and define F so that there is no entity satisfying it. We might, so this concern goes, be told by a diligent third-party investigator that, despite our intuitions about the stability of our personal identity, despite referring to and thinking about ourselves constantly, the term 'I' failed to refer to any actual person.

This concern can be addressed in several ways. The simplest – and not very interesting way – is to note that many terms refer to concepts with no embodied instances in the real world. Pegasus, for instance. One might erroneously believe that such terms did refer. Similarly we might have a concept of a person we thought we ourselves embodied, but be mistaken about this.

A second, more interesting response, is to note that there will be *some* set of functions, some subset of F, that remains constant over our lifetime. These constancies may not be fine-grained features of personality but, perhaps, more generic features of human psychology. Perhaps severe amnesia has taken our memory, dementia our reason, and trauma our emotional, gestural, non-verbal habits. There will still be more general functional dispositions that remain constant, such as the tendency to startle to a loud sound, or to feel relief when that sound was revealed to be unthreatening. For a person unfortunate enough to have suffered so many losses, these generic functions will indeed be the only self that has survived their entire life. For more typical people, smaller changes – events vivid in one's teenage years will be entirely forgotten a few decades later – do indeed mean that the teenage self is not the same as the adult self, but they don't mean that *no* self has persisted. (It should be obvious that possible changes are not just losses. As I age, I gain expertise, acquire new values, etc. and these functional additions make me someone different from who I was when younger.)

This position, in other words, does not guarantee the persistence of a *given* agent. It *does* guarantee the persistence of *some* agent: we can always find a set of functions that remains constant. Going the other way – defining a particular agent as being comprised of a particular set of functions – leaves open the possibility that lower-level volatility will undermine the implementation of those functions and thereby extinguish the person who was defined by them.

I cannot resist bringing in here another line of inquiry. It starts with the sorites I mentioned earlier: suppose my brain perishes, cell by cell. At first I am clearly myself. At the end, there is an empty skull that is pretty clearly not me. Yet intuitively a self constituted by *n* neurons is the same self as the one constituted by *n-1* neurons.

As it happens, the progression of Alzheimer's Disease (AD) is not far removed from this scenario, and we can therefore ask the tragic but informative question: What happens to a person's conception of *their own* personal identity as their brain gradually disappears? Tappen et al. (1999) analyzed conversations with mid- and late-term AD patients, recording the appropriate and inappropriate use of personal indexicals. They concluded that even in this population, personal indexicals were used 'frequently, freely, and coherently' (p. 5). This is despite the fact that these same patients unequivocally suffered from memory loss, deterioration of cognition and linguistic ability, emotional changes, and the widespread perception on the part of friends and family that the patient's *self* was 'gradually fading away' (Tappen et al., p. 2). The patients themselves were often aware that something was wrong with them, that something about their cognitive skills and memory had changed. Note that this experiment probed the proper linguistic use of the terms: it did not examine the depth of those terms' referents. It could be, that is, that the patients' coherent use of 'I' and 'my' and so on reflected not the stability of what they meant by those terms, but the inevitable presence of a 'center of narrative gravity' (Dennett, 1992) as long as narration was possible. Even as such a linguistic entity persists, the full texture of its referent could be dissolving. This possibility is supported by Addis & Tippett (2004), who explored the impact on identity of autobiographical memory loss in AD patients. They found, in brief, that several measures of identity, including strength (as measured by the number of answers given to prompts of 'I am…') and quality (as measured by the specificity of those answers) were reduced in AD patients, and that these reductions were correlated with the loss of personal autobiographical memories.

Perhaps these experiments reveal something about conceptual role semantics: if the meaning of 'I' is the *content* of a personal identity, i.e. the collection of psychological features that remain constant, then as that collection deteriorates, one might think that speakers' facility with 'I' ought to deteriorate correspondingly. This did not happen in Tappen's sample. There, speakers' semantically proper use of 'I' remained undisturbed despite the deterioration of what had once been psychological constancies. On the other hand, perhaps the patient's awareness that something was wrong would lead them to say that they were no longer the same person. I'm not aware of any studies addressing that particular question. Finally, it's possible that the patients' loss of autobiographical memory prevents them from realizing the full extent of what has changed, and therefore that they, and we, cannot make well-informed judgments about whether their selves have persisted through the turbulent course of the disease.

My account of constancy is open, of course, to the possibility that the functions that remain constant – and therefore constitute the identity of – person A are different from the functions that constitute the identity of person B. It may be, in other words, that Alice's interest in novel tastes has remained constant while Bob's has varied. Meanwhile, Bob's frustration with injustice could have remained constant while Alice's varied. In developing the 'closest continuer' theory of personal identity (more on this below), Nozick (2003) makes the same point:

> I do not believe that there are fixed details to be filled in; I do not believe there is some one metric space in which to measure closeness for each of our identities. The content of the measure of closeness, and so the content of a person's identity through

> time, can vary (somewhat) from person to person. What is special about people, about selves, is that what constitutes their identity through time is partially determined by their own conception of themselves, a conception which may vary, perhaps appropriately does vary, from person to person. (p. 113)

This also echoes Parfit's views, quoted earlier, about the non-normativity of identity of an audio system. It's important to note, though, that not everything is relative. Once we've decided upon a function, we can be quite rigorous about whether it has or hasn't remained constant. At the microphysical level, the properties determining the functional behavior of particles are well-understood: mass, charge, spin, etc. If any of those properties change, our broader theory of physics will tell us the functional difference that results. At the psychological level it is possible to quantify at least some of the properties determining input/output relations: the probability of accepting an apple pie when hungry, the level of stated agreement with some philosophical theory, the percent accuracy of autobiographical memories of the last World Series. If the psychological supervenes on the physical, then it is possible *in principle* to know whether, despite cellular turnover, various synaptic changes, etc., Alice's interest in novel tastes has remained constant. In practice, of course, this will not be possible. In practice, all we can do to determine whether the Alice of today is the same as the Alice of a decade ago is probe a few salient features and make our guess. The same goes, for that matter, for Alice herself.

Relating this all to the extended self is easy. While the psychological version of functionalism limits the state space X to the mental, generalized functionalism imposes no such constraint. Components of the self that reach out beyond the skin can also be described in terms of state spaces and causal flows; in the method I'm adumbrating here, those degrees of freedom and causal relations are just grafted to the psychological model to produce a functional description of a chimeric (i.e. extended) entity.

Applying this to the original example of Otto and his notebook: the information in the notebook is asserted (by proponents of the EST) to be a part of the total information in Otto's mind. Very crudely, the state space of the notebook could be *n*-dimensional, with one dimension for each written character. Since the notebook does not do much of interest by itself, we might just neglect the inter-state transitions for it and think only of the way Otto's mind interacts with it. But if the information in the notebook is critical to his self-identity (as judged by Otto or anyone else who wants to know), then its erasure should erode Otto's identity in the same way as would a brain injury in a non-extended self. Clark and Chalmers imagined the notebook to contain the address of a museum, but it might have included much more than that – autobiographical memories, for instance, of whatever scope. If that information is stored only in the notebook, but is used by Otto to maintain modes of behavior that uniquely characterize him, then I think it would be reasonable to say that the loss of the notebook – and the concomitant excision of an important part of F – would result in Otto's functional death. *Someone* would persist, but it would not be the same person. Looking at the sorts of things real people say when they lose information storage and processing devices (cellphones, personal organizers, web access, etc.) lends anecdotal support this claim, and helps measure the impact of amputations to the extended self.

4. The Continuity Requirement

There are theories of personal identity that have nothing to do with functionalism; space prevents me from addressing them here. What I do want to address here are functionalist theories that do not rest on *constancy*, but something else. The pivotal one is the theory created by Shoemaker (1984, 2004) and Parfit (1984) which rests psychological *continuity*. A second one, really a refinement of the first, is Nozick's (2003) *closest continuer* theory. I'll address each in turn.

In one of its simpler forms, the Shoemaker/Parfit idea – call it the *psychological continuity thesis* (PCT) – is that iff a psyche (composed of memories, beliefs, desires, etc.) at time t_2 is causally inherited in certain ways from a psyche at time t_1, then the two psyches belong to the same person. This bears on the account I'm giving in this paper because psychological variation per se is non-threatening to causal continuity: if the PCT is right, psychological constancy is simply unnecessary for the persistence of personal identity.

My first concern with this position is that it is vague with respect to what and how much has to be transmitted, with what accuracy. Suppose that at time t_1, the configuration of my brain is such that I am 99% sure that there is a jar of spaghetti sauce in the cupboard. (I assume that this would count as a belief under the PCT.) Suppose that by time t_2, the strength of the synapses encoding that belief has spontaneously decayed somewhat, lessening my confidence to 75%. Has the belief been causally transmitted enough for me to be the same person at t_2 as I was at t_1? I don't think the PCT answers that question. To answer *yes*, I am the same person at t_2 as I was at t_1, it will not be enough to say that my psychological 75% certainty was causally inherited from my earlier 99% certainty: such inheritance is guaranteed by the causal closure of the physical. To push the example to the extreme, suppose the synapses have deteriorated completely so that I have zero confidence in the spaghetti sauce. My prior belief is now altogether gone. It would certainly appear that the belief has not been transmitted from t_1 to t_2, and yet there is a clear chain of causal inheritance, at the neural level, of my entire psychology over that time span.

Indeed – and this is my second concern – I think that the PCT implies that we are immortal. In normal circumstances (barring tele-transportation, fission, etc.) a living human being is causally continuous with their future biologically and psychologically dead self. If non-branching causal continuity is *sufficient* for the persistence of identity, then I will persist indefinitely, for there is typically no interruption to the causal chains pertaining to our animal selves, from birth to death and beyond, into total dissolution of our bodies and brains. If causal continuity is *necessary* but not sufficient, then it should be a non-trivial necessity…but the causal closure of the physical (plus psychological supervenience on the physical, which I am assuming) means that non-branching causal continuity always obtains, i.e. is trivial.

On my constancy account, the spaghetti sauce question is answered as follows: If the percent certainty of the belief is judged to be a defining property of my identity, then I do not persist over the span. If a coarser measurement of that belief, like 'Do I think it more likely than not that there is spaghetti sauce in my cupboard?' is a defining property, then I do persist. The burden of determining whether I persist falls to the person who wants to know. There is no fact of the matter. In this particular case, we suspect that beliefs concerning spaghetti sauce would be judged by almost everyone as merely incidental features of my psychology. Other more substantial beliefs, on the other hand, especially when bundled together into broad functional relations (e.g. Do I regard supernatural explanations favorably?), could be more commonly regarded as constituting definitional and could tip the balance so that if enough of them changed, I would become a different person. The former me would cease to exist because there would be no entity that computed the function that the former me computed; there would be no more tokens of the type defined by the former beliefs.

A refinement of the PCT is Nozick's theory of the closest continuer, which says the following (his ideas, my notation): Let $f(x,y)$ be a metric of the functional closeness of two entities. For all x, $f(x,x)=0$. If there is a y at t_2 such that $f(x \text{ at } t_1, y \text{ at } t_2)=0$, then x and y are identical. If there is no such y, then that entity z that minimizes $f(x \text{ at } t_1, z \text{ at } t_2)$ is identical with x at t_1. In the case of a tie, i.e. if there are two entities, z_1 and z_2, such that $f(x \text{ at } t_1, z_1 \text{ at } t_2)=f(x \text{ at } t_1, z_2 \text{ at } t_2)$ then *neither* z_1 nor z_2 is identical with x.

As is clear from the earlier quote, Nozick does not provide details about f; indeed, he does not think there is an objective standard for it, in the context of personal identity. I think he is right about that. But I think he goes wrong in other ways. First, I do not think it is necessary that there be any z at t_2 identical with x at t_1. He gives the example of the fission of the Vienna Circle into two groups, one in Istanbul, with some of the original members, and another in America with other members. Both splinter groups discuss the same things as the original group, with the same traditions and practices. Nozick says, ‘Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or isn’t…’ (2003, p. 95). This clearly assumes a dichotomy; at best it is a bare assumption, at worst a false one. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the theory’s treatment of metric ties: if the Istanbul group and the American group were equal in closeness to the original group, it would *not* be the case that the Istanbul group either was or was not the Vienna Circle. That truth claim would be indeterminate. On my view, whether there is exactly one z *at* t_2 identical with x *at* t_1, or no such z, or more than one, depends on what z’s there are and how we define f.

My second problem with the closest continuer theory is that it does not do what Nozick says it does: account for our judgments of identity. At least, there are readily available cases where it does not do so. In the ‘I am not the man I once was’ idiom, the person I am today is, in most ordinary cases, the closest continuer of my former self. (Perhaps there are exceptions, like identical twins who share memories, beliefs, and values, one of whom changes dramatically while the other does not – but let’s set these aside and focus on the canonical cases.) If my judgment of personal identity were governed by the closest continuer schema, I should not be able to mean that I am not the man I once was. But I *do* mean it. In a more exceptional case, a writer like Robert Pirsig (author of *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*) expresses that meaning by referring to his former self in the third person. There, an acute psychotic episode resulted in a psycho-functional discontinuity across which personal identity did not *in his judgment* persist. This cannot be, according to the closest continuer theory. ‘But surely, it is still the same man,’ one objects. ‘–the same man, deep down.’ This just signals a different choice of functional constitution. On my account, there is no one right choice. When the Count of Monte Cristo says that Edmond Dantès is dead, he is telling a truth – and so is Mercédès, when she says that he still lives.

Expressions like ‘Of course I couldn’t answer, I was unconscious,’ and ‘I was asleep when you called’ suggest that we think that even when our psycho-functional capacities are suspended, we still exist. A continuity theorist might explain this as follows. Clearly, sleep and unconsciousness temporarily disable the exhibition of many psychological functions, but in virtue of the brain’s largely constant anatomical configuration, those functions are causally transmitted to the future self. Moreover (the continuity theorist may say) sleep and unconsciousness cause trouble for functional constancy theories, because the function computed during sleep is not the same as the function computed while conscious. This is an interesting objection. My response is as follows.

While asleep, the parts of my brain functionally relevant to many forms of psychological activity, including perhaps those the complainant above regards as constituting personal identity, cannot receive input, properly process it, or output behaviors in the usual way. In virtue of its largely constant anatomical configuration, however, my brain retains its waking functional dispositions while I sleep. Are these *counterfactual* dispositions? – or are there traces of them which a sensitive investigation could reveal? I think the latter. Suppose, for example, that the parts of my brain in question were actually missing, as opposed to merely functionally silenced by sleep processes. Surely this physical fact would have *some* consequences for the rest of my brain. It is a problem in practice, but not in principle, to expose that this is the case. In other words, we might say that while I sleep, my brain actually does compute the same function as it does while I am awake; it's just that the normal methods of exposing that function, including of course casual observation, are too crude to discover this.

Consider, finally, the expression, 'Sorry, I'm not myself tonight.' This seems to reflect a self-model containing two superimposed personalities. The first is exhibited by the way I am acting (the function I am computing) tonight. This is asserted to be a different person than the second, which is the way I normally am. That second, typical self stands in the same relation to my typical self as does the audience of this utterance. What all of this suggests to me is that part of our normal conception of 'I' includes the model of our personality as it is seen by others – pretty much, incidentally, Sartre's *être-pour-autrui*. It's not just that I know declaratively that I am perceived by others as an agent with particular properties; it's that that third-person view of myself is baked into my self-model as part of a mixed first- and third-person chimera. I don't know how a continuity theorist would account for such expressions, but I'd like to account for it by appealing to the extended self. If our models of ourselves can include cars and Monopoly pieces, surely they can also contain third-person views of ourselves. I suspect, though I won't develop this claim here, that the neurocognitive origins of that model may be understood as emerging from the brain's dual use of body-centric and world-centric representations (Snyder et al., 1998) and other neural circuits, like mirror neurons, that support contextual representations of the self and others (Uddin et al., 2007).

In short, I think that any broad theory of personal identity has to explain the ordinary situations under which selves cease to be, and theories that make continuity rather than constancy their centerpiece are weak in this regard.

5. Conclusion

It has been my assumption that linguistic expressions mirror, to a first approximation, our concepts. For the most part, only philosophers have concepts of personal identity based on exotic circumstances like fission and brain-state transfers. It would not be especially surprising, then, to find that philosophers' concepts of personal identity differed from those of the ordinary person – and I think they do differ. At the same time, even the more common view has some interesting and perhaps unexpected properties, as evidenced by the way people use personal indexicals. I have argued that one of these properties is that normal people think of their personal identities as being extended, in the sense of the extended self thesis. I have also argued that people think that what makes them *them* is their realization of a certain set of abstract functional relationships.

In the famous identity puzzle, the ship of Theseus has been retired from active service and put on display. Part one: As planks degrade they are replaced with careful replicas. Eventually, none of the original wood remains – but the ship has been uninterruptedly recognizable. We might say that it has simply been well-maintained. Part two: Surprise! The original timbers have been re-assembled off-site into what is now a crumbling wreck. The puzzle: which, if either, is Theseus's ship?

The theory of identity that I have been advocating in this paper says that in one sense, the identity of the ship – what makes it *Theseus's* ship – is a set of functional relationships. What is in that set? The functions that make it look a certain way? Smell a certain way? Have a certain history? There are no objectively right answers; people may differ regarding which properties and which levels of description matter. In a second sense, a thing is Theseus's ship just in case the thing realizes that function. The first sense is an assertion about a type, and the second is an assertion about a token. Demonstrative expressions about rigidly-designated entities (e.g. statements like, 'That is the ship of Theseus' and 'That is Abraham Lincoln') have both senses. When it comes to selves, neither sense is exhaustively correct. Most of the time, i.e. outside the problem cases invented by philosophers, rigidly-designated entities have only one token, and the functional idiosyncrasies of that *sui generis* token define the type. If it were not so – if there really were malfunctioning tele-transporters and brain-state duplicators and so on – we would probably have quite a different set of concepts and terms and would not consider such problem cases as puzzling as we do now.

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THE UNEXAMINED LIFE IS WORTH LIVING: A SOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT. Socrates is famous in *Apology* for stating that the unexamined life is not worth living, but it is argued that this statement is not deserving of its reverence. It is more likely Socrates' comment, rather than Plato's, because it is not mentioned in other dialogues. The paper's contention is that an unexamined life is also worth living, and may be superior to an examined one. Lives spent examining morality and living virtuously, though meaningful, may be less rewarding, less happy, and not as fulfilling as some meaningful unexamined ones. Practicing and investigating virtues is not necessarily the happiest or best life.

Keywords: Socrates, Plato, *Apology*, unexamined life, examined life, meaningfulness

The statement that the unexamined life is not worth living from Plato's *Apology* (38a5–6) is one of the most famous and honored utterances in philosophy, and yet it is undeserving of its reverence. Since Socrates spoke these words in 399 B.C. at his trial (assuming the accuracy of Plato), philosophers and educated persons have assumed its truth, more or less, and it has not been seriously questioned in recent philosophical literature. Although his trial has been analyzed innumerable times, rarely do scholars question the practical truth of this important and controversial statement. Firstly, this is because Socrates gives no argument or evidence for it, and secondly, the statement (ULS) does not appear in those entire words in the other dialogues. Why, then, is it famously taken for granted, along with "know thyself", as a fundamental precept of western thought?

My contention here is that this statement was not true when it was uttered and it is not true today. It cannot and should not serve as a universal normative or descriptive truth, though some people find it true for their own lives. For most people, the unexamined life can be preferable and superior to an examined one, and moreover, the examination (*exetasomen)* of virtue and one's life, as Socrates advocates, implies no special moral obligation or duty to everyone. My position is limited to what Socrates is likely to have said as reported by Plato in *Apology* and *Crito*, and *not* by Plato himself in the other dialogues. Secondly, I shall depart from this narrow perspective to explore the larger philosophical meaning, utility, and evaluation of this statement. First, I shall analyze the meaning of "unexamined" before showing why this life is surely worth living and may be happier than an examined life, and then show major reasons which provoke moral examinations, and finally how a meaningful but unexamined life may be superior to an examined one.

According to Socrates, the unexamined life is less worthy, unliveable, or of no moral value, compared to an examined one. This statement, especially in its literal sense, demands considerable defense and/or evidence that is clearly lacking in *Apology*. Neither Socrates nor Plato speaks about a "meaningful" life *per se*, yet this is implied in a sustained moral examination or inquiry. Socrates believed that an examined life involves serious reflection and discourse of moral virtues, especially justice, and the good life, and that it is the greatest good to discuss virtue every day, and other philosophical issues that he talks about. Critical introspection is indispensable using the *elenchus* with the right individual to guide it. The Socratic meaning is a cross examination, a conversation or dialogue, rather than merely discussion with oneself. "Unexamined" or" without examination" refer to the unwillingness or inability to investigate or inquire closely the meaning of moral terms – their general definitions with cogent reasoning. "Unexamined" does not necessarily imply intellectual deficiency, but it can imply a lack of interest to discuss moral virtue. Originally from the Latin *exigere*, according to an etymology dictionary, *examined* developed into meaning to ponder, weigh or evaluate. The argument or inference that *examined* refers to military examination or review does not appear useful or relevant for clarifying Socrates' views, contrary to Goldman.[1] We must distinguish between two valid definitions of moral virtues and their meanings for the good life, and the *second sense* refers to the idea that each person should inquire and understand the moral virtues, values, moral assumptions and practices of his/her own life. The first sense is the universal one, later developed by Plato in many dialogues, and less so by Aristotle, and the second is subjective and very introspective, yet it may be based from the first sense. This is less rigorous and much more accessible to every intelligent mature person who is not self-deceived. This more popular meaning is also used by non-philosophers who consider any moral assessment of one's life a fulfillment of Socrates' dictum. Plato's Socrates in *Apology* and *Crito* does not make these distinctions, as I think he probably should, but it was unnecessary in his trial. Philosophers in the analytic tradition have developed the first sense with a plethora of illustrations, but it is questionable the degree of progress they have made. This paper shall use both of these senses, but primarily the second one, which is its wider meaning.

Most scholars agree that *Apology* and perhaps *Crito* are most likely true to Socrates' own thought, but that we certainly cannot know and must question whether Plato's other dialogues also refer to Socrates' ideas. They were written after Socrates died, and we have no evidence that he ever wrote about, discussed Plato's ideas, or even contributed to them. Vlastos believes rightly that *Apology* and *Crito* represent Socrates' thought,[2] but it is doubtful whether the other dialogues actually do. Thus, exercising strict conservative caution, my position is that Socrates *himself* (excluding Plato, as such) cannot defend his unexamined life statement (ULS) using dialogues that *he neither wrote nor probably contributed to*, though some of the other dialogues enable readers to understand it more deeply. The *Socratic* ULS stands or loses credibility based solely on what Socrates *himself* is likely known to have said without defense from Plato and others. Considering that the ULS *per se* appears nowhere else in the dialogues, we can presume that it is not typical of Plato or it would have been repeated in those terms and is more likely Socrates' own thought. Of course, it is impossible to know this with any certainty. Most scholars believe that Plato wrote the *Apology* not long after the trial, thus the historical Socrates is more likely represented because Athenians who were at the trial or heard about it would have known what Socrates said or did not say, and if Plato fabricated the dialogue, the *Apology* would have been poorly received and perhaps scorned. Although we cannot know the significance of the ULS to the historical Socrates, we know that discussing virtue and justice was crucial to his mission as a teacher/midwife as expressed in *Apology* and *Crito.* In that work, he claims that the important thing is the *good life*, not merely life (48b) – one worth living, a life discussing and caring about virtue, and emphasizes thoughtful honesty, determination and intelligent speaking.

As Brickhouse and Smith argue, "Since there is no compelling reason to doubt the basic accuracy of the *Apology* and at least some reason to think it accurate, we conclude (as have most commentators) that more probably than not, the Platonic version captures at least the tone and substance of what Socrates actually said in the courtroom…to the degree that Plato's audience expected historical accuracy, they would have brought to bear in their reading of the *Apology* a great deal of knowledge about the context of Socrates' trial."[3] The *Apology*'s style and superb literary quality indicates that the actual words are Plato's own. The great irony is the huge literature written about Socrates and his philosophy attributed to him (and his fame), considering he allegedly wrote nothing and insisted that he was not wise.

S. R. Slings' *Plato's Apology of Socrates* thoroughly examines this dialogue and points out that the unexamined life should be taken only in the passive sense, and that the ULS is at least implied in Menex.246d6 and possibly other brief passages in *Republic*, and others.[4] The "unexamined life" is not repeated literally in these lines, and the ULS is, at most, only implied with broader interpretations. He also notes that there is no reason to believe that Plato was thinking of the *Palamedes* of Gorgias. Indeed it is also possible that the ULS preceded Plato in Sophocles' works. Throughout many dialogues, Plato famously shows that the examined philosophical life is one worth striving for, but the idea that the unexamined life is *not worth* living is not clearly asserted.

In *Cratylus* scholars believe that Socrates is revealing false modesty when he wonders about his wisdom and whether he can trust himself, (428d), but it is also very possible that he was speaking the truth, in which case critics in search of only the historical Socrates should limit their writings to *Apology, Crito,* the death scene in *Phaedo* – and even these may be Plato's thought. It is also likely that Plato used his name in the dialogues both to honor his friend and mentor, as well as to protect himself so that Athenians would not also prosecute him. The genius of Socrates is that he was enormously influential in western thought when the above facts are considered.

Socrates did not expect people to possess moral wisdom in that the whole purpose is a search for it, and the whole activity of the examined life is only the starting point for practical wisdom. The fundamental question is: why is the unexamined life not worth living? What gives the examined life its exalted status? Plato and Aristotle argued that the virtuous life in the end will be happier, more divine and best fits the goals of the city-state. The question whether virtue is its own reward and leads to happiness are a difficult position to demonstrate, partly because it is so speculative and shows little evidence in social observations. Nonetheless, intuitively, it makes sense as a normative, though a not descriptive statement. If it was fact, then the kindest most altruistic people would be among the happiest individuals but that is often not true. Moreover, ethicists and many other philosophers who lead examined lives would also be the happiest. However, the skeptic can smirk and answer that it is better to be Meletus happy than Socrates unhappy. This paper challenges the idea of the ULS, but does not attempt to undermine the foundation of Greek virtue ethics.

The major idea of Socrates' argument may be represented as:
If Xos leads a virtuous examined life, then Xos's life is worth living. AND
If Xos leads an *un*examined life, then Xos's life is unworthy (not worth living).
Xos leads a virtuous examined life OR Xos leads an *un*examined life.
Xos's life is worth living OR Xos's life is unworthy (not worth living).

$(P \supset Q) \cdot (R \supset S)$

$P \vee R$

$Q \vee S$

P and R cannot both be true at the same time of an individual such as Xos. The same goes for Q and S for an individual such as Xos. Clearly Q is true if and only if P is true. “Not worth living” here implies lacking Socratic value.

Furthermore, Samad points out that the greatest good of man – discussing virtue every day “is available in this life, and this means that any life after death would be better than this life only if one could carry on this activity in the next life with fewer restrictions.”[5] Thus, moral examination hopefully will continue after death, toward his relentless search for truth, and so one should be careful of taking risks in this life.

Socrates has been the subject of such considerable adulation that he seems almost beyond reproach, partly because he wrote nothing to argue against, and also because he has become the model or archetype of the Philosopher. Is this status totally justified? Emily Wilson notes that he seems especially parochial and close-minded regarding the best and only life worth living.

He never admits the possibility that the Persians, the Spartans or the Egyptians might have a different and perhaps valuable idea about what courage might be. Nor does he ever imagine that the people of the present might learn something from the traditions of the past, or that his own closed group of men might learn something from talking to their wives, mistresses or slave-girls.[6]

His ‘close-mindedness’ is a reflection of the predominant Athenian culture, rather than an individual refusal to consider other points of view. Although he was far ahead of his time in the pursuit of moral wisdom, he was only a typical man regarding some of the social/cultural mores, thus he is not open to criticism on that point. Although he appears open-minded regarding morality in some of the dialogues, he seems closed minded in respect to the life worth living.

Socrates also assumes that moral examinations, especially in the second sense mentioned, are of highest importance, regardless of the person’s life circumstances, unless he is mentally incapable. The examined life is for everyone (except slaves, children) whether one is happy or unhappy, and even if an immediate cause or inducement is absent, as if one’s important life shaping beliefs should be open to question at all times. Yet this expectation or assumption is unwarranted. On a mandate from Apollo at Delphi, Socrates believes that he has a duty to morally philosophize, but as McPherran points out, “… people other than Socrates are under some sort of a uniquely *human* obligation to philosophize by elenctically examining themselves and others. Nonetheless, the existence of a Socratic duty to urge others to do philosophy does not allow a direct inference that Socrates believed that all others – like him – have a duty to do philosophy."[7]

This distinction is that people do have a moral obligation to morally inquire (philosophize), but not necessarily a *duty* to morally inquire or examine oneself, or that Socrates held that all others have this duty. At the most, Socrates can infer a *prima facie* moral obligation to philosophize but certainly no duty, yet he is right to insist that people have a duty to develop their moral virtues throughout their lives. In its literal meaning, the ULS implies this obligation, but in a rhetorical broad sense, the connotation is weaker and no such obligation exists.

It is difficult to know the level of moral discourse in and prior to Socrates' lifetime,[8] but surely moral skeptics have always existed, as well as the multitude who believed in the dominant religion of their time, or minimally, the superstitions, common myths and hearsay tales about the gods and the divine. It is one thing for individuals to investigate the prevailing morality, and very different to accept the dichotomy of good and evil that emanates from the gods. William Stearns Davis claims that the majority of the uneducated in ancient Athens (360 B.C.) merely accepted the old stories and superstitions, but the more intelligent citizens believed, honored and worshipped the gods "because they are the protectors of the good, avengers of the evil, and guardians of the moral law. They punish crime and reward virtue…They (the gods) demand a pure heart and a holy mind of all that approach them, and woe to him who wantonly defies their eternal laws."[9] This implies that the more educated Athenians were passively religious without questioning the wisdom of the gods or good and evil. Davis suggests that the typical Athenian, like most people, was too busy in daily life to spend time on moral investigations. But this is not merely a matter of priorities, but rather unwillingness to seriously question for fear of ridicule or public condemnation. Historically, religion has tended to lull and close one's religious beliefs toward submission. Judging from the archaeological remains, statues and busts of the gods were everywhere, a constant reminder of their real presence throughout Athens.[10] Socrates urged that belief in the gods should be only a starting point for moral inquiry, and by no means sufficient or complete. Because they cannot provide all the answers, believers should be more open minded and questioning while still respecting the divine. As we know, he claimed to be on a mission from the gods, influenced by their oracles and his dreams.

Socrates' claim that the Athenians cared only for their wealth and reputations and not their souls *(Apology)* is still very true today throughout the civilized world. Yet moral examinations exist and are actively pursued outside academia, but not in the way that he would have approved and would have imagined. Arguably, most or perhaps all people, including those in positions of power and influence, are driven by selfishness – individual ethical egoist actions – because they believe that is the societal norm anyway and it is their relativist aspiration. Contrary to Socratic thinking *(akrasia*) people may have the knowledge of the right thing to do, such as examining and discussing their moral values and virtues in a cursory way (if only to themselves) but choose not to, or simply avoid this introspective endeavor without clear reasons.

Moreover, Socrates and Plato's adage that virtue is knowledge seems naïve, and perhaps that it was also even in ancient Greece. For knowing what is right, and following with the right action are separate yet linked significant issues – which deserve to be addressed in another paper. Moral examination would and should improve their moral compass, but a permanent change for the better is only a hope, rather than a likelihood. Clearly, those who need moral examination the most in order to maintain lawful moral lives are often the least likely to investigate morality, regardless of personal crises or other causes. Curiously, ethicists who teach and/or publish moral theory may themselves lead unexamined personal lives. They might believe in the argument that virtue leads to happiness, and evil to an unhappy troubled soul, and that no one willingly does evil, yet many skeptics and cynics reject that, saying that it merely reflects ancient Greek moral culture.

The pragmatic truth of the ULS is especially vulnerable when utilizing empirical consequentialism though it is obviously not a Platonic approach. From a moral point of view, the concept of a life worth living should be extended to as large and inclusive class of persons as is realistically feasible. This open-ended approach would discourage or reject a possible justification for potential depression, suicidal thoughts, moral hubris, and inferiority feelings among those persons who lead unexamined lives and are rarely engaged in moral discourse, especially if they take the ULS very seriously. It is neither beneficial nor obligatory to narrow the scope of the examined life, such that ordinary persons might question the worthiness of their lives, and consequently cause them to suffer, which could lower their self-esteem if they internalized the ULS. Besides raising interesting theoretical questions, the ULS, if taken as a core belief, could create or keep alive psychological problems or scars, and I think philosophers have an obligation to minimize them. (In addition, broadening the worthiness of lives respects our companion animals and primates.) As it stands, Socrates' ULS is a moral reproach which exalts him and his followers as morally superior to everyone else, even if he did not intend that. Indeed at one time, *elenchus* meant reproach and examination.[11] This suggests that the *elenchus* is/was a judging process by which the teacher or sophist would morally and intellectually evaluate his student and others, hopefully in a constructive and useful style so as to encourage rather than thwart the learning process.

Besides, personal moral inquiry might provoke or trigger anguish or mental distress among some people; it could uncover hidden painful regrets, psychological wounds or post-traumatic memories that would have been better buried. Sometimes denial is better left denied, rather than festering in one's daily life. I am not suggesting that ignorance is superior, but we should ask: what is the virtue or benefit in revealing safely hidden memories or secrets of moral choices? It may be beneficial when part of an effective healing therapy, or it can be very damaging over one's lifetime and haunt the individual's thoughts and dreams.[12] It could cause far more harm than would any benefit. Serious moral inquiry could cause harm, as Socrates says, with the wrong teachers, as horses must be trained by the right trainers and athletes by the right coaches

Meaningful and Examined Lives

It is important to question as a "gadfly" whether the Socratic examined life is always superior to an unexamined one. Let us define "meaning" in this context subjectively, as a positive value or worth attributed or conferred on X by a rational agent. This broad definition is highly inclusive for agents in all cultures, and is *prima facie* very relative. Critics may sharply disagree with this, but minimally, "value" and "meaning" should, I think, have the moral agent's subjectivity as a starting-point, and in this manner, argue from the particular to the universal, not the reverse. The argument follows the hypothetical syllogism. If $P \supset Q$**/** $Q \supset R$**/** $P \supset R$

1. If an individual life has significant meaning t*hen* the life has some value or worth.
2. If an individual life has some value or worth *then* the life is worth living.
3. If an individual life has significant meaning *then* the life is worth living. – conclusion

The happy *un*examined life might still possess much meaning, accomplishments, productivity and some virtue, and it would be difficult to deny that this life is worth living because the individual did not engage much, or at all, in moral discourse, question the nature of justice, inquire about definitions of moral concepts and so on. After all, Socrates expected people to inquire into the meanings of courage as well as practice bravery; concept and praxis should be together. As Aristotle said, individuals must practice virtues habitually in order to become good and happy. But to non-philosophers and moral skeptics, Socrates' dictum seems merely self-validating, and then universalized as a moral standard in order to admonish others and assume superiority over them or in, other words it displays questionable elitism. One can imagine an Athenian athlete arguing that a life without rigorous physical training is not worth living while extolling the virtues of health and fitness – claims that are invalid or doubtful. So, too, imagine that an ancient author argued in court that life without reading serious literature is not worth living. It is very possible that people will lead happier more fulfilling lives, full of meaning and satisfied expectations, reasonably virtuous, yet without the deeper reflective examination that Socrates demands. These lives may be devoted to accumulating wealth and a great reputation which he deplores, or they may be poor but happy, and their lives may still possess much meaning without this deeper investigation into virtue and social justice. Clearly, Socrates claims and would argue, that moral examination and deeper questioning are superior and more valuable than a meaningful happy unexamined life, but there is only scant evidence for this value judgment and no argument in *Apology.*

As mentioned, Socrates hopes to continue discussing virtue and examining moral issues after death, and mentions that he wishes to converse with Sisyphus in the afterlife. Yet even this mythical character known as the epitome of futility could lead a worthwhile life, depending on his thoughtful mental states. Arguably, he could be thinking about the meaning of justice and virtue while pushing his boulder uphill. Or perhaps he is contemplating the good life that he missed. Is he analyzing the scientific qualities of the boulder, e.g., its mineral composition? This very archetype of meaningless existence may not be so futile. Potentially, he could be leading an examined life while doomed forever to push his boulder uphill, only to see it roll back down again, and to happily embrace his fate; not unlike the Devil in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, who must discuss free will and determinism in hell forever as one of God's punishments. This poetic black humor is not as radical as this famous Greek myth of the meaningless life – utilized so well by Camus and later philosophers like Richard Taylor.[13] From this point of view, the meaningless life *prima facie* may not be so meaningless, and secondly, this putative futility is not necessarily futile. It may merely be shallow and/or lacking an in depth understanding of moral concepts for the ethical endeavor. So, too, if it is examined, then it is also not futile. Eventually, though, after so many years of pushing up the boulder, Sisyphus would eventually cease discussing morality with himself, as he would repeat the same thoughts over and over compulsively until the moral investigation would simply pall and die.

Despite all the reasons and tradition for intellectual moral examination, skeptics claim that serious moral inquiry is unnecessary, despondent, pessimistic and even pointless. An anti-intellectual reaction deems it merely academic, as if that made it unimportant and dispensable. The Socratic examiner could argue that skeptics refuse to take life seriously enough, and that one should not lapse into a superficial and less meaningful existence. Moreover, a large number of the uneducated or unsophisticated public lacks the logical intellectual ability and moral concepts for this endeavor. Skeptics naively respond that their lives are better off without engaging in moral discourse, if they were to consider it at all, because it is supposedly a cul-de-sac. Anecdotal evidence shows that many individuals take pride in leading unexamined lives. They may say "you take life too seriously" or "don't over analyze the (moral) issue," and some substitute laughter for introspection. This inability or refusal justifies their rejection of the examined life, but this may be a Freudian case of sour grapes or sweet lemons rationalization. They figure that deep logical moral thought is too difficult – too much work or time – for a very uncertain unresolved payoff, and thus they believe that they are better without it. Skeptics believe that ethics provides no definite answers or proof – a result or cause of widespread global relativism that undermine the search for final universal moral truths. If they are correct, then further deep discussions appear irrelevant or useless. Unfortunately, this activity is often perceived as a waste of time, as Russell observed over 100 years ago in *The Problems of Philosophy*.

Barring many of life's sad and decisive situations, some people, then and now, are able to manage their lives with luck and good fortune remain usually happy, and thus avoid the reasons which provoke serious moral examination in the second sense. This is especially true for short but happy lives. It is important to consider the major motives or reasons that are likely to cause people to examine their lives and life seriously as Socrates implores. It would be rare to make it through life without experiencing one or more of the following seven reasons, *not* necessarily in this order.

1. **Loss of faith in God of theism.** This can be the cause or effect of the other reasons, except 6.
2. **Deaths in the immediate family**, especially tragic, violent or impending. Grief.
3. **War and genocide, including the Holocaust** and ethnic cleansings.
4. **Extraordinary political injustices**, including Socrates' trial.
5. **Serious deeply felt regret of things done or not done**. Chronic counterfactual worries.
6. **Unrequited love that forces questions about the meaning and purpose of love.**
7. **Wise insights from popular and serious** *art, film, literature, philosophy.*[14]

Each of these reasons has a huge literature of critical and scholarly work, as well as popular fiction, poetry and other artistic expressions. This list is merely an outline without the pertinent details for further development. The essence of these seven is that they raise moral reflections of rightness and wrongness or good and evil. Generally, reasons 1–4 emphasize a significant loss and are often significant life-changing moral events. Six is only a potential loss of what might or could have happened. The first four reasons may provoke the “why?” which turns toward reflecting on the problem of evil. The God fearing theist can explain the crisis of these four as a divine test or punishment, fate or perhaps mysterious wisdom. Reason three can be the most overwhelming and horrific, but the farther back in time of the event, the less impact it has on the collective conscience and memories. Naïve relativists maintain that the meaning of war and injustice varies by culture and thus all truths are only opinions and none are final. Reason four includes wrongful sentencing, unjust trials and major attacks on a democratic constitution and civil liberties. Reasons three and six are often interpreted as futile attempts to produce a good end from an evil. Lovers know that their love for the beloved is unobtainable or lost and can never be mutually fulfilled. It is all in vain, for nothing, as it creates only the illusion of hope and wishful thinking. Lovers are crushed by the realization that nothing can be said or done to make a truly positive difference. Reason five is directed toward what is lacking or missed based on perceived needs and desires, and could outweigh the positive values. Reason seven, the least important, often provokes reflection that is unlikely to be sustained for a lengthy period, except when seriously studied and involves the inner self.

Without at least one of these reasons, many if not most people are probably unlikely to be provoked or caused to engage in moral inquiry of their values or virtues, and even these may not be sufficient. They may, however, explore the larger objective definitions and meanings of virtues and vices. Certainly, these individual lives are worth living, regardless of their lack of moral scrutiny. In any case, some individuals do not possess the training or the conceptual understanding or ability for this process. Generally, reasons 1–6 are likely to cause unhappiness, sadness or pessimism over lengthy periods of time. It is apparent that individuals who perceive themselves as happy are less likely to engage in serious moral examination.

My position is that if one is free from physical and mental pain that would totally interfere with daily life, or which devastates the body or consciousness, and if one generally does not commit evils deliberately, then that life is worth living. No further moral introspection or understanding of ethical definitions is necessary. Overall, if one has enjoyed life and has not committed egregious evils, (or has shown honest remorse, and then lead an exemplary life), we should say that this life is worth living. This includes primitives (with some exceptions) in all cultures who would have no concept of the examined life.

Today worldwide consumerism, mass media, Internet, and faster access to international cultures are major reasons for seeking out and enjoying non-intellectual pleasures which provide important meaning and value to human lives. Clearly, Socrates and most philosophers after him argue that popular tastes in no way can substitute for higher mental pleasures and deep honest moral examinations. Philosophy and traditional religion (and some theoretical disciplines) are intended to elevate humans to the highest levels that reason and faith can achieve, but the fact is that people find significant meaning, purpose, and lives well worth living with minimal or no moral examinations. Indeed, academics aside, a majority of philosophers probably fit in this category. Moral examining should enrich these lives but there is no guarantee that it will establish this lasting value. (Longer work commitments shorten the available time for this, as well.) Anyway, the historical Socrates might admit that an enduring undeceived love for family and/or spouse entails a more worthy valuable life than a virtuous one spent alone discussing morality. Empirically, then, the ULS is untrue today and probably untrue in ancient Greece and elsewhere. Socrates, like so many after him, under estimate the vital influence of society and overestimate one's ability, satisfaction and happiness with the examined life.

Let us compare two different types of moral agents. Suppose that *Green* is totally knowledgeable about the meanings of justice and discusses virtue regularly with neighbors and acquaintances, and is very concerned about leading the good life. He has been psychoanalyzed for years – maybe too much examination for his own good. He has endured pain for much of his life, suffering from disease and a mental breakdown with much anguish. Green has little money and few family members. Eventually, he is confined to bed. His life is worth living, many would agree, but increasingly, with less meaning and less value. We can imagine him becoming a national authority on moral virtue and Plato, but his loneliness and despair only increases and triumphs over him. Contrast him with *Black* who is the opposite. He has no true understanding of ethics or justice and no interest in that either. His shallow life is happy; he has good friends, supportive family and a decent marriage. He squanders away his time in unproductive activities which are meaningful only to him. Black collects useless junk for no reason, plays trivial games and sleeps half the day. His time is frittered away, and yet he loves it and will not change. Is this life worth living? Socrates must answer negative, but arguably, this life is definitely worth living. *Black* may watch frivolity on television all day every day and his life would still be worth living, though not one capable of being recommended to others. His life is worth living at least to himself and perhaps to some others, but the vast majority of individuals would object that it is a meaningless waste of time. Green and Black's future patterns of life are able to be predicted for many years, according to inductive reason, assuming that nothing significant in their lives changes.[15] This should offer an interesting analysis for epistemology and longitudinal studies in psychology. Thus, *Black* and others who live an unexamined life, and appear to waste their time, cannot be reproached, for their lifestyle has much enjoyment which provides important meaning to them. Socrates, then, mistakenly rejects a totally unexamined life as somehow not worth living because it does not meet his unstated level or lack of worthiness.

Moreover, we ought to avoid the *false* dichotomy of posing the Socratic moral thinker versus the shallow moral agent whose only goals are material things, social status, and ordinary pleasures. This dichotomy represents a kind of moral arrogance in which the Socratic thinker is obviously wiser, yet rarely obtainable, and *Black*'s type is the moral dunce. Realistically, isn't it actually a *matter of degree*? It is not a dichotomy between an ascetic Socrates (or hypothetical *Green)* and an intellectually vapid *Black*, but instead a long horizontal measuring line with the greater majority of individuals much closer to the latter, not the former. On one extreme end are the most meaningless lives, and the other far end includes individuals such as Gandhi, Kant, Augustine, and everyone else is in between toward the middle. More importantly, it is not always possible and often very debatable to clearly distinguish between the lives which are worth and not worth living. It would be difficult or impossible to establish the necessary or sufficient criteria, much less find a consensus among philosophers and others involved in this project. Who could or should make this distinction? In theory, over 90% of human lives would *not* be worth living if Socratic-Platonic criteria were utilized, so that the ULS becomes basically a moral ideal or rule, but of course, this estimated number does not weaken it. The skeptic could then charge Socratic examiners with moral hubris or arrogance by undertaking this challenge. Physicians in end of life situations have been making these difficult choices for their patients, along with close family members, for many decades now and many have been accused of playing God.

Furthermore, why should philosophers alone be the sole authorities and judges for the examined/unexamined lives? Plato's *Republic* aside, Philosopher-Kings are not the only answer. Ethicists are not the only credible judges; as mentioned, they may devote all their investigations to purely academic work and not to their own lives. They can be highly successful in the first sense of the word 'examined' but not in the second sense. An excellent ethicist might focus solely on theory, not practice and neglect the personal level.

Theologians and some clergy who provide counseling possess special spiritual insights to those who believe that God is the ultimate meaning. Over 95% of Americans say that they believe in God, and for a majority of them, moral inquiry is conditional, determined by their faith, their understanding of the Bible, and the depth of their belief. Further investigations and questions about moral issues seem unnecessary to them, partly because of their belief that clergymen have the answers to their moral inquiries; the uneducated or unsophisticated members are willing to accept the church's views without further questioning.

Besides, some psychologists, serious playwrights and others contribute eclectic meanings and valuable perspectives. Psychologists and sociologists provide relevant empirical evidence, especially from extensive longitudinal studies, which reveal how and why people repeat the same patterns of moral behavior and beliefs, habitually over years.[16] An individual's integrity may fluctuate, or remain the same, and this would influence his/her various moral choices and the meaning to their lives. Their future choices and actions and even outcomes can be predicted with a strong degree of probability. The unexamined life does not entail that it is meaningless or futile. A meaningless life is a distinctly separate issue. The unexamined life may be very meaningful and a meaningful life may be unexamined in the second subjective sense. X may do meaningful actions without ever reflecting on or examining morality. Y may do few or no meaningful actions, but engages in serious moral introspection and dialogue which itself is very meaningful. However, the class of Y's is very small because almost all actions are at least minimally meaningful to a particular person. (Collecting matchbooks or bottle caps may be very meaningful to some people as souvenirs but to no one else.) One might argue that discussing the definitions of justice for many years while not providing for his/her family's needs is morally unacceptable and *not* worthwhile, even if that individual is wise and inspiring to others. When moral examinations taken to the extreme neglect other moral duties or financial obligations, objections should be raised.

Rarely do we find lives without any redeeming features and are entirely not worth living. Examples would include some highly addicted drug users, a prisoner who wastes all his free time and leaves prison after most of his life is gone, a comatose patient who will never awake, some lifelong criminals, and a severe psychotic patient who cannot escape from his fantasy life, like the character in the film K-PAX who believes that he is from another planet. These are extreme cases whose lives are hopeless and whose suffering or meaningless activities are worse than their pleasures. As stated, if the person is free from devastating mental or physical pain which seriously interferes with daily life (work, sleep and leisure), and is not committing significant moral evils, who does not suffer from constant hallucinatory delusions, and is capable of clear thinking, then that life is worthwhile, even if unproductive.

This broad inclusive criterion (condition) is not an objective one, though others could argue for its objectivity. It enables or facilitates toleration and a less judgmental position with or without respect for lifestyles considerably more lax and less meaningful than our own. Susan Wolf's argument proposes stricter criteria in her understanding of meaning in life issues. For example, she argues that someone who loves smoking pot all day or doing endless crossword puzzles without restraint does not make her life meaningful. But this is not always true; the pot smoker's mind after smoking may nonetheless be capable of appreciating literature or doing some productive activity. The lover of crossword puzzles is learning definitions of words and perhaps sharpening her cognitive skills. For Wolf, meaning "comes from active engagement in projects of worth, which links us to our world in a positive way…mere passive recognition and a positive attitude toward an object's or activity's value is not sufficient for a meaningful life."[17] Generally, Wolf affirms two kinds of necessary meaningfulness for the individual. The first view is to find your passion or love, and not to settle for something else; this is subjective (the Fulfillment view). The second is for the individual to become part of something larger and other than him/herself and with independent value, referred to as a Bi-partite view. The latter is "objective," yet she claims that no objective theory of value is argued.

This position may look acceptable or even laudable until it is closely examined, and then numerous glaring exceptions must be admitted from her broad generalizations. If we were to abandon these two criteria, our lives would no longer be meaningful and perhaps not be worth living for Wolf, and this I cannot accept. Secondly, as I have shown, one can easily imagine and may know individuals with meaningful lives utilizing one or neither of these criteria. Thirdly, the criteria will be too idealistic rather than realistic for many individuals. Living one's dreams and following one's passions (do what you love) is a popular platitude, and encourages wishful thinking and often disappointment and regret. Passions for climbing every mountain over 14,000 feet in the U.S., becoming a television star, or perhaps a tenured university professor in an extremely competitive field are praiseworthy and meaningful but are often missed or impossible life projects. J. Raz's review of her book raises many other interesting objections.[18]

As I have shown, the unexamined life can be definitely worth living and striving for, and in many cases, strengthen or bring more happiness and satisfaction to our daily lives and long term goals. Deeply felt moral examinations can bring unhappiness as well as happiness, especially to cases like the hypothetical Green and to very sensitive people. Any of the seven stated reasons may provoke such examinations or perhaps another reason may do so. The examined life, per Socrates, can be certainly worthwhile and rewarding, as well as providing intangible pleasures, but it is not the *sumum bonum*, a moral duty, except to Socrates. We cannot know whether the ethical roads not taken would have given us more or less worthwhile lives. Certainly, the examined life is very recommendable, but it is not essential or the only necessary or sufficient one for the 6.8 billion people in the world today.

Socrates' ULS was untrue when he uttered it at his trial, and is even more untrue today throughout the world. He held that life should include more than intellectual pursuits, and he is said to believe (wrongly, I think), that moral philosophizing brings happiness to more people. As stated, if this was true, then ethicists would be among the happiest people with the most worthwhile lives. Rather than accept this self-congratulatory acclaim, we ought to be content knowing that we are making the ascent from the cave, hopefully on the journey to gain certain moral knowledge, and we may be no happier when it is attained.

NOTES

1. H. S. Goldman (2004), "Reexamining the 'Examined Life' in Plato's *Apology of Socrates*," *The Philosophical Forum* 35(1): 3.

2. G. Vlastos (1991), *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 50–51. "Plato makes him (Socrates) say whatever *he* – Plato – thinks *at the time of writing* would be the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in expounding and defending his own philosophy." It is interesting to wonder, as Vlastos mentions, whether Plato heard Socrates discuss ideas from early dialogues, or even if Socrates wrote down his ideas but they were lost somehow and never mentioned by anyone. Moreover, neither Aristophanes nor Xenophon's writings contribute to the ULS for purposes of this paper.

My thesis that Socrates' own thought is confined to *Apology* and perhaps *Crito* was confirmed from correspondence with Ronald Polansky, Duquesne University.

3. T. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 5, 9.

4. S. R. Slings (1994), *Plato's Apology of Socrates*. New York: E.J. Brill, 374–375.

5. E. Wilson (2008), "What Is Wrong With Socrates?" *The Philosopher's Magazine* Quarter two: 53.

Certainly, it is possible that Socrates discussed moral issues with his wife and other women, but prefers not to disclose that from fear of ridicule. He cannot admit without some shame that he received a wise ethical idea from a slave, woman or "barbaric" Persian in court or among friends without experiencing laughter.

6. M. L. McPherran (1999), *The Religion of Socrates*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 209.

7. Few sources of accurate written information existed, so Greeks relied mostly on oral communications for their news, and probably for the moral implications and insights regarding battles, serious injustices, tragic deaths, adultery, etc. and the moral analysis. If the amount and quality of moral discourse in Athens was so limited and scarce, this is likely the result of their culture and motivating forces, rather than the fault of individuals such as Meletus.

8. W. S. Davis (1914), *A Day In Old Athens*. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 206–207.

9. Thousands of Greeks have been visiting these ancient sites in their renewal of faith in the gods. In opposition to the Greek Orthodox Church, a large underground movement uses these sites for baptisms, prayer, and other religious functions. M. Brunwasser (2005), "The Gods Return to Olympus," *Archaeology* 58(1): 63–70.

10. F. Renaud (2002), "Humbling as Upbringing: The Ethical Dimension of the Elenchus in The *Lysis*" in *Does Socrates Have A Method?* University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 186.

11. In his novel *Chevalier D'Harmental,* Alexandre Dumas writes: "It is the property of every sorrow which overtakes us to reawaken past griefs which we believed were dead, but which were only sleeping. The soul has its scars as well as the body, and they are seldom so well healed but a new wound can reopen them."

12. J. Samad (2011), "Socrates' Pragma and Socrates' Toughness: On the Proper Translation of *Apology* 30B 2–4," *Polis* 28(2): 265.

13. See R. Taylor (2008), "The Meaning of Life," in E. D. Klemke and Steven Cahn (eds.), *The Meaning of Life*, 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

14. For example, *Sentimental Education,* G. Flaubert, Arthur Miller's plays, J.-P. Sartre's "No Exit," V. Hugo's *Les Miserables*, Shakespeare and many others. Existentialism and Stoics such as Seneca and Epictetus, could also become part of a deeper moral examination or inquiry.

15. Everyone establishes habits of living which become very repetitive as we age. Life is inherently inductive because of our repetitive causal pattern of living, year by year, over many decades. Understanding this inductive pattern of a person's past provides meaning and insight into our lives. The theory of induction from Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* can offer much meaning if one searches for and explores it. We realize that the future may be somewhat closed regarding certain expectations and not as open to change as we would like. In later years, it may not significantly change in that the future depends on the past, plus luck, good fortune and freewill choices. The older we become, the greater is the force (or power) of induction upon us, and the less we can escape from the fixed past. The weight of a long past determines our future to a point; it is a matter of probability or possibles. The unexamined life is likely to continue unexamined until one or more of the seven reasons occurs, and perhaps not even then. This huge field for future study is at the nexus of sociology, psychology and philosophy. My hope is that this research will be soon developed.

16. See M. F. Steger, P. Frazier, S. Oishi, M. Kaler (2006), "The Meaning in Life Questionnaire: Assessing the Presence of and Search for Meaning in Life", *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 53(1): 80–93. Authors claim that poor measurements have hampered research into meaning of life issues.

17. S. Wolf (2010), *Meaning in Life and Why It Matters*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 58.

18. J. Raz (2010), review of *Meaning of Life and Why It Matters*, *Ethics* 121(1): 232–236.

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DEFINITION OF NECESSITY WITH ENTAILMENT

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ABSTRACT. The main idea of the article is to give a reductive explanation of the concept of necessity. It is done with the concepts of truth, law and entailment. I claim that the sentence "It is necessary that P" means that (1) There is a set of truths and (2) There is a set of laws such that (3) P is implied by the set of truths and the set of laws. Because of some implicature phenomenon the sentence "It is possible that P" means that (1) There is such a set of truths that (2) There is no such a set of laws that (3) It is implied by the set of truths and the set of laws that not P. Kinds of necessity (like logical or physical) rely on the kinds of laws which are used. After the theory is presented some detailed questions are discussed. I raise such questions like kinds of practical necessity, unavoidability, real and fictional necessity, possible worlds, epistemic necessity, necessity *de re*, conceivability and implication. The main author I refer to is Kripke, though in the main I criticize him. Also I indicate a mistake in Quine's "number 9" reasoning, and I present how to introduce the natural implication to the propositional calculus without use of any modal operators.

Keywords: necessity, possibility, entailment, truth, possible worlds, counterfactuals, implication, fiction

The concept of necessity has been examined for many years but still we do not have a good theory of it. There is some variety of accounts but after all they do not seem to be convincing. Perhaps the reason is that we need a new approach. In this article I make a step towards a new direction.

After five introductory paragraphs I present my theory in the next twelve ones (6–16). The concept of necessity is defined with the concepts of truth, law and entailment, so my attempt is reductive. Paragraph 16 is a short recap, and the following paragraphs (17–23) present some further discussion. I raise such questions like kinds of necessity (logical, physical, practical etc.), unavoidability, real and fictional necessity, possible worlds, epistemic necessity, necessity *de re*, conceivability and implication.

1. Various Kinds of Necessity

What is striking when you analyze the concept of necessity (and possibility as well) is that there are many kinds of necessity. You have logical, conceptual, physical, psychological and many other types of necessity. Many authors concentrate only on some chosen cases or examine them separately. Some kinds of necessity are still omitted as it is with practical necessity, usually expressed with the word "must".

My idea is that a good theory of necessity is not to be a theory of a kind of necessity or a set of theories, each for a detailed case, but a theory that explains what is to be necessity in general, and only then elucidate what the reason is for the variety of necessities and how to deal with them. The idea is based on the belief that the various kinds are the kinds of one common concept, and that it is not a case of essential polysemy.

Thus from my point of view numerous authors which have worked on detailed kinds of necessity missed the general point, though their works may be valuable as case studies. For example, in *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant worked on a priori and analytic (kind of logical) necessity. Carnap (1956) also worked on analytic necessity as did Quine in his famous essay on dogmas (1951), also Bealer (2006) worked on logical necessity. Many authors like Horgan (1993) or Chalmers (1996) dealt with both logical and physical necessity.

On the other hand every necessity is of a kind. So the authors, who worked on the concept of necessity without any specification, also called "metaphysical necessity", as C. I. Lewis (1932) or Kripke (1959), (1963), 1970), (1980) and their numerous followers (even of the counterfactuals approach like Stalnaker (1968), Lewis (1973a), Hill (2006), Kment (2006) and Williamson (2007)), and as it is usually in theology or similar domains, also have missed the general point. Generally Kripke puts his claims in the sense of necessity *tout court* (cf. p. 164), but according to the meaning of his argument he supposed that it is close to the physical necessity (pp. 99, 160, 164). Nevertheless he did not explain what "necessity" means, only he used the concept.

Compare the theory of necessity with the theory of geometric figures. Theories of circles or rectangles or of any other detailed cases will never exhaust the general theory of geometric figures. But on the other hand every figure has its shape and talking about a figure without the shape has no sense.

2. Kinds and Relativity of Necessity

The belief that there is one general concept of necessity starts to seem plausible when you realize that it is difficult to draw some evident boundaries between detailed kinds. For example Quine's challenge against analytic and synthetic dualism (1951) made it difficult to find a strict boundary between logical (or conceptual or analytic) and physical necessity.

On the other hand you can see that any kind of necessity may be divided into more detailed kinds according to what constraints are taken into account. Within physical necessity you can differentiate what is necessary form the chemical point of view, or from the point of view of Newton's theory, Quantum Mechanics or Relativity Theory. You can even speak about biological, psychological or economical necessity. For example one might say that if you want to sell a house then the faster you want to sell it the lower price you obtain. So it is economically necessary that if you sell the house tomorrow the price will be lower than if you looked for a buyer for a month. Finally you can see that any detailed kind of necessity is based upon a law with which you deduce some consequences.

Similarly you can divide logical necessity. If you ask whether a geometrical theorem is necessarily true it is important what axioms and rules of inference you take into account. So there is not any general logical necessity but only various concepts of necessity relative to logical systems. This relative aspect of logical necessity was noticed by authors that meant it to be equal to provability, like Carnap (1956) or Bealer (2006). The idea that necessity equals to provability is quite close to the theory that I present below.

3. Mental Ability Approaches

Conceivability approach, like of Descartes and Hume and their followers as Yablo (1993), Menzies (1998), or Chalmers (1996) and (2002), and imagination (Hume), understanding or intuition approaches as well (Bealer 1987, 1999 and 2002, Peacock 1997, 1998 and 2002), are of a psychological kind and tell nothing about the concept of necessity. They are to a degree circular because they explain possibility with what is possible to think, to conceive, to imagine, to understand or intuitively grasp by a human being.

4. Emptiness of Possible Worlds

The idea of possible worlds, started with works of Kripke (1959), (1963), (1970), gives a useful background for necessity calculus but on the other hand it is misleading when you search for the explanation of the concept. It is so because when you think about necessity through the possible worlds you may think that something is explained, whereas in fact, possible worlds explain nothing about the concept of necessity. It is still to be explained: what does it mean that a world is possible?

5. Constraint for Necessity

An important hint to understand necessity is that every statement of it is associated with some constraints. So it looks like an inseparable feature of the notion. Just look at the list of modalities given by Vaidya (2011). Notoriously he uses such phrases like "given everything James knows," "given propositional logic," "given classical propositional logic," "given the actual laws of physics," etc. Generally when somebody claims something to be necessary the natural question is what the basis for it is.

For illustration consider the following common situation. You say:

"John must have met Mary."

The question could be:

"Why do you say that he must?"

Your answer could be:

"If John went to Peter he would meet Mary and I know that he went."

In many contexts of necessity and possibility considerations we automatically assume some constraints and take them as the basis for any necessity or possibility claims. Take for example the following quotations from Kripke (1980):

> Although we could say cats *might turn out* to be demons, of a certain species, given that cats are in fact animals, any cat-like being which is not an animal, in the actual world or in a counterfactual one, is not a cat. (p. 126) …one thing we cannot imagine happening to this thing is that *it*, given that it is composed of molecules, should still have existed and not have been composed of molecules. (p. 126) The objector is correct when he argues that if I hold that this table could not have been made of ice, then I must also hold that it could not have turned out to be made of ice. (p. 141)

6. Necessity

Finally my theory of necessity goes as follows. I say that the word "necessity" means the same as the phrase "being entailed upon a set of truths and a set of laws". For example the sentence:

"It is necessary that P"

means in fact the same as:

"It is entailed upon a set of truths and a set of laws that P."

When you say that it is necessary that P in fact you say that

1. There is a set of truths and
2. There is a set of laws such that
3. P is implied by the set of truths and the set of laws.

It means that a necessity statement is in fact always relative to a set of truths and a set of laws. One thing may be necessary upon some sets but not necessary upon some others.

The truths may be facts but they may be also some laws more detailed then the laws that are the engine for the deduction. If you say that

"It is physically necessary that $E = mc^2$"

You may mean that

1. There is a set of physical laws and
2. There is a set of more general physical laws such that
3. $E = mc^2$ is implied by the set of laws and the set of more general laws.

7. Negation of Necessity

The sentence "It is not necessary that P" is ambiguous. In literal sense it means the entire conditionlessness, indeterminacy or rationalelessness. Literally the sentence means:

1. No set of truths and
2. No set of laws
3. Imply that P.

But such a statement is very utmost and it is very rarely used. Usually the way we use the concept of necessity is not entirely tidy from formal point of view. And this probably is a case of a petrified implicatural meaning, similarly as with “no fool” and “clever.” It is possible because of the rarity of the literal meaning, and it works upon the Gricean Maxim of Manner. So in the implicatural (usual) meaning when you say that P is not necessary you do not mean that the negation refers to the pair of existential conditions (1) and (2) but only to the existence of the laws, it is, to the second condition (2). In the implicatural meaning the sentence:

“It is not necessary that P”

means:

1. There is a set of truths but
2. There is not any set of laws such that
3. P is implied by the set of truths and the set of laws.

Below I will mean the negation of necessity in this manner. Colloquially speaking when you say that P is necessary you say that there are such facts and such laws that P is entailed from the facts upon these laws. While when you say that P is not necessary you say that there are such facts that there are no such laws that P is entailed from these facts upon these laws.

To illustrate that we usually use the implicatural necessity let me consider a case. When you say that it was necessary that Nixon won the election in fact you mean:

1. There is a description of Nixon’s situation in a given moment before the election and
2. There are some sociological and psychological laws such that
3. They imply that Nixon won the election.

But when you want to deny it, it is, when you want to say that it was not necessary that he won, usually you are not to say that

1. No description of Nixon’s situation in a given moment before the election and
2. No sociological and psychological laws
3. Imply that Nixon won the election,

because it would be a very strong negative thesis, claiming shortly speaking that Nixon’s victory did not come out from anything. It would be very counterintuitive and it is little probable that one would like to say something like that (though it might happen). It is rather obvious that shortly before election the situation in USA and the states of electors’ minds made it upon the laws of psychology and sociology (even on the intuitive level) necessary that Nixon would have won. So you would not want to say that there was no such description of this situation that it was not necessary that Nixon would have won. Thus in fact when you say that it is not necessary that he won you want to say that there is such description of Nixon's situation that upon no laws it results that he won. Usually you speak about a situation which was much earlier than the election, for example when Nixon was a child. So when you say that it was not necessary that Nixon won the election you may mean:

1. There is a description of Nixon's situation in a given moment before the election but
2. There are no sociological or psychological laws such that
3. They imply from the description that Nixon won the election.

In other cases you may mean that a restricted set of Nixon's features was not enough to win, for example the feature of being a man is not enough, because not every man wins:

1. There is such a limited description of Nixon that
2. There are no sociological or psychological laws such that
3. They imply from the description that Nixon won the election.

8. Possibility

The sentence:

"It is possible that P"

means:

1. There is such a set of truths that
2. There is no set of laws such that
3. It is implied by the set of truths and the set of laws that not P.

So for example when you say that it is possible that Nixon become a musician you mean that there was such a moment in his life, maybe when he was a child, that upon no laws it was implied that he would not become a musician. More strictly speaking:

1. There is a description of Nixon's situation in a given moment in his life but
2. There are no sociological or psychological laws such that
3. They imply that Nixon did not become a musician.

Generally speaking my theory explains how it is possible that P is necessary and it is possible that P is not true in the same time, e. g. "It is necessary that Nixon won election in 1970" and "It is possible that he lost." The apparent contradiction is possible because the uses of necessity and possibility in these two statements are based on different descriptions of Nixon, that is, on different sets of facts and different laws concerning him.

9. Avoidance of Tautologies

To avoid tautological necessity the law may not be the law of identity, nor a law of propositional calculus in general. If to omit the condition everything would be necessary in a trivial way. Whereas to avoid tautological possibilities P may not be entirely general, like "Something happens," because in such cases there are obviously no laws that could forbid it to be true.

10. Knowledge of the Basis and the Context

The speaker does not have to know the truths and the laws that are to be the basis for the necessity. He claims only that they exist. He may have feeling of what kind they might be, or share the conviction that they exist after he heard it from somebody else. In the cases of Nixon you may claim that something is necessary because you yourself know some psycho-sociological rules that would be the basis for such statements but also you may refer to some laws that you only have heard about and you would not be able to quote.

Nevertheless the speaker usually has in mind a more or less clear imagination of the facts and the laws that are the basis for the necessity and once he speaks out the necessity claim they create a conversational context to speak about the given necessity. Anybody who discusses with him this necessity makes it in the sense of the sets and the laws which comes out from the context which he just has made with his utterance.

It is a very important point, and it makes discussions on the concepts of necessity and possibility difficult. When somebody speaks about possibility you automatically seek for the kind of possibility he means. When you start to feel and somehow understand it you follow him thinking what may be possible or not, within the limits of the given kind of possibility. When you lose the consciousness that the results which you obtain refer only to this particular kind of possibility (to a particular basis for possibility consideration) a mistake is possible.

That is the problem of various Kripke's examples, e.g. the table made of a hunk of wood (1980, p. 113f). Saying what is necessary he relies on his intuition. Often he uses the phrase that "it seems to me" that something is necessary (e.g., 1980, p. 10, 41, 43). It is possible that his intuitive understanding of the contexts of his utterances keeps a constant meaning and is connected with a uniform consistent kind of necessity. But it is also possible that in different contexts he speaks of different kinds, and his theory is inconsistent.

The problem may be seen also when Kripke (1980, p. 110) discusses Sprigge's (1962) case, if the Queen could have been a swan. They put it in such a way (such a context) that it seems plausible to say that she could not. If one sketches the context (Kripke does not but it is suggested) saying that if she had looked like a human, talked like a human and thought like a human, so it seems impossible that she could have been a swan. But any possibility consideration is based on the choice what facts and laws are taken into account. If you take as a fact her human appearance then the context becomes very narrow and being a swan becomes impossible. But it does not mean that it is not possible at all. It is impossible only in the very particular context, on the very particular basis. The only medicine for such situations is to step back from the given context and ask on the basis of what the given possibility is being discussed. Then you can see that there are some assumptions that make the context narrow and you may brush them off. Only then you can see that the Queen could have been a swan, because she had been a living being. Similarly you can see that atomic number of gold could be 80, because it is an element (cf. Kripke 1980, p. 123f); and that cats could be demons, because beings looking like cats could be demons (cf. Kripke 1980, p. 122f), and also that water could be something else than H_2O, because it is a compound and compounds have various molecular structures (cf. Kripke, 1980. p. 117f).

In some cases the vagueness of the basis goes very far. It is so in the case of logical or conceptual necessity. If you say that it is logically necessary that a bachelor is an unmarried man the basis for the statement are some facts concerning concepts of bachelor, marriage and manhood, and some logical rules concerning the proper ways of putting the concepts together. But our imagination what these facts and laws would be is very vague. It is often said that analytic statements are true upon the meaning of the words. It seems that the meanings should be the logical facts. Whatever they are the necessity speaker expresses his conviction that some facts and laws which are the basis for the given necessity exist.

The problem of the vagueness is the reason that sometimes you mix the question of possibility with some other concepts. For example it seems that Kripke discussing essential properties sometimes mixes the question of possibility with the problem of diachronic identity (1980, p. 114, notes 56, 57). Perhaps this is the reason why he mixes the question of the essential properties and the structural (molecular) properties which could be the basis for identity. For example he writes:

> The molecular theory has discovered, let's say, that this object here is composed of molecules. … It was something we didn't know in advance; maybe this might have been composed, for all we knew, of some ethereal entelechy. Now imagine an object occupying this very position in the room which *was* an ethereal entelechy. Would it be this very object here? It might have all the appearance of this object, but it seems to me that it could not ever be *this thing.* The vicissitudes of *this thing* might have been very different from its actual history. It might have been transported to the Kremlin. It might have already been hewn into bits and no longer exist at the present time. Various things might have happened to it. But whatever we imagine counterfactually having happened to it other than what actually did, the one thing we cannot imagine happening to this thing is that *it,* given that it is composed of molecules, should still have existed and not have been composed of molecules. (p. 126f)

It looks that the atomic structure of an object he takes as essential property whereas the spatial location (Kremlin or whatever) he does not. But he forgets that atomic structure also relies on some spatial relations and that there is a continuity between spatial relations of macroscopic objects and spatial relations of atoms. So in fact relations between atoms of an object and between the object and Kremlin are of the same kind, and there is no reason to say that the proper are essential and the latter not. It seems that his concept of essence is close to structural identity.

Let me also add that Kripke is wrong when he writes: "Ordinarily when we ask intuitively whether something might have happened to a given object, we ask whether the universe could have gone on as it actually did up to a certain time, but diverge in its history from that point forward so that the vicissitudes of that object would have been different from that time forth." (1980, p. 115, note 57)

Of course such consideration (such a meaning of possibility) might happen, but in fact it is very rare. It would rely on the question if the world is entirely deterministic, even on the quantum level. Ordinarily if we consider a counterfactual situation we are conscious that some other facts should have been different too. Nixon could have lost the election in 1970 if some "ifs" had had place. But the origins of these "ifs" could have had their places very long ago (for example USA had not ever existed), so no particular point in time is considered, and we are aware of it.

11. Classification and Kinds of Necessity

The relativization of necessity to the sets of truths and the sets of laws makes the ground for classification. You speak about kinds of the necessity according to the kinds of the laws. Besides, because it is necessary that the truths and the laws are of the same kind, for the entailment could go on, the kinds are in the same time the kinds of the truths. For example in the Nixon case you speak about psycho-sociological necessity because the facts and the laws that you have in mind belong to this domain. There is also the general kind of necessity, when no domain is determined, and all the facts and all the laws are taken into account. It is rather never used.

Usually when you speak of necessity you do not add any label. In such cases the necessity is called “necessity *tout court*,” or “metaphysical necessity” (Vaidya 2011). However you do not mean the general necessity then.

The kind of necessity that whatever kind of laws is allowed seems to be a very weak kind of necessity, whereas usually when we mean “metaphysical necessity” (or necessity *tout court*) we mean something strong. Kripke calls it even “necessity in the highest degree” (1980, p. 99). If the detailed kind of necessity is not explicitly mentioned it is still quite well determined but the listener is to guess it. He has to guess the facts and the laws as well. The feeling of the strength of the metaphysical necessity is based on the strength of the kind of necessity which is to be guessed. It is possible that philosophical intuition connected with the concept is consistent and close to the epistemic, the physical or the logical necessity (for Kripke it is close to the physical one, 1980, p. 99, 160, 164). However it seems more probable that in different metaphysical contexts philosophers deal with various kinds of necessity, in particular they probably take into account different kinds of the sets of the facts.

When for example one says that Aristotle could have not been the Alexander’s teacher, the listener automatically guess that all the Aristotle’s features that made it necessary that he became the Alexander’s teacher are to be omitted. The more easy it is because usually the listener has a very little knowledge concerning Aristotle’s life and perhaps knows nothing that had made it necessary that he became the Alexander’s teacher. Nevertheless he silently assumes that these facts unknown to him are to be omitted. They have to, because on the other hand if in fact Aristotle became the Alexander’s teacher then for sure there was a moment in the history when upon some psycho-sociological laws it was necessary that he would have become the teacher. For example it could have been when Aristotle had agreed to be Alexander’s teacher.

So Kripke is not right when he writes: “It just is not, in any intuitive sense of necessity, a necessary truth that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him” (1980, p. 74).

It is fact that in the context of discussion over the philosophy of language, like in his lectures, perhaps only some conceptual principles come to our minds, so only conceptual (or logical) necessity is at stake. Thus Kripke is right in his own context, but after the context change any other kind of the laws and the facts may come into the range of consideration and many other kinds of necessity may be found.

It is worth to mention that because there are many logical laws that may be the basis for necessity considerations there are many kinds of logical necessity and possibility. Especially you may suspend most of the logical laws and leave in force only a few of them. Then even a square circle could be possible as a cluster of properties, no matter if consistent.

12. Commonness of Necessity and Possibility

In fact every true proposition is necessary upon some other truths and some laws. Even measurements in quantum physics are not any exception, because even if you could not have foreseen the result of a quantum experiment upon any physical laws, you know it upon the principles of the measurement. Also the sensual data are necessary upon physiological laws of perception. The reason is that we do not claim anything to be true without any reason, and the reason always consists of some facts and some general rules. The rules do not have to be causal laws, they may be some principles of measurement, moral or logical laws etc. It means that everything that is real is generally necessary.

On the other hand everything what is real is possible. But it does not come out automatically that reality entails possibility. Any fact which is real is possible upon the existence of some other facts and a domain of laws which enables it. When you say that P is physically possible you mean that there is a set of facts S but there are no physical laws which entail upon these facts that P is false. The principle of commonness of possibility, it is, the principle that everything what is real is possible means that for any fact you can find such facts and such a domain of laws that make it possible.

13. Real and Fictional Necessity

When you say that something is necessary or possible it is important that you assume a set of truths. If you say that something is necessary about Nixon you may take some very strange, devoid of many obvious facts from his life, description of his person but it is to be true. This is the condition for the necessity or possibility to be real. In an extreme case you may strip almost all the facts off him and leave only this that he was a man. It could be a basis to say that he could have been a Roman legionary, no matter that there would be a 2000 years gap. It would mean that there are no laws upon which it results that somebody who had been a man would not become a legionary, Nixon for example. Which would be the last property (like being a man) that you leave is not determined, so it might be any of the properties possessed by the object. In the case of Nixon it could be being a person, being a material object or having a nose. So it is possible that Nixon was made of lithium, because he is a material object, and it is possible that Nixon saw Brutus stabbing Caesar, because he was a seeing person. Also it is possible that the Queen is a swan, because she is a living being, and even she is a vertebrate, thus Sprigge is wrong (1962). Within the range of the general possibility there is everything what is not excluded by a fact upon any law.

D. Lewis is not right when he insists that possible worlds are given only qualitatively and that when one talks about possible Nixon he talks only about his counterpart (1968, p. 114). Kripke is right criticizing him (1980, p. 76). But on the other hand Kripke is wrong to insists that a given object in a counterfactual situation may not be deprived of its essential properties because otherwise it could not be the same object (1980, p. 77). There are no essential properties in this sense and there are no reasons why an object could not be deprived of almost all its properties and still be itself in a sentence like “Nixon could have been a Roman legionary.”

Yet we often consider some fictional situations. They may refer to some real objects or states of affairs, and then we call them “counterfactual.” They may also be entirely thought out, and then we call them simply “fiction.” In general the rules referring to fictional necessity or possibility are the same as for any other kind of fiction. Fiction relies on assuming some facts (or even a very long list of facts if you write a novel). You may also assume some fictional laws, though usually in a fiction real laws are more or less silently accepted. If you write a realistic novel then lots of real facts are silently assumed too. Furthermore if you in addition assume that your fictional picture is to be logically consistent then some consequences are implied. Then one might say that some things are necessary or possible in the fiction. The general rule is that from fictional assumptions you may obtain only fictional consequences, fictional necessity or possibility. Only one fictional assumption among many real makes a consideration fictional. (The conditional character of fictional considerations makes it possible to call fictional necessity also “conditional” or “suspended.” I prefer the word “fictional” because it makes clear that it is not real in any sense.)

Clearly fictional or counterfactual considerations may be very useful in education as a practice of mind, in science for better understanding the facts and the laws, and of course in art for artistic and emotional experience. They are also unavoidable in communication, because until you decide that the speaker tells the truth the content of his utterance which you recreate in your mind has the status of fiction. But in none of these situations they tell us anything about reality. If you asked what would have happened if Nixon had had a cancer five years before the election it could start perhaps an interesting consideration, but it would not tell us anything about Nixon. You may obtain some new knowledge about Nixon but only if you draw consequences from some true facts concerning him. Counterfactual assumptions may lead only to fiction. The same refers to counterfactuals in science. If you consider such counterfactual situation as physical properties of a 100 meters big iron cube (as far as it is known there is no such object in the universe), it tells us nothing about reality, and nothing about the real physical laws. It may only make us better understand them.

The condition, put by some authors (e.g., Lewis 1973b, Putnam 1975, Kripke 1980, Chalmers 1996, p. 34), that the laws of nature are to be in force even in counterfactual situations is tautological and adds nothing to the concept of a law of nature. It is obvious that if one assumes that in a counterfactual situation some given laws are to be in force then they would be. Hence the laws of nature are simply the regularities of facts, and causality means only regularity in all facts, but they may not be anything more. Any appeal to fiction cannot change it.

Let me add that the real and fictional mode of necessity speech sometimes are mixed and in some situations it is a question of gust which mode one uses to express what he wants to say. For example you may say that “It is possible that Nixon was a Roman legionary.” It is true because it is based on the true premise that he was a man, and on the true rule that a man could have become a Roman legionary. The possibility is real, because it is based on a true premise, but it is counterfactual. But one may ask how it could have been possible that Nixon had become a Roman Legionary. The answer could be that it could have been possible if he had lived 2000 years ago. It means that a real counterfactual possibility requires some other counterfactual conditions. The additional conditions are to be possible too, as it is in this case, because it is possible that Nixon lived 2000 years ago, as a human, and there were conditions for humans to live 2000 years ago at the Earth.

But the same set of imaginations you may put in a different way. You may start to imagine what would have been possible if Nixon had lived 2000 years ago. The assumption that Nixon lived 2000 years ago is counterfactual, so whole the consideration would be fictional. You might say that 2000 years ago Nixon could have become a Roman legionary. But it would be a fictional possibility, because it would be based on a false premise.

14. Fiction of Possible Worlds

It is important to notice that possible worlds are fictional and differ radically from reality. The difference relies on this that a possible world is notoriously indefinite, or it is definite only as far as you define it, but any series of acts of defining me be only finite, so any possible world is indefinite in an infinite number of aspects. In this point Hartshorne (1965) is right, and Adams (1974, p. 189f) is wrong. The infinite indefinity is a general feature of any fiction.

Take the example of Nixon. Say you consider a counterfactual possible world in which Nixon lost election in 1970. But this may not be a one possible world. The state of affairs that he lost may be realized in an infinite number of possibilities. But you cannot just say that you take one of them, because it would not be clear what the world is like. So to make the world more definite you have to add some facts to explain the Nixon's failure. Of course they would be counterfactual too. For example the reason could have been that Nixon had blundered heavily speaking about equal rights for men and women. But how could this have happened? Perhaps he had a bad day, was angry and thinking about a stupid joke during a TV interview etc. The definition of a counterfactual world requires an infinite series of postulates, and every postulate requires a further explanation. All such explanations serve to make the counterfactual assumption consistent with reality. The basic difference between real and possible world is that a possible world does not wait ready-made for research. In fact it may not be researched as something unknown. It may be only postulated step by step and the only thing you may examine is the logical consistency of the set of the postulates.

Let me also mention that there is a substantial difference between a possible world thought out as a counterfactual situation placed within the real world (as in the Nixon cases) and an entirely thought out world with fictional (assumed) objects, fictional facts, and fictional laws. The difference relies on the structure of the definition of a world. An entirely fictional world is given only upon the assumptions, whereas a counterfactual situation in a "counterfactual within reality" world is defined with a set of counterfactual assumptions but also upon a set of postulates which aim is to make the counterfactual assumption consistent with reality.

15. Epistemology of Necessity

Justification of necessity relies on justification of the points of the definition, it is, justification of the existence of the set of facts and the set of laws and justification of the entailment of the necessity claim upon these facts and laws.

16. Recap

The presented idea of the concept of necessity gives one general definition for any kind of necessity (that a statement comes out form a set of truths and a set of laws) but on the other hand it points out what is the ground for the variety of necessities (according to the domain of laws taken into account). Also it explains why any necessity speech is to be based on some premises or assumptions. So it fulfills the general intuitive constraints for any explanation of the concept. Now I shall discuss some further detailed questions.

17. Epistemic Necessity

If the set of truths and the set of laws are all the truths and laws that a person knows we talk about epistemic necessity. The sentence:

"It is epistemically necessary for Mark that P"

means the same as:

1. All the propositions Mark believes in and
2. All the laws Mark believes in
3. Imply that P.

Of course it does not happen that all Mark's beliefs are used to imply that P but only a part of them. So the conditions may be formulated as follows:

1. There is a set of factual beliefs among Mark's beliefs and
2. There is a set of laws among Mark's beliefs such that
3. P is implied by the set of factual beliefs and the set of laws.

Because of the commonness of necessity in fact all that we know is epistemically necessary for us, whereas the realm of the unknown gives the basis for epistemic possibility. If we do know that Nixon was a president of USA, this is epistemically necessary for us. But when we do not know if he had a mole on his left shoulder, then it is only epistemically possible for us. It is so, because if, for example, we knew some facts and rules which exclude existence of that mole (e. g. photographs), then it would belong to our knowledge that he had not any, and it would be epistemically impossible.

A special kind of epistemic necessity uses Kripke in his lectures (1980), though he would mind perhaps that his notion is epistemic. In a few places he distinguishes the clearly epistemic possibility as if it were different from his (e.g., 1980, p. 103, 125, 141). The reason is that his meaning is epistemic but limited. Properties of an object or of a natural kind he divides into essential and contingent. Only the proper are necessary for him. The principle of the division is not clear but it is obvious that the essential properties are necessary in epistemic sense. The limitation means that only some of known facts and laws Kripke takes into account when deciding what is necessary. The division into essential and contingent properties enables him to introduce the concept of rigid designator. He defines rigid designators as expressions pointing out the same objects or the same kinds of objects in every possible world. The identity of objects and kinds in counterfactual worlds is enabled by the essential properties. Till an object or a kind possesses its essential properties it is the same object or a kind.

But as I have claimed above there are no essential properties necessary to talk about a given object in a counterfactual world, it is enough that you mean the name as pointing to the same object, and necessity or possibility is real until it is based on some real properties of the object. Even you can say that Nixon could have been a Roman legionary if he had lived 2000 years ago (since he was a man). It means that every name is rigid or in other words the concept of "rigidness" is pointless.

As I understand a simple reason to introduce rigid designators for Kripke were such expressions like "the inventor of bifocals" (1980, p. 98). The most popular example of such expressions is "the highest mountain on the Earth." He claims that they may not point to the same object in every possible world because it is possible that in a possible world another man is the inventor of bifocals. I claim that saying this he is not consistent in his critique of the classic theory of names. In the sentence of the structure "A is not A", like:

a. The inventor of bifocals is not the inventor of bifocals.

The first A plays a different role than the second one. The only function of the subject (the first A) is to inform which object the sentence is about, and not to describe it. Kripke is right that in this respect only the effectiveness counts and anything goes. In a given case of conversation it may happen that the man who is meant is not the inventor of bifocals, but still he may be pointed with the expression "the inventor of bifocals." It relies on the context. The result is that the sentence (a) is not contradictory (though literally it is), and there is not possible that there is a contradiction between literal meaning of the name and the predicate. Even if Franklin were not the inventor of bifocals the expression could be used to point to the man on the basis of literally mistaken but effective reference, like in Donellan cases (1966).

The delusion that Kripke is sometimes right about rigid designators is possible because he mixes the use of a phrase as a name and as a predicate, but he seems not to see it. For example he writes: “The reason is that ‘the inventor of bifocals’ is not a rigid designator; a world in which no one invented bifocals is not *ipso facto* a world in which Franklin did not exist.” (p. 145)

But such a statement contains an obvious semantic equivocation. At the beginning of the statement Kripke speaks of a name “the inventor of bifocals” and in the second part of it he uses the phrase as a predicate. It is obvious that if a predicate calls an object the objects is not determined within the meaning of the predicate. The case of “the inventor of bifocals” shows that in fact Kripke mixes names and predicates that have a singular designate. Names point to some objects whereas predicates may be only used accessorily during an act of pointing.

Moreover Kripke seems to forget that literally taken even proper names may be used as predicates. So his “rigid designators” could be sometimes not “rigid”. If you saw a woman you might ask “Is she a Kathy?”. It would sound funnily but it would be alright form logical point of view. The same phrase may be used as a name and as a predicate, and there are no exceptions. The only problem is the effectiveness of communication. But if in a group of people there would be shared a stereotype of Kathyhood an utterance like “She is a Kathy” could be quite informative. The difference between names and predicates relies on the role they play in the proposition and not on the literal sound. The whole Kripke’s theory of rigid designators seems to be based on this mistake.

The use of epistemic necessity requires much attention in reference to the moment in the subject’s knowledge history to which the speaker refers. Unfortunately Kripke seems to mix various cognitive perspectives and this makes his meaning of necessity more difficult to interpret. Take the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus (1980, p. 20f). Kripke insists that it is necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus, because both terms refer to the same planet Venus. But saying this he bases on our contemporary knowledge that in facts it is so. Today because it occurred to be true it is also necessary, upon the principle of commonness. But for our ancestors it was not a fact so they could have thought that it was possible that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, in the epistemic sense. But Kripke evidently wants that even then it would have been necessary, because no matter if our ancestors had known this these two names had pointed to the same planet. It is the point where he mixes the perspectives.

Of course for an ancient speaker it was possible that in future it would occur that Hesperus is Phosphorus, so it was possible for him that there would be some reasons that would make this identity necessary. Kripke even feels the problem when he writes that it is epistemically possible that “the four color theorem might turn out to be true and might turn out to be false. It might turn out either way. It still doesn’t mean that the way it turns out is not necessary” (1980, p. 103).

But still it would be only a supposed necessity and not real. In his discussion of the Hesperus-Phosphorus case Kripke seems to forget that it is entirely based on his own contemporary knowledge. And this forgetfulness, that his claims are based on his own perspective, forces him to seek for some properties that are independent from the speaker’s knowledge, which he calls essential. Thus finally when you use the epistemic necessity you have to be very careful not only in reference to the described speaker’s knowledge but also in reference to your own one.

Of course the discussion here I limit to the epistemic sense of necessity because otherwise even today one might say that it is not necessary that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same object. And it could be true if the basis of the statement were devoid of these our contemporary beliefs which make the identity justified.

18. Practical Necessity

A special kind of detailed necessity is practical necessity. The realm is difficult to define but in general if a state of affairs is practically necessary it does not imply that it is real. For example from moral point of view it may be necessary that John will do P, though in fact he will not. Practical reasoning that may lead to necessities of this kind may be based on such sources like drives, needs, emotions, wants, dreams, purposes, good, evil, values, duties, morals or state law. According to the detailed kind of the practical deduction there are several kinds of practical necessity, like political, moral, legal, based on agreement, based on what is objectively good, or what is good for a given human or for a group of humans, based on somebody’s needs, wants or dreams etc. Let me call the states of affairs that are practically necessary “practical aims.” They may be autotelic or instrumental. The latter are deduced upon some autotelic purposes and some causal laws. The causal laws may be of physical kind but also they may be more general and belong to cybernetics. If in an academic system it is necessary first to obtain M.A. title before one may obtain Ph.D., then M.A. title may be an instrumental purpose for one’s action, though it does not rely on any detailed physical causal laws. Similarly if in a computer system it is necessary first to start program P in the aim to start program Q then starting program P may be an instrumental aim in the system, even though the relation does not rely on any detailed physical laws, upon which the computer system works.

If the practical aim is a person's action then usually we use the word "must." A sentence which calls for a practically necessary action I call a "categorical imperative." (My use of the term is quite far from Kant's one. He used it only in reference to morals and he did not use the concept of necessity in reference to practical issues.)

The difference between "You must go" and "Go!" lies in this that with the former you state that there is a reasoning (some truths and laws) upon which "the going" is entailed. In other words saying "You must go" you mean that "There is a reason to go." You use the phrase toward a person that has doubts in his thinking. People who have doubts do not like to act without any reason. The simple order "Go!" you use toward a person which does not need any extra reason but only an impulse to start the action.

Besides of real practical necessity there is also the fictional kind. It appears when you consider what would be the consequences if, for example, somebody wanted P or if P would be a value or if P would be the purpose of action. A sentence which calls for an action which is necessary to obtain a fictional practical aim is called "hypothetical imperative."

19. Negative Practical Necessity (Unavoidability)

It happens during the decision making process that there are some facts that will happen in future and it is not possible to avoid them. All you can do is to accept them. For example the sentence:

"It is practically necessary (unavoidable) that the price of oil will be higher than 100 dollars a barrel tomorrow"

means the same as:

1. There is such a set of truths concerning oil market that
2. There is a set of laws (esp. economical) such that
3. It is implied by the set of truths and the set of laws that the price of oil will be higher than 100 dollars a barrel tomorrow.

But what is important the sets of truths and laws include facts and laws concerning some possible actions of a given group of people, because when you speak of unavoidability you always mean it in reference to a group of people. In fact you consider if they are able to intervene the course of events.

Such statement is also relative to a given kind of actions which the members of the group could perform, for example you may say that something is unavoidable unless they use force. Thus more strictly the elucidation is:

1. There is such a set of truths concerning oil market and a given group of people that
2. There is a set of laws (esp. economical, psychological and sociological, including the range of considered actions of the given group of people) such that
3. It is implied by the set of truths and the set of laws that the price of oil will be higher than 100 dollars a barrel tomorrow.

20. Conceivability. Law of Non-contradiction

The concept of conceivability literally speaking refers to what is possible for a subject to conceive, so it is a detailed kind of possibility and it belongs to psychology. It is not the place here to discuss mind-body problem, so in general I say that a theory of human mind is to describe what a human mind is able to conceive. (Within physicalism, which I prefer, psychology is simply a causal theory of mind; in fact it belongs to cybernetics.) Nevertheless contemporary psychology is far from a good theory of conceivability. A subject may claim that something is conceivable for him upon his intuition. This intuition is in fact his intuitive autopsychology, based on what happens to him to conceive or not. But it does not tell us what "possible" means.

On the other hand our ability to conceive things as an aspect of mind relies on the conceptual and propositional content of mind. So the question if something is possible to conceive tells us something about our notions and beliefs. So thought experiments based on imagination may be used to analyze the content of our minds. Hence imagination is a way to examine concepts, though as a method it needs a deeper analysis. Simply it seems that there are lots of kinds of conceivability, for example it seems that in the case if it is conceivable that 5 + 7 = 13 the meaning of conceivability is different than in the case if it is conceivable that horses have wings. Also it is seems that one conceives himself flying in another meaning than he conceives a fifth degree equation having a solution or a 100-figured number which figures are placed without any rule. Moreover the question is to be answered if it is enough to conceive a thing when you only describe it with words, like the number above, and the description is not contradictory. Another basic question is what conceivability tells us about the construction of human mind and what it tells about the concepts and propositions which are being used in an imagination.

From the third point of view considering a thing is the same as conceiving a situation and the same as making a thought experiment or performing an imagination. So when you consider if something is possible then you cannot avoid conceiving things. Thus considering and conceiving as well is based on taking into account some facts and some laws. When they are real and true then the consideration refers to reality, when only one is fictional then whole the consideration is fictional. From this point of view you may call the result of any consideration "the conceivable." But this meaning of conceivability is not psychological, because it is not based on the idea that a conceivable state of affairs is to be graspable by human mind. This kind of conceivability is sometimes called "conceivability in principle". It means that there are possible beings that can grasp it.

In this meaning "conceivable" means "possible to obtain in the course of correct consideration," so this is the same as "thinkable" (by a human or a better thinker). But the concept is useless to explain "possible" because any possibility may be only an object of consideration. If you can think that P is possible it tells you no more about the concept of possibility than if you can think that P is red. So the concept of conceivability in principle also does not tell us what "possible" means. Generally speaking it seems that the idea that the concept of conceivability is a key to understand possibility relies on mixing a mental act with its object, and it is perhaps based on a colloquial metonymy.

The customary connection of conceivability and possibility (esp. logical possibility) is the source of various usage of the words "necessary" and "possible" in the context and the meaning of "conceivable." An example is the law of non-contradiction. The sentence:

"It is logically impossible that a proposition is true and false in the same time" (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1011b).

Literally means the same as:

1. There is such a set of truths (concerning in particular the concepts of proposition, truth and false) that
2. There is a set of logical laws such that
3. It is implied by the set of truths and the set of laws that no proposition is true and false in the same time.

The question arises what the truths and what the laws they could be, because the principle of non-contradiction seems to be an axiom believed without any reasoning (Aristotle, Met. 1006a). So you can say that you feel that it is true or that it is clearly evident. If it is so, that there is no reasoning for the principle, then I do not count it as a counterexample to my theory. It only means that you should not use the word “necessary,” “possible” or “impossible” when you express it. Instead you should say something like:

“The situation never arises in which a proposition is true and false in the same time”

or:

“No proposition is true and false in the same time”.

or (as I say above, that it expresses an intuitive feeling referring to human ability to grasp things with mind):

“It is inconceivable that a proposition is true and false in the same time”

Another example is the law of identity, in nominal (A=A) or propositional (P↔P) formula. Simply because it is not thinkable that A is not A or that P is not equivalent to P we usually say that (A=A) and (P↔P) are necessary. In fact they are not. Moreover sentences “A is A” and “P if and only if P” as pleonastic are not a correct sentences. Because of pleonasticy tautologies are not correct sentences in general, though they serve well as bases for schemata of deduction. The sentence “A is A” is not thinkable equally as “A is not A”, though perhaps the mental reasons of these are different. The apparent thinkability of “A is A” comes probably out of this that “A is not A” seems to be more unthinkable, so the opposite would have to be thinkable.

21. Independence and Necessity

Some authors (more recently Bealer 1996) think that if a being exists independently from physical and psychological facts its existence is necessary. It is wrong because the fact of independence means only that the existence of such a being is physically and psychologically possible. It is so because you can only say that there is no true physical or psychological facts and laws showing that this object does not exist. To say that something exists necessarily it is not enough to say that it is independent from a domain of facts. You may say that something exists necessarily only if there are some facts and laws entailing that it exists. If existence of a being is independent from the physical and forms psychological then the reasoning is to belong to another domain.

22. Necessity *de Re*

Sentences in which necessity is stated about objects I treat as paraphrases of sentences in which they are stated referring to sentences. It is, the sentence

“A is necessarily B”

or:

“Necessarily A is B”

means the same as:

“It is necessary that A is B”.

There are no examples in which such a rule of transformation would be wrong.

Quine’s example with number 9 (1961) which is meant to be a counter-example against necessity *de re* is based on a mistake because the reasoning goes wrong, and also, when you take it with necessity *de dicto*:

1. It is necessary that 9 is greater than 7
2. 9 = the number of planets
3. It is necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7.

So it could be an argument against the concept of necessity in general. But it is not. What is wrong is the premise (2). It is not true that number 9 is exactly the same as the number of planets. The phrase “number 9” or simply “9” we use to talk about numbers; like in (1). But the phrase “the number of planets” we use to talk about planets. And in fact (3) is a sentence about planets. So (2) is wrong because a switch of reference takes place in it.

Of course there are 9 planets in the solar system (they were before the definition change). So one may suggest that he means number 9 with reference to the number of planets. So to avoid a switch you should say something like:

2’. 9 = the number which is the number of planets.

Such description still refers to a number, but the phrase “number of planets” is only an attribute (a phrase which function is to point out which object of a kind the speaker means). Finally reformulated (3) contains no problem:

3’. It is necessary that the number which is the number of planets is greater than 7.

23. Implication

Concepts of necessity and implication are closely tied together. Especially when you have a true implication (P→Q) and you know that P is true then it is obvious that Q is necessarily true. Necessity upon *modus ponens* is entirely according to my theory; P and (P→Q) are a fact and such a law that their result is Q.

Nevertheless the concept of necessity is not useful to explain implication. Implication itself contains no necessity in itself. Implication means only that if you have a sentence you can go to another one. And there is nothing more in it.

Introduction of natural implication to propositional calculus needs no modal operators, as C. I. Lewis tried (1932). It is enough to use the following rule of substitution:

In any formula of propositional calculus in any position you may substitute a sentence Q with the formula:

P and (P→Q)

If you apply the rule to a tautology of propositional calculus, then you obtain a tautology of propositional calculus with the natural implication. For example (modus ponens):

[P and (P→Q)] > Q

is a substitution instance of

Q > Q,

where “>” means material implication.

This rule of substitution is enough to obtain all the tautologies that are necessary as the basis for logical entailment in any reasoning in which natural implication is used. The idea of the rule fulfils all the intuitive requirements that we have toward the natural implication, it is, that the function of implication is to make shift from one sentence to another.

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SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS: THE PRINCIPLE OF DIALECTICAL CORRESPONDENCE

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ABSTRACT. In the epistemological field, the issue of scientific progress has been deeply investigated by some illustrious philosophers of science like Thomas Kuhn, Karl R. Popper, Paul K. Feyerabend and so on, but they disregarded the fact that all scientific theories are idealizations of reality. Because of that, they didn't catch some specific problems concerning scientific progress as the methodologists of the so-called Poznań School did. In fact, two outstanding members of this School, that is to say Izabella Nowakowa and Leszek Nowak, stressed their attention on the problem of dialectical correspondence in order to explain the issue of scientific progress, overcoming, that way, some of the most famous neo-positivist and post-positivist fallacies concerning scientific progress.

Keywords: abstraction, correspondence principle, idealization, scientific progress

1. Introduction

As Leszek Nowak (1943–2009) and his Poznań School of Methodology widely demonstrated,[1] the theoretical procedure of science is not based on the Aristotelian abstraction (that's to say, generalization of empirical facts), but on the method of idealization and concretization.[2]

In fact, differently from what has been upheld by inductive philosophies or even by the positivist and post-positivist ones, the latter should be considered as the core of scientific method and not the first, according to Nowak.

This difference is explained by Nowak in the following way:

> A scientific law is basically a deformation of phenomena. It resembles much more the logical structure of a caricature than that of the generalization of facts. The crucial point for a proper understanding of the Idealizational procedure is that it differs

> fundamentally from that of abstraction […]. Abstraction, i.e. the omitting of properties, leads from individuals to sets of individuals (and from sets of individuals to families of sets, etc.). Idealization does not do this. Omission of the dimensions of physical bodies does not yield any set of physical bodies but the mass-point. Abstraction is generalization. Idealization is not.[3]

Another fundamental requirement of the idealizational method is the so-called dialectical correspondence, in turn followed by dialectical confutation. Even though Nowak accepted this principle, we must turn our gaze to Izabella Nowakowa,[4] because she was the one who elaborated it for first (during some congress and meetings held in Warsaw, Poznań and so on) taking inspiration from the concept of correspondence applied in physics by Niels Bohr for the elaboration of the quantum theory.

In any case, we must specify that the principle of dialectical correspondence rises from a previous reflection about the historical evolution of science, that brings the methodologists of the Poznań School to subdivide, or classify, history of science into two thresholds and into three periods. The classification into two thresholds (that's to say, scientific nature of knowledge) and the thresholds of maturity of science, must be attributed to Izabella Nowakowa, in divergence from Nowak who, at the opposite, postulated the existence of only one threshold (from immature science to the mature one);[5] moreover, Nowakowa established a triple distinction of history of science: the period of pre-scientific knowledge, the period of the pre-theoretical knowledge and the period of mature science.[6]

The first one corresponds to the pre-Aristotelian science, when philosophers used to explain natural phenomena on the basis of their metaphysical theories. The second one corresponds to the Aristotelian physics, that aimed to explain phenomena, events and so on, recurring to the collection of data and facts that, through the procedure of abstraction, gave birth to statements of factual nature. The third one includes Galilean physics, Darwinian biology and Marxian political economy, during which science crosses the threshold of mature science thanks to the systematic application of the idealizational method.

Nevertheless, this period, defined empirical-idealizational, includes also the theoretical-idealizational one, that's to say the one that we can find in Newtonian physics, where the role of mental experiments is higher.[7]

So, extensively, the scientific method is by Nowak and Nowakowa synthesized in four key-words, that is to say:

1. *Idealization;*
2. *Concretization;*
3. *Dialectical correspondence;*
4. *Dialectical negation*.[8]

By turning our gaze to the epistemological meaning of dialectical correspondence, it is interesting to observe that – analogously to what happens with Karl R. Popper about the importance that he attributes to the dynamicity of scientific thought – according to the methodologists of Poznań we can catch the mechanism that allows the evolution of science by characterizing the history of science, methodology and theory of science in levels and periods. Otherwise, to every period corresponds a particular mechanism of evolution inside a vision of scientific progress that makes use of the concept of correspondence between theories.

As we have said previously, the principle of dialectical correspondence has been elaborated after some discussions concerning the publication of Nowakowa's PhD thesis of 1972, during which time some seminars were organized in Poznań, Warsaw, Cracow, and so on. In physics the correspondence principle "appeared for the first time in the old quantum theory of the atom created by Niels Bohr."[9]

As it is well known, Classical Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics seemed to refer to two separated physics: the physics of the macro-world (Classical Mechanics) and the physics of the micro-world (Quantum Mechanics).

According to this principle, the basic equations of quantum mechanics "pass asymptotically into the equations of classical mechanics when we assume that h tends to zero."[10]

But, Krajewski continues, it is easy to note that also the relation between the Albert Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity and Classical Mechanics is analogous to the one existing between Quantum Theory and Classical Mechanics;[11] *ergo* also Albert Einstein made use of this principle. But let's see why.

If we assume that the speed of light c tends to infinity, it means that some equations of the Special Theory of Relativity tend asymptotically to the equations of Classical Mechanics. Let's see, for instance, this equation:

$mrel= mo$

in this case, it becomes mrel=0 when $c \rightarrow \infty$.

The correspondence principle, as Max Jammer wrote, "turned out to be a most versatile and productive conceptual device for the further development of the older quantum theory – and [...] even for the establishment of modern quantum mechanics. [...] It was due to this principle that the older quantum theory became as complete as classical physics."[12]

Historically speaking, for what this problematic concerns, Krajewski's point of view is very interesting; in fact, according to him, the period between the 20's and the 30's, was not so positive. In fact, from one side there were the Vienna Circle's neo-positivists, that used to put at the summit of their analysis the problem of the demarcation between science and metaphysics on the base of an a-historical attitude; we can say the same, even though to a lesser degree, about neo-Kantians, who used to stress the active role of mind in the process of knowledge valorizing the Kantian a-priori but without analyzing the real scientific practice and its historical development (except for Ernst Cassirer who, in his *Substanzbegriff und Funktionbegriff*, distinguished abstraction and idealization[13]).

Things were different on Marxist front; in this case it focused its attention both to science and to its history: it is enough to turn our gaze to Engels' *Dialectics of Nature* or to Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* in order to realize that.

As everybody knows, even though this attitude was bended to Soviet dogmatism's needs, in any case, "the most Soviet philosophers of science accepted the correspondence principle as one of the basic laws of the development of science."[14]

Starting from the 60's, the Correspondence Principle caught the attention of some epistemologists like Karl R. Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, but while the first adopted it "for its conception of science progress as explanation plus correction," but without an accurate methodological analysis of it, instead Kuhn and Feyerabend "asserting the variability of meaning between requiring terms in successive scientific theories, deprived it of any fundament, unless of conceiving it in a purely formal way."[15]

The correspondence principle, instead, in Poland, during the 70's, found a rich soil because of two reasons: the historical Marxist approach (see Leninian and Engelsian reflections on science) and the higher methodological cogency that Polish philosophers applied for this topic. In fact, the correspondence principle has been analyzed in connection with the idealizational approach to science, especially for what concerns scientific progress:

> We shall consider the Correspondence Principle as a general methodological principle of the development of an advanced science, and in any case a principle valid for contemporary physics. According to this principle, when we replace an old law by a new one containing some new parameters, the former is not eliminated; its equation is a limit case of the new equation under the condition that the new parameters have some extreme values (usually zero). Then the new law (or, strictly speaking – the new equation) passes asymptotically into the old one when considered parameters tend to the extreme value. When these parameters have values close to the extreme, the old law preserves its validity with a good approximation. We may apply the Correspondence Principle also to theories: a new theory *T2* is in a Correspondence Relation with an old one *T*1 when there is a Correspondence Relation between basic laws of *T*1 and *T*2.[16]

In this case, obviously, the procedures of abstraction and concretization play an essential role for the correspondence principle; in fact, if we suppose the dependence of the quantity *y* on the quantities $x_1,\ldots, x_k$ on the base of the hypothetical equation $F_k(y, x_1,\ldots,x_k)=0$, then its concretization will consist in the fact that new factors $x_{k+1},\ldots,x_{k+m}$ will be introduced, and the new law will be characterized by the following new equation: $F_{k+m}(y, x_1,\ldots, x_k, x_{k+1}, x_{k+m})$. Otherwise, on the base of the Niels Bohr's correspondence principle, the old equation F_k should have been obtained as a *limit case* of F_{k+m}, when the new factors $x_{k+1},\ldots, x_{k+m}$ are assumed counterfactually equal to zero.

2. Idealization and Scientific Progress

By analyzing the epistemological conceptions of Karl R. Popper and C. G. Hempel and of the other supporters of the so-called *Standard View*, it is easy to notice the substantial diversity between these epistemologists and the Poznań methodologists, just because Popper and Hempel didn't catch the idealizational nature of scientific theories. This misunderstanding brings them to conceive differently both the construction of scientific theories and scientific progress.[17]

In this respect, Nowakowa, whose reflections are fundamental, stated that one of the most important problem of the methodology of the empirical sciences is the one concerning the regularity of the development of science. We can analyze this topic taking into account the two main conceptions of scientific progress, that is to say the cumulative one and the anti-cumulative one.

The former affirms that successive scientific theories are compatible with the others, so the possible and gradual incorporation of the previous progresses in the brand new theories is postulated;[18] the latter affirms, instead, that sometimes this situation doesn't happen, so the scientist privileges the revolutionary changes during the which theories are deposed and completely substituted by the successive and brand new ones.

There is a way to justify the cumulative conception, that's to say the correspondence principle, even though, according to Izabella Nowakowa, there are different ways of interpreting it.[19]

a. Implicative version: "the later statement T_2 corresponds to the previous one T_1, if *T1* is a logical consequence of T_2 (and, possibly, another premises)" (this is the version, for instance, accepted by E. Nagel, J. Witt-Hansen, W. Mejbaum, etc.);
b. Explanational version: "*T2* corresponds to the previous statement *T1*, if all the observational statements entailed by T_1 are entailed by T_2 as well, but not vice versa" (this is the version accepted by Kemeny and Oppenheim);

c. Approximative version: "T2 corresponds to the previous statement T_1, if T_2 entails (possibly together with another premises) T'_1 which is in a way "approximation (precise explanation is not given by the followers of this conception) of T_1"[20] (accepted by Schäffner and, even though from another point of view, by Karl R. Popper).

To all the followers of the three versions of correspondence mentioned above, we can make one objection, that is to say, they completely ignore that all scientific theories, as Leszek Nowak demonstrated, are idealizations; it means that the applicability of appropriate notions of correspondence "is limited to the realm of factual statements (non-idealizational ones) that are peculiar rather to common-sense quasi-knowledge than to the scientific knowledge"[21] (Izabella Nowakowa, from this point of view, also criticizes both Thomas Kuhn e Paul K. Feyerabend).

Let's compare, for instance, this classic equation (that is to say Newtonian law of motion):

[1] *F=ma*

With the one belonging to the Special Theory of Relativity:

[2] $$F = \frac{ma}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$$

In this case, the second law [2] could seem more general than the first one [1], but, as Francesco Coniglione stated, "both [1] and [2], from the ICS [Idealizational Conception of Science] point of view, are incomplete formulations, just because they don't mention any idealizational assumption abstracting from some secondary factors."[22] So, if "from the point of view of the physicist all these formulas are fully legitimate because he is interested more in the functional dependency between variables and factors rather than in the logical antecedent that justifies this dependency, nevertheless, from a methodological point of view, we can get along without expressly formulating the antecedent"[23] for whom [1] and [2] are only the consequent. That's why Izabella Nowakowa formulates the statements in the following way:

T1: $G(x) \wedge D(x)=0 \rightarrow F(x)=m(x)a(x)$

T'1: $G(x) \wedge D(x)=0 \wedge 1/c=cost \rightarrow F(x)= \dfrac{ma}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$

where $G(x)$ means that x is a physical body, $D(x)=0$ means that the dimensions of this body equal to zero, that is to say, it is a material point. So, as we can notice, [T'_1] is not more general than [T_1] because "they are both satisfied in an empty way because dimensionless bodies don't exist."[24] It means that the Implicative version of correspondence is properly inadequate because, as Coniglione states, "it can, at most, refer to the incomplete formulation of the laws."[25]

So, we can maintain [T_1] only if we assume that the speed of light is infinite:

T2**:** $G(x) \wedge D(x)=0 \wedge c = \infty \rightarrow F(x)=m(x)a(x)$

In the light of that, if we assume that the fundamental procedure of science is Idealization, then it's easy to notice that the growth of knowledge "consists in acquiring increasingly new information about the essential factors of the investigated magnitudes;"[26] but, as Leszek Nowak demonstrated in his works, this is not enough because if we introduce idealizing assumptions by omitting secondary factors, after that we must remove these assumptions in favour of more realistic ones, because:

> If a science applied idealization (establishing idealizing assumptions) without any limitations, then scientific statements would be out of empirical tests; it would be quiet sufficient to abstract from disturbing factors always when they occur and to safe statements from falsification in this way. But there occur another strategy in scientific research: one may abstract from disturbing factors on the condition that he will show how they disturb regularity stated in a testified statement. In other words, one may introduce an idealizing condition if he will remove it correcting at the same time the testified statement. Idealization is allowed on the condition that concretization is undertaken; "pure" idealization without concretization is forbidden.[27]

Let's see how Izabella Nowakowa exemplifies and resumes the question:

> the later statement T_2 *corresponds* to the previous one T_1 if and only if 1) T_2 contains more idealizing assumptions the T_1 does, 2) T_2 is concretized with respect those newly added idealizing conditions at least; as a result the statement T'_1 is established which contains the same idealizing assumptions as T_1 does.[28]

So, the statements discussed above will have the following form:

T1: $G(x) \wedge p1(x) = 0 \wedge \ldots \wedge pk(x) = 0 \rightarrow F(x) = f(h1)(x),\ldots,Hn(x))$

$T2: G(x) \Lambda\ p1(x) = 0\ \Lambda \ldots \Lambda\ pk(x) = 0\ \Lambda\ pk{+}1(x) = 0\ \Lambda \ldots \Lambda\ pm(x) = 0 \rightarrow F(x) = f(H1(x),\ldots, Hn(x))$

$T'1: G(x) \Lambda\ p1(x) = 0\ \Lambda \ldots \Lambda\ pk(x) = 0\ \Lambda\ pk{+}1(x) \neq 0\ \Lambda \ldots \Lambda\ pm(x) \neq 0 \rightarrow F(x) = g(H1(x),\ldots,Hn(x), pm(x),\ldots pk{+}1(x))$

According to Nowakowa, in opposition to Krajewski,[29] these statements show that the Implicative version of correspondence (the later statement T_2 corresponds to the previous one T_1 if and only if T_1 is a logical consequence of T_2) is definitely inadequate.

In effect, the dialectical conception of correspondence in the reflection of Izabella Nowakowa, and accepted also by Leszek Nowak, is characterized by some connotations that differ from the neo-positivist ones, for two reasons:

1. First of all, Izabella Nowakowa turns his gaze to the Engelsian analysis on science that, in turn, "refers to the Hegelian conception of the *Aufhebung* (preserving and changing);"[30]
2. Secondly, this statement of the problem is the only "conception consequently anti-cumulative of the development of science [...] the only one that admits that scientific theories can be in contrast with the previous ones."[31]

3. Conclusions

As we have seen, idealizational conception of science doesn't refer only to the issue of theory construction but also to the one concerning scientific progress. The correspondence principle applied by Niels Bohr in physics can also be applied in philosophy of science in order to describe scientific progress from an anti-cumulative point of view. Obviously, this anti-cumulative point of view differs from Thomas Kuhn's, Neo-positivism's and Karl R. Popper's views on scientific progress on one essential point: they ignore the fact, as we said previously, that scientific theories are idealizations.

NOTES

1. See Nowak (1980).
2. On this topic see Borbone (2011a) and Borbone (2011b).
3. Nowak (1992), 10–11.
4. See Nowakowa (1975a). This work corresponds to Nowakowa's PhD thesis that she discussed on 1972, see: Nowakowa (1972).
5. In effect, Thomas Kuhn postulated something similar, with his distinction between *normal science* and *revolutionary science*, supporting that way an anti-cumulative conception, but, as we will see further, Nowakowa's and Nowak's reflections go deeper. See Kuhn (2000), 13–32; Kuhn (1996) and Kuhn (1999), 139–157.

6. Nowakowa (1976), 69. About these aspects see also Nowakowa (2000), 417–428; Paprzycka (1990), 277–286; Such (2004), 185–215 and Nowakowa (1994).

7. About this aspect see the scheme included in Coniglione (2010), 444.

8. Nowakowa-Nowak (1998), 37–38. Anyway, Nowak resumes this method in a more complete way, that is to say: Idealization-Essenziality-Concretization-Theory-Proof-Dialectical correspondence-Dialectical negation. See Nowak (1994), 20–21.

9. Krajewski (1977), p. 1. We have to specify that the correspondence principle was formulated by Niels Bohr in some papers starting from 1913, even though he never used the term "correspondence," but the term "analogy"; see Bohr (1976), p. 178. In fact, the first one was used by Bohr in his speech for the Nobel prize he obtained in 1922. It is worthy to say that some illustrious scientists like Heisenberg, Born and others, used this principle after the development of quantum mechanics between 1925 and 1927. About this topic see Radder (1991), pp. 195–226; Bokulich (2008); Stachel (2009) and Schaffer (2007).

10. Krajewski (1977), 2.

11. Ibidem.

12. Jammer (1966), 116.

13. See Cassirer (1910).

14. Ibid., 4.

15. Ibidem.

16. Ibid., 6.

17. Anyway, things are different with Karl R. Popper, because the Viennese epistemologist, from one side, used to make an explicit use of Bohr's correspondence principle and, from the other side, he was very close to Poznań School meditations with his "modified essentialism," even though, he didn't catch the idealizational nature of scientific theories.

18. About these two views of scientific progress see: Losee (2004).

19. See Nowakowa (1975c), p. 75.

20. See Nowakowa (1975b), p. 65. On this topic see also Nowakowa (2000a), 185–188 (this essay appeared for the first time in Nowakowa (1974), 51–55.

21. Ibidem.

22. Coniglione (2010), 458.

23. Ibid., 458–459.

24. Ibid., 459.

25. Ibidem.

26. Nowakowa (1975b), 67.

27. Ibidem.

28. Ibidem.

29. Krajewski, in fact, doesn't accept Nowakowa's and Nowak's conclusions. According to Nowakowa the relation of correspondence exists only between statements *T2* and *T1* and not between *T1* and *T'1*, because she thinks that idealizational law *T2* is more basilar than the factual law *T'1*. Krajewski, even though he was influenced by Nowakowa's PhD dissertation, doesn't accept her conclusions. His reasoning is the following: "[…] this procedure is in sharp contradiction to the language customs of physicists (which she admits). […] Therefore, it is better to consider CR [Correspondence Principle] to be the relation between *T1* and *T2*, i.e. between an earlier law which turned out to be an idealizational one and its later

factualization. These laws have different consequences, hence they are by all authors considered as *different* laws," Krajewski, (1977), 48. So, Krajewski tries to propose a new interpretation of the correspondence principle, saving the intuitions of physicists for what concerns the relationship of implication that he calls *renewed implicative version*: see Ibid., 48–54.

30. Coniglione (2010), 465.

31. Nowakowa (1975b), 69.

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TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TEACHING AND LEARNING

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ABSTRACT. In this essay, written for educators who might be unfamiliar with the more technical aspects of "existential-phenomenological" philosophy, I focus on diverse and alternative forms of meaning arising from the lived experience of educators and students in the process of learning, in order to reacquaint practitioners with the forgotten and more original aspects of education. Through a modified phenomenological method, I attempt to show how teacher/student alienation from the curriculum might be transcended through an understanding of authentic education, by means of recovering the forgotten ontological aspects of living and learning, which might lead in a positive direction to the reassessment of the standards, practices, and values of contemporary education. It is my claim that this "existential" form of insight into the human and education holds the potential to enrich our current notions of teaching and learning and inspire authentic professional development in order to improve the quality of our teaching and teacher education programs.

Keywords: phenomenology, ontology, education, Heidegger, Sartre, social efficiency

This paper falls into the following divisions: (1) I begin with a brief overview of "alienation" in education and focus on the crisis in contemporary education, which might be traced to two sources: the "professionalization agenda" in teacher education and "high-stakes testing" in public education, both of which emerge from *social efficiency ideology*; (2) I move to consider how an authentic education might be conceived in terms of the phenomenological tradition in philosophy, specifically I focus on the philosophies of both Sartre and Heidegger,[1] concerned with the potential contribution their thought might make to education by focusing on the "existential" understand ing of the human; and (3) In a conceptual and speculative manner, I reveal how these philosophies might inspire renewed ways of thinking about education by those who teach and those who educate teachers.

1. The Crisis in Contemporary Education

The current definitions of a good teacher, or "expert teacher" (Darling-Hammond & Bransford, 2005) and ideal Democratic student are grounded in sets of pre-determined competencies established and bureaucratically imposed. As Pinar (2004) rightly observes, contemporary American education is deterministic, and "in its press for efficiency and standardization," has the effect of reducing both teachers and students to "automata" (28). Ironically, by means of education, we have come to view teachers and students as "data," "numbers," "products," and "things," with mere *present-at-hand* existence to be manipulated, used, and discarded when their instrumental value is exhausted. We have forgotten what it means to be truly human from the "philosophical" perspective of what might generally be referred to as *existential-phenomenological-ontology*, with its perennial concern for what it means for us to be authentic communal beings engaged in heuristic acts of learning about our world through demonstrating a solicitous concern and care for our Being and the Being of others within learning communities, which always transcend the predictable and sterile conditions of high-stakes accountability within today's institutionalized education system. Teachers are increasingly becoming alienated from the curriculum (educational content and pedagogy), their students, and themselves with dire consequences to the overall view to authentic subject-hood and real education.

There is a crisis in contemporary democratic education: radical achievement gaps in the public schools, a shortage of highly trained and effective teachers, and the continued bureaucratization of the American university where market place values dominate (Pinar, 2004; Spring, 2000; Solomon & Solomon, 1994). While a detailed, systematic diagnosis of this problem is beyond the scope of this essay, I consider two problems inhibiting the drive toward effective education emerging from the recent educational reform that produced the high-stakes accountability atmosphere linked with the ratification of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 2001, No Child Left Behind (NCLB, 2002). First, the ineffectiveness of teacher reform emerging from the *professionalization agenda* for the training of effective teachers, which attempts to definitively establish what teachers should know and teach, and secondly, the detrimental effects of "high stakes" testing on students and their teachers, who upon entering a system of education are forced to teach an inauthentic curriculum. Reading Diamond (2008) and Zeichner (2009), it is possible to trace these problems to the *social efficiency model* in education, which represents the dominating ideological force in American education. Thus, a brief explication of its philosophy and educational methodology is provided in order to contrast this stultifying view of education with an alternative, more positive vision of authentic education that might be inspired by phenomenology.

Spring (2000) writes that the "dominant public goals for education in the twentieth century are economic […] and these goals include preparation for work, the control of labor, and economic development" (p. 5). Our contemporary educational, pedagogical, and ultimately, our overarching curricular goals are still grounded in the *social efficiency model* for education, stressing essential principles of utility and the student's potential contribution, as functioning and flourishing democratic citizen, to the general economic growth of the country. The *social efficiency model* works off *product-process* logic for designing and implementing curriculum (as in the Tyler rationale), it is teleological, i.e., goals, standards, and objectives, which comprise the definition of "good education" are determined in advance, and often times, at a proximal distance from the practical unfolding of learning in the classroom. For example, private foundations (Carnegie Corporation) and accrediting agencies (ETS – Education Testing Service) are "non-governmental professional organizations that establish standards and criteria for educational institutions" (Spring, 2000, 207). Since the *social efficiency model* works to implement programmed instruction, which is designed to assure that students achieve established sets of standardized objectives, it deals only "with a limited part of the child's total functioning; it is not intended to give students a well-rounded education but to provide them with a set of specialized skills" (Schiro, 2009, 85). According to Pinar (1994), this model for education, which embodies the "factory model" in praxis, has turned the classroom into a highly unpleasant and unproductive environment for teachers and students, causing more than a few teachers to "retreat into the apparent safety of their own subjectivities. But in doing so, they have abdicated their professional authority and ethical responsibility for the curriculum they teach. They have been forced to abdicate this authority by the bureaucratic protocols that presumably hold them 'accountable,' but which in fact, render them unable to teach" (4).

Zeichner (2003), writing on recruiting, preparing, and retaining qualified teachers, addresses deficiencies associated with the *professionalization agenda*, which as stated, represents the "current incarnation of what has been referred to as the social efficiency tradition of reform in teacher education – the quest to establish a profession of teaching through the articulation of a knowledge base for teachers based on educational research and professional judgment" (498). This agenda is propelled by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, the National Commission on Teacher's and America's Future (NCTAF), the National Council of American Teacher Education (NCATE), and the Holmes Group and Partnership. The *professionalization agenda* pushes for universal standards that determine teacher excellent, and as a system, “addresses teachers’ abilities to display certain knowledge, dispositions, and perfections thought to be necessary for effective teaching” (498). Because the federal government, private foundations, and accrediting agencies are playing major roles in “nationalizing educational policies,” a yawning chasm exists between those who draft and push for the implementation of education standards, many of whom are not remotely involved with education, and the actual lived sphere of the curriculum (Spring, 2001, 201).

The *professionalization agenda* bases the validity of educational standards on the decisions of panels of experts and scholars, there is a “failure to establish clear links in teacher standards and pupil learning even as broadly defined,” and as a result, critics argue that “performance based teacher education is of little consequence” (Zeichner, 2003, 498–299). As related to the issue of alienation in education, Zeichner raises an important point regarding the fact that experienced teachers are becoming more hesitant to work in teacher education programs because “they are asked to write performance indicators and rubrics and to examine their courses to see if they are covering what will be covered on the state content exams” (501). Along with public education, teacher education programs are also grounded in the *product-process* model of education, and are thus creating the identical problem in higher education that exists on the levels of elementary and secondary education, which Apple (2004) describes as a situation wherein the “tail of the test wags the dog of the teacher” (174). Educators in institutions of higher learning are unable to freely select and organize curriculum content and pedagogy, which might benefit from their insight, experience, and sense of better judgment concerning the best ways to educate teachers because they have been absolved of the responsibility of writing and implementing the curriculum. As Zeichner states, this type of standard based educational program for teachers does not lead to better learning, and that the clear and present danger is already upon us, because teacher education is “turning performance based teacher education into a purely mechanical implementation activity that has lost sight of any real purpose and of the need to constantly step back from the daily grind of implementation to ask hard questions about what is being accomplished and for whose benefit” (502).

Diamond (2008) stresses yet another aspect of educator and student alienation from the curriculum, namely, the manner in which “high stakes testing” is negatively effecting both curriculum content and pedagogical methods. Diamond states that teacher and student accountability and performance on standardized tests have changed the face of education, e.g., Illinois State Standards directly effect “instructional content (the knowledge and skills that teachers teach) and pedagogy (how teachers teach that content)” (293). Since the bulk of the curriculum is grounded in the content of standardized tests, based on the Board of Education’s mandates, the context of the learning environment, and subsequently those who teach and learn, is being adversely affected in the following ways: First, there is a narrow focus of curriculum content, e.g., Diamond sights a current rise in privileging math and language arts over other subjects such as science and social studies. Next, there is a narrow focus within these areas that are privileged, e.g., only certain aspects of math and language arts are highlighted. Finally, there is a significant amount of class time devoted to test preparation, e.g., teachers are not only drilling students using the content of tests, they are also reproducing the stultifying "testing atmosphere" in the classroom, all in the name of "accountability."[2]

According to Smith (2011), standardized testing in education represents the process of "erasing social difference," which in philosophical terms might be likened to the process of "reification," whereby the abstract, generalized categories education creates, as they emerge by means of inductive reasoning from standardized scores, in terms of student "ability," "achievement," and "intelligence," assume the objective and substantial characteristics of "real," existing transcendent/transcendental categories of human Being, and to the detriment of students and educators "differences in language, opportunity, familiarity, education, and safety are somehow forgotten" (93). The problem of alienation in education is duplicitous and it unfolds in a vicious and circular manner, engendering an insidious process of codependence. Instructors are increasingly alienated from what might serve as legitimate or authentic curriculum; for teachers entering the field are slaves to institutions governed by pre-determined standards of achievement. Institutions are then filtering ill-prepared (alienated) teachers into a system that is governed in much the same way, namely, by standards and competencies established by bureaucratic agencies that are at a remove from authentic educational purposes and practices. Teachers are thus alienated in two-fold manner, both from the "standardized" curriculum they are now forced to teach and the students who cannot relate to what is being taught.

2. The Phenomenological Understanding of Education: Authentic *Being-in-the-World*

Contemporary education, as I have presented it, is forging "subjects" in terms of reified inauthentic categorizations, and in doing so, and here is my philosophical concern, there is also a loss, or, in terms that are perhaps more appropriate, a *forgetting* or *covering-over*, of authentic *phenomenological subject-hood* occurring. Educators, unfamiliar with philosophical origins, usually trace the problem of "standardization" and "accountability" in education, as it emerges from *social efficiency*, to positivism and the rise of scientism in the post-industrialized age of advanced technology. However, if we look to the modern tradition in philosophy that branches out and breaks off from Husserl's phenomenological science (*Logical Investigations*), i.e., the "existential-phenomenological" tradition, the problem I have identified is understood in terms of the "forgetting" of our ontological roots and is commonly traced back to the metaphysics of Plato (*metaphysics of presence*) and moves forward through the Christian philosophy of Descartes. For the purpose of this paper and for the sake of brevity I focus on one thinker among many who has addressed this problem in detail, namely, Heidegger.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger (1962) identifies what he calls the *forgetting*, or *covering-over*, of the original "phenomenological," or authentic, sense of self (*Dasein*). Heidegger claims that the ontological sense of existence is always present to our various activities and modes of comportment. "Dasein's Being is an issue for it in a definitive way," writes Heidegger, "and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing *in the face* of it and forgetfulness *thereof*" (69/44). Here, Heidegger is referencing the *ontological difference* between Being and being, or the crucial, and long forgotten authentic distinction in metaphysics between a being (as a thing or entity) and its Being (the way of its unfolding, the "how" of its existence). Our phenomenological sense of selfhood is associated with the second conception of Being, and this represents the ontological aspects of our lives that the history of philosophy as it has been taken up within the tradition in education, within which we are immersed, has turned a blind to.

Contemporary education, as a spawn of positivism, haunted by the specter of Platonic metaphysics, obscures, or *covers-over*, the more primordial, ontological sense of selfhood associated with the Being of students and educators. For Heidegger, the *covering-over* of the ontological aspects of our lives marks the necessity for a return to the original questioning of our Being, which might allow us to transcend the grip of positivistic explanations of history and the tradition, which serves as our "master," which blinds us through what it "transmits," causing us to "forget" that our lives have an ontological origin, which then becomes inaccessible, and beyond, in a mode of double-concealment, "makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand" (43/21). The tradition in education that is driven by the concern with beings and permanent presence over the ontological meaning of Being, "blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part genuinely drawn" (43/21). Thus, we simply take our inherited ways of viewing the world, ways of conceiving and enacting education, as self-evident. As stated, our ways of doing things and viewing humans and the world get solidified, codified and we become oblivious to the fact that we have the power to change things, we forget "the most elementary conditions which would alone enable [us] to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively [our] own" (43/21).

We have forgotten the most original ways in which we exist, i.e., we have forgotten the sense of *phenomenological selfhood* that defines us, not in terms of a thing or being, but rather in terms of an individual with unique and indeterminate possibilities who, in the most primordial moments of worldly dwelling, demonstrates a solicitous sense of care for its existence. Bonnett (2001), writing on the phenomenological aspects of education, echoes the above sentiments when stating that the current "predisposition to regard *outcomes* of education as definable in advance of the *process* of education" engenders a deterministic system of education that obscures authentic *subject-hood* and we lose sight of the fact that humans are "individual centers of consciousness capable of relating to the world in ways that have personal meaning, for this is essential to human being against some sort of mechanized and depersonalized being" (30). In short, there is a loss of ownership of the learning process on the part of both educator and student; ironically, by means of education, we are losing sight of what it means to be truly human, and the inauthentic notion of the self that education grounded in the philosophy of *social efficiency* is fostering is both "phenomenologically untenable and educationally stultifying" (Bonnett, 2001, 357).

Moving beyond Bonnett, I suggest that that the ontological understanding of the human being as *Being-in-the-world* with others should precede curricular discourse for determining the overarching purposes, aims, and goals of education. Traditionally, the essence of education is located in epistemological concerns, e.g., asking, what forms of knowledge are most reliable and hence valuable? However, phenomenological research claims that ontological concerns are antecedent to any and all systematic considerations of epistemology in education, focusing more on the view of the human and the unfolding of its Being-in-the-world, which includes, of course, ways of knowing and learning, which are derivative of the more primordial ways of human dwelling: In short, phenomenology is concerned first and foremost with a view to the human and only secondarily with technical, systematic questions of knowledge. I now move to formalize a reconceived notion of *phenomenological selfhood* as it relates to inspiring a view towards authentic education as it emerges from: (1) Sartre's phenomenological description of *Being-for-itself* and the notion of freedom and the concomitant burden of responsibility, which opens the potential for our authentic projects and allows for the manifestation of the unique values we bring into existence through autonomous choice, and (2) Heidegger's phenomenological (fundamental) ontology of *Dasein* ("there-being") and the ontological understanding of *Dasein's* "care-structure," which grounds the deep, solicitous care we demonstrate for our Being and the Being of others. Attempting to return to the grounds of human existence in order to philosophically define the human in terms of its untapped ontological-existential possibilities, I consider common themes or patterns in the phenomenological descriptions and interpretations of Sartre and Heidegger, which might provide insight into the various modes-of-Being that potentially define and give structure to our worldly existence, as the essence of our *Being-in-the-world* with others.

Sartre (1986) states that the main tenet of existentialism is reducible to the epigram, "existence precedes and commands essence," which succinctly represents the ontological understanding of the human being set within a critique of essentialism in Western philosophy (438). Any analysis of Sartre must begin and end with the interrelated notions of freedom, responsibility, and the "creation" of values. The human is for Sartre *Being-for-itself (entre-pour-soi),* while all other aspects of the world are *Being-in-itself (entre-ea-soi).* The human is free and *for-itself* because she is self-questioning and can envision a life-project, or "fundamental project," that emerges through the exercise of her autonomy in relation to *facticity* within what Sartre terms "the situation." There is always the potential, barring the single fatality of death, of assessing, reassessing, and re-defining our lives, this because of the ontological structure of freedom itself, which is a necessary condition for the enactment of our freedom in any and all situations, within the lived experience of our life. Morris (2005) states that being free within particular situations refers to "the fact that the situation is a condition for, though not a limitation on, our freedom" (144).

"To be free," writes Sartre (1986), "is not to choose the historical world in which one arises – which would have no meaning – but to choose oneself in the world whatever this might be" (668). When born into the world, or *thrown-into-the-world,* the historical milieu we enter is not of our choosing, it is literally given to us in advance as heritage. This is something we cannot change, but can work with, in that we can determine its meaning for us and re-value it if we so choose. This represents for Sartre, according to Sherman (2006), the dialectical aspects of subject formation, or the manner in which Being is revealed by intuition, which is "the perspective of the subject that must actively make itself in history rather than the perspective of the subject that is wholly made by history" (104). Other aspects of *facticity* would include the laws of nature, the historical world with its scientific limits, the genetic limits of our physiology, and the past choices we have made as *having-been*. Sartre even includes family and community to this notion of *facticity*. However, *facticity*, "far from being a danger to freedom, resolves only in enabling it to arise as freedom" (621). *Facticity* might be understood as marking out the horizons, or limits, that allows for authentic freedom to manifest in the first instance. Initially, when our choices are made possible there is a convergence of freedom (as human *transcendence*) and *facticity*.

Sartre (1986) writes of the *freedom toward* the enactment of a "fundamental project," which always involves "nothingness," or the *negatite*, because in the present situation we are always seeking to bring into existence that which has not-yet been chosen or given form, and all authentic action "necessarily implies as its condition the recognition of a 'desideratum,' or lack, and absence" (560). Morris (2005) claims that for Sartre, *nothingness* is duplicitous in nature, involving a "double nihilation:" First, the ideal end or goal that exists is conceived in futural terms as that which is not-yet enacted, and represents *nothingness* in the present moment, while the present moment also shows up as lacking (*nothingness*) that particular "something" in terms of the futural goal or ideal end (148). According to Sherman (2006), for Sartre, "Nothingness is not a transcendental foundation but rather arises within Being itself" (96). As stated, freedom is directed toward our *fundamental project*, which "constitutes the person's – totally individual and changeable – essence" (Morris, 2005, 154). We are utterly responsible for our "fundamental project" and the enactment of our own unique possibilities that arise through its creation, and this project is always bound up in important ways with others, because while choosing a world the human is also choosing, or creating, the values that give meaning to it. The values that the *for-itself* brings into existence also affect others, and so there is a great burden of responsibility associated with the authentic exercise of one's freedom.[3]

If we turn from this responsibility, Sartre (1948) claims that we are living in *bad faith*, which in certain instances amounts to turning ourselves and other human beings into objects, or the *in-itself,* things with immutable essences lacking embodied, conscious potential. Thus, we must be cautious and clear when making choices, for all actions are bound up with a process of personal valuation, but this valuing transcends mere subjectivity when we are choosing projects that involve others, e.g., the creation of institutions, states, nations, and the like: "And when we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men" (471). Thus when we express our values, we are at once informing the Other, "I value X, you too *should* value X." So, we must always act with the understanding that in significant ways we are ethically responsible for the Other's Being. When "creating" values, we are engaged in reassessing, reinterpreting, and either accepting or rejecting the values that have, in many ways, been passed along to us through our emersion in the world and by way of our heritage, which forms one of the horizons of our *having-been.* If we accept, or choose, these values as part of the *status quo,* we are not authentically exercising our freedom, and hence, living in *bad faith,* resisting the burden of freedom and making excuses for our imagined lack of autonomy. Since the latter portion of this explication of Sartre concerned the human's responsibility for others, I deepen this line of thought by turning to the philosophy of Heidegger in order to further elucidate what human responsibility entails when thinking about human communities, history, and destiny.

In Heidegger's (1962) fundamental ontology, "care," in terms of the human's *care-structure*, is instantiated within the "formal existential totality of *Dasein's* ontological structural whole" (237/192). Care situates the human being in the world temporally, as the stretching out of the Dasein from its birth to its death, in such a way that both its own Being and the Being of others become issues for it. The understanding of care is linked inextricably with the enactment of Dasein's authentic Being-with others: "Selfhood is to be discovered existentially only in *Dasein's* authentic ability-to-be a self, that is to say, in the authenticity of *Dasein's* Being as care" (369/322). When dealing with others, our sense of concern should manifest as care (*Sorge*) and in particular, care as *Fursorge*, or solicitude that "cares-for" the other, and this represents not only a respect for and preservation of the other's freedom, it also represents the call for a resolute understanding of the responsibility we must shoulder when helping to the make the other's freedom an authentic possibility. When caring for entities in the world that are not like Dasein, we demonstrate concern (*Besorgen*), e.g., when encountering *present-at-hand* entities. It would be inauthentic to show mere concern (*Besorgen*) for other human beings, and yet this is precisely what education grounded in the model for "accountability" and "standardization" appears to be doing. Huebner (1999) expresses precisely this concern when critiquing educational goals, aims, and objectives that are determined in advance of education, in this instance "educators too easy acceptance of the function of or the necessity for purposes or objectives has replaced the need for a basic awareness of his [temporality and] historicity," i.e., at a complete remove from the student's temporality, her historicity conceived in terms of the "caring" communal destining of Dasein's supreme, authentic manifestation of *Being-with* (132). Care, as *Fursorge*, is thus integral to Dasein's living historically (*Geschichtlichkeit*) in an authentic manner, crucial to it enacting its collective destiny (*Geschick*).

Heidegger (1962) states that Dasein's authentic temporal existence, as related to the three moments, or horizons, of the *care-structure*, expressed in terms of the fundamental character of our Being as "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)," is an historical occurrence culminating in Dasein's authentic destiny (293/249). While it is certain that we die alone, it is not the case that we enter the world in the self-same manner, for we are born into a family and community, we share, as part of our *throwness*, a common lineage and heritage, and this element of our Being discloses our factical possibilities through our authentic historical comportment, or *historizing*. When authentic Dasein enacts its possibilities, projecting itself toward the future, its heritage approaches from out of the indeterminate future and is taken up in "repetition," by enacting the possibilities "it has inherited and yet chosen" (435/384). However, the mere acknowledgement of the past does not constitute the authentic understanding of heritage in terms of *historicality*, rather *historicality* involves choosing to accept or reject, through reinterpretation and appropriation, the decisions and choices of our forebears, the collective *ethos* of the community, in light of our unique and ownmost potential-for-Being. Thus, there is the notion of the "burden" of autonomous choice also present to Heidegger's fundamental ontology as associated with the "repetition" of Dasein's heritage. The concept of destiny, the pinnacle of Dasein's authentic existence, refers to the shared, collective *historizing* of a community, through ecumenical endeavors that include education in community with others, in which people draw from a collective heritage and fatefully enact their existence through "communication" and "struggle." Destiny is not merely a collection of individual fates, as it is guided in advance by the fact that Dasein's existence is *Being-in-the-world* as *Being-with*. "Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world. […] Only in communicating and struggling does the power of destiny [*Geschick*] become free," and our destiny "in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full our authentic historizing of Dasein (436/384-385).

3. Reclaiming Our Authentic *Being-in-the-World* as *Being-with-others*: Recovering of the Ontological Aspects of Education

What are the implications of the ontological-existential insight as described above for students in the lived experience of the classroom of the public school, for educators in the *lived world* of the university who are engaged in teacher education programs? I suggest the ontological concerns that are at stake manifest across the curriculum through the organization, or *bringing-into-existence*, of the context of an authentic experience of learning. My focus will not be directed on curriculum content, on the subjects that are included or excluded, i.e., the knowledge-centered aspects of education. Rather, I am concerned with focusing on learner-centered and community-centered aspects of education along with the crucial aspects of authentic classroom management, which includes pedagogy, when seeking to understand the types of things that authentic teachers should know about the education of their students. It is the case that when educators are developing a curricular vision they are concerned with the knowledge of the students and how they learn, the *content-knowledge* that students are to be learning, and the manner in which student learning might be clearly, cogently, and accurately assessed in relation to the goals and aims of the curriculum in order to evaluate the processes of education.

However, as suggested earlier, developing an authentic curricular vision does not begin with attempting to provide answers to the foregoing "epistemological" curriculum concerns, but rather with an analysis of the ontological constitution of the human as related to the processes of learning about the world, which is to say, we should first be concerned with the types of questions being formulated. Prior to concerning ourselves with answers or solutions to problems, educators should return to an original understanding of the questions they are asking and encouraging students to ask. For example, when formulating what might be termed "original" questions, we embark on an *inquiry* as opposed to an *investigation*. With respect to the latter, it is terminated by the answer provided; as related to the former, the problem is not terminated but enriched by means of revelation and understanding (Gelvin, 1979, 81). When asking original, or fundamental, questions, we learn that answers do not always follow the lines of logical argumentation and that the truth revealed defies standards of deductive correctness. As related specifically to our educational practices, Heidegger (2000) states that the original questions that educators should be concerned with formulating emerge only when they are "not being seduced by overhasty theories, but instead experiencing things as they are in whatever may be nearest" (32/23). Original questions are of a dual-nature: they are *transformative* in nature and inspire in us the preservation of and care for the basic question-worthy status of such things as love, existence, transcendence, freedom, human potential, and authentic education. Original questioning "pushes us into the open […] and transforms itself (as does every genuine questioning), and casts a new space over and through everything" (32/23).

Thus, the question I pose is of a special kind, which is antecedent to any formalized curriculum plan, and it is not a question that admits of an easy answer, for it is the type of question that evokes the mode of the infinitival as it attempts to elucidate the essential movement of the experience of learning, intimately bound up with inquiry of a philosophical nature. Pursuant to the end of understanding what authentic teachers should know about education and pedagogy, as opposed to asking the question, "What *is* an effective teacher?" "What *is* an efficient curriculum?" Or, "What *is* an ideal democratic student?" I ask the more primordial question, "How is it in the first instance that an authentic education unfolds in its essence in relation to the unfolding of the human's Being-in-the-world?" Addressing this ontological concern, the reader is encouraged, in a resolute moment of reflexivity, to return to the lived world of the classroom as an ontological context for learning in the *originary* sense, envisioning her future role as educator enlightened by the phenomenological understanding of the ontological structures that facilitate the potential for meaning to arise in our existence through the processes of *real* education. This final section is devoted to inspiring the educator's transcendence of the alienated state of education by means of formulating a response to the foregoing query. The ontological-existential structures introduced above, as they emerge form the philosophy of Sartre and Heidegger, will be interpreted in terms of their concrete enactment in educational *praxis*. By formalizing the manner in which authentic education might be conceived, in and through this interpretation, an authentic notion of curriculum is intimated within the vision emerging from the inquiry.

Education includes the creation and sustaining of a fecund and intimate environment (or world) for learning that engenders a sense of responsibility for the values that emerge through the activities in which educators and students engage. The classroom "situation" that fosters and nurtures an atmosphere of existential authenticity must be grounded in the notion of a free, responsible, and caring human being, and this phenomenological understanding gleaned from approaching education by means of asking fundamental questions about existence might serve as the guiding framework, or *Gestell*, marking or sketching out the appropriate horizons within which the authentic occurrence of learning transpires. Educators seeking to promote authentic learning experiences should allow students to *feel-at-home-in-a-world* of learning that is, in great part, of their own making, in terms of their *fundamental projects*. It is possible to conceive of the curriculum in terms of a *fundamental project*, as the organizing structure that directs the learning, but is itself, as of yet, incomplete, for it is "groundless," bound up as it is with the students' indeterminate *futural* potential. It is possible to state that education, as our *fundamental project*, is rooted in the choices educators and students make, and it is always the "original choice which originally creates all reasons and all motives," and our *fundamental project* as educators "arranges the world and its meaning, its instrumental-complexities, and its coefficient of adversity" (Sartre, 1986, 465).

Every *for-the-sake-of-which* giving direction and form to an authentic education, e.g., choice of curriculum, choice of content, choice of instruction and assessment, selection of knowledge that we value or devalue, is directed toward the fulfillment of our *fundamental project*. Thus, the phenomenological understanding of *being human* inspires the educator's *fore-knowing* into the authentic "formation" of the classroom because it is always already situated in the ontological understanding of the student as human Being, as *Being-for-itself*. Through this preparatory insight into the Being of students, educators are readied to respond authentically to the ever-changing, ever-evolving needs, wants, and desires of all students, which emerge through the understanding that change, *becoming*, and transcendence are integral components of our lives, in terms of a way of life, and this is essential to all authentic teaching and learning. All situations, all learners, hold the potential to be otherwise, but this is something that is either forgotten or ignored in much of contemporary education, and such an authentic understanding of the student as a locus of freedom and the unique, as of yet, untapped potential for enacting a free, unique, and meaningful life-project, as I suggest, might be understood in terms of Sartre's philosophy.

Educators should be skeptical of "empirical" models for curriculum making such as the Tyler (1949) rationale, which through techniques of behavior modification leads students toward the achievement of curriculum goals and aims that have been established in advance for their learning. In addition, to reiterate a point made earlier regarding "reification" in relation to Sartre's existentialism, when we standardize, label, and categorize students and prospective teachers preparing to enter the field based on rigid standards that are pre-determined in advance of the curriculum, we are stripping students and educators of their ontological sense of *self hood*, or existence as *Being-for-itself* and reducing them to mere objects, to *Being-in-itself*, to things equivalent to the chairs, tables, desks, books, and things, or artifacts, that fill up our classrooms that have immutable essences but do not hold the power to transform their existence. There must be ways of teaching and formulating the direction of our educational practices in which students are participants and co-creators in the process of learning and the determination thereof in ways that maximize their freedom through the enactment of unique possibilities that contribute simultaneously to the context of education, the formation of the student, and the emergence of authentic standards of education, where the goals and aims for teaching, rather than being determined in advance of the curriculum, are imminent, or emergent, *as* potential in the authentic unfolding of the curriculum within the classroom. Greene (1995), who has written much on the subject of existentialism and education, also argues for the power of student autonomy in contributing to the authentic "dialogue about educational purposes, standards and common learning," and claims that fundamental to the formation of our educational purposes must be "the achievement of human freedom within a human community" (184).[4]

Authentic education is also concerned with the educator's knowledge of the subject matter and the most effective ways to teach the subject matter, and these issues are undoubtedly crucial to effective teaching and learning. However, putting these aforementioned components of teaching aside, our focus should first be on the understanding of "how" authentic education unfolds by exploring the educator's understanding of knowledge as it relates to the ontological aspects of the student's Being, i.e., becoming aware of whether or not educators are operating "within the framework of a crude subjective-objective dichotomy that encourages passivity and inhibits" the thoughts of both teachers and students (Detmer, 2006, 83). Education grounded in *social efficiency philosophy* tends to favor the positivist notion of "objective knowledge" (and this is clearly the epistemological model for standardized exams!), which means that in education there exists but one answer, the "correct" answer, which can be verified and validated through the application of the appropriate technique or methodology. This epistemological view presupposes a specific form of pedagogy that is direct and didactic, wherein education unfolds exclusively in terms of monologue or lecture. Detmer finds Sartre helpful on this epistemological point in education, for Sartre's philosophy questions the validity of the simplistic subject-object dichotomy at work in much of philosophy's tradition.

"Sartre" according to Detmer, "is everywhere concerned to emphasize the importance of freedom and of subjectivity, even in connection with such seemingly objective domains as mathematics and the physical sciences, without, in doing so, ever lapsing into a crude, facile sort of relativism" (84). As opposed to didactic techniques such as monologue, where the educator embodies a "possessor" of objective, immutable knowledge to be transferred through a system of "delivery" to students who are viewed as empty vessels, education should unfold primarily by means of discourse (dialogue), which stresses the importance of the student's subjective existence and represents the search for meaning through a process of inquiry and knowledge-construction, or *meaning making*, in fellowship. This opens the space for student participation in a communal environment for learning, for in the processes of asking original questions about not only the material they are engaging, but also their lives, their "autobiographies," regarding various and potential meanings, students are at once assuming the roles of learners, teachers, and assessors and, in a true Sartrean sense, "creators of values," contributing to determining both the validity and value of the learning, in the context of their lessons. "[A]s teachers we should be careful not to reinforce, especially through our assessment methods, the idea that education is primarily a matter of passively memorizing the ideas of others. Rather our challenge should be to help our students achieve genuine *understanding* – to encourage them to respond, critically and creatively, to the ideas of others and, ultimately, to develop their own ideas" (Detmer, 2006, 85, emphasis in original).

As evident from Sartre's philosophy as outlined, bound up with freedom is the supreme burden of responsibility, which both student and educator must assume. However, the contemporary state of education, as earlier described, in fact works to abolish the students' freedom outright, and so with the loss of freedom it follows that any authentic sense of responsibility for the curriculum, learning, and their unique potentiality-for-Being is also lost. This occurs because we are telling students in advance what forms of knowledge are most valuable, what specific "facts" and "skills" are absolutely necessary for mastery, and then we are handing over to them the curriculum in the form of a pre-packaged finished product. Education of this type is not intellectually demanding from the perspective of deep meditative rumination, as the foundation for all critical thought, nor is it personalized in any sense of the term, so it should not be surprising that students fail to demonstrate an authentic sense of responsibility, they are not beholden to the material educators are presenting in the curriculum. They are being forced to assume the *faux* sense responsibility for things learned that are not of their own choosing or making, things that are not related in any authentic manner to their own unique fundamental *projects.* We are doing a great disservice to students by relieving them of both the burden of freedom and responsibility as related to their unique lives. Because every single thread forming the student's web of meanings comprising her present and potential world, every action, every *for-the-sake-of-which,* must be done in the service of her unique *fundamental project* if it is to be authentic.

In terms that are familiar to educators, the situation described above manifests a lack of student ownership of to the process of learning, and this I suggest is a problem of monumental proportion. If students and educators are to ever experience the full weight of their freedom and responsibility, they must take seriously what Sartre indicates about those who ignore, or *flee-in-the-face* of, their responsibility as autonomous agents: When in "anguish" we shirk the responsibilities of enacting our freedom, we are living an existence of *bad faith,* for we must not seek to, nor should we impose this condition on others, relinquish the burden of responsibility that has been given over to us in light of our being condemned to an existence that is bound up with autonomous choice and action, When living authentically, we "cannot help escape the feeling of [our] total and deep responsibility" for our lives and fundamental project (Sartre, 1986, 472) It is clear from the foregoing diagnosis of the crisis in contemporary education, educators must shoulder much, if not all, of the burden for creating the inauthentic learning institutions that are exemplary of *bad faith.* There must be a move by teachers to engender an authentic sense of responsibility, or ownership, in the classroom, which accompanies the informed choices that our students make in the process of learning. This relates directly to the manner in which the learning unfolds, i.e., the "how" of an authentic education and the pinnacle role that the teacher must assume when working towards structuring and managing an authentic classroom in order to facilitate and allow for a deep and true sense of ownership in student learning to emerge, and hence, inspire the all-important sense of responsibility for the unique and authentic choices they make.[5]

Sartre's concept of *nothingness* as earlier introduced will prove helpful when envisaging the space of education as the locus of potential, growth, and evolution. "If man as the existentialist conceives him is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing" (Sartre, 1986, 471). This notion includes responsibility for the learning environment that students and educators have formed as well as a responsibility for its future enactment, by means of speculating on how the learning environment might be improved in more authentic ways through collective choice. It is crucial to grasp that the present structure of worlds within the classroom represents what Sartre calls the "given," that which has been brought into existence through the autonomous choices we have made, and the Being of both educators and students "causes there to be a given by [first] breaking with it and illuminating it in the light of the not-yet-existing," and that which does not yet exist, represents our unique futural potential (615). The notion of *nothingness* also relates to learning, knowledge, and meaning, i.e., what we already know and what we seek to know in the future as it relates to the *fundamental project* of education to which we are contributing. If educators view the context of the classroom authentically, a sense of *nothingness* must be acknowledged, they must remain open to student potential, which is the understanding of those elements of human existence, as *Being-for-itself*, that have not yet been enacted, and can never be fully determined in advance of the *situation* at a remove from the lived world of the classroom, the locus of the merging of *transcendence* and *facticity*. To teach and to learn is to be as "projection" toward the future, with the knowledge that learning occurs when what is (a current lack of knowledge) is rejected in the move to bring about a condition that is not as of yet present (future erudition as actualized potential brought about by our inquiries). Reading Sartre we are reminded that no educational program, no curriculum, no lesson, no method of pedagogy, no schema for classroom management, despite the amount of research poured into its justification is determinate, for he is adamant that that no current state of affairs (including education as a national institution) can influence the projection of our freedom, nor can any factual state "determine consciousness [*Being-for-itself*] to apprehend it as a *negatite* or as a lack" (615).

When discussing the importance of the awareness of the values we are choosing in the classroom, recall that Sartre claims our actions affect the lives of those around us. It is crucial to understand that in choosing our values in the present moment of action, in the *situation*, and "creating the man we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be" (Sartre, 1986, 427). Thus, educators assume a double-responsibility when choosing values, for not only do they establish values in the present, they are simultaneously bound up with projecting these values upon others, and in an undeniable ethical sense, making a powerful normative declaration that others *should* assume the values they are endorsing. Here, I focus exclusively on the educator and the awareness that she is at all times modeling values for students along with embodying the collective values of the educational programs that she endorses. For if the context of the classroom represents the human's communal, social, and ecumenical *fundamental project* of learning in microcosm, the teacher must be vigilant at all times about what her choices (personal and educational) indicate about the values she is endorsing ("creating") and projecting onto students. This includes everything from the physical structure of the classroom's organization, the way the room is arranged, the style of instruction, the manner of assessment, to the tone and timbre of her discipline. In addition, simply the manner in which she expresses her thoughts and emotions to the students is indicative of her value system. While Sartre is clear that our values are really groundless, for without God, the luminous realm of intrinsic values falls, evaporates, it is perhaps safe to say that an educator choosing and modeling an authentic existence would demonstrate the characteristics of an engaged, authentic learner, a person who genuinely functions as an "engaged" co-facilitator and co-participant in the process of learning, and as such, would be of great benefit to all students.[6]

Moving from Sartre's *existential-phenomenology* to Heidegger's *fundamental ontology*, it is the case that the authentic learner is in integral component of an authentic learning collective, whose *fundamental project* might be described in terms of a caring collective who are engaged in the ecumenical pursuit of their *destiny* as authentic learners. Caring for our own Being of that of others as a "primordial structural totality, lies before ["vor"] every factical 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially *a priori*; this means that it is always in them" (Heidegger, 1962, 238/193). In order to speak of a true community of learners in the Heideggerian sense, it must be understood as representing Dasein's authentic possibility as a "historical," communal being, because for Heidegger, when Dasein is readied through *Angst* and individuated for its authentic existence, there occurs the resolute openness to the understanding that its own Being is authentic (historical) only when in community with others, and this is referred to as *Mitsein* ("Being-with"). In Heidegger's analysis of the existential-ontological structures in relation to time (temporality), he writes about *Dasein's* authentic communal achievement, or its destiny, which is "fateful Dasein," or the authentic way in which the human "exists essentially in being with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [*Geschick*]" (436 /384).[7] In the classroom we are always already bound up with others in our ecumenical pursuit of learning, and to grasp the weight of this claim, Heidegger indicates that this social aspect to our Being is the center of our authentic *historicality*, and it is inextricably linked with the notion of solicitous care and temporality. The care of a solicitous nature might be understood as manifesting in the context of the classroom, where the student's freedom is embraced and she is given space for both personal and communal growth within an environment that strives to assure that her own most *potentiality-for-Being* becomes *as* authentic possibility in communion with others within the learning experience.

Learning in community, learning within an intimate social context, is essential to an authentic education, and we return to Heidegger whose philosophy indicates that the bond between the teachers and taught represents the primordial relationship wherein Dasein is in tune with its own Being in communion with the Being of the other, soul to soul, as it were, which allows learning to be *as* authentic learning. Importantly, each student brings to the learning context (as *having-been*, as *heritage*) a vast store of knowledge and personal experience, which holds the potential to make a valuable *futural* contribution to the communal learning. Communal learning, in an atmosphere of solicitous care unfolds through a process of knowledge construction, where the view to knowledge is primarily one of a *procedural* nature (constructivist), especially when dealing with the humanities, art, music, and the like. There is at once care for the communal archive of knowledge developing as a collective in the classroom, and care for the student's individual store of knowledge, as related to her own unique possibilities of existence, which grow and evolve in community with others who are also demonstrating a like-minded sense of care. Meaning is constructed within a shared horizon of learning wherein students' interpretations are composed of clusters of interpretations, and individual interpretations develop along with, and indeed because of, those with whom the student participates with in the process of learning. The communal character of learning, where knowledge emerges through the arduous but respectful process of accepting rejecting, refining validating and honing various interpretations that are offered up for debate, nurtures the students' problem-solving abilities through a process of self-discovery grounded in communicative discourse, or "conversation."

Students are engaged in the community of learning because their Being and the Being of others is an issue, and we might imagine the classroom embodying what Heidegger (2004) refers to as the "originary community," which represents Dasein's authentic dwelling in the world with others, its authentic *destiny*, which manifests as a possibility because of the way Dasein is grounded in the world as *Care*. There is a true sense of belonging in such an environment embracing *heritage* and students are beholden to the learning because the classroom or learning community is, "through each individual bound up in advance to something that binds and determines each individual by exceeding them," and what they are bound in advance to is the common, ecumenical goal of authentic learning as the authentic destining of both students and educators; authentic learning may be likened to the process of *historizing,* where what is given as *heritage* is taken up in "repetition" by the students and creatively interpreted anew, in relation to their unique and distinct *potentiality-for-Being* (74). This community of learning also unfolds as an "ethical dwelling," for as Brook (2010) states, the Being-with others in the authentic sense requires that "the practice of teaching should pursue the formation of an interpretive horizon of care within students' awareness of life that will cultivate in students the goal of caring relations" (61). Brook goes on to add that an "authentic or ethical education requires that the teacher-student relation serves as the basis for confronting ourselves and our lives […] the teacher-student relationship is thus, in the first case, the practice of ethical formation in relation to the question of what it means to be human […] teaching becomes the formation of authentic relations in so far as the teachers demonstrate, explain, and genuinely live out their 'care' for students and their concern for the formation of students" (62).

As related to Heidegger's fundamental ontology and the *heritage* that each student carries with her to the context of authentic learning, in addition to foreknowledge, the student also brings a diverse cultural background to the learning context, which has been given over to her in advance through her unique *heritage*, as a member of a family, community, and most importantly, a person with a distinct, and unalterable, culture ground. This authentic aspect of our Being, as *Being-with*, must not be overlooked, and functions as a valuable and indispensable contributory aspect of an authentic education, which seeks the formation of students in social contexts, welcoming diversity in learning and actively embracing the social, cultural, and linguistic background of students because these elements are inherent to their *Being-in-the-world* with a *heritage.*

Solicitude, according to Heidegger (1962), has two distinct forms, an inauthentic manifestation, wherein "it can, as it were, take away 'care' from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can *leap in* for him" (158/122). When this form of solicitude manifests in education we have an example of learning that is devoid of authentic care. Drawing on Heidegger, this taking away of the other's care might manifest in several ways in the classroom: First, in the form of a domineering educator, who assumes that students are inferior, and secondly, in the form of a dotingly overbearing teacher, one who may be good-hearted and well-intentioned, but is adverse to witnessing students struggling and is all too eager to step in at the most inopportune moments. Ultimately, she becomes an enabler to students who are dependent on her for their learning. In both cases, Heidegger indicates that was is actually occurring is that when we are "dominated" or "dependent," the notion of solicitous care degenerates into the type of concern we show objects, and "pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand" (158/122). The authentic manifestation of care is described by Heidegger as "a kind of solicitude that does not so much leap in for the Other as *leap ahead* of him [ihm *vorausspringt*] in his existential potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his care but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a '*what'* with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and become free for it" (159/122, emphasis in original).

Dwyer, Prior, & Shargel (1988), writing on Heidegger, authenticity, and education present a valuable interpretation of how care might manifest in the act of teaching as the solicitous concern for the Being of students as essential learners. The authors suggest that this latter instance of authentic care is enacted by teachers who, "rather than doing the work for the students, leaps ahead and prepares the way for them" (147). Students should be given encouragement as they work through formulating their own answers and solutions to learning quandaries, in a moment of anticipation, as related to *fore-knowing*, the authentic teacher "should anticipate the obstacles to be encountered and, rather than remove, help the students to find what is necessary for them to overcome such problems themselves" (147).[8]

4. Conclusion

As stated at the outset, I believe that ontological insight into the human and education holds the potential to enrich professional development and improve the quality of our classroom teaching. However, there is resistance to the positive contribution that the type of theorizing represented in this essay might make to education, and this occurs along two lines: First, practitioners are wary of academics or curriculum scholars, at a remove from the day-to-day operations of the "lived classroom," who are writing on educational issues from the supposed abstract heights of the university, speculating on educational reform by means of abstruse, impenetrable jargon. Secondly, education policy makers are wary of the potential application of such philosophical theorizing because it does not live on the epistemological plane of quantitative research associated with the "bureaucratic rational choice model," which forms the foundation of what policy makers prefer to reference. Apple (2004) traces this propensity to resist philosophical methodology in educational policy making to the overarching anti-theoretical and anti-intellectual tendencies in the United States. For Apple, resistance is centered around the tradition of "aristocratic culture," which is underdeveloped in the United States, and in general, there is disdain for what might be termed "elitism," which means that "theoretically complex apparatuses like the kinds of ways of looking at the politics of education and curriculum that requires a great deal of discipline and study are actually seen as simply 'mere theory'" of an impotent, vacuous nature, which is of no practical (or pragmatic) value in the day-to-day happenings of our schools (185).

Dall'Alba (2010) argues along similar lines, stating that such descriptions the we find in the phenomenological tradition, which take us into the ontological grounds of the human Being are viewed pejoratively by educators as abstruse, metaphysical speculation, and often "goes unacknowledged in theorizing and practicing relating to higher educational programs" (42). Clearly, one reason for the "anti-theoretical" attitude toward such philosophizing is the difficulty in adequately justifying it by means of traditional epistemological models, and like much of phenomenology it is subjected to the charge of epistemological subjectivism, or worse, relegated to theoretical scrapheap of obscurantism because it is untenable. However, as Morris (2005) argues, the charge of subjectivism and obscurantism leveled at the phenomenology is itself untenable as critique. Admittedly, there is no way in which to provide categorical objective verification for its claims because they emerge from interpretive descriptions of the lived experiences portrayed. However, this is not to indicate that these descriptions are limited to subjective ruminations occurring within the interior consciousness of an isolated ego to which readers have no legitimate epistemic access. Rather, in a manner unique to phenomenology, readers are "meant to *recognize* something in this description, a recognition which may be manifested in our spontaneity of relating" the descriptions contained within the work to our own world and occasions where we have had similar, if not identical, experiences (29). Morris goes on to add, that far from phenomenological "descriptions being untestable, we might say that our recognition is a *criterion of correctness* for a phenomenological description" (29, emphasis in original).

For example, in the phenomenological educational research of Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis (1994), the "criterion of correctness" of which Morris writes extends beyond validation through recognition, and serves as testimony to the *authenticity* of all that is revealed through the phenomenological lens, which captures "the essence and resonance of the actors' experience and perspective through the details of fiction and thought revealed in context" (12). The authors, in line with the theme of this essay, writing on "portraiture" as a methodological tool for conducting qualitative research, which is "framed by the traditions and values of the phenomenological paradigm," express identical concerns with revealing and discovering "resonant universal themes" (13-14). As was my concern, I sought to highlight the common themes of ontology as they might be expressed through and within the enactment of our authentic modes of teaching and learning. However, it must be noted that the alternative paradigm for approaching education that I chose does not represent, despite the fundamental, ontological nature of the discussion, the entire picture of what authentic education should be. For as Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis rightly point out, researchers must always recognize their limitations, and their "inability to capture and present a total reality," and thus our purposes must not be "complete and full representation, but rather the selection of some aspect of – or angle on – reality that would transform our vision of the whole" (5).[9]

Thus, I have attempted throughout to present an aspect of or view to education that is not readily available to research methods grounded in traditional empirical quantitative methods, in order to reveal, or tease out, an alternative vision of education as related to the question of the Being, or essence, of authentic teaching and learning, which might lead to a transfigured vision of teaching and learning – contributing to a renewed, invigorated *vision of the whole*. Although working from the critique of the standardization of education and professional development, I have refrained from compiling a list of new and improved standards and practices for teaching our students or future educators, or specific directives aimed at more efficient teaching techniques or professional development, which are grounded in the above existential-ontological analysis; for to produce yet another rigorously outlined program of education is counter-productive to the meditative aims of this essay. Rather, focused on the forgotten ontological aspects of learning, I have attempted to speculate on ways in which teacher education might inspire a move beyond the inauthentic constraints and limitations of the standards imposed on both teacher education programs and the public schools' curriculum.

NOTES

1. Sherman (2006) thoroughly and convincingly argues the irreconcilability of Heidegger and Sartre in *Sartre and Adorno: The Dialectics of Subjectivity*. In brief, Sherman, reading Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* and *Jargon of Authenticity* interprets Heidegger's fundamental ontology (from the perspective of "objectification" in metaphysics) as devolving into a form of "identity thinking" (which shares commonalities with both idealism and positivism) through which the misuse of language "hypostatizes" general categories of Being at an abstract remove from subjectivity and the authentic dialectic unfolding of the processes of history. Sherman situates Sartre outside existential-phenomenological thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger because Sartre embraces a form of human subjectivity that is "mediated" through and dependent on the dialectic encounter with the unfolding of history, and we find this notion expressed in Sartre's *Search for a Method* and *The Critique of Dialectic Reason*. In education, as encountered in the various phenomenological (*reconceptualist*) movements in curriculum theory of the twentieth century, the difference between Heidegger and Sartre manifests in two forms of phenomenological research grounded in (1) the search for abstract, ontological "essences" (van Manen, 1990) and (2) the search to elucidate the radical subjectivity of the individual (Pinar

& Grumet, 1972), seemingly at the expense of the "objective" empirical aspects of existence, which work to "dialectically" shape human subjectivity (see Willis, 1991). I am well aware of the differences between the varying phenomenological approaches, for the sake of this paper I sought not so much a reconciliation, or *rapprochement*, between Heidegger and Sartre, but rather sought a way to "winnow the chaff from the grain," so to speak, separating that which is potentially useful from that which is useless (from the perspective of education) in their respective philosophies while attempting to tease out the common, or similar, albeit neither immutable nor invariant, existential-ontological "themes" as might be related to a re-conceived vision of contemporary education.

2. Although Diamond's findings show that the effect of high stakes testing has a greater effect on curriculum content than pedagogy, Pike (2003) writing on the authentic aspects of teaching English, or literature, indicates that a major change in pedagogy is evident when educators are forced to approach literature exclusively from the perspective of the Either/Or epistemological framework. Pike observes that English teaching is being reduced to a calculative and "explicit" endeavor, wherein teaching is akin to a technology, or "vehicle which delivers a subject in an efficient and effective manner, where rote analysis and explicit teaching are all that appear to be required" (92). In effect, English teaching, which should unfold as interpretation, along the lines of hermeneutic discourse, is being reduced to a didactic system of delivery, and so in reading Pike there is the sense that pedagogy (at least as it relates to teaching literature, which interesting enough, Diamond claims is now being privileged in the "High Stakes" curriculum) is in fact impacted in a severely detrimental way. See also, Magrini, J. M. (2012) "Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heidegger, Technology, and the Poietic Attunement of Literature," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 44(5): 500–521.

3. It must be noted that this notion of the "burden of freedom" (as it is presented in Sartre's 1945 public address, *Existentialism as a Humanism*) in relation to other people appears to overcome the problem associated with the mode of Being-for-others in Sartre's philosophy as expressed within *Being and Nothingness*, for it tends to outstrip, or at least gloss over, the inevitable state of "conflict" into which all interpersonal relationships ultimately fall. Sherman (2006) sheds light on this issue regarding *Being-for-others* when stating, "Being-for-itself is, therefore, basically a relation, and in addition to being mediated by its relation to being-in-itself, being-for-itself is mediated by its relation to others […] As the indispensable condition of making the for-itself an object for itself, others are responsible for the development of the empirical ego" (113). Sherman goes on to add that there is inevitable conflict and tension within our relations with others because "our individual projects of founding ourselves invariably conflict on account of the mutual objectification that this process involves" (113–114).

4. Greene (1995), however, does not talk explicitly about the process of allowing goals and aims to organically emerge from the curriculum in progress, but it is possible, in line with the phenomenological method, to imagine goals and aims for the curriculum emerging through a process of hermeneutic interpretation. Following a "spiral structure," rather than a linear model for curriculum-making, educators begin with a fore-conception, or presupposition, concerning goals and outcomes, but these goals and outcomes are fluid and protean in nature, they change, evolve, develop,

and are reworked as knowledge and understanding of the student and her needs, desires, and abilities are revealed and “interpreted” by the educator. Following a *process-product model,* goals and aims set forth at the outset are thus subject to revision and elaboration as the educator works to deepen and clarify her understanding of that which emerges from the learning experience. It must be noted that the goals and aims should always begin at the existential level of the ‘lived experience’ of the student in her environment. See also the existential study, Greene, M. (1973). *Teacher as Stranger: Educational Philosophy for the Modern Age.* Wadsworth: California.

5. It is possible to make the claim, in light of what I have presented earlier in the paper, that since teachers are alienated from the authentic notion of education (curriculum) in a duplicitous sense, that the values they are modeling might not be freely chosen, and in fact, are being forced upon them by social-political-economic ideological factors governing the institution of education. In short, it is the system that has stripped teachers of their ontological *Being-for-Itself.* This would undoubtedly represent a post-modern critique of social structures, institutions, and human subjecthood. However, if we are to read Sartre correctly, and take his claims about *bad faith* to their logical conclusion, to make such a claim, that one is a mere victim, or unwilling and reluctant participant in the processes of social construction, amounts to the admittance of living a life of *bad faith.* It is for this reason that I have focused on the teacher as one who is in full-ownership of her choices and the subsequent values she brings into existence and models.

6. Although I am not pursing the issue here, there are certainly aspects of Sartre’s existentialism that might be related with great success to *social reconstruction* and *critical pedagogy for social justice* in education. For the values we are “creating” and endorsing are never restricted to the classroom, they have an impact on the greater society and, most importantly, the potential that exists for its change. Education can help us “to live up to not only our moral and political responsibilities, but also our educational responsibilities to our students,” who should be viewed in terms of autonomous agents of change” (Detmer, 2006, 87). Our responsibility as educators might be enhanced by Sartre’s philosophy, for in addition “to assisting our students in their preparation to fit into existing social, political, and economic structures, as so much of our educational system is currently geared toward doing, we, perhaps especially those of us who teach philosophy, need to encourage our students to think about how these structures might be significantly changed for the better” (87). Indeed, this is something I deal with when teaching Sartre and existentialism to my undergraduate students, for although Sartre is clear that values are “groundless,” if we survey Sartre’s life and works we can certainly see that he values human freedom within his championing of humanitarian causes. He has chosen these values as his own and is in a sense offering these to us as viable (albeit not intrinsically valuable) life-choices for our consideration – and hence, within Sartre’s philosophy, my students and I find the inspiration for authentic ethical discussions.

7. In Huebner (1999), we find an educational scholar who, for the first time in the philosophy of education, confronts Heidegger’s fundamental ontology head on. Huebner argues for what he refers to as the “individual-world dialectic” in his philosophy, which is related directly to Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s authentic “historizing,” in terms of Heritage, fate, and destiny in *Being and Time* Section 74.

Huebner's claim is that philosophers of curriculum and those who design and make curriculum have neglected the authentic notion of time, or "temporality," in their work. For Huebner, temporality is experienced within the "back-and-forth" between individuals seeking to understand their world: "The springs or sources of temporality do not reside in the individual, but in conjunction between the individual and other individuals, their material objects, and other ways of thinking as they objectified in symbol and operation" (138).

8. Although I have quoted a scholarly work from the 1980s, it must be noted that Heidegger scholarship in education continues to grow. Willis (1991) wrongly dates the introduction of "American" phenomenology to curriculum studies at 1972, with the publication of *Toward a Poor Curriculum* (Pinar & Grumet), when in fact it was Dwayne Huebner, as Pinar (1992) indicates, that introduced phenomenology to the philosophy of education in the United States when he read a paper at the Ohio State Curriculum Colloquium entitled, "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality," which introduced not only phenomenology to educational philosophy, it also presented the first in depth treatment of Heidegger's fundamental ontology as related to education (Vandenberg 1965 and DeSoto 1966 did write short articles for *Educational Theory* incorporating Heidegger's ontological notion of death/ mortality). Since that time such studies in education focused on Heidegger have become ubiquitous. See Peters, M. (2002) (ed.), *Heidegger, Education, and Modernity*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield; Thomson, I. (2005). *Heidegger and Onto-theology: Technology and the Politics of Education*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Magrini, J. M. (2012) "Huebner's Critical Encounter with the Philosophy of Heidegger in *Being and Time:* Learning, Understanding, and the Authentic Unfolding of History in the Curriculum," *Kritike* 5(2): 123–155.

9. Indeed, this phenomenological vision or insight into existence is one that is always situated at an ontological distance from the things it attempts to reveal and know – and this is precisely how Sherman (2006) describes Sartre's epistemic position in relation to his ontological philosophy, i.e., to classify the "understanding" of Being we must approach Being in terms of it representing a "remainder," an overflow, because it is recalcitrant to all epistemological moves to capture it in terms of "knowledge" in the traditional sense of the conscious subject "assimilating" objective reality: "I believe Sartre's emphasis on a subject that is 'constantly changing' has far reaching implications. To be sure, unlike Husserl's transcendental ego, which statically intuits essences from a privileged point of view, Sartre's prereflective cogito, by virtue of its unity with positional consciousness, is inescapably in a changing world," within a world that *flees in the face* of our best attempts to capture it and render it wholly present and understandable to consciousness (102).

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ASPECTS OF METALINGUISTIC AWARENESS IN SOLUTION-FOCUSED THERAPY

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ABSTRACT. My paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on cognitive maturity and the associated enhanced capacity for explicit L2 learning, the development of language learning aptitude and metalinguistic awareness, the metalinguistic awareness gained by learning a second language, and the relationship between metalinguistic awareness and the active participation of language in the constitution of society.

Keywords: metalinguistic awareness, knowledge, cognition, society, translation

1. Introduction

This paper aims to analyze and discuss the role of metalinguistic awareness in filtering the effects of social structure on language use and form, the constitutive functions of metalanguage, and the centrality of metalanguage to how language operates. The findings of this study have implications for the metalinguistic organization of discourse, the metalinguistic knowledge of illiterate adults, and the role of metalinguistic awareness in emerging literacy.

2. The Role of Metalinguistic Awareness in Cognitive Development

Tellier and Roehr-Brackin explore whether the development of language learning aptitude and metalinguistic awareness in children aged 8–9 could be enhanced by means of the teaching and learning of Esperanto. In order for L2 learning at an early age to be successful, considerable amounts of input are needed. Allowing for explicit learning, cognitive maturity facilitates L2 acquisition in a minimal-input setting. Learners in a foreign language classroom typically experience minimal input only. An early starting age confers no benefits in the minimal-input setting of the average school classroom. Requiring attention and effort, explicit processes rely on a learner's working memory.

The results above provide sound evidence that explicit teaching and learning draw on a learner's metalinguistic awareness. Tellier and Roehr-Brackin states that metalinguistic awareness, knowledge, and ability are cognitively demanding:[1] in young children, language learning aptitude and metalinguistic awareness and grow together in a mutually reinforcing cycle. Language-analytic ability and metalinguistic awareness are partially overlapping constructs, drawing on the human capacity to analyze and problem-solve in the linguistic domain. Esperanto may function as a catalyst for the development of both metalinguistic awareness and linguistic competence.

> Language-analytic ability and metalinguistic awareness enable the learner to direct attention to the formal properties of language, to make comparisons, to identify regularities, to extract patterns, and to link these with the functional properties of language, i.e. semantic and pragmatic meaning. Moreover, language-analytic ability and metalinguistic awareness enable the learner to move from exemplar to rule and from rule to exemplar, i.e. to think inductively as well as deductively in the domain of language.[2]

Kurvers et al. claim that metalinguistic abilities are ways of conscious reflection on,[3] and analysis and internal control of, different aspects of language. Illiterate adults are experienced users of language, and have not had any systematic introduction to written language. Explicit knowledge about structural units of language is a consequence of systematic introduction to the writing system. Literacy brings a change in what people know about the language they already understand and speak fluently.[4] Mertz and Yovel outline the implications of the new, empirically-informed approach to metalinguistic awareness. A core function of metalanguage is its role in constituting and framing ongoing discourse (metalinguistic features can be performatives whose domain is discourse).

The findings above reveal that metalinguistic activity frames rhetorical and performative speech, and referential speech that purports to belong strictly to object-language. Mertz and Yovel explain that metalinguistic activity and awareness may not entail a true realization of language's performativity and other systematic pragmatic characteristics. Awareness of language is more evident when higher language skills are involved. Metalinguistic function and ideology exert a great deal of influence on language, forming a crucial nexus with social processes.[5]

Rauch et al. say that bilingualism is positively associated with both metalinguistic awareness and third-language (L3) acquisition: literacy in both first (L1) and second (L2) language (full biliteracy) is needed for bilingualism to be positively associated with L3 reading proficiency; positive effects of full biliteracy on L3 reading proficiency are mediated through metalinguistic awareness. Rauch et al. measure L1, L2 and L3 reading proficiency and metalinguistic awareness in 299 German and Turkish-German secondary school students: fully biliterate students outperformed monolingual and partially biliterate students in both L3 (ΔR^2=.07) and metalinguistic awareness (ΔR^2=.06). Within the group of biliterate students, positive effects of the individual degree of biliteracy on L3 reading proficiency are an indirect effect that is mediated through metalinguistic awareness.[6]

Lazo et al. note that metalinguistic abilities at phonological, syntactic, print and pragmatic levels are linked to later attainments in literacy. Using time-reversed path analyses, Lazo et al. explore the possibility that metalinguistic awareness registers stronger direct effects on literacy than early pre-conventional reading and invented spelling skills. Pre-literate metalinguistic abilities affect pre-conventional reading and invented spelling skills and combine with these to influence further growth in literacy.[7] Kuile et al. analyze whether increased metalinguistic awareness in bilingually taught children is related to the ability to understand the writings in an unknown language:[8] *metalinguistic awareness allows reasoning and application of logic with language* (the more languages one is fluent in, the better a person's metalinguistic awareness). Bilinguals have a better ability compared to monolinguals to understand an unknown language. Bilingual education gives students an additional advantage above simply being fluent in two languages.[9]

3. Metalinguistic Awareness and Gender in Robbe-Grillet

Fragola and Smith state that in *Last Year at Marienbad,* Robbe-Grillet offers intricate games designed to undermine any ultimate explanation of the events, also undermining any attempt to impose *rational order*, *linear time*, or *plausible explanation* on the filmic world (we are active participants in the dream). Robbe-Grillet subverts our ability to make clear distinctions between divergent points of view. Robbe-Grillet merges the subjective and the objective, creating a visual metaphor illustrating *that apparent contradictions between the real and the imagined, the subjective and the objective, can cease to exist.* At the core of *L'Immortelle* lies the breaking down of distinctions and merging of the subjective and the objective (*a relationship is established between a man and a woman who meet once but do not seem to belong to the same universe*).

In sum, we have numerous reasons to believe that Robbe-Grillet substitutes the shot for the sequence as the basis for narrative, establishing the primacy of the image found in the individual shot as the basis for film narrative. Fragola and Smith contend that *L'Immortelle* further elaborates Robbe-Grillet's techniques and motifs, leaving the viewer with striking images. Robbe-Grillet's films should be appreciated *from a sensory and aesthetic response to the individual shots that eventually comprise a non-verbal universe*. The project for *L'Immortelle* consists of considering as the unit of narration not the sequence but the shot. The formal ensemble of shots tells a rigid story, not very realistic. The main character looks more like a narrator (everything takes place in the character's mind). The discourse originates from the character in the room who is thinking (what unfolds in his imagination lies beyond the confines of his room).[10]

Raylene stresses that Robbe-Grillet's male is situated in the mainstream of our cultural representations and sociopolitical structures[11] at the pole of power. The feminine figures are often objects of sadistic desire or repression with little voice with which to express their own desire. We are in representations of phantasies which are related as much to a world of "false" symbols as to our bodies. Robbe-Grillet justifies the choice of sado-erotic material in his novels as the use of "sadism against fear." We should bring images that exist in our society and in our literary and artistic forms into the open, revealing their superficiality. The feminine bodies are the objectified site of the battle of the sexes/texts. The forest/sea is a place of *danger*, *nightmare*, *entrapment* by the feminine, *death*, and *evil*.

> Robbe-Grillet's suspicious rereadings of the texts of the feminine in Western consciousness and on display on billboards bear striking resemblances to contemporary feminist readings of our mythologies. His texts reproduce and flatten an ambivalent fascination with the young and beautiful body unmarked by time or death and the desire to control, or silence, or sacrifice, or suppress the fatal attraction of its more hidden orifices. The voyeuristic fascination with, and the visual pleasures provided by, an objectified female other is just that dominant if concealed mode of the responses of Western art to the female body (or the text-gendered female) against which feminism has been reacting.[12]

4. Metalinguistic Awareness and Translation Skill

Cronin holds that the age of digital production and reproduction is the age of translation. Translation is a scalar concept which covers a wide variety of practices, is shaped by the technical media it employs, is central to the working out of any notion of ethical transparency in a multilingual world, is another branch of digital activism, is a key component of the elaboration of soft power in the digital age,[13] is the shop window for the culture's literary goods, and *has a visceral link to prevailing paradigms of literacy*.

The rapid dissemination of online social networking practices generates new translation needs and has far-reaching consequences for the profession of translator. Interactive, user-generated content is now informing translation practice (translation consumers are increasingly becoming translation producers). The bi-directionality of Web 2.0 determines the nature of translation.

This line of reasoning suggests that information technology is bound up with translation, whereas translation as a human activity is a technology. Cronin writes that the various digital supports for translation are *means to make operational and maximize the aim of ethical transparency*. The changes in the form of the content have changed the way that content is translated. In the case of crowdsourced translation, the potential audience for the translation does the translation. The emergence of gist translation must be related to shifting reading and literacy norms. The history of information and information technologies is a history of forms of translation (the history of translation is the history of the quest for human autonomy). The notion of translation problematizes simple notions of encoding. The credo of universal translatability implies a notion of universal verifiability. The cult of transparency in the digital age informs practices and perceptions of translation. The failure to translate would render opaque any attempt at ethical transparency. In a multilingual world, there is no information without translation or mediated translation.

> The translators both point to the shortcomings of the software and reveal how certain previously unsuspected potentials in the TM software are realized by their engagement with it. In both instances, then, there is a kind of intransitive excess, where both the human agency of the translator and the material agency of the software 'draw out or bring forth potentials in the person of the producer and the surrounding world', the surrounding world in this instance being the software. That is to say, in producing a translation using the new version of the software, they reveal the transitive deficit of the software (the things it purports to do, but cannot) and the intransitive growth of the translators who discover new ways of working beyond 'the prior representation of an end to be achieved.'[14]

5. Conclusions

This paper seeks to fill a gap in the current literature by examining the important role of metalinguistic awareness in the acquisition and use of language, the connection between metalinguistic awareness and the development of language skills, and how forms of metalinguistic awareness interact with speech and social power.

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THE RECONFIGURATION OF TRANSLATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE

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ABSTRACT. The theory that I shall seek to elaborate here puts considerable emphasis on the translation fallout of crowdsourcing, the emergence of new forms of translation production/reception, the impacts of digital technology on translation practice, and the work of translation in the age of digital reproduction. I am specifically interested in how previous research investigated the contribution of translation to the construction of communities, translation's relationship with technology, translation practices in the digital age, and the rising popularity of gist or indicative translation.

Keywords: translation, MT, technology, digital age, process

1. Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been increasing evidence describing the mental changes imposed by TM technology, the confluence of technologies and translation, the role that translation will play in the era of distributed, ubiquitous computing, and the power dynamic informing translation relationships. In the present paper, I focus on the constant move towards the automation of translation, the interaction between translators and new digital technologies, the activity of translation as a result of the emergence of online machine translation, and the relationship between translation and technology. The mainstay of the paper is formed by an analysis of interactivity in CAT, solutions to improving the quality of the translations supplied by an (MT) system, computer systems which are able to translate text or speech without human intervention, and the cognitive processes of translation. The aim of the present study is to examine and evaluate the translation's engagement with technology, the effects of digital technology and the internet on translation, observable aspects of the translation process, and mental TM-assisted translation processes.

2. The Mental Changes Imposed by TM Technology

Khanna et al. claim that language barriers may prevent clinicians from tailoring patient educational material to the needs of individuals with limited English proficiency, and evaluate the accuracy of an online translation tool for patient educational material: when applied to patient educational material, GT performed comparably to professional human translation in terms of preserving information and meaning, whereas in situations where professional human translations are unavailable or impractical, online translation may fill an important niche.[1] Koehn says that today's machine translation systems are mostly used for inbound translation (*assimilation*). The demands for quality are much higher for outbound translation (*dissemination*). Human translators are required for such high-quality publication-ready translation, and computer aided translation tools aim to improve the productivity of human translators.[2]

According to Barrachina et al., present translation technology has not been able to deliver fully automated high-quality translations. In order to achieve good or acceptable translations manual post-editing is needed. The human translator cannot take advantage of the adaptive ability of the MT system, ensuring high-quality output in CAT (computer-assisted translation), whereas the machine ensures a significant gain in productivity in MT (machine translation).[3] Paulsen Christensen emphasizes that a translation-memory (TM) is a database of previous translations by means of sentences or sentence-like units called segments[4] (TM tools impact on translators' mental processes). TM systems can be used both by individual translators and by teams of translators collaborating on the same or related texts. Being an instance of distributed cognition, TM-assisted translation interferes with and controls translators' mental processes. Logically, the translation product forms an inherent part of the translation process. Paulsen Christensen insists that the computer software tools offer a way to look into translators' internal processes. All observational methods are supposed to influence translators' behavior. Verbal-report methods generate metacognitive data because subjects are asked to think about their cognition. Translation as a distributed activity does not take place only within the brain of an individual human.[5]

Doherty and Moorkens focus on the experiences of translation technology labs, showing the importance of resources available for translation technology (TT) lab sessions. The current market requires translators who understand and can use TT tools. By embracing TM and MT, translators can reap the benefits of such technologies (translation and technology are not mutually exclusive). Professional levels of competency require day-to-day use of computer-assisted translation (CAT) tools. Doherty and Moorkens note that basic competence can be built on once the students begin to work as professional translators. The lab sessions primarily focus on technological competencies. Many of the skills gained in the process of learning to use these technologies are transferable. The struggle to remain up-to-date and provide both an academic and industrial perspective with the lab content is a continuous process.[6]

3. The Confluence of Technologies and Translation

Pym remarks that in the age of electronic language technologies, texts are increasingly used paradigmatically:[7] technology diminishes dialogue and enables new social locations for translation, upsetting the fundamental linearity of text. The dominant mode of constructing knowledge is dialogue that may become part of a new humanization.[8]

On Sproat's reading, *technology has a way of changing the way people live*: writing is a language *technology* (it is a technology for representing language), having a profound effect on life and society,[9] whereas speech technology has become commoditized. Much of the technology involves mechanical (or electronic) devices that can mimic human abilities and participate in human interactions. Electronic text technology has changed the equation for the mechanical input of text.

This position relies on the argument that language technology is an augmentative device, helping us use language in a way that would not otherwise be possible (language and technology are what makes us human). Sproat states that the advantage of the interlingual approach becomes apparent when one considers building systems that can translate between a variety of languages. Depending upon the type of translation, *deep* understanding of the source material may not be required. Machine translation attempts to model the process that the human translator performs. For any MT evaluation, there is an actual human translation against which to compare the output of the MT system. The gap in quality between machine translation and human translation has narrowed.[10]

Folaron holds that translation is a fact of life in multiple spheres[11] defined by global interest. Translation history is long in the transfer of information and knowledge between diverse languages and cultures. Local technology histories could be written in concert with translation-related ones. Localization is the forerunner of the encounter between traditional translation and the technologically configured digital world. Translation and localization practices play an important role in keeping global and local networks alive. Translation and localization as intervention are legitimate prospects. Translation and localization social networks are *scalable* and *reorganizational*.

A key argument here is that the spontaneous eruptions and manifestations of translation and localization practices by users within the global Web are uniquely digital. Folaron affirms that the underlying logic of the technologies suggests a new relationship between translators and textual content. Digital codes often incur translation at multiple levels of data transmission between computational and digital devices. The space of global digital communications is a "space of translation" *par excellence*. Communication has always shaped translation. Learning to read and interpret the global digital world through the eyes of translation provides us with a profound understanding *of our interactive human-technology relationships and our participation in the discourse of machines*. Bringing translation to Web-inspired practices means widening our spheres of knowledge and expanding *our concepts of otherness and our "experience of the foreign" in translation through a contemporary digital lens*.[12]

4. The Role of the Translator Working in a Digital Environment

Cronin focuses on the consequences for popular notions of translation[13] of the emergence of online translation systems, considers the consequences for contemporary translation practice of an ideology of transparency, is concerned with dominant representations of translation in the digital age, and considers the implications for translation practice of the emergence of nomadic, interactive computing. Translation is living through a period of revolutionary upheaval, is in many respects anything but transitive in its practice and results, is a part of the value-creation process in the economy of information exchange, is everywhere in the emergence of proto-global information networks, and becomes a dual experience of limits in language and culture. The demand for translation keeps growing apace in the contemporary world.

It turns out, then, that information is a subset of translation, and our contemporary moment is the translation age. Cronin states that Concerns around the direction of particular forms of translation activity have prompted the emergence of new forms of localization. Technology has been central to the definition of translation activity in many different societies. The various changes to translation practice are an effect of the pre-eminence of information technology. The working practices of translators have been changed in terms of the access to different kinds of knowledge that are afforded by the infrastructure of the internet. Over time and in the present, translation has shaped and been shaped by the tools it uses. The tools that make translation possible by their nature may overdetermine the effects of translation itself. Translation tools are used by humans as social and political beings located in a particular place and a particular time. When we speak about translation as a human activity, we need to take account of the intrinsic involvement of *techné*.

Note a point that is implicit here. What is at issue is that translation and technology are co-terminous in contemporary human culture. On Cronin's view, translation as a culture–technology hybrid is unsettling, not the act of language transfer *per se*. The intersection of translation and technology allows for the unfolding of political possibility. *Time*, *critical mass*, and *cost* are factors informing the organization of translation as an activity (they are crucial parameters in the reconfiguration of translation in the digital age). Continuing translation over time is the triumph of ongoing process over final form. Translated material is *personalized*, *user-driven*, and *integrated* into dynamic systems of ubiquitous delivery. The majority of translators who use translation memory (TM) software do not receive formal training in its use.

> The omnipresence of online translation options, the proliferation of smartphone translation apps, the relentless drive towards automation in large-scale translation projects, the fundamental changes in literacy practices as reading migrates from page to screen, the unforgiving instantaneity of electronic communication as responses are demanded 24/7, the ever-changing wardrobe of digital translation props such as endlessly mutating translation memory software – all of these factors contribute to the sense that 'this feels different.' […] In the excitable hyperbole of the cyber apostles, automated translation will mean the end to all human strife, grief, and misery as humans unite in the higher communion of mutual intelligibility. […] Underlying both the mass provision of translation by global translation providers and local initiatives to promote alternative forms of translation delivery are the shift to ubiquitous computing and the emergence of bi-directionality. […] The challenges are, of course, how to situate translation in that emergent noosphere and where to place it in the future reconfiguration of language, culture, and society in the digital sphere.[14]

5. Conclusions

This paper seeks to fill a gap in the current literature by examining the role of the translator working in a digital environment, the extensivity of information technology allied to translation, the relationship between medium and message in translation, and the contribution of translation to the opening up and enrichment of cultures. The paper generates insights about the digital age of machine translation, the new forms that translation is adopting in the digital age, translation powerfully assisted by the digital toolkit, and the ubiquitous presence of online translation options. My paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the roles of translation and translators in the technologically configured digital world, the ethical challenge for translators in the digital age, and the progressive practice of using translation to promote and enhance linguistic diversity in the digital age. The findings of this study have implications for the catalytic effect of translation in the evolution of cultures and languages, the question of translation and power in the digital age, the engagement between translation and technology, and mental aspects of TM-assisted translation.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF RESEARCH PUBLISHING AND THE COMPETITIVE NATURE OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT. The main objective of this paper is to explore and describe the quality and reliability of the scientific literature, the importance of validation in online publishing, the publication of unworthy scientific research, and the dissemination of scholarly knowledge. I am specifically interested in how previous research investigated the potential rise in scientific misconduct, the competitive nature of the scientific community, the fundamental force driving the speed of the move towards full open access, and the rational use of citation data as a primary source of performance evaluation.

Keywords: research, publishing, science, misconduct, impact factor

1. Introduction

In the present paper, I focus on the objective evaluation of scientists, scientific publications, and journals, the values and limitations of the citation index and the impact factor, and shady publishing practices. The findings of this study have implications for the future of science communication, the transformation of research publishing, the broad use of the citation index as a general measure of scientific quality, and scholarly publishing scams. The results of the current study converge with prior research on the changes that have taken place in scientific publishing since the rise of the open-access movement, the exponential growth of questionable publishers, the cost-effectiveness of open-access journals, and the integrity of scientific self-assessment.

2. The Rational Use of Citation Data as a Primary Source of Performance Evaluation

The San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA) notes that the JIF, which ranks scholarly journals by the average number of citations their articles attract in a set period warps the way that research is conducted, reported, and funded: the JIF is the average number of citations received in a year per paper published in the journal during the two preceding years (the earliest that a new journal can have a JIF is the end of its third full year of publication), has become a powerful proxy for scientific value and is being widely misused to assess individual scientists and research institutions (the JIF can be "gamed" by editors and authors), and is based on the mean of the citations to papers in a given journal, rather than the median.[1]

Loscalzo argues that the citation index and the impact factor are used as quantifiable measures of quality, of the scientist and of the journal in which the scientist publishes. These indices are increasingly incorporated in *curricula vitae* and letters of reference for promotion, and may be used formally as objective indicators of suitability for promotion or increased financial compensation. the impact factor us the central currency in the journal realm, as authors wish to publish in journals with the highest impact factors. A journal's impact factor is an index of journal quality and success, determining the extent to which the journal is resourced by its sponsoring organization or publisher.

> The citation index is driven by the scientific community of which the publishing scientist is a part. If that community is comparatively large and active, comprising members who publish frequently, the likelihood that a published paper will be cited is greater than if that community is more limited in size and productivity. […] The citation index and the impact factor are only weakly correlated, at best, with true quality, were we to have an independent measure of quality against which to compare them.[2]

It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that any scientist doing work recognized as sufficiently novel and ground-breaking may be highly cited. As Loscalzo puts it, the impact factor is riddled with many flaws that can be misleading to readers and to journal editors: one can decrease the overall number of published articles, and the number of original articles published, and increase the number of highly citable reviews published (the impact factor is a surrogate for use). Published scientists are active in their field, their work undergoes rigorous peer and editorial review before publication, serving as arbiters of scientific quality by citing a peer's publication. The highest-quality science changes the direction of a field dramatically, advancing the field in a major quantal fashion.

> The impact factor *is* not so much a measure of what *is* being read but what *should be* read by the larger scientific community, including those scientists who publish frequently and those who do not. Assigning such influence to published scientists sustains their influence in their field, driving it in a particular direction that is (consciously or subconsciously) self-affirming at best (and self-serving in the extreme). The great majority of their scientific progeny carry on where they left off, moving the field forward incrementally, often without changing the underlying scientific paradigm on which it was built.[3]

On Ioannidis' view, the relative impact of specific journals compared to others changes over time. Some journals may try to increase their impact factor by publishing items that are not categorized as papers counted in the denominator of impact factor calculations. Single papers have a very transient presence in citations and are rarely cited half a century after their publication.[4]

Larivière et al. present concentration measures of research funding, publications and citations at the level of individual researchers. The WoS contains research that is published in core international journals. According to Thomson Reuters, no one metric can fully capture the complex contributions scholars make to their disciplines. A JIF considers the citation performance of a journal as a whole unit, and is based on the cited references generated by the scholarly community. Having a large number of citations compared to the volume of scholarly content generates journal impact. The JIF is not based on the citation of individual publications.

It follows from the preceding analysis that the editorial process strives to ensure the quality of the scholarship, giving the journal a reputation for relevance and excellence, and having the potential to result in a higher JIF compared to other publications with similar subject matter (*appropriate publication venues should be topically relevant and scientifically appropriate according to the content of the article*). Larivière et al. observe that the majority of scientific resources, output and impact are associated with a small minority of researchers. High productivity, high citation levels and low uncitedness decrease concentration. The size of the discipline in terms of both papers published and citations received is negatively related to concentration.[5]

3. The Exponential Growth of Questionable Publishers

Kolata notes that many of the journals and conferences have names that are nearly identical to those of established publications and events: scientific publishing has shifted from a traditional business model for professional societies built almost entirely on subscription revenues to open access. Open access won widespread acclaim with the advent of well-regarded, peer-reviewed journals like those published by the Public Library of Science (PLoS). Researchers ordinarily want to publish their papers in the best journal that will accept them. Universities are facing new challenges in assessing the résumés of academics. There are online journals that will print seemingly anything for a fee, and nonexperts doing online research may have trouble distinguishing credible research from junk.[6] Butler writes that two first-rate European science journals (*Archives des Sciences* and *Wulfenia*) have fallen prey to identity theft by criminals who have created counterfeit journal websites and have duped hundreds of researchers into paying author fees, whereas the ill-won gains were funneled to Armenia. The scammers display on multiple websites the titles of the authentic journals, and their impact factors, postal addresses and ISSNs. The forged sites initially misled Thomson Reuters, a metrics company that produces the Scientific Citation Index and compiles journal impact factors, one of the imposters persuading Thomson Reuters to include a link to the false journal in its list of indexed publications.[7]

Van Noorden says that the number of open-access journals has risen steadily. Most open-access publishers charge fees that are much lower than the industry's average revenue (*small start-ups can come up with fresh workflows using the latest electronic tools*). Commercial publishers make larger profits than organizations run by academic institutions. A more-expensive, more-selective journal should generate greater prestige and impact. Van Noorden insits that scientists have every economic incentive to submit their papers to high-prestige subscription journals. Low article charges may rise if more-selective journals choose to go open access, and shifting the entire system to open access may increase prices because journals would need to claim all their revenue from upfront payments. Some publishers may manage to lock in higher prices for their premium products.

> The publishers of expensive journals give two other explanations for their high costs, although both have come under heavy fire from advocates of cheaper business models: they do more and they tend to be more selective. The more effort a publisher invests in each paper, and the more articles a journal rejects after peer review, the more costly is each accepted article to publish. Publishers may administer the peer-review process, which includes activities such as finding peer reviewers, evaluating the assessments and checking manuscripts for plagiarism. They may edit the articles, which includes proofreading, typesetting, adding graphics, turning the file into standard formats such as XML and adding metadata to agreed industry standards. And they may distribute print copies and host journals online. Some subscription

> journals have a large staff of full-time editors, designers and computer specialists.[8]

Beall states that predatory publishers publish counterfeit journals to exploit the open-access model in which the author pays: they are dishonest and lack transparency, aiming to dupe researchers by setting up websites that closely resemble those of legitimate online publishers, and publishing journals of questionable and downright low quality. The predatory publishers and journals often have lofty titles. The names may sound grand, but some sites look amateurish or give little information about the organization behind them. Beall claims that predatory open-access publishers charge the fee without providing all the expected publishing services (peer review, editing and website maintenance). Such outfits publish 5–10% of all open-access articles. Pressure to publish is often intense in developing countries. Legitimate open-access publishers are being forced to promise shorter submission-to-publication times, weakening the peer-review process. Conventional scholarly publishers have had an important role in validating research. Scientific literacy must include the ability to recognize publishing fraud.[9]

4. The Importance of Hindsight in Recognizing True Quality in Science

Lee insists that detecting scientific misconduct is a direct means to control deviant behaviors, working also as a deterrence mechanism if other researchers are aware of the possibility to be detected. It is difficult and costly to detect and report scientific misconduct. Being aware of institutional policy prevents researchers from involving themselves in misconduct and encourages them to report suspected misconduct.

What matters for the present discussion is that formal regulations on research misconduct are often unclear about critical matters. Lee maintains that evidence of scientific misconduct is rarely conspicuous, whereas the cost for finding others' misconduct far exceeds any benefits that it brings to individual researchers. experts can tell whether a research result in their field is based on falsification or fabrication if they find substantive evidence of misconduct by replicating the research.[10]

Resnik and Master argue that research integrity is a global concern. Most high-income countries have developed policies and initiatives to address research misconduct (international guidelines are an important step toward international cooperation on research integrity as scientists from different countries may have different understandings of the concepts related to research integrity).[11] Macilwain observes that two main factors drive an upsurge in global activity to address research misconduct: one is the drip-drip-drip of high-profile misconduct cases, the other is the flood of hard information regarding the frequency of misconduct.[12]

Fang et al. contend that the number and frequency of retracted publications are outstanding indicators of the health of the scientific enterprise: *the retraction of flawed publications corrects the scientific literature and provides insights into the scientific process*. Most retracted articles result from misconduct. For many retractions, the retraction notice is insufficient to ascertain the true cause of a retraction.

According to this discussion, the greater visibility and enhanced scrutiny of high-impact journals may contribute to more rapid retraction of fraudulent papers. Fang et al. claim that articles retracted because of fraud represent a very small percentage of the scientific literature. Retractions because of misconduct undermine science and its impact on society. Increased retractions and ethical breaches may result from the incentive system of science. The impact of plagiarism and duplicate publication on science is limited.[13]

Casadevall and Fang argue that society should nurture the scientific enterprise and optimize its functioning to ensure the continuing survival and prosperity of mankind. Research funding is often restricted to specific topics believed to represent the most urgent social priorities. The pool of qualified peer reviewers is inadequate to meet demand. Competition in excess can be a compelling incentive for scientific misconduct, and can be healthy when it promotes ingenuity and creativity and harnesses primal human energies.

The overall conclusion to be drawn from these and similar observations is that science is a community effort comprising innumerable interdependent contributions. Casadevall and Fang affirm that trends in the numbers of retracted publications are an indicator of the failure rate of the scientific process. Retracted publications signify a large body of poor-quality scientific work that has made its way into the published literature. The accelerating rate of retractions is a serious indicator of trouble in the scientific enterprise. "The immediacy and rapidity with which knowledge disseminates today means that incorrect information can have a profound impact before any corrective process can take place."[14]

Tavare holds that *rigid metrics of success* such as career advancement, tenure, and peer recognition can put pressure on researchers to act in a less than scrupulous manner. Peer review is good at picking up poor quality science, but the dark side of scientific research claims high profile casualties.[15] *Nature* writes that the words "technology" and "revolution" are being bandied around a lot in scientific publishing. New technologies allow a much greater and faster transition to a digital future. The dazzling variety of publishing options may fragment the information available on the web.[16]

Priem contends that the journal and article are being superseded by algorithms that filter, rate and disseminate scholarship as it happens. The Web erases the artificial distinction between process and product. The flow of scholarly information swamps our paper-based filtering system, the Web era is exposing the delicate tracework of ideas beneath the formal structures of the academy, and the editors and reviewers will be replaced by the aggregated, collective judgements of communities themselves.

> Scholars now share their research data in repositories such as GenBank, Dryad and figshare (figshare is supported by Digital Science, which is owned by the same parent company as *Nature*). They use repositories such as GitHub to share code, analyses and even 'executable papers' that automatically knit together preloaded data, analysis and prose. They challenge the traditional article format by including blog posts, interactive graphics and video. […] Academics are moving informal scholarly conversations from the faculty lounge to social media platforms such as Twitter. […] Today's publication silos will be replaced by a set of decentralized, interoperable services that are built on a core infrastructure of open data and evolving standards.[17]

What these latter observations reveal is that the Web has irrevocably changed our information environment, frictionless, Web-based dissemination increasingly pervades the research process, the former constituents of the article fracture and dissolve into the fluid Web, whereas the Web-based system assesses authority recursively from the entire community. Priem says that peer review is *unhitched from the creaky machinery of paper-native publishing*. Qualitative peer review will move into the open, whereas the reviewer will metamorphose from gatekeeper to interlocutor and collaborator. Scholarship has always been a community enterprise. The selection pressure generated by scholars' hunger for relevant information may drive rapid evolution in systems for *certification*, *recommendation* and *assessment*. Priem says that readers will rely on personalized recommendation engines to aggregate both altmetrics and qualitative badges. Scholars' CVs will transform from static lists of formal products to real-time displays of transparent metrics that reveal diverse impacts. "Authors will select the best services for each product and purpose, pinning certifications to their products' web pages like county-fair ribbons. For instance, an article might receive a 'B+ overall significance' badge from *Nature*, a 'statistically rigorous' badge from a specialist statistical review service and a 'highly read' or 'highly influential' badge from an altmetrics aggregator."[18]

5. Conclusions

The implications of the developments outlined in the preceding sections of this paper suggest a growing need for a research agenda on new metrics of scholarly influence, the role of the journal impact factor (JIF) in evaluating research for funding, hiring, promotion, or institutional effectiveness, the importance of hindsight in recognizing true quality in science, and the competition for author fees among fraudulent publishers. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the current literature by examining the development of the impact factor as a measure of journal use, the Web's power to disseminate and filter scholarship, the murky world of nonprofessional science publishing, and the critical role of peer review in screening and correcting manuscripts prior to publication.

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THE ROLE OF TRANSLATION IN BORGES'S CREATIVE PROCESS

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ABSTRACT. This paper aims to analyze and discuss the role of translation in Borges's writing, Borges's writings on translation and its prevalence as a theme in his fiction, and the narrative features of Borges's translation. The findings of this study have implications for Borges's translation practices, Borges's poetics at work in his translations and in the incorporation of translation into his fiction, and the role that translation has played in Borges's creative work.

Keywords: Borges, translation, creative process, aesthetics, fiction

1. Introduction

Considerable research attention has focused on the significance of translation in Borges's oeuvre, Borges's creativity as translator, the role of translation in Borges's poetics, and the process and product of Borges's translations. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the current literature by examining the importance of translation in Borges's work, the various roles translation plays in Borges's aesthetics, Borges's translation theory, and the connections between Borges's practice as a translator and his writings.

2. The Role of Translation in Borges's Poetics

Levine maintains that, for Borges, translation is *a polemical tool, an act of literary criticism* (through translation one writer outdoes another): *even great translations, like originals at their best, are brilliant failures.*[1] Fraser points out that Borges enjoyed seeing his texts undercut by translation,[2] setting foreign language renderings above his originals.[3] Waisman claims that Borges thematizes translation as an exploration of difference and representation, serving to propel reflections about originality and the production and transmittal of meaning:[4] *translation is a springboard for innovation as well as ethical and metaphysical explorations*. Rewriting, mis-reading and mis-translating are thoroughly interconnected. In the *ficciones* Borges develops a poetics based on a practice of mis-translation. Literary texts, traditions, and history can be reevaluated and rewritten from the periphery.

> Borges argues that translations are not necessarily inferior to originals, that the concept of a 'definitive text' is a fallacy, and that the merit of a translation resides unexpectedly in its traditional translation theory as he destabilizes the concepts of originality and authorship. Borges's radical insights into the potential of translation shed light on a specific kind of *mis*-translation that makes use of creative infidelities to displace and re-contextualize fragments of the original into the target language and culture.[5]

Wood maintains that translation as a daily, difficult practice[6] may look like a story of repeated failures: the translator is *only the orchestrator of a second, different form of life*. The difficulty with Borges's pronouncements on translation is their infallible mischief. Borges offers *an oblique but devastating attack on the ideas both of creativity and of fidelity*.

> First, it cannot be absolute or final: many words, images and modes are persuasively translated all the time. Second, even when force or connotation is lost in the passage from one language to another, something may be gained, a glimpse of new meaning, or a resonance in the very gap between idioms. And third, our standard of success cannot be the perfect transmission of all aspects of a text or speech. This would not be a translation at all but an unimaginable replica, rather like the map of an empire in a Borges story which turns out to be as big as the empire itself.[7]

Borges adduces the idea of translation within a single language, translation helping us to understand the "modest mystery" of literature because it tackles "a visible text." Translation is a form of trouble as well as a second life. The various translations of a single text are *different perspectives on a mobile fact*.

> Borges invokes the concept of 'translating against,' as if translation were always (or often) an attempt to erase the anxiety of influence induced by past translations. […] We might think the translated text gets a little lost in the process, and Borges does think so. He also thinks that losing a famous text in translation may be a way of finding it has entered another literature. […] In all translations, case by case, there will be chances for creative choice, and fidelity does not have to be dull, but the simple embrace of either of these abstractions will put a stop to the only activity that matters, the proliferating and potentially endless talk among texts.[8]

3. The Connections between Borges's Practice as a Translator and His Writings

Leone contends that Borges provides an outstanding case for the study of narrative in translation: translation is destined to illustrate discussions of aesthetics,[9] subverts the authenticity of the original by hinting at a proliferation of possible alternate versions, is a critical dialogue, voids the notion of definitive texts, serves to destabilize mimesis, need not be accompanied by a sense of loss much less an accusation of treason, and enriches the original. Translation, as a trope and a literary device is a visible manifestation of mediation. Leone points out that Borges has no compunctions about purposely altering a text in translation, inscribes his tastes, values, and judgments about the literature he is translating onto the target-language texts, makes changes to the form and content of the novels he translated to move them closer to the action-centered, personality-effacing fiction, recreates texts in translation, using the original as a pre-text for his own aesthetic purposes, and uses the inassimilable distance that separates cultures of the past and present to explain that literalness cannot be a criterion for judging the worth of translations. Gender and genre are intertwined in Borges's translation practice. In almost every translation, Borges pushes back against non-normative gender and sexuality, reorienting characters toward traditional gender stereotypes. A translation is a variation of a text which is itself a version of the themes that came before it. Fidelity in translation is a tautology (the "original" is no more original than the translation).

The results of the above analysis suggest that translation and the alternate versions to the "real story" it implies are a tool for foregrounding a foundational aesthetic of Borges's fictions. Leone holds that literary translation and translators figure prominently in Borges's stories. A translation's source text is a moveable event: it exists as a real but separate text in the perception of every individual reader. The translation cannot be judged for its likeness or dissimilarity to the source text (*those works which presume themselves to be perfect, definitive, inalterable are the most apt to be forgotten by history*). The history and culture of ancient texts are in many ways entirely inaccessible to the translator: *to translate the texts of the ancient world as if transcribing the reality in which they were produced is a fallacy based in arrogance*. Leone states that when dealing with translation Borges is more concerned about assertions of "literality" than about the actual interpolation of "local color" into a translated text. A text is an axis of countless intertextual relationships. The equation of relationships between texts and their cultural influence, the precursors they create and the texts they inspire is not an obstacle to translation (*translators bring only their assumptions and second-hand knowledge to the original text*). Even translations that follow a text word for word produce wildly different results. A translator may use the information an original text provides creatively, and may focus on whatever she or he considers most important about the source text (translators must emphasize the parts of a text they find aesthetically relevant).

4. Borges's Views on Translation

Kristal argues that Borges's literary works often require the creative complicity of his readers[11] *to produce the sense that a window has been opened onto singular worlds of fiction with a logic of their own*. His preposterous situations and impossible objects have the air of the credible, and his characters are intriguing. Borges's *unmistakable lyrical persona* oscillates between *the uncanny aperçu* and *the disarming confession*. Translation plays a major role in every one of Borges's literary endeavors, and as a process whereby a writer remodels one sequence of words into another is central to his reflections on writing.

The point to be stressed is that Borges's translations are at the core of his creative process. Kristal underscores the pivotal role translation plays in the gestation of Borges's literary world. Borges is interested in translation as a means of enhancing a work: translation is a means to enrich a literary work/idea. Several literary works are solutions to problems resolved in the process of translation or responses to works Borges translated. Borges's translations offer insights into the workings of his imagination. An original work does not harbor an advantage over a translation. The work is a collective enterprise *that carries more weight than the input of any individual author, reader, or translator*.

The findings above reveal that Borges develops a way of writing fiction informed by his own approach to translation, and his strategies as a creative writer have much in common with his methods as a translator. Kristal remarks that Borges's translations remain identifiable reflections of the originals (his translations transform his originals into drafts that precede them). An original can be unfaithful to a translation, and the Italian expression *traduttore traditore* is an erroneous generalization that conflates difference with treachery (*a translator's transformation of the original is not necessarily to the detriment of the work*). A translation can enrich or surpass an original. The original is a text produced by a fallible human. A good translator might choose to treat the original as a good writer treats a draft of a work in progress. The translators of a work may be more beneficial to the work than its author *because their lack of vested interest in the text as it was published makes them more effective as editors*. In literary translation ideas raise as significant difficulties. Certain works afford pleasures lost in translation. A text is untranslatable because its conjunction of cadences and associations are not transferable. A translator can take the necessary liberties to achieve *a convincing work of literature*. Original works do not have any advantage over translations from the perspective of their literary merits. The poetry of ideas can be translated in such a way that the original and the translation amount to the "same" text. The decision as to whether a text is translatable or untranslatable depends *on whether a translator is able to recreate the text in such a way that it produces a gratifying literary effect.* The differences between languages and modes of expression *offer multiple possibilities to a translator whose aim is to recreate the original.* A translation may sparkle in passages where the original falls short. A translator can interpolate his own inventions and excise passages that could have been rendered with ease, producing an unfaithful work that surpasses the original because it is unfaithful, by correcting mistakes and inconsistencies of a text (*there are no perfect originals, any more than there can be perfect translations or rough drafts*). A translator should be faithful to a perfectible work.

This line of reasoning suggests that a translation necessarily involves a transformation with regards to the original: a new translation can be an improvement over a previous one, *whereas the chronological precedence of an original with respect to a translation is no guarantee of the literary primacy of the original.* Borges contends that translations resulting from the intelligent or inspired taking of liberties improved his originals (the work takes supremacy over the author). A translator may cut, add, and reorganize a text to produce a work that improves on rougher sketches. Translation from one language to another is a special case of rewriting a draft, involving *choice*, *chance*, and *experimentation*. The incommensurability of any two languages provides stimulating challenges to the literary translator. A translation can take place in a single language, and we can copy a text from one language to another.

It is of first-rate importance to notice that a translation suggests a transformation that may surpass the original. Borgess usually compares a translation to an original, judging the translation and the original on equal footing (*the ideal arbiter of a translation is the unlikely reader who can resist the almost inevitable prejudice in favor of the original*). Shifts in language can have positive or negative effects on a work or on its translations. It is legitimate to "mutilate" an original if one has good reason to do so. In the passage of time the meanings, connotations, and associations of words can change, justifying repeated translations of the same work. A translation is a transformation of a text into another, and the appreciation of a literary work can be enriched by translation. A literal translation attempts to maintain all the details of the original. Borges's most radical engagements with an original *did not take place in his translations*.

> No activity, other than reading, has been more central to his Borges's creative process than translation. […] His translations transform his originals into drafts that precede them; his own literary works transform his readings into a repertoire of possibilities in which his own translations, and his views about translations, play a decisive role.[12]

5. Conclusions

My paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the centrality of translation in Borges's work, Borges's views on translation, the significance of translation in Borges, and the role of translation in Borges's critical and fictional writing.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Melancholy and the Otherness of God
Alina N. Feld (Hofstra University)
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Feld argues that understanding depression as a perduring condition of the human spirit may contribute to a revision of modern anthropological conceptions. Plato's *chora* interconnects melancholy, the absence of God, and time. *The world of Ideas can be reached only through the containment, control, and sublimation of the passionate nature by the higher intellect*. Pseudo-Aristotle poses the question of the relation between melancholy and exceptional individuality. Aristotle elaborates on the originative source of the all. The universe has an extremity and a center, an up and a down. Hippocrates establishes invisible connections between the human dimensions of being and the natural universe. The ideal is one of harmonious attunement of the individual and the natural cosmic environment. Sleep and inaction are indicated as the causes or aggravating agents of the phlegmatic condition. All senses, since warm and dry, must be exercised to compensate for the cooling effect of aging.

Evagrius engages in a consideration of the passionate thoughts that constitute the main hindrance in the progress of purification of the passionate and intellectual natures. *Acedia* appears in the pure state of its Greek meaning of "carelessness," and has a demonic causality. The conditions known in antiquity as phlegm and melancholy (*passionate thoughts*) are *acedia* and sadness. Sadness and *acedia* are separate experiences provoked by different demonic agencies. Evagrius's spiritual exercises, intended as a self-applied exorcism, imply intellectual work. There are two kinds of representations that influence the intellect – figural, referring the intellect to objects of sense, and abstract, filling the intellect with spiritual realities. *Self-observation is a specific form of thought-observation and analysis of one's own mental and affective activity*. Demonic agency intends to take over the soul by gradually insinuating itself into the victim, becoming indistinguishable from one's own body. Demonic thought is an image of sensorial man constituted inwardly. Our common sense of the self is a form of naïve consciousness.

Gnosis is salvific on the condition it is applied. Cassian indicates a psychosomatic understanding of the role played by the body in the malady of the soul. *Acedia* emerges as the sin of sloth for which manual work becomes the principal remedy.

Aquinas creates a division of gravity between *acedia* and despair, establishing the status of *acedia* as a mortal sin of the layman. Despair is the most aggravated mode of the condition. Aquinas's *acedia* is an oppressive sadness about the divine good: *acedia* is both a capital sin by being the source of other sins and a mortal sin by killing the spiritual life, stands apart as the grey eminence among moral sins, and emerges as a mortal sin of the will for which the remedy is willful resistance and cultivation of joy.

Ficino engages in the construction and elucidation of the symbol of melancholy, initiates melancholics into the art of exorcising demonic melancholy, and intends to find a cure for melancholic philosophers. Melancholy is congruent with both the center of the cosmos and with Saturn, and is the condition made up of the Hippocratic phlegm and black bile. Age contributes to the aggravation of boredom by smoothing out emotions and dissolving interests.

Feld points out that Ficino's art involves the transmutation of *nigredo* or the stone of madness into *albedo*, the flower and stone of philosophy. Everything in the inner and outer world is a symbol suffused with meaning. Ficino's compensatory therapeutic becomes a poetics of imagination. Ficino's hermeneutics prescribes the internalization of alchemical transmutation as indicated by an experiment in imagination. Henry of Ghent asserts that the metaphysical incapacity of the melancholic and the resultant feeling of imprisonment cause melancholy. The melancholic genius bears the artistic or religious propensity and destiny par excellence.

Burton prioritizes the hypostasis of *acedic* idleness as cause of melancholy, considers melancholy both as malign cosmic power and as a splenetic disposition of the mind that is constitutive only of the melancholic temperaments, emphasizes the hypostasis of boredom, and contemplates the nothing made visible in idleness, and considers only socially purposeful engagement as work. The entire work melancholizes. What is lacking is progressive social purpose and a corresponding passionate engagement. Nobility is a symbol of disengagement from any socially relevant cause. Idleness is the fundamental existential cause of melancholy, is the deadly sin of sloth, and is the prerogative of aristocracy.

Pascal sees the nothing in the recesses of being that idleness makes visible, insists on contemplating the terrible nothing, the dark abyss, and interprets all human work and play as distraction from being at home with oneself. Being active in the world serves as an escape from facing oneself.

Idleness creates the perfect conditions for the possibility of contemplating the unredeemed human condition.

Feld posits that Pascal recommends one to arrest the impulse toward diversion and contemplate the void: face to face with this absolute emptiness the contemplator will realize that the nothing is tragically one's own groundless ground of being. The nothing is the ultimate ground of one's being. Metanoia as a way to faith and God's grace is the only authentic remedy for the dread and despair of the nothing. Boredom and idleness are the conditions for the possibility of seeing the nothing. The tragedy of man comes from not knowing how to stay unoccupied in his room. The tragic condition of man is the disquieting reality that becomes visible only in the *acedic* condition. Pascal's reflections on the cause of man's restlessness are ones on boredom. Unreflective attitudes of ignoring or denying melancholy are misguided.

Descartes's ideal of absolute freedom from contingency and finitude presupposes relinquishing our humanity and surpassing it. Descartes establishes the certainty of the being of pure, abstract thinking substance, and ushers the treatment of the passions into modernity. Sadness is the embarrassing locus where evil is encountered. Sadness's negativity and otherness provoke Descartes's desire for self-transcendence. Descartes's ideal human has a purely spiritual ontology. In the life of the body sadness is a harbinger of death manifesting all the signs of extinction. The true nature of the soul is disembodied transparent intellectual joy and tranquility. The passions represent the *other* of the perfectly bodiless mind and infinite will.

Kant's disparagement of divine frenzy and madness is a sign of the abasement of mental acumen. Emotion and passion are pathological conditions suffered by reason. The shattering of imagination in the experience of the sublime makes possible the realization of our supersensible vocation. The melancholic frame of mind is most fitted to the sublime and the moral due to its specific mental attunement. The practical ideal is a Stoic *apatheia*. The monastic would never encounter God because God transcends our transcendental schemata. Involvement with fine arts and social life are just modes of passing or killing time.

Schelling refers to human melancholy as a trace of primordial divine otherness. As the ground of freedom and creativity, melancholy must continually be conquered. Schelling interprets melancholy as a vestige of the abysmal groundlessness of God, and insists on a living God whose revelation is the act of a free being. God's self-negation precedes God's revelation as its ground. The mystical theology of *via negativa* involves the paradoxical denial of God's existence. Corporeality is the ultimate *telos* of both God and creation. Melancholy is a trace of God's otherness, and is a reflection of otherness within God. The life of reason itself is a constant overcoming of melancholic madness. Madness must be controlled by reason but never eliminated.

Hegel maintains that melancholy is an inevitable negative stage in the dialectical evolution of the Idea: *the movement from nature and necessity toward freedom and creativity traverses all the forms of depression and melancholy*. Hegel classifies mental distress, melancholy, or disgust with life as forms of insanity: crime and insanity are extremes of the condition of distress that the soul in its evolution has to overcome.

Feld remarks that Hegel's description of madness is one of melancholy. The melancholic is the mad. Melancholy is the painful experience of the soul undergoing the critical transformation from immediacy and total union with Nature to freedom. Mental strain and disturbance are symptoms of a superior stage in the evolution of the Idea. Mood is an inferior manifestation of nature to be overcome by the Spirit. Temperament is not a locus of freedom (it manifests an excessive proximity to nature). Boredom refuses self-transcendence and reverses evolution and time. Hegel justifies the death of God as the absolute crux of his philosophical system. Schopenhauer argues that boredom is a metaphysical principle. The phenomenal world is the veil used by the Will to life to hide its nakedness from itself.

Hume's melancholy accompanies a crisis of meaning provoked by his metaphysical skepticism. The most important human endeavor is the metaphysical search for ultimate principles. Philosophy begins with painful existential questions without immediate answer. Hume has a glimpse into the nothing left by the absence of God and vacuousness of the self. Hume's approach to existential despair indicates a new stage in the process of maturing consciousness. In his search for truth, Hume takes leave of all established opinions, without having a criterion for truth. Nietzsche abhors resentment, a complex of inactivity and past-consciousness. The *Übermensch* is fully embodied and impassionate.

Burke singles out idleness or rest as the ultimate cause of melancholy, and proposes the role of work as pain and terror in awakening by tension and contraction a languid organism and psyche. The melancholic requires an awakening or quickening through work and terror, both belonging to the category of the stimulating agency of the sublime. The feeling of the sublime is grounded in the impulse toward self-preservation in the fear and pain that agitate and awaken the entire being. Bodily pain and mental anguish are productive of the sublime that belongs to self-preservation as our strongest emotion. Painful labor and terror within limits are pleasurable and healthy leading to "delightful horror."

Maine de Biran replaces classical reflection with an inner transcendental experience whose organ is the transcendental inner sense, and describes the pathos of the ontology of the passivity of the self toward the body and the organic. Maine de Biran's self emerges from the originary passivity toward the organic. The subject of the ontology of effort is the ego of the cogito. The individual becomes himself through the effort of the will, transcending the immanence of primordial melancholy. The stages of Maine de Biran's philosophy are experiments in living and thinking melancholy. Effort is the labor of the self to give birth to itself out of original *acedic* immanence. The primordial state of immediacy and immanence emerges in and through the experience of effort. Mood is the primordial stage of passivity toward the organic from which the self emerges through effort.

Le Senne notes the strategies used by the self to cope with its painful suffering, develops a regimen for the relief from inactivity – *a hygiene of melancholy*, and emphasizes the correlation between melancholic inhibition of action and excessive mental activity. Le Senne's explanation of melancholy is the closing of the future. In the case of melancholic philosophers, the *demon of perversity* understood as a propensity for and fascination with the negative becomes manifest as their predilection for metaphysical negation and otherness. The most important truth about melancholy is the danger of indulgence. The melancholic self reminds us of what it means to be a human being.

Feld claims that Le Senne's metaphysics of the psyche mediates between the traditional discourse of melancholy and the contemporary phenomenology of subjectivity. Spontaneous activity is illustrated by the child's natural impulse to play. There is an intrinsic and direct relation between melancholy and inactivity. The inactive self is the one discouraged by obstacle (the active one is titillated by it). The obstacle is the primordial other. The melancholic was the first, best known, and well defined of all the temperaments. The literary form of the *journal intime* is the mode of expression par excellence of the melancholic. The psychic propensity for activity is not identical with the proliferation of acts. Melancholy is present in the active character in a latent form. The nature of boredom is conditioned by the constitutive property of inactivity. Boredom is the ghostly atmosphere hovering about the cemetery of stillborn desires.

Jung puts it that *the assumption of melancholy as the dark shadow is the task of consciousness*. Beginning the work of inner transformation with melancholy is alchemically appropriate. Western culture has been marked by an entrenched Gnostic suspicion of passionate nature. *Nigredo* is the first phase of the alchemical work, and is a symbol of guilt and of the devil. Henry focuses on the pathos of self-affection, searches for a more primordial ground of self-knowledge, discovering it in the subjectivity in and for itself, and arrives at the notion of the primordial immanence of the subjective body. *The body is already subjective and subjectivity is always embodied*. Subjectivity is life revealed in a sphere of absolute immanence. The body as a mode of life implies an existential perspective. The more originary beginning is the pathetic subjective body. The self and the body can never be separated. Henry's ontology of immanent pathetic affectivity is the more primordial beginning and the original revelation of the absolute. Sin and resurrection are existential historical modes or intentionalities, correlating with damnation and redemption.

Otto distinguishes the healthy sense of culpability from a morbid sense of guilt and defilement: *the imaginative-mathematical melancholic can be saved only by divine intervention*. Jaspers explains that mental pathos is a condition for deepening self-consciousness. Being and reason are rooted in their respective others as their ultimate ground. Bodily feelings are part of the feeling-states. Only thus the message from the "margins of experience" can be received. The beginning of authentic life originates in *Angst*. The gifted personality reaches hidden sources of *Existenz* through confrontation with the limit situation of the melancholic malady. The core of depression is a change in vital feeling. Madness is a boundary or marginal situation that must be accepted as such. Schizophrenia is the soil in which certain exceptional personalities developed.

Binswanger develops a transcendental phenomenology of intentional consciousness, describes mental diseases and their particular constitution of being, and affirms the primordiality of the transcendental dissolution of constitutive temporal articulation in melancholy: *the melancholic is victim to an imaginative delirium of loss, guilt, damnation, and emptiness.* Melancholic confession is the beginning of a hermeneutic of the melancholic mode of being. The theme of melancholic loss is independent of any specific or mundane content. Melancholic anxiety, in loosening the weave of intentional threads constitutive of temporal objectivity, is an experiment of nature in which nature creates something new in order to aid itself when the course of normal processes is altered.

Feld holds that Binswanger detects the melancholic disorder in the malfunctioning of the three egos – empirical, transcendental, and pure. The pure ego is charged with the constitution of the ego totality. Melancholy indicates an alteration in the constitution of the pure ego. The economy of the triad of egos is circular. Pathological melancholy should be distinguished from existential anxiety. Psychoses make visible the otherwise inaccessible transcendental operations. The phenomenological *epokhē* makes visible the constitutive moments of our world.

Heidegger says that anxiety and boredom are fundamental attunements of Dasein, respectively existential and ontological. *Therapaeia* reflects an absolute reversal in the interpretation of the condition. Heidegger's call of the bored back to boredom is a form of Evagrian courageous resistance to *acedia*. *Angst* is the existential mood par excellence. Boredom is a fundamental ontological "attunement" of *Dasein*, emerging as our own fundamental attunement. Mood is a fundamental mode of being – understanding and state of mind are the two constitutive equiprimordial ways of being-there (*Dasein*).

Feld writes that Heidegger identifies three forms of boredom of increasing depth: (i) *becoming bored by something* and *killing time*; (ii) being bored with oneself and the passing of time belonging to it; and (iii) profound boredom – *boring for one*. Boredom springs from the temporality of *Dasein*. The sin is distraction from what boredom reveals. Authenticity calls forth attention to what the attunement to profound boredom discloses. Heidegger undertakes two radical unveilings: the call back to boredom that can be understood through a shift in *Dasein*'s consciousness, and the ground of *Dasein* in its depths is Being itself in its otherness. The Heideggerian existential moods (care and anxiety) relate to boredom as the fundamental ontological attunement. Heidegger associates existential anxiety and care in the context of *Dasein* analysis. Melancholy in its hypostasis of *acedia* or depression is the contemporary mood par excellence.

Levinas's *there is* pertains to existence even in annihilation. Salvation comes in the form of love of the other. Levinas examines the instant of fatigue phenomenologically as an event. The experience of existence empty of existents is frightening and provokes ontological horror. Levinas's analysis questions the theology of the sin of sloth. The triumph over morning indolence is a triumph over impersonal Being. The impossibility of escaping from an anonymous existence is the tragedy of subjectivity and consciousness. The burden of *irremissible existence* must be constantly reassumed.

Ricoeur introduces fallibility as an experience accessible to pure reflection. The self-reflection induced by confession is constitutive of the self as undivided causality. The *acedic* self, undergoing the experiences of heaviness, darkness, emptiness, appears as the *faille*. The synthesis of the imagination is only an intention. Primordial perfection is the original paradigm (fallenness can only be a pseudo-genesis). Only the fallen is immediately visible. Access to the primordial is possible only through fallenness.

Feld affirms that Ricoeur's recourse to a symbolism of evil facilitates an encounter with originating affirmation, makes visible the slide from fallibility into fault, and shows the ambiguity of the transition from the mere possibility of evil to its reality. Sin is a hybrid of the voluntary and the involuntary, and is a condition rather than an act. Phenomenologically, evil becomes visible only in man: it can appear and be recognized only by consciousness. By assuming the agency of evil, confession is the locus where the interrogation of evil begins.

Baudrillard emphasizes that *the hyperreal world of postmodernity situates itself outside the dialectical play of polarity*. Postmodern consciousness lacks self-division and depth. Melancholia is the acedic complex of boredom or depression, and is the postmodern state of consciousness. Hadot maintains that with the adoption of spiritual exercises, Egyptian and Syrian monasticism was penetrated by Greek philosophy of a neo-Platonic inspiration. There is an immediate relation between the degree of self-awareness and the sense of time. Altizer's death of God theology focuses on the hermeneutics of melancholy as the stigmata in subjectivity of divine nonbeing and pathos. Altizer's notion of the death of God implies resurrection of the dead God. Altizer laments in postmodernity the absence of self-dividedness. The death of God is a historical enactment of God's own sacrifice.

There is much to appreciate in *Melancholy and the Otherness of God*. I find it to be both insightful and admirable, and a masterly success.

A Philosophical Guide to Chance
Toby Handfield (Monash University)
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 256 pp.
ISBN 978-1-107-60735-4

Handfield assumes some form of objectivism about chance: the sorts of facts that make chance ascriptions true are facts that obtain independently of our beliefs and attitudes. There is a clear connection between the chance *claims* we make and the sorts of *beliefs* we have. All probabilities are degrees of belief. A subjectivist translates all claims about probability into claims about subjective psychology. Subjectivism is an irretrievable position. The psychology of someone who believes in objective chances is *compatible* with anti-realism. Chances are objective, whereas chance is the sort of thing that is properly studied by the natural sciences. Chance is the degree of belief recommended by the best identifiable advice function, given the available evidence: it is *something like the advice given by the best advice function identifiable, using only available evidence* (chance is the best *advisor we can choose*, given certain information). The best evidence for "degrees of belief" is at an unconscious level of mental life. Degrees of confidence are properties of our minds. By available information, Handfield means information that *can be possessed.* The chances of a proposition can change over time. Chance claims are representational. Positing primitive chance invites metaphysical questions. Our state of knowledge is compatible with a number of different ways the world might be.

Handfield calls individual points of phase space "snapshots:" they are representations of ways a world might be *at a single time*. Phase space represents an important subset of our beliefs about the world, is a good approximation of what is possible, *relative to the available evidence,* and can be used in an account of chance (*the best degree of belief, given the available evidence*). Beliefs in general cannot be captured in phase space. Given the right measure chances are facts about the relative measures of different macro-conditions (*the modal volume theory of chance*). The micro-condition of the world is unavailable to us, *in all plausible senses*. Super-positions are the mathematical device by which quantum mechanics gets probabilistic phenomena (*quantum mechanics does not provide any acceptable metaphysical account of the nature of chances*). Past microscopic events leave traces more than future microscopic events. There is an asymmetry of chances because of an asymmetry of evidence. In our universe, a past hypothesis is true, while no analogous future hypothesis is true. Handfield stresses the evidential status of the low-entropy past. Alternative characterizations of chance risk *trivializing* all chances. What evidence we count as available may vary in virtue of context. The ontological nature of our chance concept has developed to *discourage* us from using more "high tech" cognitive apparatus in contexts where it will be fruitless. Actualist accounts of chance fail to explain the normative role of chance unless they adopt an implausible anthropocentrism.

A Philosophical Guide to Chance is a stimulating, sharp and keenly argued book. The line of discussion is lucidly presented and well conceived.

Infinity: New Research Frontiers
Michael Heller (Pontifical University of John Paul II)
W. Hugh Woodin (University of California, Berkeley)
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 311 pp.
ISBN 978-1-107-00387-3

Religious and scientific concepts of infinity are deeply intertwined. (Achtner) The set of all truths of the transfinite universe cannot be reduced to the set of truths of some explicit fragment of the universe. (Woodin) There is a close connection between the logic of mathematical concepts and the logic of informal concepts from commonsense thinking. (Friedman) We can refine the *concepts* that we use for understanding the world by enlarging, refining, and sharpening the ensemble of notions that we use for thinking about the world. The source of the problems raised by our *intuition* about infinity might be in the limitation of our intuition. What we feel as infinity is the immensity of what we realize that we cannot reach. Science and the history of science teach us a sense of the infinity of what we *do not* know. (Rovelli) Everlasting inflation brings into being an infinite number of bubble universes, each of which is spatially infinite at each time. The theories devised to explain the finite observed region of the universe *naturally produce an infinite* *universe* through *everlasting inflation*. (Aguirre) Our view of the universe is characterized by many of those features that convey aesthetic force to infinity in artworks. (Bersanelli) There are pressures that drive theologians to claim that God possesses some properties to an unquantifiable extent. There are no substantive results in contemporary logic, mathematics, or physics that depend essentially on theological assumptions. Mathematical investigations of infinity will have significant consequences for theology if theological talk is given a straightforwardly realist construal. (Oppy)

On the whole, *Infinity: New Research Frontiers* is an excellent collection from some first-rate philosophers. The importance of the contributors along with the high quality of their pieces make this a volume worth reading.

The Evolution of Logic
W. D. Hart (University of Illinois at Chicago)
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 299 pp.
ISBN 978-0-521-74772-1

Hart notes that, as Kant puts it, we know *a priori* that for every event there is a prior event that caused it. There are whole, systematic bodies of knowledge that are known *a priori*. Our geometrical knowledge is *a priori*. Knowledge of necessity is *a priori*. Mathematics is all of it synthetic *a priori*. It is synthetic that all bodies are heavy, whereas it is analytic that all bodies are extended. Kant rules out *a posteriori* knowledge of analytic truths. The objects of the attitudes seem themselves to be mental. The truth of an analytic judgment can be adequately known in accordance with the principle of contradiction. Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise. Nothing could be red all over and green all over at the same time and place. Truths of pure mathematics carry with them necessity, which cannot be derived from experience. The necessity of a mathematical truth is inseparable from that truth.

Leibniz contends that our actual world is only one world among a vast range of other merely possible worlds. Descartes observes that there is a one–one order-preserving correspondence between the points on a line and the real numbers. Hume writes that existence is always a matter of fact, never a relation of ideas.

Hart remarks that Frege initiates the analytic style of philosophy that thinks itself distinguished by the clarity of its exposition and the care of its argument. There is a single right deductive order of the truths. If the primitive truths from which the proof of the proposition proceeds are general logical laws and definitions, then the truth is analytic. For a truth to be *a priori*, its proof should proceed from general laws that neither need nor admit of proof.

For a truth to be *a posteriori*, it must be impossible to construct its proof without including an appeal to facts. The distinctions between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, analytic and synthetic, concern the ground for making the judgment. When a proposition is called *a posteriori* or analytic, this is a judgment about the ultimate ground upon which rests the justification for holding it to be true. The reference of a predicate is a concept, which is a function whose value is always a truth value. A conclusion can be justified only by premisses from which it follows. The mathematics of number is reducible to logic. A cardinal number is an answer to the question how many.

Dedekind articulates the infinity of a set as its being in one–one correspondence with one of its proper subsets. Cantor stresses that there are more reals than natural numbers. The power set of an infinite set is of the next, or successor, infinite size. Every set is strictly smaller than its power set, the set of all its subsets. Only God is absolutely infinite. On Gödel's account, if prevailing set theories are consistent, the continuum hypothesis is not refutable in them. Both the generalized continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice are consistent with set theory. No consistent axiomatic system proves all mathematical truths.

Russell thinks of propositions as extensions of sentences as sets are extensions of predicates and as its denotation is the extension of a name. Propositions are like abstract entities expressed by sentences in the same way as numbers are abstract objects named by numerals. Some sentences that seem utterly in order are meaningless and express no proposition. All conditionals with false antecendents are true. Quine holds that the self-evidence even of the middling is an epistemic illusion. Tarski defines truth in semantic terms. The bearers of the truth values are linguistic items, sentences. Burge marks occurrences of the truth predicate with names for the various contexts in which the predicate occurs. The notion of truth cannot be adequately represented in terms of a truth predicate that lacks any sort of stratification. Singular terms for contexts are present in the language and attached to occurrences of its truth predicate. According to Austin, statements, acts performed by speakers using sentences, are the bearers of the truth values.

The Evolution of Logic is a book of admirable breadth and complexity. I find it to be tremendously interesting and thought-provoking. It will be widely discussed.

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