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# Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations

AN INTERNATIONAL PEER-REVIEWED ACADEMIC JOURNAL

VOLUME 13 | 2014

Addleton Academic Publishers
NEW YORK

NEW SERIES

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE ASSOCIATION • NEW YORK

# Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations

VOLUME 13 • 2014

ADDLETON ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS • NEW YORK

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An international peer-reviewed academic journal
Volume 13 / 2014
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***Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*** (ISSN 1841-2394) is published yearly by Addleton Academic Publishers, 30-18 50th Street, Woodside, New York, 11377. All papers in this journal have undergone editorial screening and anonymous double-blind peer-review.

Editor-in-Chief: Cynthia Neal, neal@addletonacademicpublishers.com

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Produced in the United States of America

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Michael A. Peters

Addleton Academic Publishers
NEW YORK

*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 11–32, ISSN 1841-2394

# REMARKS ON "THE SEMANTICS OF RACIAL SLURS"

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ABSTRACT. In "The Semantics of Racial Slurs," an article recently published in *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*, Hedger (2012) draws upon Kaplan's (1999) distinction between descriptive and expressive content to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content. Here I review the key considerations presented by Hedger (2012) in support of his purely expressive account of slurs and provide clear reasons for why it must ultimately be rejected. After reviewing the key cases Hedger (2012) offers for consideration in support of his view that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content, this article provides a critical evaluation of these cases, pointing out at least 13 ways in which his purely expressive analysis of slurs fails. In considering the 13 ways in which the purely expressive analysis of slurs remains inadequate, this article concludes with the suggestion that an adequate account of slurs will ultimately involve not only an expressive aspect but a descriptive aspect also.

Keywords: slurs; epithets; philosophy of language; semantics; pragmatics; expressivism

## 1. Introduction

In "The Semantics of Racial Slurs," an article recently published in *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*, Hedger (2012) draws upon Kaplan's (1999) distinction between descriptive and expressive content to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content.[1] In this article I review the key considerations presented by Hedger (2012) in support of his purely expressive account of slurs and provide clear reasons for why it must ultimately be rejected. After reviewing the key cases Hedger (2012) offers for consideration in support of his view that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content, this article provides a critical evaluation of these cases, pointing out at least 13 ways in which his purely expressive analysis of slurs fails. In considering the 13 ways in which the purely expressive

analysis of slurs remains inadequate, this article concludes with the suggestion that an adequate account of slurs will ultimately involve not only an expressive aspect but a descriptive aspect also.

## 2. Slurs as Purely Expressive Expressions

The use of a slur – such as *chink* or *whore* – has often been characterized as a form of "hate speech […] directed to a group of people, based on a shared characteristic of that group" (Fraleigh & Tuman 2010, p. 139), with racial slurs such as *chink* being used primarily to target people on the basis of race-based features and sexual slurs such as *whore* being used primarily to target people on the basis of sex-based features. In his article "The Semantics of Racial Slurs," Hedger (2012) draws upon the distinction between descriptive and expressive content in order to provide an analysis of slurring expressions and to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content.[2] The distinction between descriptive and expressive content, as Hedger (2012) explains, consists in the fact that "*descriptive* content […] represents the world as being a certain way, and as such can be either true or false" whereas "*expressive* content […] merely display[s] an attitude of the speaker, and as such are not truth-apt" (p. 76). Hedger (2012) offers examples of expressions with purely descriptive and purely expressive content; for instance, expressions with purely descriptive content including *black* and *elephant* (p. 78) and examples of expressions with purely expressive content including *fucker* (p. 77) and all slurring expressions (p. 74, 78).

Since expressions with purely descriptive content are typically inoffensive whereas expressions with purely expressive content are typically offensive, by arguing that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content Hedger (2012) aims to account for the inoffensiveness of expressions like *Chinese American* and the offensiveness of expressions like *chink*. This particularly salient ability of slurs to offend is best accounted for, Hedger (2012) proposes, by adopting a purely expressive account of slurs: "The view here offered for your consideration is that slurs contain merely expressive content – i.e., they display an attitude of contempt on the part of the speaker toward their targets – but they lack an extension, and hence don't make truth-apt contributions to semantic content" (p. 77–78).

Drawing upon the work of Kaplan (1999), Hedger (2012) adopts a strict distinction between expressions with purely descriptive and purely expressive content such that the content of each expression is either descriptive or expressive but not mixed. The argumentative strategy that Hedger (2012) will resultantly adopt is that of aiming to show that slurs are not expressions with purely descriptive content and so must be expressions with purely expressive content instead. So the first step Hedger (2012) takes aims to

demonstrate that slurs are not expressions with purely descriptive content by showing that the projection behavior of slurs differs markedly from that of expressions with purely descriptive content, and that the two must therefore be distinct.

Hedger (2012) provides several examples showing how the projection behavior of slurs differs from that of expressions with purely descriptive content, and examples such as these have already been well-discussed in prior work (Potts 2007; Hom 2008; Potts, Asudeh, Cable, Hara, McCready, Alonso-Ovalle, Bhatt, Davis, Kratzer, Roeper, & Walkow 2009; Williamson 2009; Hom 2010; McCready 2010; Croom 2011; Hom 2012; Anderson & Lepore 2013; Croom 2013a; Hay 2013; Whiting 2013). So for the purposes of our analysis it will suffice to review just one such example that Hedger (2012) considers involving the comparison between (1) and (2) below, "when S is a slur normally used to target blacks" (p. 78):

(1) If David is intelligent, then so is Judith.[3]
(2) If Obama is an S, then so is his wife.[4]

The basic point being made with an example like this is that, whereas a speaker of (1) can still plausibly deny that they have expressed anything about David (since *intelligent*, an expression with purely descriptive content,[5] is embedded within the antecedent of the conditional), a speaker of (2) *cannot* still plausibly deny that they have expressed anything about Obama (even though the slurring expression *S* is likewise embedded within the antecedent of the conditional). Consider another example below that is perhaps clearer since the comparison it involves between (3) and (4) more closely approximates a minimal pair and actually provides a concrete example of the slur under investigation:

(3) If I didn't like *Chinese Americans*, then I'd probably be racist.
(4) If I didn't like *chinks*, then I'd probably be racist.

Since in (3) the descriptive expression *Chinese American* is embedded within the antecedent of the conditional, it is clear that a speaker uttering (3) does not generate the inference that they are racist simply in virtue of uttering (3). The speaker of (3) is only committed to saying that they probably would be racist *if in fact* they did not like Chinese Americans, but that is an *if* they can plausibly deny. So the scope of the descriptive expression *Chinese American* is restricted by the conditional and does not project out to generate the inference that the speaker uttering (3) presumably holds racist views. But notice that in (4), although the slurring expression *chinks* is embedded within the antecedent of the conditional, the derogatory force of *chinks* still manages to *project out* of its embedded position to generate the inference that the speaker uttering (4) presumably holds racist views. "For if the speaker were not currently in possession of derogatory

attitudes," Croom (2011) notes, "there are many other non-derogatory neutral descriptive terms that the speaker could have used, for instance, by saying" something like (3) instead of (4) (p. 345). Slurs "exist in the language as alternatives to other words," Finlay (2005) similarly notes, or else "Why would a speaker call a person a 'faggot' rather than homosexual, or a 'nigger' rather than a Black or African-American? This choice of terminology is explained by the intention to express contempt towards a group" (p. 19). So in considering examples like those above showing how the projection behavior of slurs differs markedly from that of expressions with purely descriptive content, Hedger (2012) seems to have offered a good case in support of the claim that slurs are not purely descriptive expressions.

After arguing that slurs are not purely descriptive expressions, Hedger (2012) then proceeds to further argue that slurs are expressions that are purely expressive instead. Here Hedger (2012) attempts to reinforce the strict conceptual bifurcation between expressions with purely descriptive and purely expressive content by attempting to demonstrate that slurs "lack descriptive content whatsoever" (p. 77) and "that slurs contain merely expressive content" (p. 78). Hedger (2012) argues for this further claim that slurs are purely expressive by asking us to consider three key cases: (1) that "When I would look up certain cuss words [in Spanish] I noticed that different dictionaries would give very different English expressions as translations" and so "It occurred to me that a vast number of derogatory expressions (particularly those considered most offensive) don't obviously differ in meaning" (p. 77); (2) that we consider "the person who, while working on a car, hurls a wrench in frustration and yells "fucker!" It would be odd to claim that this person has described the wrench or the car as being a certain way" since a purely expressive expression like *fucker* "doesn't describe […] at all, but merely expresses an attitude of contempt" (p. 77); (3) that we consider the following case, "when S is a slur normally used to target blacks, and the utterer of (17) [provided in (5) below] points[6] to, say, a person of Swedish decent" (p. 78):

(5) That person is an S.[7]

Of (5) Hedger (2012) claims that "this utterance still manages to be offensive, and that a Swede who felt that the speaker was expressing contempt toward him would not thereby be making a linguistic error" (p. 78). So in providing these three key cases for consideration – (1) where Hedger (2012) found different translations for English "cuss words" in Spanish, (2) where "It would be odd to claim that this person [that yells *fucker* in frustration] has described the wrench or the car as being a certain way" (p. 77), and (3) where "a person of Swedish decent" still manages to be offended by "a slur normally used to target blacks" (p. 78) – Hedger (2012) claims to have

presented a compelling case in support of his purely expressive view that, not only are slurs not purely descriptive, slurs further "lack descriptive content whatsoever" and "contain merely expressive content" (p. 77, 78).

## 3. Problems with Considering Slurs as Purely Expressive Expressions

Although Hedger (2012) has a persuasive case in support of his claim that slurring expressions and expressions with purely descriptive content are distinct, he has not yet adequately argued in support of his further claim that expressions with purely expressive content are the only alternative to expressions with purely descriptive content and that slurring expressions must therefore be purely expressive rather than purely descriptive. For a mixed or hybrid account of slurs, in which slurs are most aptly considered as expressions with both descriptive and expressive aspects, still remains an open possibility and has in fact been productively explored in the recent literature on slurs (Croom 2010; Croom 2011; Croom 2012; Croom 2013a; Croom 2013b). The purpose of this section is aimed at offering insight into the reasons why one might consider rejecting a purely expressive account of slurs in favor of exploring a mixed or hybrid approach to slurs instead.

Recall that Hedger (2012) offered three key cases to consider in support of his view that slurs lack descriptive content altogether (p. 77–78). The first case was where Hedger (2012) found different translations for English "cuss words" in Spanish (p. 77), with him arguing that since "different dictionaries would give very different English expressions as translations" for these "cuss words," it therefore seemed plausible to conclude that "a vast number of derogatory expressions (particularly those considered most offensive) don't obviously differ in meaning" (p. 77). So here Hedger (2012) takes an analysis of "cuss words" that suggests different "cuss words" "don't obviously differ in meaning" and assumes that from this analysis a conclusion about "slurs" can be straightforwardly drawn, namely, that different "slurs" don't obviously differ in meaning either.

But a problem here arises from the fact that Hedger (2012) treats "cuss words" like *fucker* as equivalent to "slurs" like *chink*, considering both as similar examples of "epithets" (p. 74, 76–77), and then illegitimately draws conclusions about "slurs" from an analysis of "cuss words." This maneuver is problematic, however, since "cuss words" like *fucker* function in a way that is linguistically quite distinct from "slurs" like *chink* and the two must accordingly be treated as distinct types of expressions. This point is now widely uncontroversial. For instance, Hom (2010, 2012) and Whiting (2013) have distinguished between "swear words" like *fucker* and "slurs" like *chink*, Croom (2011, 2013) and Gutzmann (2011) have distinguished between "pure expressives" like *fucker* and "slurs" like *chink*, and Hay (2013) has

distinguished between "general pejoratives" like *fucker* and "slurs" like *chink*. Nonetheless, it might be useful to briefly inspect how purely expressive expressions like *fucker* function in a way that is distinct from slurring expressions like *chink* for the purpose of achieving clarity on this point. Let us then first briefly review how expressions with purely expressive content differ markedly from expressions with purely descriptive content, and then subsequently turn to more clearly inspect how slurs are distinct from both purely expressive and purely descriptive expressions.

Consider the following examples below, with purely expressive and purely descriptive expressions in predicate position ((6a) and (7a) respectively) and NP position ((6c) and (7c) respectively):

(6a) T is a *fucker*, but I deny saying anything about his $[x]^d$.
(7a) T is a *Chinese American*, but I deny saying anything about his $[x]^d$.

(6c) That *fucker* is my classmate, but I deny saying anything about his $[x]^d$.
(7c) That *Chinese American* is my classmate, but I deny saying anything about his $[x]^d$.

Let $[x]^d$ represent a variable that admits only of expressions with purely descriptive content. Substituting expressions with purely descriptive content for $[x]^d$ in the examples above shows that the substitution of certain purely descriptive contents blocks the felicity of purely descriptive cases (7a) and (7c), but does not block the felicity of purely expressive cases (6a) and (6c). This is suggested in the examples involving substitutions below:

(6b) T is a *fucker*, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].
(7b) T is a *Chinese American*, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].*

(6d) That *fucker* is my classmate, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].
(7d) That *Chinese American* is my classmate, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].*

Since the particular descriptive features of the target T are inessential to the *speaker* indicating *their own* emotional state, in purely expressive cases (6b) and (6d) the speaker can felicitously call a target a *fucker* while denying that their utterance has anything to do with *certain (e.g. racial) descriptive features* of that target at all.

Although Hedger (2012) may be right in considering expressions like *fucker* as purely expressive, he is quite wrong in considering expressions like *chink* as purely expressive also. For even if we grant that *fucker* is purely expressive it is clear that this is not the case with slurs like *chink*. This can be observed below:

(6a) T is a *fucker*, but I deny saying anything about his $[x]^d$.
(7a) T is a *Chinese American*, but I deny saying anything about his $[x]^d$.
(8a) T is a *chink*, but I deny saying anything about his $[x]^d$.

(6b) T is a *fucker*, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].
(7b) T is a *Chinese American*, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].*
(8b) T is a *chink*, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].*

Observe that whereas the purely expressive case (6b) is felicitous on the grounds that expressions with purely expressive content do not pick out or target certain specific descriptive features (such as racial identity) and can therefore be felicitously uttered while denying some particular set of descriptive features (such as racial identity) to its target, the slurring case (8b) is not likewise felicitous. So in this respect the slurring case (8b) is not like the purely expressive case (6b) but is instead rather like the purely descriptive case (7b). Evidently this point is not specific to racial slurs but is a general point applying to others such as sexual slurs, for consider also the following examples:

(9a) T is a *fucker*, but I deny saying anything about her $[x]^d$.
(10a) T is a *woman*, but I deny saying anything about her $[x]^d$.
(11a) T is a *whore*, but I deny saying anything about her $[x]^d$.

(9b) T is a *fucker*, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].
(10b) T is a *woman*, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].*
(11b) T is a *whore*, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].*

Observe that whereas the purely expressive case (9b) is felicitous on the grounds that expressions with purely expressive content do pick out or target certain specific descriptive features (such as sexual identity) and can therefore be felicitously uttered while denying some particular set of descriptive features (such as sexual identity) to its target, the slurring case (11b) is not likewise felicitous. So in this respect the slurring case (11b) is not like the purely expressive case (12b) but is instead rather like the purely descriptive case (10b).

This result is in fact unsurprising since slurs are commonly understood to target those descriptive features typically considered to be associated with members belonging to certain classes; for example, the expression *chink* typically slurs Chinese Americans, the expression *gook* typically slurs Korean Americans, and the expression *nigger* typically slurs African Americans. As Anderson and Lepore (2013) have rightly pointed out in "Slurring Words," there in fact exist a large variety of slurs "that target groups on the basis of race ('nigger'), nationality ('kraut'), religion ('kike'), gender ('bitch'), sexual orientation ('fag'), immigrant status ('wetback') and sundry other demo-

graphics" (p. 25). But we have observed that purely expressive expressions like *fucker* do not target group members on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender, sexual orientation, immigrant status, or other such sundry demographic features. So although it may be acknowledged that purely expressive expressions like *fucker* and *damn* do not differ in their descriptive content,[8] it seems clear that slurs like *chink* and *whore* are in fact distinguished from one another by virtue of (differences among) their descriptive content.

For our purpose here of better understanding the actual content of various racial and sexual slurs, it may be useful to briefly consider the very different ways in which racial and sexual slurs have actually been used and are commonly understood. Considering the racial slur *nigger*, for instance, Easton (2007) has explained in *A Treatise on the Intellectual Character and Civil and Political Condition of the Colored People of the United States; and the Prejudice Exercised Towards Them* that this slur was understood as "an opprobrious term, employed to impose contempt upon blacks as an inferior race" (p. 41–42). Blassingame (1979) further explains in *The Slave Community* that, "to relieve themselves of the anxiety of thinking about slaves as men […] whites of all classes came to rely on language (and especially the use of pejoratives like the N word) in the pursuit of such relief" (p. 14). In "The N Word: Its History and Use in the African American Community," Rahman (2012) further explains that "the racist use of *nigger* criticizes a presumed innate moral and intellectual inferiority of African Americans" (p. 158) and that "*nigger* became a convenient term for indexing the subhuman characteristics being ascribed to African Americans through this ideology" (p. 143). Now considering the sexual slur *slut*, on the other hand, Attwood (2007) has explained that this slur was understood as identifying a "vulgar promiscuous woman who flouts propriety" (p. 233) or "a woman of a low or loose character" (p. 234). In "How the Jilt Triumphed Over the Slut: The Evolution of an Epithet, 1660–1780," Blackwell (2004) also explains that "The word 'slut,' a charge easy to level and hard to disprove, is an ambivalent emblem of women's perception of their sexuality" (p. 141). So given the very different ways in which the racial slur *nigger* and the sexual slur *slut* have actually been used in race-directed and sex-directed applications, respectively, it seems clear that racial slurs (such as *chink*, *nigger*, and *gook*) and sexual slurs (such as *bitch*, *slut*, and *whore*) are in fact distinguished from one another by virtue of (differences among) their descriptive content. In other words, what makes a racial slur *r* a *racial* slur is determined by the content or application-conditions of *r* just as what makes a sexual slur *s* a *sexual* slur is determined by the content or application-conditions of *s*. This point can be clarified with the examples below:

(12a) T is a *whore*, but I deny saying anything about her $[x]^d$.
(13a) T is a *chink*, but I deny saying anything about her $[x]^d$.

(12c) T is a *whore*, but I deny saying anything about her [racial identity].
(13c) T is a *chink*, but I deny saying anything about her [racial identity].*

(12d) T is a *whore*, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].*
(13d) T is a *chink*, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].

Although the sexual case (12a) and the racial case (13a) both involve utterances the felicity of which are blockable by *some* descriptive content, it can be observed from these examples that they are not both blockable by the *same* descriptive content. Namely, that content which blocks the felicity of the sexual slur in (12d) does not block the felicity of the racial slur in (13d), and that content which blocks the felicity of the racial slur in (13c) does not block the felicity of the sexual slur in (12c). Accordingly, since slurs are distinguishable from one another by virtue of their descriptive conditions, it follows that slurs must have descriptive contents that possess sufficient differences among their varieties such that they can be aptly distinguished from one another by competent speakers. Even Hedger (2012) seems implicitly committed to conceding descriptive content to slurs since he seems to find no problem identifying *which slur* is to count as *the relevant S*, "when S is a slur normally used to target blacks" (p. 78). So contrary to the analysis offered by Hedger (2012) it is clear that slurs are not purely expressive at all but instead possess a descriptive aspect also.

The second case Hedger (2012) offered in support of his view that slurs lack descriptive content altogether was where he argued that, "It would be odd to claim that this person [that yells *fucker* in frustration] has described the wrench or the car as being a certain way" (p. 77). But here Hedger (2012) has again taken an analysis of "cuss words" that suggests that "cuss words" fail to describe targets (p. 77) and assumed that from this analysis a conclusion about "slurs" could be straightforwardly drawn, namely, that "slurs" fail to describe targets as being a certain way also. But again what is problematic here is that "cuss words" like *fucker* function in a way that is linguistically quite distinct from "slurs" like *chink* and so Hedger (2012) is not warranted in drawing conclusions about slurs like *chink* from considerations of cuss words like *fucker*. To reinforce this point further still, let us briefly consider which targets might reasonably *take offense to* particular slurs (Croom 2013b). That is, if expressions like *fucker* and *chink* are really expressions of the same type (i.e., purely expressive expressions) as Hedger (2012) suggests, and no one in particular tends to feel especially targeted by an expression like *fucker*, then it should follow that no one in particular tends to feel especially targeted by an expression like *chink* either. But it seems clearly false that no one in particular tends to feel especially targeted

by an expression like *chink* (Leung 2004; Jackson 2005; McLaughlin 2008; Islam 2011; Stampler 2011; Miles 2012; Debucquoy-Dodley 2013). So with respect to this point, the purely expressive account of slurs that Hedger (2012) advocates seems committed to a claim that is empirically false.

Further still, Hedger (2012) also seems committed to the related *normative* commitment that no one in particular *should* feel especially targeted by an expression like *chink*, since the slur "lack[s] descriptive content whatsoever" (p. 77) and is instead purely expressive of the state of the speaker (Potts 2003; Potts & Kawahara 2004; Hedger 2013). As Hedger (2013) further explicates his view in "Meaning and Racial Slurs," "the same point about [the purely expressive expression *blasted*] could be made about expressions such as 'ouch' or about racial slurs. The main point is that they don't convey any information beyond the attitude which the speaker expresses by using it" (p. 211). So Hedger (2012) seems committed to the claim that, if anyone in particular *were to feel* especially targeted by a particular slurring expression like *chink*, then they would be feeling offended *unreasonably*. For example, if a Chinese American were to feel especially targeted by the slur *chink*, say more so than a Swedish person, then according to the purely expressive view of slurs endorsed by Hedger (2012) that Chinese American must be feeling especially targeted *unreasonably* since a Chinese American *should feel no more targeted by the slur chink than by the purely expressive expressions blasted* or *ouch* (Hedger 2012, p. 78; Hedger 2013, p. 211). Yet this apparent commitment itself seems unreasonable, as it fails to take seriously, for instance, the history and nature of particularly *race-directed* offense, which has already been well-discussed in prior work (Fredrickson 1971; Blassingame 1979; Bonnell 1998; Sniderman & Piazza 2002; Asim 2007; Smith 2011; Croom 2013). So when one actually takes into consideration the historical facts regarding particular types of offense, such as documented events of race-directed and sex-directed acts of derogation or subordination, it becomes especially clear that the purely expressive view of slurs proposed by Hedger (2012) suffers from a serious explanatory weakness insofar as it suggests (a) that no one in particular tends to feel especially targeted by slurring expressions like *chink* just as no one in particular tends to feel especially targeted by purely expressive expressions like *fucker*, and (b) that no one in particular *should* feel especially targeted by a particular slurring expression like *chink* since slurs presumably "lack descriptive content whatsoever," as expressions like *fucker* do, and are instead purely expressive of the state of the speaker (p. 77).

The third case Hedger (2012) offered in support of his purely expressive account of slurs was where he argued that "a person of Swedish decent" still manages to be offended by "a slur normally used to target blacks" (p. 78). The idea here seems to be that, since it is *not only* African Americans

that find the slur *nigger* offensive, but presumably Swedish people and *others also*, then slurs like *nigger* are *generally* offensive expressions with respect to everyone. And since each particular slur is presumably such that that slur is *generally* offensive with respect to everyone, then each slur must be *generally and purely* expressive, lacking sufficient descriptive content that might figure into the felicitous *differential* ascription of *particular* slurs towards *particular* targets in context. As Hedger claims, the sentence *Obama is the first S President of the U.S.*, "when S is a slur normally used to target blacks," "fails to offer sufficient descriptive content to predicate anything of Obama" (2012, p. 78) and that "Slurs express contempt but don't say anything about or describe their targets, and thus are composed of purely expressive content" (2013, p. 206).

But there are at least two reasons why the analysis Hedger (2012) offers for this case remain problematic. First, it is important to notice that in this case the real referential work towards the Swedish person is being done by the speaker's *ostensive act of pointing* rather than their *lexical choice* of the "slur normally used to target blacks" (p. 78). That is to say, Hedger (2012) has failed to isolate *the act of uttering a slur towards a target* from *the act of pointing towards a target* and demonstrated that the target was offended by the *former act* and not the *latter act*. For you might be offended by a stranger pointing their finger at you *regardless of what they say*. Or, you might be offended by a stranger pointing their finger at you while doing something that is *generally* offensive to witnesses (e.g., if they pointed their finger at you while spitting on an honored or cherished text, or while masturbating in public), as if by pointing at you while doing (e.g., saying) something generally offensive they were somehow *ostensibly involving you* in their generally offensive act. So as it stands, Hedger (2012) has not yet sufficiently argued that in this case "a person of Swedish decent" still manages to be *personally* offended by "a *slur* normally used to target blacks" (p. 78, my emphasis), since he has so far failed to properly isolate the act of *slurring* from the act of *pointing* within the larger communicative event under consideration.

A second reason why the analysis Hedger (2012) offers for this case is problematic is that he conflates being the *target* of a potentially offensive act with being the *witness* of a potentially offense act (Croom 2013b). Consider that a Swedish person that is offended by the use of the slur *nigger* can still take offense as a *witness* of this linguistic act while not taking offense as the *target* of this linguistic act. For instance, even if you are not Chinese American, since you are presumably not racist you are still likely to find the slur *chink* offensive *as a witness*. But given whatever racial or sexual identity you happen to have, you are likely to further find some particular slur *particularly offensive as a target*. If you are Chinese American, for

example, you are likely to find the slur *chink* – but not the slur *kraut* – particularly offensive *as a target*. Although the purely expressive account of slurs that Hedger (2012) proposes may be able to account for their *general offensiveness for non-targeted witnesses*, it seems unable to account for how slurs have the capacity for *particularly targeted offensiveness.* For if Hedger were correct in holding that all slurs "lack descriptive content whatsoever" (2012, p. 77), "contain merely expressive content" (2012, p. 78), and function as purely expressive expressions like *ouch* do to convey *no information beyond the subjective state of the speaker* (2013, p. 211), then it would remain ultimately mysterious why in certain contexts a (for instance, racist or in-group) speaker would find the slur *chink* more linguistically apt than the slur *kraut* for targeting Chinese Americans, and why Chinese Americans would presumably feel more directly offended by the slur *chink* than by the slur *kraut*.

In holding that slurs contain purely offensive expressive content, Hedger (2012) not only fails to account for the fact that in certain contexts a speaker would find one slur more linguistically apt than another for use (*lexical aptness*) and that in certain contexts some targets would find one slur more directly offensive than another (*target aptness*), he further fails to account for the fact that the use of a slur doesn't *always or necessarily* express offense. Recall for instance that in considering the statement *Obama is an S*, when S is a slur normally used to target blacks, Hedger (2013) claims that "there is no way to characterize the speaker's belief content which does not contain an expression of contempt or in a way which is not offensive" (p. 208). Hedger (2013) further asserts that "Slurs are offensive in every use, no matter the context of conversation" (p. 207), that "A slur can't be uttered without saying something derogatory" (p. 207), and that "the offensiveness of racial slurs should be considered part of their semantic content" (p. 206). Apparently, Hedger (2012, 2013) is held captive by a certain a priori picture of how slurs *must* work in natural language, for he is unwavering in his view that slurs *must* always and necessarily work to express offense.

Yet a commitment to this purely expressive view of slurs that Hedger (2012) proposes leaves the non-derogatory in-group (or re-appropriative) use of slurs appearing paradoxical and counter to "common sense" (p. 83). For if, as Hedger (2012) suggests, slurs *in general* always and necessarily work to express offensive content, it seems paradoxical that slurs *in some particular case* should work in opposition to this and express non-offensive content instead. Unfortunately, the uninformative strategy that Hedger (2012) adopts for dealing with this apparent paradox is to not deal with it at all, but rather to brush it aside as tangential to an adequate analysis of slurs (p. 83; see also Hedger 2013, p. 206). But perhaps Wittgenstein (1953) offers

relevant guidance when he advises in *Philosophical Investigations*: "Don't think, but look!" (§66). "One cannot guess how a word functions," Wittgenstein (1953) suggests, instead "One has to look at its use and learn from that" (§340). Often in philosophical or linguistic inquiry, Wittgenstein (1953) further remarks, a "paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose" (§304). Concerning the activities we call "games," for instance, Wittgenstein (1953) asks:

> What is common to them all? – Don't say: "There *must* be something common, or they would not be called 'games'" – but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. – For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. (§66)

By following Wittgenstein (1953) and *looking to see and listening to* how slurs are actually used in natural language discourse, it becomes clear that accounting for the fact that slurs can be felicitously used in a way that is non-offensive is crucially important for an explanatorily adequate account of slurs, since there is now substantive empirical evidence showing that slurs are not always or exclusively used to derogate.

For example, in a recent article published on *CBS Sports*, Wilson (2013) reports on the longtime friendship of fellow Lions teammates Tony Scheffler and Louis Delmas and points out that between the two of them "racial slurs are considered a term of endearment" (see also Foster 2013; Smith 2013). Scholars have also noted that the racial slur *nigger* has been used non-pejoratively since at least the early 1800s (Dillard 1977; Stuckey 1994; Spears 1998; Jacobs 2001; Wilson 2002; Rahman 2012), and that slurs are in fact frequently picked up and reappropriated by the very in-group members that the slur was originally intended to target, presumably as a means for like speakers to strengthen in-group solidarity or to diminish what derogatory force the slur had previously carried (Kennedy 2002; Galinsky, Hugenberg, Groom, & Bodenhausen 2003; Brontsema 2004; Croom 2010; Croom 2011; Croom 2012; Croom 2013a; Croom 2013b; Galinksy, Wang, Whitson, Anicich, Hugenberg & Bodenhausen in press). This reappropriative or non-derogatory in-group use of slurs is a bone fide and widespread use of slurs that communicates positive, non-pejorative content or meaning when employed between in-group speakers that differs markedly from the "Pejorative meanings that have historically come from outside the community" (Rahman 2012, p. 141). As Croom (2013) has suggested in "How to Do Things with Slurs," within the context of certain in-group speakers a slur can often be used as a *norm reversed variant* of the original paradigmatic derogatory use and can thus be understood between in-group speakers as

non-derogatory. In "The Co-Construction of Whiteness in an MC Battle," Cutler (2007) also explains that, within hip-hop culture especially, "Whiteness is still marked against a backdrop of normative Blackness" so that within such a cultural context an "alternative social reality [exists] in which Blackness is normative and Whiteness is marked" (p. 10–11; for reasons motivating norm reversal see discussion in Croom 2013a, p. 190–194; Anderson 1999, p. 36, 112, 234). Considering the non-derogatory use of the racial slur *nigger*, for instance, the influential hip-hop lyricist Talib Kweli has reported that, "Our community has been using the word and trying to redefine the context of it for a long time" and "the fact of the matter is that there's a large segment of black people who grew up hearing the word intended as nothing but love" (quoted in Echegoyen 2006). In *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*, Kennedy (2002) also discusses how many African Americans continue to non-offensively use the slur "openly and frequently in conversations with one another" (p. 37). Spears (1998) likewise claims in "African-American Language Use: Ideology and So-Called Obscenity," that "the great majority of African Americans, male and female, use [the] N [word] when among other African Americans" non-offensively (p. 239). Henry Louis Gates, Jr., director of the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for African American Research at Harvard University, also claims that he is not at all offended by the use of the slur in an in-group context among African Americans (Gates 2009). Russell Simmons, the founder of Def Jam Records, further explains that:

> When we say 'nigger' now, it's very positive. Now all white kids who buy into hip-hop culture call each other 'nigger' because they have no history with the word other than something positive […] When black kids call each other 'a real nigger' or 'my nigger,' it means you walk a certain way […] have your own culture that you invent so you don't have to buy into the US culture that you're not really a part of. It means we're special. We have our own language. (quoted in Jackson 2005)

Yet this non-derogatory use of slurs is clearly not restricted to racial slurs alone but extends to slurs of other varieties also, such as sexual slurs. For instance, sexual slurs like *queer* and *bitch* have also been popularly re-appropriated for in-group use (Kleinman, Ezzell & Frost 2009; Schillinger 2010; Angyal 2011). Just as it has been pointed out before that speakers often exchange race-pertaining terms with each other, "not as a means to derogatively characterize each other, but as a means for naming each other as fellow members belonging to the same racial group" (Croom 2008, p. 45, fn. 5; p. 43–44), Stampler (2011) has likewise discussed how "the word "queer" [is] as an example of a[nother] word that was once strictly pejorative but is now a common sexual identifier used [non-offensively] by the LGBT

community." The representatives of SlutWalk, an international movement that has received widespread media coverage, have expressed their view on slurs over a radio broadcast in the following way:

> One of the most effective ways to fight hate is to disarm the derogatory terms employed by haters, embracing them and giving them positive connotations. This also serves to provide a sex-positive term for women (and men), few or none of which currently exist, and allows sluts (individuals of any gender who have and enjoy frequent consensual sex, especially with multiple partners) to identify as part of a cohesive group for political representation. We feel that offering a place for women who lead such a lifestyle to self-identify as sluts does not disrespect them – indeed, the disrespecting is done by the rapists, the victim blamers who excuse the rape, and the slut shamers who say or imply they are disgracing, degrading, and dishonoring themselves. (Murray, Sacks & Schimmel 2011)

In an article to appear in *Psychological Science*, which seems relevant to our discussion here, Galinksy and colleagues (in press) conducted ten empirical studies on re-appropriation to test its potential effects on speakers and listeners empirically. The basic result from their ten studies was that they found that a reciprocal relationship holds between (a) the feeling of power, and (b) self-labeling with a slur such as *queer* or *bitch* (p. 1). As Galinksy and colleagues (in press) explain their results:

> Self-labelers felt more powerful after self-labeling and observers perceived self-labelers and their group as more powerful. Finally, the label was evaluated less negatively after self-labeling and this stigma attenuation was mediated by perceived power. Importantly, these effects only occurred for derogatory terms (e.g., queer, bitch) but not for descriptive (e.g., LGBT, woman) or majority group labels (e.g., straight). These results suggest that self-labeling with a derogatory label can weaken its stigmatizing force. (Galinksy, Wang, Whitson, Anicich, Hugenberg & Bodenhausen in press, p. 1)

In another empirical study conducted by Associated Press-MTV involving 1,355 participants, it was also found that 54% of respondents "think it's OK to use them [slurs] within their own circle of friends" and that in such contexts the slur is non-offensive (Cass & Agiesta 2011; Greene 2011). As one of the subjects in another empirical study conducted by Rahman (2012) explains, "You see, the people who say they're offended are the older adults. Young kids don't understand what the big deal is about the word. They know it's about black people and slavery, but they're like 'that's over'" (p. 161). So we have now seen that recent empirical studies in fact substantiate other independent reports of in-group speakers claiming to use slurs non-

offensively, and thus provide a serious challenge to the purely expressive account of slurs proposed by Hedger (2012) which argues a priori that "Slurs are offensive in every use, no matter the context of conversation" (p. 207).

Yet another problem with the analysis presented by Hedger (2012) in "The Semantics of Racial Slurs" concerns his suggestion that slurs may function as reverse or anti-honorifics (p. 78–79). The problem here lies in his assumption that he can legitimately commit to both (a) the claim that slurs have purely expressive content, and (b) the claim that slurs function as (anti-) honorifics. For there is reason to doubt that one can legitimately maintain this joint commitment, for as McCready (2010) has already explained in "Varieties of Conventional Implicature," "honorifics like *irassharu* are instances of mixed content" rather than purely expressive content since they "simultaneously honor some individual and predicate something of her" (p. 17). Consequently, a commitment to (b) seems incompatible with a commitment to (a), and thus in suggesting that slurs may function as anti-honorifics Hedger (2012) seems to at least implicitly go against the grain of his purely expressive view of slurs by suggesting that slurs, just like honorifics such as *irassharu*, involve mixed rather than purely expressive content.

As a final point of criticism, the purely expressive analysis of slurs offered by Hedger (2012) suffers from the serious problem of failing to observe, take into consideration, and discuss actual concrete examples of slurs being used in natural language discourse. It seems plausible that many of the weaknesses in the analysis Hedger (2012) offers of slurs are at least partly due to the fact that he continually ignores inspecting concrete examples of slurs as they are actually used in natural language and simply identifies all instances with the blanket label *S* (p. 74, 78), which has evidently resulted in his weakened ability to notice distinctions between different slurs and his failure to connect theorizing about slurs with empirical data from an enlarged sample of competent speakers. Hedger (2012) says that he "believe[s], as Wittgenstein did, that common sense should not be treated like an umbrella, but should be carried into the room as a guiding principle when we philosophize" (p. 83). But perhaps Hedger (2012) should also believe, as Wittgenstein (1953) did, that "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to *look at* its use and learn from that" (§340).

## 4. Conclusion

To review, our discussion in this article has proceeded as follows. Section 1 provided an introduction and section 2 reviewed the purely expressive approach to slurs recently proposed by Hedger (2012) along with the three key cases he asked us to consider in support of his claim that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content: (1) where Hedger (2012) found

different translations for English "cuss words" in Spanish, (2) where "It would be odd to claim that this person [that yells *fucker* in frustration] has described the wrench or the car as being a certain way" (p. 77), and (3) where "a person of Swedish decent" still manages to be offended by "a slur normally used to target blacks" (p. 78). We critically evaluated these cases in section 3, finding that all of the arguments presented by Hedger (2012) are problematic and that the case for a purely expressive account of slurs remains weak.

To be clear, this article has shown that the purely expressive analysis of slurs presented in "The Semantics of Racial Slurs" by Hedger (2012) ultimately fails in at least the following 13 ways: (1) it illegitimately draws conclusions about slurs (e.g., *chink*) from analyses of cuss words (e.g., *fuck*); (2) it fails to consider the different ways in which different (e.g., racial and sexual) slurs have conventionally been used (e.g., in race-directed and sex-directed acts, respectively) and are commonly understood; (3) it fails to account for the fact that slurs are differentially applied towards targets with different descriptive features; (4) it falsely suggests that no one in particular tends to feel particularly targeted by particular slurs; (5) it wrongly suggests that if anyone in particular were to feel especially targeted by a particular slurring expression then they would be feeling offended unreasonably; (6) it fails to properly isolate the act of slurring from the act of pointing within the larger communicative event under consideration; (7) it conflates being the target of a potentially offensive act with being the witness of a potentially offensive act; (8) it fails to account for how slurs have the capacity for particularly targeted offensiveness; (9) it fails to account for both lexical aptness and target aptness; (10) it fails to account for the empirical fact that slurs can be used non-offensively; (11) it illegitimately suggests that slurs have purely expressive rather than mixed content while simultaneously suggesting that slurs function as honorifics, despite the fact that "honorifics like *irassharu* are instances of mixed content" in that they "simultaneously honor some individual and predicate something of her" (McCready 2010, p. 17); (12) it fails to consider concrete examples of slurs as they are actually used in natural language and simply identifies all instances of slurs with the blanket label S, resulting, for instance, in a weakened ability to notice distinctions between different types of slurs; (13) it does not take into consideration the linguistic behavior and explicit reports of robust populations of fully competent (in-group, typically minority) speakers, prejudging in advance that only self-confirming evidence should be taken seriously. In clearly showing that the purely expressive analysis of slurs that Hedger (2012) offers is inadequate in at least these 13 ways, it also becomes clear that an adequate account of slurs will ultimately involve not only an expressive component but a descriptive component also. In other words, slurs are best

accounted for by a mixed or hybrid approach, as I have further outlined in other recent work.

## NOTES

1. Hedger (2012) cites Kaplan's unpublished manuscript from (2004), but since it has been available since at least (1999) I here cite the earlier version.

2. It is interesting to note that, although Hedger (2012, 2013) does not cite the earlier work on slurs by Croom (2011), it is clear that most of the correct points made by Hedger (2012) and Hedger (2013) were already previously discussed in sections 1–4 in Croom (2011) and section 5 in Croom (2011), respectively. It is not the main aim of the present work to explicate these points of comparison, but the reader can easily observe these points of comparison by consulting Croom (2011, 2013) and Hedger (2012, 2013).

3. Example (1) here is identified as example (3) in Hedger 2012, p. 75, but has been renumbered to avoid confusing the reader with an incoherent numbering method for the multiple examples provided throughout this article.

4. Example (2) here is identified as example (5) in Hedger 2012, p. 76.

5. I am here granting for the sake of argument Hedger's (2012) use of the expression *intelligent* as an apt example of an expression with purely descriptive content, but it is perhaps worth further exploring on a separate occasion whether the expression *intelligent* may also be expressive of an attitude towards the target of predication.

6. See criticism 6 in the present article for an important discussion about the speaker *pointing* in this case. I reserve the discussion now for the sake of suspense.

7. Example (5) here is identified as example (17) in Hedger 2012, p. 78.

8. This is due to the fact that the expressions *fucker* and *damn* are commonly assumed to lack descriptive content altogether (Potts 2005; Potts 2007).

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 33–54, ISSN 1841-2394

# SHUTTER-SPEED MEANING, NORMATIVITY, AND WITTGENSTEIN'S *ABRICHTUNG*

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ABSTRACT. How is it, the paper asks, that on hearing the word sound of "intriguing" we cannot at the very same time entertain the concepts of "green" or "democracy"? I approach this question with the help of Wittgenstein's concept of *Abrichtung* and the discussion of *normativity* as rule-following. Instead of truth-conditions, assertability-conditions, justification-conditions, and correctness-conditions, the paper proposes *imaginability conditions* as foundational for linguistic meaning. Instead of Platonic, intensional, externalist, and neural accounts of meaning, the paper argues that meaning in both high-speed habitual and interpretively problematic contexts can be viewed as *indirectly public* association of the sounds of linguistic expressions with mental iconic schematisations. The paper concludes by recommending an intersubjective mentalism within which we can argue the notion of *normativity* as an automated rather than rule-guided form of *Abrichtung*. This allows for a general concept of meaning as defined as part of a *semantics of imaginability*, eschewing meaning ideality on the one hand and semantic externalism, on the other.

Keywords: *Abrichtung*; normativity; meaning blindness; imaginability conditions; habitual use; meaning as indirectly public

> The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement [that is] the crystalline purity of logic. (*PI* §10)

## 1. Introduction

Why is it that when we hear the word sound "pleasant" we are not able, in the split second event of comprehension, to entertain the meaning of "democracy", "running", "green", or any other signified? How is it that during this minimal event, measured in neuroscience to typically less than 250ms, the native speaker is tied or, as Ludwig Wittgenstein would say, *abgerichtet*, to doing more or less the same as other native speakers. Let us call this tie

the *comprehension compulsion.* Throughout the *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*), Wittgenstein refers to the source of this phenomenon of natural language as *Abrichtung.* While the term is rendered in English as "training", there is a marked difference in the semantic scope of the two signifiers. "Training" is a broad notion in English, including as it can many forms of education, from sport to the fine arts. One cannot however be *abgerichtet* in the art of sculpture without turning into mere mimicry. *Abrichtung* is employed in the context of the strictest possible sort of training as in the military, on the parade ground, in the handling of weapons, and in the sense of breaking in horses or making circus lion jump through hoops on fire. Indeed, the word tells us, those that are so trained are aligned exactly in the same direction (*Richtung; Ab-richtung*). In its extreme form, *Abrichtung* results in "blind" obedience. (*PI* §129) Is this perhaps what happens in the high-speed event of meaning under the *comprehension compulsion*? And is this perhaps the most important part of the training of native speakers? And does the notion of 'normativity' capture this specific part of linguistic meaning?

There has been relatively little research on the problems of rendering Wittgenstein's German manuscripts in English. What inquiry there is can be found neatly assembled in Dinda Gorlée's recent *Wittgenstein in Translation: Exploring Semiotic Signatures* (2012). Comparing all the standard translations, and especially retranslations, of Wittgenstein's writings published during his life time and since then, and drawing especially on his manuscripts and *Nachlass* in the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen, Gorlée addresses the pitfalls facing his translators in English, as well as in other languages. This is an important contribution since Wittgenstein saw it as one of his key tasks to unravel the causes of our "bedazzlement" by language. (*PI* §109) *Abrichtung*, however, is not one of the terms Gorlée has singled out for critical scrutiny. I will briefly attempt such an investigation here, but not from the perspective primarily of translation and semiotics but rather in order to argue a fundamental characteristic of natural language, namely what makes language appear "natural". (Tarski 1956, p. 267) In choosing this topic I want to go along as far as I can with Wittgenstein only to break away from his meaning scepticism at the point where he excludes *imaginability*, his *Vorstellbarkeit*, from meaning as use. (*PI* §395) Whereas Wittgenstein grants *imaginability* the role of incidental by-product of meaning, a mere playing on the *Vorstellungsklavier*, (*PI* §6) I want to show that it his very own notion of *Abrichtung* that permits us to reinstate *imaginability* as a constituent feature of linguistic meaning. In pursuing the implications of *Abrichtung*, I will however steer a middle course between meaning ideality on the one hand and merely externalist use, including Wittgenstein's, on the other.

## 2. *Abrichtung*

To grasp the meaning of *Abrichtung* we follow Wittgenstein's rule of looking at how he uses the term. Early in the *PI* he tells us that when we teach children their mother tongue this process is not an "explanation" but rather "*ein Abrichten*", a strict form of training,(§5) consisting to an important extent in a combination of ostension, directing a child's attention to what is being pointed out, while at the same time uttering a word. (§6) An example of *Abrichtung* is to teach the pupil the technique of reading charts, (§86) another, the teaching of algebra. (§§146; 151f.; 189; 320) Wittgenstein also invokes such imaginary scenarios as using "human beings, or creatures of some other kind" being "*abgerichtet*", that is, automated into "reading machines". (§157) A person so trained has not primarily changed his mental disposition, but his behaviour. (§158) Bringing into play the formula "$y = x^2$", Wittgenstein demonstrates that anyone trained in the correct application of the formula will come up with *identical* results, while comparing different kinds of formulae and uses will yield the result of "different kinds of *Abrichtung*". Likewise, Wittgenstein suggests, the meaning of natural language terms, such as "determine". (§189) What then is the relation, he asks, between the expression of a rule, a signpost as it were, and my actions? His answer is "*ich bin zu einem bestimmten Reagieren auf dieses Zeichen abgerichtet worden, und so reagiere ich nun"* (I have been trained to react in a specific way to this sign, and this is how I now react). After a while, once we have acquired the grammar of the expression "to follow a rule", such reactions turn into "*Gepflogenheiten* (Gebräuche, Institutionen)", that is, habits (customs, institutions). (§198; 380) How strictly Wittgenstein conceives of the phrase "to follow a rule" is made clear a little later in the *PI* when he compares it by analogy with "to obey an order". We have no choice in the matter because we have been *abgerichtet* to react to it in a "*bestimmter Weise*", a phrase usually rendered idiomatically as "in a particular way". What gets lost in translation is that "*bestimmt*" also suggests the sense of "determined", an emphasis that shores up Wittgenstein's obvious intention to make the notion of rule-following more rigorous a requirement than the broader concept of "following" permits. (§206) The rhetorical question what would happen if someone were to respond one way, another person in a different way, is answered a few paragraphs later where he insists that the rule "always tells us the same, and we do what it says". To a person that has been so *abgerichtet* we could say: "See, I always do the same thing". (§223)

To be sure, Wittgenstein's analogies between natural language and algebra are problematic. While the sense of determined *compulsion* applies to both, it does so in two radically different senses. In algebra, and certainly

in all formal systems, rule-following is bounded by syntax as univocally determining definitional sense. This is not the case in natural language the meanings of which can be refined by syntax but are primarily determined by nonverbal *aboutness* and modified by *voice*. This why Wittgenstein's algebraic analogy, like that with chess, is misleading in that it conflates an *intensional* sign system with an *extensional* system, involving perceptual and quasi-perceptual *aboutness* as well as speech modalities. And yet, in habitual speech, semantic uptake is roughly as fast as that of algebraic grasp. To that extent, then, his analogy holds, though we are dealing with clearly different *kinds* of *Abrichtung*. Different *Abrichtungen*, says Wittgenstein, lead to different types of "techniques", such as for "*Wunschäusserungen*" (expressions of wishes), (§441) or in the disciplines of sport and in chemistry. (§630) Lastly, in the "Philosophy of Psychology" Wittgenstein considers the case of someone *abgerichtet* in such a way that on seeing something red he would utter a certain sound and on seeing something yellow another one, and so on. Such training would however not amount to a description of objects by their colour, even if this could assist us in producing a description. What is missing is "a representation of a distribution in a space (for example, of time)". (*PI* PPF 70) I am inclined here to add that usually there is neither a real space nor a real passing of time, nor a real distribution within such spaces. In typical linguistic situations we merely *imagine* such circumstances. And we do so at astonishingly high speeds. So successful is linguistic *Abrichtung* that we are able to comprehend small units of meaning in an incredibly short span of time. As Wittgenstein likes to refer to this phenomenon, we understand an expression "at a stroke" or "in a flash". (*PI* §§139; 191; 318; 319; 339)

It does not require too far a stretch of the imagination to connect the recurring themes of *Abrichtung* and high-speed comprehension in the *PI*. There can be little doubt that Wittgenstein sees a causal nexus between the two. Only if we are *abgerichtet* are we able to "*understand* the meaning of a word when we hear it or say it "*mit einem Schlage*" (at a stroke; *PI* §191). But now Wittgenstein draws an important distinction between "what we grasp in this fashion" and "the "use" which is extended in time" (§138) and asks "how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a *use*?" (§139) In the subsequent paragraphs Wittgenstein further dissociates the two. We should ask, however, why it is not possible that nothing comes to the native speaker's mind on the cue of a word sound. Wittgenstein does not address this crucial question. Yet, the idea of semantic uptake "at a stroke" in relation to his notion of "use" continues to dog his investigation.

> *Can't* the use – in a certain sense – be grasped at a stroke? And in *what* sense can't it? – It is indeed as if we could "grasp it at a stroke" in a much more direct sense. (§191)

Unfortunately we lack a "*Vorbild* (example, model) for this *übermässige Tatsache*" (excessive fact). Because all we have is "the result of the crossing of images", we are "seduced into using an *Überausdruck* (a meta-term; super-expression) … a philosophical superlative". (§§191f.) It is telling, I think, that in spite of such difficulties, Wittgenstein refuses to let go of what he termed "this excessive fact". A few paragraphs later he reiterates, "it's as if we could grasp the whole use of a word at a stroke", closing the paragraph with the question, "where is the connection effected between the sense of the words 'Let's play a game of chess' and all the rules of the game?" His answer is the triptych: *the index of rules; pedagogy; and day-to-day practice*. (§197; my emphasis) These are the necessary ingredients of *Abrichtung*, serving the purpose of drawing our attention to the relentless character of the pedagogy by which the speech community enforces the rules that *naturalize* language as meaningful for native speakers. In turn, native speakers are *abgerichtet* to practice those rules without the autonomy of choice. I want to support Wittgenstein's distinction of use as "rule" and "meaning as use" by regarding the latter as the instantiation of the former. From this perspective, I now ask whether the compulsory character of this relation has been convincingly addressed in the literature on *normativity*.

## 3. Normativity

In the wake of Kripke's discussion of rule-following in the *PI*, an entire industry has sprung up exploring the concept of *normativity*. (Kripke 1982) Broadly, the debate makes two assumptions, one, that the concept of *meaning* remains unaffected across all kinds of language use, a problem I will postpone until later in the paper; and, two, that *normativity* likewise retains its conceptual identity in different linguistic contexts. What the literature however demonstrates is that there is by no means general agreement as to how precisely we should conceive of *normativity*.

In order to avoid the Humpty-Dumpty situation of meaning determination, Kripke argues against "dispositional" accounts. Instead, by following community rules governing the use of language-games we are confirming ME, that is, meaning engendered *normativity*. In defense of *normativity* in this sense, semantic performance is an obligation to obey "the dictates of meaning" itself. (McGinn 1984, p. 45; cf. also McDowell 1984; Whiting 2007) McGinn's support of a strong *normativity* thesis rests on the condition that meaning must be trans-temporal. Linguistic correctness can be guaranteed

only if meaning remains constant across time and so across a diversity of applications. (McGinn 1984, p. 174) While making for a neat argument, this Fregean, formal conception of natural language semantics as being rooted in meaning identity falls foul of Wittgenstein's criticism of being dazzled by the "crystalline purity of logic". (*PI* §107) Likewise, the attempt by early Husserl to argue meaning as a Platonic ideality was bound to fail, as demonstrated by his retreat to its exemplification by formal examples. Wittgenstein's meaning as use escapes both the formal fallacy of confusing linguistic meaning with fully defined intensional entities and rampant "dispositional" accounts by his constraint of radical *Abrichtung*. The main amendment I make to Wittgenstein's rendition of use is that its externalism has to be amended by re-incorporating *Vorstellung*, taken as mental iconic schematisations, a point to be resumed below.

Another version of meaning engendered *normativity* is the argument from "correctness conditions" as presented for example by Paul Boghossian. Since the deontic rules for action include guidance as to how to employ language-games, the way we use language meaningfully is normatively constrained. Such rules provide the conditions for "correct" use. Without giving up on *normativity* and by shifting Kripke's epistemic emphasis of a speaker's meaning ascription to one that foregrounds the "possibility of meaning", Boghossian argues from "correctness conditions" to meaning as constitutive, (1989, p. 515) a combination rejected for instance by Wikforss (2001). In a later paper Boghossian reduces his support for general normativity to *content*. (Boghossian 2003; cf. also Speaks 2009). It remains doubtful, though, whether Boghossian's strategy can lead to a satisfactory answer to his crucial question, "How do public language symbols come to acquire meaning and what role does thought play in that process?" (Boghossian 1989, p. 549) I will attempt an answer to this question in the section on "Imaginability conditions" below by characterizing "thought" in comprehension as nonverbal and *indirectly public*. (Ruthrof 2011b, pp. 166; 172) Correctness conditions are shown by Boghossian and also Millar to rest on a Davidsonian picture of "belief", taken as the ground for the very possibility of *normativity*. (Millar 2008; cf. also 2002)

A strong defense of *normativity* is mounted by Meredith Williams in the sense of Wittgenstein's rules as engendered by the speech community. Because the community lays down what are correct and incorrect applications, the notion of rule-following acquires a high degree of "objectivity". (Williams 2007, p. 61) Her arguments deviate from Kripke's on the point that rule-following should not be regarded as the result of thinking but as a form of unified action. As such, rule-following cannot be an "interpretation". (2007, p. 87) What Williams, like most of her colleagues, is addressing is *habitually automated speech.* Yet in a phrase like "nervous as a mother roo

in a room full of pickpockets" the event of meaning construction is extended in time and so "interpretation" re-enters the analysis. This exposes a serious weakness of global conceptions of *normativity:* the assumption that rule-following is the same sort of thing in all linguistic contexts. While the majority of arguments for *normativity* share the rejection of dispositional accounts of meaning, Ralph Wedgewood for one attempts to show a way of retaining both *normativity* and intentionality, (Wedgewood 2009) a theme taken on also by Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007), though with opposite results. (2007) Two recent contributions in support of *normativity* are offered by Aude Bandini, who insists that in spite of meaning being constitutive there is nevertheless a normative dimension to semantics of linguistic expressions, (Bandini 2011; cf. Boghossian 2008) and by James Connelly who, by resuming Kripke's rejection of intrinsic, intentional meaning, affirms the basic principles of meaning *normativity* as fundamentally "prescriptive". (Connelly 2012)

In strong opposition to *normativity* Wikforss (2001) argued the concept to be obscure on the grounds that there are many different kinds of ought and prescription. Furthermore, we cannot use "truth" as a criterion since falsehoods need not be semantic mistakes, nor "correctness", the opposite of which would simply be a violation of "use". Likewise, Wikforss rejects Kripke's link between intention and future action as normative on the grounds that if we violate the rules of adding up we simply are not doing algebra. In other words, she views rules as *constitutive* rather than *normative.* Wikforss further rejects the idea that constraints on rationality are grounded in *normativity* because they do not readily apply to creative language use. Next, she objects to meaning as normative by pointing to the fact that ought rules presuppose concept possession. The emphasis is applied also to arguments from communication in that the relation between use and meaning is constitutively rather than normatively constrained. Lastly, Wikforss maintains that if meaning were normative, then naturalism fails. In a joint paper with Glüer published in 2009, Wikforss resumes her opposition to linguistic *normativity*, sharpening the argument by focussing on "content normativity". (Glüer and Wikforss 2009). The authors argue that neither CE, normativism as essential to certain contents, nor CD, normativism of determined content, go through because there simply is no essential connection between content and semantic correctness conditions and because CD either results in a regress of rules or in the conceptual vacuity of "rule-following". So the authors are confident that *normativity* should be rejected as lacking in specificity and, as a further consequence, that naturalism should be abandoned in the description of meaning.

The position that semantic *normativity* cannot be coherently argued is held also by Anandi Hattiangadi, who objects to Kripke's claim that dis-

positional meaning is irrelevant to meaning and undermines rule-following. Instead, Hattiangadi insists that what we mean by an expression cannot be eliminated from the debate and so *normativity* in the wake of Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein is not sustainable. (Hattiangadi 2007)

From the position taken in this paper, there are several criticisms that can be made about the broad concept of *normativity* and also of some of the specific arguments. The global application of *normativity* fails because the linguistic expressions as meaning entities always supervene on specific combinations of *aboutness* and its modification by *voice*. In this sense, disposition enters the process of meaning of necessity. Furthermore, we need to distinguish carefully between habitual and interpretive comprehension. In response to a sentence such as "Time hath My Lord a knapsack on his back, wherein he puts alms for oblivion" we follow semantic rules in the construction of meaning. Yet can the same be said about the comprehension of the word sounds of "what a tall tree", "stop running", "green", or "democracy"? If we are indeed following rules in both types of speech, "rule-following" must have two different meanings. When Dummett notes that "the sense of a command is determined by knowing what constitutes obedience and what disobedience" he is describing well what occurs in complex interpretive situations. (Dummett 1978, p. 8) However, this cannot account for what happens under the near instantaneous time frame of the *comprehension compulsion* in automated speech, where *Abrichtung* makes the option of disobedience unavailable.

Lastly, it is broadly assumed that disposition is subjective and therefore cannot be reconciled with rule-following as community constraint. This is a continuing Fregean prejudice. While it was an assumption made by Frege in ridding semantics of psychologism, there are good reasons to argue in favour of the *Vorstellung* he banished being treated as rule-governed, very much like language itself. *Imaginability* would then be intersubjectively systemic and qualify as non-dispositional component of linguistic meaning. (Ruthrof 2014) Such an approach finds some support in a broad range of cognitive literature (Fouconnier and Turner 2002; Hampe 2005; Itkonen 2008; 2005; 2003; Johnson 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 1999; Ziemke at al. 2007; Zlatev 2007; 1997; Zlatev et al. 2008; Zwaan and Madden 2005) As to *Abrichtung*, this would allow us to reintroduce *Vorstellung* into natural language semantics by replenishing Wittgenstein's notion of meaning as use. (Ruthrof 2011a) Taking such a corporeal turn leads us to the consideration of *imaginability conditions* as foundational for linguistic meaning.

## 4. *Imaginability* Conditions

If we look at the series "verification (Frege; Schlick) – truth-conditions (Davidson) – "correctness conditions" (Boghossian) – "assertability conditions" (Dummett) – "justification conditions" (Kripke) we note an increasing sense of caution and a diminishing sense of certitude. In the face of the realities of natural languages the propositional starting point of truth as a criterion of meaning has had to give way to weaker and weaker theses. Has the philosophy of language perhaps started with the wrong Aristotelian keyword? It may be useful here to remind ourselves that in *De Interpretatione* the notion of proposition is not the first base for the description of language; what we find instead is a realist version of the Platonic *mimesis* in the guise of "resemblance relations", Aristotle's *homoiomata*. In comparison with propositions facilitating judgment of whether sentences are true or false, the base task of language of reflecting the world, our perceptions, as well as our variations of those perceptions, is a much broader function. One could call the purpose of propositions a second-order function, a language-game on top of primary semantic uptake, requiring meta-comprehension. This does not in itself disqualify attempts at using truth-conditions from being argued as a test of meaningful sentences, as long as we are aware that to form propositions is always already an application of *aboutness*, one of the two *sine qua non* of linguistic meaning, the other one being *voice*. What seems to have happened in the history of the philosophy of language is that a specialized language use, the formation of propositions, has claimed the whole turf, with elegant but not always satisfactory results.

If on the other hand resemblance relations were to be taken as the base line of natural language semantics, allowing for *mimesis* in a broad sense, including realist as well as fictional language-games, then we should look in the first place at the role of *imaginability conditions* in the process of comprehension and meaning. *Imaginability* is understood here as our ability to have and draw on mental iconic, multi-modal projections (olfactory, gustatory, auditory, tactile, thermal, emotional, kinetic, proximic, visual, etc.) stored in memory as nonverbal *schemata*. What has to be avoided in such a semantics is the category mistake of conflating the notion of *schema* with *image*. Doing so would be like confusing "currency" with "notes" or "coins". While truth-conditions ask what would have to be the case for a sentence to be true and assertability conditions characterize the recognizable conditions "under which it may be correctly asserted", or "under which an assertoric utterance … would be true", *imaginability conditions* could be described as the *indirectly public* conditions under which we are able to imagine what a linguistic expression is about and how its specific utterance modifies its aboutness. Yet before what a sentence says can be traced to the

conditions that make it true and prior to its being judged according to warranted assertability, its content has to be *imagined.* And so does its *purpose* in terms of its speech act, Frege's "force" or, more broadly, *implicit deixis*. (Ruthrof 2000, pp. 48–53; cf. also "modal opacity", 1992, pp. 4f.) Leaving aside here the criticism made by Dummett who declares truth conditions as "generally unrecognizable", (Dummett 1978, pp. xxii; xvi; cf. also Kripke 1982, pp. 73ff.; 86ff.) all those secondary "conditions" fundamentally supervene on *imaginability conditions*, defined here as *the necessary conditions for the kinds of mental iconic projections without which we cannot be aware of linguistic aboutness and the purpose of the utterance of an expression.* As such, they are iconic, quasi-perceptual schematisations of mental materials regulated by concepts according to directionality, quality, quantity, and degree of nonverbal abstraction, strictly trained and monitored by the speech community. (Ruthrof 2011b, p. 170) *Imaginability conditions* thus are the conditions under which native speakers have been *abgerichtet* to comprehend the meaning of linguistic expressions by imagining what they are *about* and for what *purpose* they are being uttered. Comprehension in this sense can be habitually automated or interpretively probing.

In pursuing this line of argument I draw on claims made by Hintikka and Hintikka concerning the mimetic function of Wittgenstein's language-games. They ask "What is the mode of existence of the semantical relations between language and world?" (2007, p. 34) In answering the question they attack the received view that language-games are not so much about the link between word and world but rather about "language-acts" and their "interrelations", "contexts", and their nature". This, the authors reject as an intralingual misreading. Instead, they argue that Wittgenstein's earlier isomorphism between name and object has morphed in the *PI* into a more complex relation. Now language-games serve a range of different relations between language and world. Wittgenstein has progressed from "description" to a "multi-modal" account. Yet Hintikka and Hintikka insist that Wittgenstein retained the notion of "mirroring" in the sense of a syntactic reflection such that linguistic symbols are grammatically integrated in language-games constituting the "projective relations" between word and world. (2007, pp. 38–54) Yet, Wittgenstein's concept of grammatical mimesis can be read at least in two ways. One is that grammar is an intralinguistic convention which we impose on the world, producing a conceptualized version of it; another is to say that resemblance between language and world should not be surprising since after all the former has inherited its basic structures from a pre-linguistic perceptual hominid *protosyntax.* The first explanatory avenue is supported by the view of syntax as the result of a catastrophic evolutionary event; (Cf. the early Bickerton 1981; 1987) the second is

shored up by arguments for iconicity in language. (Haiman 1985; 1980; Bouissac 1995; Landesberg 1992; Simone 1995) Whichever reading of Wittgenstein's "pictorial representation of our grammar" we prefer, (*PI* §295) what is crucial is the question of what sort of *imaginability conditions* typically prevail in different kinds of language-games and how *Abrichtung* has automated our pragmatic/semantic uptake. Consider the following examples.

(1) When you get to the yard you will find a 600x50x6 [mm] 316 stainless steel flatbar. Cut into two 250 [mm] pieces, leaving one of 100 [mm] length. Continuous welding as per attached drawing.
(2) That was *such* a pleasant evening last night. Pity your husband couldn't join us. I hope he will be better soon.
(3) Starve the lizzards.
(4) I was murdered.

What sort of *imaginability conditions* must we stipulate for each of these sentences? It is only to be expected that such conditions should differ according to the more or less realistic and more or less complex human situations expressed in each case. But can we nevertheless speak of a common base condition? (1) Here we have a realist situation in which language functions as technical instruction for someone who knows what he or she is supposed to be doing. But far from the basic conditions of comprehension being restricted to action and immediate grasp of a portion of the world, even here complicated imaginative processes are called upon to facilitate the event of comprehension. To understand the instructions, the welder must mentally project the typical appearance of a flatbar, the properties of stainless steel grade 316, what "continuous welding" consists in, and a host of other mental operations. The public portion of this process is relatively small. Ditto Wittgenstein's "slab". (Cf. however Stainton 2009; Noë 2004) (2) The three short sentences here are all about *absent* things. Comprehension involves mental time travel to the previous night, a scenario of the presence and absence of certain guests, and an implication, an additional mental reconstruction, of the reason for the husband's absence. Here, the *imaginability conditions* include minimally our ability to project a skeletal mental, *nonverbal schema* to cash out the notion of a dinner or party. This can be done neither by way of sentences nor by propositions. The former would lead to an infinite regress of signifiers, the latter to the substitution for meaning of something that is already parasitic on the comprehension of sentences. High-speed nonverbal mental projections in suitably schematised form appear to offer themselves as a more likely solution. (3) In the case of metaphors, we can follow the traditional distinction between the comprehension of dormant or, perhaps better, habitual metaphors and novel meta-

phors. This is because in the former we are able to understand the expression "at a stroke", while in the latter we find ourselves in an interpretively problematic context involving a noticeable span of time. In such opaque contexts, the linguistic linking compulsion often first produces an inappropriate sentence meaning. On the other hand, if we are familiar with the metaphor "Starve the lizards", we have available the basic *imaginability condition* of a surprising situation and someone's response to it. Here, Frege's law of *compositionality* will not come to our aid. *Abrichtung* alone proves itself as a necessary condition. Accordingly, we have been conditioned what sort of situation we should imagine in response to the signifiers. (4) When the ghost appears on stage in *Hamlet*, telling that he has been murdered, the actor playing Hamlet, the character Hamlet, and the audience comprehend at high speed that what has occurred was a "murder most foul". Meaning is near instantaneous and not in dispute, notwithstanding the time-consuming interpretive labour involved in any possible reconstruction of truth-conditions, correctness-conditions, or assertability-conditions. Hamlet's doubts and subsequent procrastination have nothing to do with the shutter-speed comprehension of the sentence "I was murdered". All that is required here is that the right *imaginability-conditions* are met. We must be able to imagine the paradoxical situation of a dead person being able to "appear to tell the tale".

Without *imaginability*, then, no meaning. And so we cannot but wonder why the author of the *PI* declares that "what is hidden … is of no interest for us". (*PI* §126) If so, why does Wittgenstein continuously call upon such propositional attitude terms as "consider", "suppose", "think of", grasping and understanding "at a stroke" or "in a flash", "lightening thought", "sudden understanding", and especially the ubiquitous "imagine"? One answer is that in spite of Wittgenstein's penchant for "outward criteria" for "an inner process" (*PI* §580) in the bulk of language use, aboutness is indeed *hidden*. The slab is behind the house, not in front of us. It has to be imagined before it is seen. And even when something an expression talks about is in front of us our imagined schematization typically overrides its perception. The sceptic may say "When I comprehend a linguistic expression I don't imagine anything; I just *know* what you are talking about", which leaves us wondering what "knowing" amounts to. If it is simultaneous then we have collapsed the *motivated signified* (mental iconic materials plus their conceptual regulation) into the *arbitrary signifier*. The attraction of this economically elegant solution lies in its promise that "a whole cloud of philosophy" has suddenly condensed "into a drop of grammar". (Wittgenstein, *PI*, PPF 315) Unfortunately, what has happened here, I think, is that we have conflated the speed with which signifiers are followed by signifieds in habitual speech with their quite unwarranted *identification*. Linguistic

signifiers are being confused with meaning. But signifiers only have signifieds if we know the language, which begs the question of the meaning in a big way. Even though Wittgenstein dismisses *Vorstellung* as incidental to meaning, he proceeds more cautiously. This is why he asks about the role of "*Vorstellbarkeit*" (imaginability) in securing "the sense of a sentence". (§395) Beyond Wittgenstein's meaning as use I want to ask how *imaginability* squares with *normativity* and the comprehension compulsion. I briefly turn to neuroscience for assistance.

## 5. What Can We Learn from Brain-language Research?

Even a cursory comparison will show that the complexities of existing theories of natural language will not be matched quickly by a similar level of sophistication on the side of neuroscience. Furthermore, it would seem that at least so far all the language features tested in neural research come from existing paradigms in the philosophy of language, semiotics, and linguistics. It will be a while yet before neuro-linguistics will be able to forge its own independent foundations and tell other language paradigms where they have gone wrong. Moreover, as Bennett and Hacker suggest, there will have to remain a division of labour between philosophical questions and empirical research, the former attending to conceptual clarification, the latter to the description of biochemical events. What these authors object to is that "the brain is conscious, feels sensations, perceives, thinks, knows, or wants anything". After all, "these are attributes of animals, not their brains". Above all, Bennett and Hacker want to expose the conceptual incoherence involved in statements like "the brain is ashamed". (Bennett et al. 2007, p. 132)

Unlike some of the more vigorous critics of neural approaches to language like Maxwell Bennett, Peter Hackett, Roy Harris (2008), or Raymond Tallis (2011), I want to ask if, and if so what, an imaginability oriented semantics can learn from brain-language research. In so doing, I look critically at some recent claims that "the brain contains conceptual representations used to interpret image-like representations, thereby implementing powerful computational functions such as categorization, inference, propositions, and productivity". (Barsalou 2012, p. 240) On this basis, Barsalou suggests that "the conceptualizations that underlie language production are similarly assumed to rely on systems of propositions". (2012, p. 242; cf. 2003) But why, one may ask, should the generally assumed sequence from percept to concept and linguistic concept determining the meaning of linguistic expressions rely on "propositions"? Is there any evidence that propositions occur in the brain at the base level of neural functions? Is it not more likely that we import the notion of proposition as a Wittgensteinean

"requirement" into brain functions and so confuse our descriptive tools with what is? Is it not more likely, I ask, that it is not propositions but rather neurally coded resemblance relations, Aristotle's *homoiomata*, that form the basis in the brain on which we have learnt to perform propositions for the purpose of considerations of the truth and falsity of sentences? Is there any neural evidence that suggests that we should reverse the Aristotelian sequence? What is striking too in Barsalou's account is the resumption, though not acknowledged as such, of Kant's productive *Vorstellung* under the simpler term "productivity" as a brain function generating "an infinite number of linguistic and conceptual structures that go far beyond those experienced". (2012, p. 242) In this way, the bottom-up mechanisms" of "modality-specific" perception interact productively with the "top-down" mechanisms of conception. (Barsalou 2012, p. 250) As a result, however, modal specificities, such as iconicity, undergo "redescriptions" in an "amodal representation language". (Barsalou 2012, p. 247) While the emphasis on multi-modality looks exciting, the invocation of yet another kind of language, I suggest, threatens a vicious regress of signifiers being explained forever by more signifiers, without ever producing meaning.

Neuroscience legitimately asks what must be going on in the brain for us to have concepts and linguistic meaning. As Pulvermüller puts it, "the aim of the neuroscience of language is to find the brain correlates of linguistic processes and representation". (2010, p. 255) As such, neuroscience is aiming to provide empirical evidence from the parameters and hypotheses formulated in linguistics and the philosophy of language. The experiments of neuroscience are conducted accordingly. This being so, a serious worry is that if our dominant paradigms are flawed, neuroscience will import faulty assumptions into its experiments. To mind come assumptions about the role of propositions in natural language, public meaning, syntax driven semantics, Fregean compositionality, or the elimination of *Vorstellung* from meaning. If such worries are justified, as the example of Barsalou seems to suggest, then the propositional bias declares neurolinguistics hostile in principle to a description of natural language based on *imaginability*. The *semantics of imaginability* asks primarily what language must be like if we understand expressions only to the degree to which we are able to imagine what they are *about*. As such, the *semantics of imaginability* employs a transcendental speculative critical procedure in order to pinpoint the conditions without which we could not comprehend language the way we do. That such a research project is not entirely opposed to neuroscientific goals has recently been suggested by Fitch when he writes that "the ultimate goal will be to develop a theory of meaning incorporating non-linguistic conceptual representations". (2009, p. 283) The kind of iconic mental schematisations at the heart of the *semantics of imaginability* would qualify, except that

mentalism is not part of Fitch's research paradigm. There seems to me a conflict within Fitch's project between the incorporation of non-linguistic conceptual representations and their quantifiability as "mathematical" entities, since the latter would result in a loss of the very *iconicity* characteristic of the nonverbal which he wishes to incorporate. (Fitch 2009, p. 307)

Given this qualification, what then are the insights in the brain-language camp that the *semantics of imaginability* could use to shore up its claims? One research result certainly qualifies as a candidate: the time span of semantic uptake in response to word sounds and simple phrases. As Pulvermüller et al. sum up, we can now measure brain responses "with millisecond temporal resolution", with the typical result of <250ms for simple expressions. (Pulvermüller et al. 2009, p. 81) So fast can the event of linguistic comprehension be that even "incomplete word identity" permits "semantic integration". (Van Petten et al. 1999, p. 394; cf. also Pulvermüller et al. 2006) This strongly suggests that "*normativity*" as rule-following is not a persuasive characterization of what is going on in habitual speech. If linguistic comprehension is automated to the extent that it occurs at such high speeds, the active notion of "following" is inappropriate and should be replaced by something like "being driven" or "compelled". Hence, the vast bulk of semantic uptake seems better characterized by something like the *comprehension compulsion*.

A number of other neuroscientific observations, stripped of propositional and computational assumptions, could also be helpful. For example, the exploration of the multi-modal perceptual basis of linguistic meaning which we find in the emphasis on the brain producing an "attenuated copy" of perceptual reality could assist in shoring up the argument of *imaginability* as the semantic anchor of natural language, but only on condition that we view with scepticism the claim of an empirical priority of propositions (Barsalou 2012, p. 239) and such metaphors as "the computation of word meaning". (Cree 2006) Sensorimotor brain activity as a source of abstraction has found increasing support in the literature since Maturana, Varela, and Lakoff argued notions of embodied meaning. (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et al.1991; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Johnson and Lakoff 1999; Prinz and Barsalou 2000; Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Barsalou and Wiener-Hastings 2005; MacNorgan et al. 2011) Empirical evidence for "olfactory sensory-motor circuit" and "somato-sensory maps" interacting in a spontaneous "latching dynamics" as "the hopping of the network from one attractor state to another" up to "infinite latching" in the production of imagined scenarios strongly suggest that putting *imaginability* at the heart of natural language is not such an outlandish research hunch after all. (Russo and Treves 2011) Likewise, "mental simulations" as "central to linguistic processing" are attractive as long as the notion of simulation does

not lose its essential *iconic* character. (Barsalou 2012, p. 241; cf. also 2009) Lastly, resemblance relations could receive support from the literature on "mirror neurons", once more on condition that their function is not reduced to computational and propositional explanations. (Rizzoletti and Craighero 2004; Kemmerer and Gonzales-Castillo 2010) I conclude from this brief excursion into neuroscience that, given my qualifications, the *semantics of imaginability* cannot be written off as mere folk psychology. After all, the event of meaning requires *awareness* of what is being talked about, which is a necessary *imaginability condition.*

## 6. The Comprehension Compulsion

Consider the way trapeze artists follow the rules of their training when they let go at a certain moment in order to grab in mid air another trapeze swinging across their trajectory. They have been *abgerichtet* in the sense of a strict training programme to follow the rules that guarantee their act is successful. One could say they enact a certain grammar of movement. But each time they do so they have the option of not to do so and as a consequence fall into the safety net or to their deaths. In the event of the native speaker's moment of linguistic comprehension this option is not available. At the split second event of understanding what a word sound is about, its *aboutness*, we are not in a position to choose to obey or disobey. Although we are strictly trained, that is, *abgerichtet* in Wittgenstein's sense, to comprehend the sounds of a standard expression, we do not follow a rule even if what we are doing reflects a rule. Our linguistic behaviour is automated well beyond habit, or *Gepflogenheit.* (*PI* §§198f.; 205; 337) Even Wittgenstein's phrasing "*Ich folge der Regel blind*" (I follow the rule *blindly; PI* §219) seems to me to understate the degree of passivity involved in the event of meaning as *comprehension compulsion.* Ironically, this socially generated compulsion moves the process of verbal semantic uptake – however we wish to define it – closer than one might have expected to such biologically grounded processes as perception. Just as we do have much of a choice in what we hear, smell, taste, and see, so too is there no choice in understanding "*delicious"* on the verbal cue "delicious". The *comprehension compulsion* appears to be inescapable, such that the "gap between an order and its execution" which must be "closed by the process of understanding" (*PI* §431) is so small that its escapes consciousness. The semantic externalist and internalist (intensionalist) are able to agree on the *form* of the comprehension compulsion as described. They can agree on the speed of semantic uptake measured by neuroscience at less than 250ms for words and simple phrases and even short sentences. They can further agree that both semantic and syntactic comprehension fall within this time span. Neuro-

linguists advise us that this is so because of the parallel processing they have been able to observe take place in the brain. (Barsalou 2012; Pulvermüller 2010) Externalist and intensionalist semanticists are likewise able to concur on the absence of choice in the matter. And lastly, both camps hold that in linguistic comprehension word sounds are linked with something besides the linguistic expressions themselves, either states of affairs or definitions.

Where externalists and intensionalists disagree with mentalists, and do so radically, is on the *content* of the *comprehension compulsion*, or on what precisely it is that is so compulsively linked. Intensionalism secures meaning definitionally. Externalism does so by linking word directly to world. (Stainton 2009) However, given that the bulk of natural language is about external states of affairs imagined *in absentia*, I suggest that we cannot do without a suitably abstracted mentalist component in the meaning process. This has been argued variously via Lockean nonverbal generalisation, the Kantian "monogram" of the schematism chapter, a Peircean "hypoicon", Husserlian *appresentation*, Wittgenstein's "super-likeness", Eleanor Rosch's "prototype", Fauconnier and Turner's mental maps and "conceptual blending", Ruthrof's "mental iconic schematisations" and similar notions. Naturally, none of these are attractive to either externalists or intensionalists. While all three camps defend some version of "meaning", externalism locates it outside the human mind, intensionalism in definitions, and the *semantics of imaginability* in the association of word sounds and mental iconic schematisations. This is incompatible with a number of intensionalist and externalist commitments: (1) formal sense, where *aboutness* and *voice* have been reduced to zero and absorbed by syntactic relations such as characterize $x = y^2$; (2) meaning as intensional procedure because of definitional regress unable to capture either *aboutness* or *voice*; (3) meaning as reference, which conflates *aboutness* with one of its applications, namely referring use; (4) verbal and sentential explications of meaning as we find them in dictionaries, which can be pursued only on pain of vicious regress; (5) the syntactic solution, which supervenes on *aboutness*; (6) neural meanings, which rely on causal relations in the brain while failing to account for the social dimension of meaning; (7) meaning as computational and propositional as brain functions, importing unwarranted theoretical assumptions; (8) meaning as use, which only caters for what is observable about language games and so cannot account for the contribution made to meaning by *imaginability* as regulated by the speech community.

The crucial question then is how to account for formal features, reference, verbal substitution, the role of syntax, neural causes, propositions, and what is public about language without failing to acknowledge meaning as a high speed mental and compulsion driven event. The summary answer I want to offer is by way of a *semantics of imaginability*. (Ruthrof 2014;

2011b) Such a theory finds qualified support in the middle path picture drawn by Grayling in *Truth, Meaning, and Realism.* (2007) "According to an influential view", Grayling writes, "meanings are not in the head. I wish to argue that although this is correct, meanings are nevertheless in our heads. No paradox is here intended: the plural possessive hints at the direction of argument". (Grayling 2007, p. 77) Grayling argues for both the role which speakers play in natural language and its public character and relative stability. Up to a point we can use Grayling's double perspective to overcome Locke's *semantic privacy* without giving up on *intersubjective mentalism*. I do so by arguing that we are not only strictly trained to play by the syntactic rules that prescribe idiomatic combinations of words in language-games and their application to relevant social situations; we are likewise *abgerichtet* to mentally project appropriate nonverbal *aboutness.*

## 7. Conclusion

Given that *Abrichtung* produces "meaning blindness" (Kripke 1982, p. 47) in automated speech under the gun of the *comprehension compulsion,* shutter-speed meaning should not be surprising. However, cortical conduction time, we are told by neuroscience, rules out instantaneity of meaning and the identity of signifier and signified. Neural research further suggests that even in high speed habitual speech, meaning remains a relation between signifiers and signifieds, involving motor, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and other modalities. At the same time, as argued, linguistic meaning defies formal, intensional, referential, verbal, sentential, syntactic, neural, computational, propositional, and observational, behavioural explications. I conclude, then, that shutter speed meaning is most likely achieved by repetitive, relentless, that is, automated *Abrichtung* of native speakers who cannot but perform meanings as community sanctioned associations of the sounds of linguistic expressions (words, phrases, sentences) with olfactory, gustatory, proximic, kinetic, visual, tactile, emotional, gravitational, thermal, and other *nonverbal schemata.* This is the result of the *comprehension compulsion,* which conceals the meaning process in its character of community regulated linkage of the arbitrariness of verbal signifiers and nonverbal iconicity. In this type of language use, *normativity* excludes non-sanctioned schemata. It follows that in its less exacting sense of "rule-following", normativity fails to capture the quality of compulsion that seems to me at the heart of linguistic meaning as a mental and yet *indirectly public* event.

When Dummett writes, "in using words of a language, a speaker is responsible to the way that language is used now, to the presently agreed practices of the community", he seems to me to understate the role of *Abrichtung* while overstating our capacity of decision making in the mean-

ing process of actual speech. (Dummett 1978, p. 430) For even in complex and opaque linguistic contexts, the construction of thoughtful, interpretive meaning rides on the shoulders of immediate uptake that occurs within the constraints of the *comprehension compulsion*. Only in the secondary sense of meaning performance can we speak of being "responsible", an observation that draws our attention to two fundamentally different kinds of "use", habitual use and its interpretive extension. But are we therefore also dealing with two different kinds of *meaning*? I do not think so. Meaning can still be globally defined as above, as long as we accept that the association of sounds and iconic mental schemata occurs at "shutter speed" outside the speaker's control in habitual speech and at a slower pace at the other end of the interpretive spectrum, with infinite shades of meaning events in between.

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*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 55–76, ISSN 1841-2394

# ANXIETIES OF KNOWING: ACADEMIC PATHOLOGIES, CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CULTURE OF THE ACADEMIC SELF

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ABSTRACT. This exploratory paper coins the term "academic pathologies" to discuss in a critical approach the culture of the academic self focusing on what is called "anxieties of knowledge". The paper plays with these themes in reference to the work of Kierkegaard, the American film director Woody Allen, and Jacques Derrida. This topic and paper has eluded me over the years as I tried to gapple with various formulations. The paper that follows the history of my failed attempts is an exercise in self-therapy, confession and self-examination about my continuing inability to produce this paper.

Keywords: academic pathologies; anxieties of knowing; Kierkegaard; Woody Allen; Derrida

> Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possiblity, laying hold of finiteness to support itself. Freedom succumbs in this dizziness
> —Søren Kierkegaard (1968) *The Concept of Anxiety*, p. 152

> Who has the more difficult task: the teacher who lectures on earnest things a meteor's distance from everyday life-or the learner who should put it to use?
> —Søren Kierkegaard (1962) *Works of Love*. p. 62

I have been trying to write one particular academic paper now for many years, at least over a decade and I can't cut the mustard so to speak. This paper has gone by different names that have stabilized around the words

"academic pathologies". Sometimes I have tried unsuccessfully to write this paper with different co-authors including my wife and partner Tina Besley who has a therapy background as a counselor in one of her past lives: I am one of her "works in progress". Other times I have tried to work on the paper with other colleagues. The paper has never got much beyond an idea or a few scribbled notes. Actually I lie: I counted recently when coming to write this paper seven different beginnings some of a few lines, others, an abstract, a table of contents, and an introduction sketching out the contours of the concept. I will share these failed attempts a little later. I should say this failure to write is a very unusual situation for me because I write easily and freely. It has not always been the case. I should explain that by most standards I do write quite a lot. I have written over 60 books and some 500 papers and chapters. I also do a lot of editing. At last count I edit over 32 issues of journals per year. And last year I established a new journal called *Knowledge Cultures* with Addleton Academic Publishers.

This paper, then, is an exercise in self-therapy, confession and self-examination about my continuing inability to produce this paper. It is also a public exorcism. I am hoping that I can finally rid myself of this ghost paper, an insistent idea that forever returns to my academic consciousness and says: "write this paper it is probably the most important piece you will ever write!"; "make this idea!" "Create!" Only by finally writing it will I be able to stop thinking about it. There is a certain anxiety with not being able to produce. For me there is also as well the sheer luxury of being able to endlessly dwell in a state of indecision and contemplation, a state of anxiety *before* knowledge, before choosing how and with what words one will put a stamp on a series of difficult concepts and aspects of experience that swim in the imagination but refuse the various forms I try to assign them: I call this the "anxieties of knowing".

I believe that I coined this phrase linking it to a range of different academic pathologies. "Anxieties of knowing" include anxieties about reading, writing, speaking, thinking and learning. By anxiety I mean the commonly accepted definition that emphasizes "uneasiness" or "apprehension" or "uncertainty" and sometimes "fear" of an anticipated state, event or situation that may cause psychological impairment or feelings of insecurity and helplessness. The notion of anxiety here could easily be called by a variety of other kinship terms: "dread", "angst", even "despair" or less dramatically, "annoyance", 'irritation", "disturbance". It's a universal sentiment or feeling that is often associated in the philosophical literature with "doubt" or "skepticism" and sometimes with forms of "madness" that we might say take the form of pronounced, exaggerated, deep anxiety that can lead to desperation, despair, anguish and depression.

This is the "dark epistemology" of not-knowing, the neuroanatomy of the visceral mind, the confusion of unruly, inchoate and formless thought that troubles us and calls for resolution and order, if only temporarily. The word "knowing" is used here with imprecision: some people will say why not "writing" or "thinking"? I am happy to contemplate these substitute notions but I also employ the poet's license to invent the metaphors. "Anxieties of knowing", "academic pathologies": *Anxiety, Dread, Angst. Despair.* This run of concepts reminds me of the great Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, widely considered one of the foundational thinkers of existentialism, who wrote and published *Fear and Trembling* (1843), *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844) and some twenty-one major works in a period of nine years between 1841–1850 often under pseudonoms on topics concerning Christianity, theology and the philosophy of religion, ethics, and psychology.

His highly personal and poetic work focusing on "truth as subjectivity" engages with how one lives an ethical life as an individual with freedom, choice, commitment and faith. He wrote *The Concept of Anxiety* in 1844 as a psychological deliberation on the dogmatic issue of hereditary sin. In this work he examines the experience of anxiety through the example of a man standing on the edge of a cliff who both fears falling into the abyss and also feels the terrifying impulse to throw himself over the cliff.

The experience of anxiety or dread is a fact of our complete freedom to do something that includes the most terrifying possibilities and triggers our feelings of dread. In Kierkegaard's theological discussion "anxiety" precedes "sin". Hence, for Kierkegaard "anxiety is the dizziness of freedom". As he says in in one of his journals "Anxiety is the first reflex of possibility, a look yet a terrible spell" (JP, vol 1, 102: Pap. X2 A22). Arne Gron (2008) is a researcher affiliated with the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen and an expert theologian on Kierkegaard explains: "The concept of anxiety leads us directly to freedom, but what freedom means is encircled negatively by examining forms of unfreedom. In anxiety the possibility of freedom presents itself, but in anxiety a human being also becomes unfree" (p. ix). For Kierkegaard as Gron reminds us, anxiety opens up the question of what it means to be a human being.

I use the term "anxieties of knowing" to suggest the "burden of freedom" that one faces in choosing words to formulate a sentence, or a research topic, or an interpretation of a work, or indeed an utterance. On any topic seemingly there is a vast literature, a myriad of choices of word and phrases. The past is strewn with many literatures: so many great thinkers, poets, writers have gone before us. The prospect of saying something – anything of significance – is so daunting and many students and faculty in face of adding to knowledge say to themselves: what do I have to say? Do I have *anything* to say? Who am I in the history of ideas to add anything of con-

sequence? Conscious of the past couple of thousand years of tradition of literacy these anxious individuals are reduced to silence and to the anguish of thinking they have nothing to contribute.

The phrase "anxieties of knowing" also reminds me of the greatest living Jewish New York philosopher, film director Woody Allen. The gravity of his philosophy is explored in a series of movies, scripts, roles, plays and books that exemplify the American tradition of stand-up and slap-stick comedy coloured with European art cinema and particularly Bergman and Fellini. He starts his "Speech to the Graduates" (1979) with the following remark:

> More than at any other time in history, mankind faces a cross-roads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.
>
> I speak, by the way, not with any sense of futility, but with a panicky conviction of the absolute meaninglessness of existence which could easily be misinterpreted as pessimism.
>
> It is not. It is merely a healthy concern for the predicament of modern man. (Modern man is here defined as any person born after Nietzsche's edict that 'God is dead,' but before the hit recording 'I Wanna Hold Your Hand.') This 'predicament' can be stated one of two ways, though certain linguistic philosophers prefer to reduce it to a mathematical equation where it can be easily solved and even carried around in the wallet.

Woody Allen's instincts are not untutored yet in contrast to Kierkegaard he uses comedy rather than tragedy to explore the fundamental existential condition of humanity. Adam Cohen (2007) writing for the *New York Times* suggests: "More than any other American writer, Mr. Allen put existential dread on the map." He reviews Allen's two collections of his comedic essays: *The Insanity Defense: The Complete Prose* and *Mere Anarchy* and goes on to write:

> When Mr. Allen started out doing stand-up comedy in Greenwich Village clubs, young people sat in cafes reading books like Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, and debated man's fate late into the night. Mr. Allen found himself turning to the same questions. 'What if everything is an illusion and nothing exists?' he wondered. "In that case, I definitely overpaid for my carpet."

Existence is considered as an absurd cosmic joke. As Allen once said about all the characters in his films: "You're born and you don't know the script, you suffer tragedy and catastrophe, and then you are wiped out for no offence that you have committed". Allen explores the desire of many of his characters to ground their lives in traditional ethical values despite their

realization that such values may no longer be certain and the idea that contemporary American society is rapidly descending into barbarism precisely because of societal failure to maintain a sense of individual moral responsibility.

**Woody Allen on Existentialism**
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RB9afLhro3M

I am often asked why I write so much. I guess as much as experiencing problems with academic writing, "writing too much" can be seen as compulsive behaviour, as an academic pathology in itself. One colleague told me facetiously and semi-seriously some years ago that my new performance target for next year was to write half of what I wrote last year and the following year to write half again. He is a colleague for whom writing is a form of self-torture causing him deep and continuing distress, sleepless nights, and hours of sitting at a computer mulling over the same sentence for hours. His feelings of distress are exacerbated by the fact that his father, a famous professor of Islamic history, wrote over sixty single-authored books in his life-time. He can spend a week writing a paper and end up with nothing but a whole raft of feelings of self-disgust and emptiness. It is self-imposed distress, a form of self-hurt and personal self-inflicted behavior often causing deep psychological suffering. He and many others – both students and colleagues – have a deep anxiety and fear of writing.

Psychologists talk of reading and writing problems in terms of "dyslexia" and "dysgraphia". These are technical terms defined in a neurological discourse with very specific meanings:

> **Dyslexia** has been defined as, 'a disorder in children who, despite conventional classroom experience, fail to attain the language skills of reading, writing and spelling, commensurate with their intellectual abilities.' – World Federation of Neurology.
>
> 'A complex neurological condition, which is constitutional in origin. The symptoms may affect various areas of learning and

function and may be described as a specific difficulty in reading, spelling and written language. One or more of these areas may be affected: numeracy, notational skills (music), motor function and organisational skills. However, it is particularly related to mastering written language, although oral language may be affected to some degree.' – British Dyslexia Association

**Dysgraphia** sometimes termed agraphia is a specific deficiency in the ability to write not associated with ability to read, or due to intellectual impairment. (See for example, the Institute for Neuro-Physiological Psychology website at http://www.inpp.org.uk/).

Yet I am not talking about the fear of writing as a neurological problem but rather as a philosophical and educational problem that is connected with a range of other problems of self, fundamentally of self-expression, of the culture of the academic self, often exacerbated by "performance anxiety" in a publish or perish environment. But the fear of writing is not simply a fear experienced by scholars and students who experience problems with writing but also by those for whom writing is everything. Let me elaborate by viewing a clip of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida talking about the fear of writing.

**Jacques Derrida - Fear of Writing**
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoKnzsiR6Ss




The comments posted on this YouTube clip are interesting. Somebody writes (grammar and writing in the original):

"Holy shit this is exactly how i felt writing my term paper."

Another adds:
"Monsieur Derrida, the charlatan."

In the same vein, someone adds:

"Such agony, living as he does, as the divine instrument of great cosmic philosophical forces: the danger, the sense of mission, the posturing and hairstyling… The vanity is overwhelming."

One person, closer to where I'm standing, writes:

"It's all about nudity. Writing (good writing) rips your clothes off. It's an expression. Your soul has spoken, and perhaps somebody has listened. Taking your (actual) clothes off, letting the dreams and thoughts overwhelm you – how could you possibly avoid anxiety?"

I have so far focused on the fear of writing, certainly a pathology and one that haunts writers and philosophers and academics, perhaps also journalists, speech-writers and people in their everyday lives whenever they have to write, speak or think before an audience. We hear of "writer's block". This is how one critic portrays the contemporary Singaporean playwright Tan Tarn How's play *Fear of Writing*:

> *Fear of Writing* portrays a playwright's creative handicap – the writer's block – under intense anxiety and scrutiny. Through this crisis, Tan uncovers the existentialism of self-censorship and freedoms in Singapore. An urgent provocation of the country's boundaries – as bound to art, artist, citizen and humanity.

There are many remedies and programmes: "Ten Steps to Overcome Your Fear of Writing". I don't have the time to explore or even discuss these "writing technologies of the self" tonight. All I want to say is that fear of writing is very definitely an educational and a philosophical problem. Philosophically speaking we can consider it an "academic pathology" that is connected to deeper problems of the academic self and to the question of style and to problems of self-stylization or self-creation. We might say simply "writing the self" to use an expression used by the late Michel Foucault. By "self-stylization" I do not mean "dummy subjects", "split verbs", "verbosity", "Prepositions at the End of a Clause Beginning With *That*", "Dangling Modifiers", or other defective rule of the style manual.

Both terms – "academic pathology" and "writing the self" – I have used consistently in my thinking and in my work over the years. I borrowed the term from Foucault who used it to describe an ancient form of self-writing (*hupomnemata*) used by the Greeks, a kind of journal or notebook to capture the already said, to collect what one has managed to hear or read, and for a purpose that is nothing less than the shaping of the self" (Foucault, 1997: p. 211). It is an ancient art for "care of the self". The concept of "writing the self", like reading or speaking the self is part of attaining selfhood in the world of literacy and especially in academic culture. Texts, especially those in the humanities, are autoethnographies in this sense and we have genres that consist entirely of the expression of self: diaries, letters,

confessions, autobiographies. Some scholars argue that the modern novel arises as a narrative expression of character. Is all writing both autobiographical and therapeutic? I have used the term "writing the self" in relation to the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's confessional style of philosophizing that is compelled to tell the truth and thus creates conditions for ethical self-formation (Peters, 2002).

Foucault's colleague at the College de France, Pierre Hadot, signals to us the importance of writing the self as the basis for understanding the development of academic cultures. In his investigations of "spiritual exercises" in Latin antiquity Hadot (1995: 81) describes in the philosophy of the Stoics the way in which "thought, as it were, takes itself as its own subject-matter" as the basis for an art of living where the individual is transformed into an authentic state of heightened self-consciousness providing both inner peace and freedom.

Sigmund Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents*, a seminal work written in 1929, explores the fundamental tension between the individual's quest for freedom and civilization's demand for conformity. It is a work where he contemplates for the first time the notion and consequences of a "sick" culture. Where the early Freud was interested in specific neurotics, in *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud expands his interest to identifying the neurotic aspects of society itself. I acknowledge him in this regard not because I believe in "oceanic feelings", the Oedipal conflict, or theories of sexual drives but because he provides the insight that we might contemplate the frustrations to individual freedom of self-expression as a primary source of academic pathology. I use the term pathology, then, in its original Greek sense of *pathos* to refer "feelings" or "sufferings" and "-logy" as the study of these sufferings. Academic pathologies are the study of the causes, development, changes, and consequences of changes of subjects who suffer from impediments to their fundamental self-expression, sometimes cause or brought about by the academic culture itself.

I thought I had invented the term "academic pathology" when I first started thinking about this topic many years ago. Now I discover to my horror that an online journal in education took up the term as the theme for a special issue in 2009. In *Educational Insights*, the Editors of the journal write:

> In 2007 sociology professor, Doug Aoki, (University of Alberta) assembled a call for an issue of *Educational Insights* exploring the paradoxical relationship between pathology and normalcy in the context of teaching, research, labour, theory and writing within the Academy, 'in love and hatred, pride and prejudice, genius and folly, sex and lies.'

They continue:

> The academy systematizes pathology through a myriad of vectors. Once again, the diagnosis turns on how we handle the language. *Patho-*, from *pathos*, means suffering or feeling; *-logy*, that definitive academic suffix, is the venerable normalization of *logos*, with all its familiarly appalling connotations. Then a productive reading of *academic pathologies* is the variable institutional logics of suffering and feeling in the university.

The articles themselves follow with some interesting titles:
"Desentence(sizing) the Reference: Lifenotes in Endnotes"
Hartley Banack and Daniela Elza, Simon Fraser University
"Living in Paradox"
Ardra Cole, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto
"The Academy of Everyday Life – Psychology, Hauntology, and Psychoanalysis"
Jan de Vos, Ghent University
"Enlivening the Curriculum of Health-Related Fitness"
Rebecca J. Lloyd, University of Ottawa
Stephen J. Smith, Simon Fraser University
"I Shouldn't Be Telling You This – A Story of Teacher Burnout and Attrition"
Nan Nassef, University of British Columbia
"Geo-literacies in a Strange Land: Academic Vagabonds Provoking à Pied"
Patricia Palulis, University of Ottawa
'"Lately I've taken to walking…' Embodying the Space of the Campus"
E. Lisa Panayotidis, University of Calgary
"Spousal Hire"
Celeste Snowber, Simon Fraser University
"Never Quite Getting There: Confessions of an Academic Wanna-Be"
Joanna Szabo, Mount Royal University

I never read them all but I thought it is the subject, (dare I say "discipline"?) of education that is so unruly and undisciplined that still has room to experiment and to think outside the ever-increasingly regulated space (or regimes) of academic writing.

I have postponed long enough. This is what I call the *pedagogy of differral*, the educational science of delay. I did say I would return to this paper that refuses to be written. This paper I called "Academic Pathologies". Here is the history of my failed attempts to deal to or realize this concept:

First, a simply attempt that came with trying to frame an abstract:

> In this paper I coin and explore the term 'academic pathologies' as a form of analysis for understanding disorders of the academic self. The paper first provides a genealogy of the various depth hermeneutical models employed by Freud focusing on the thinkers in the critical theory tradition and it evaluates the attempts of Marcuse (*One Dimensional Man*), Adorno (*The Authoritarian Personality*) and Wilhelm Reich (*The Mass Psychology of Fas-*

*cism*) to provide a critical psychoanalysis that serves to interpret the structure of the personality in relation to the structure of society, a relation first contemplated by Freud in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. I indicate how in the critical tradition such as Christopher Lasch (*The Culture of Narcissism*; *The Minimal Self*) and Michel Foucault (*Madness and Civilization; The Birth of the Clinic; History of Sexuality*) provide some interesting possibilities for developing an alternative to mainstream educational psychology in understanding academic behavior.

In this attempt I never got beyond the abstract but it did indicate the territory I wanted to traverse. Here a second more sustained effort (this time in bold to distinguish it is a past attempt):

**There is a more or less direct line from the origins of modern philosophy – from Descartes' 'subjective turn' and Hegel's *Phenomenology* – to what we might call today 'critical political psychology' or to critical forms of 'depth psychology' or a 'critical hermeneutics of the self' that calls special attention to the issue of power in the institutional creation and self-constitution of identities. Descartes' assumption of the *cogito*, the reflective 'I', as the basis of all claims to knowledge and morality set modern philosophy on the track of subjectivity. Twentieth century French philosophy's rehabilitation of Hegel coalesced with Descartes' subjective turn in Henri Bergson's emphasis on the temporality of the subject. Later Alexandre Kojéve's lectures at the Collège de France during the 1930s served to introduce an influential generation of thinkers to Hegel and began a renaissance in French thought that has had lasting impact.**

**In the German context critical theory owes its origins also to Hegel's *Phenomenology* and also to the young humanist Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts, to Freud, and later to Husserl, Heidegger and phenomenological tradition. Indeed, both strands of critical *philosophy of the subject*, both French and German were never divorced from questions of power even though this was thought different at different periods. Twentieth century French philosophy beginning with Bergson and undergoing transformation at the hands of phenomenology-existentialism, hermeneutics, structuralism and poststructuralism, focused heavily upon *power as ideology*, domination and hegemony in the Marxist sense but also attempted to foster understandings of disciplinary power, power exercised through discourse and forms of continuous control especially through the works of Foucault and Deleuze.**

**Critical theory as it was inaugurated by Grunsburg, and established by Horkheimer and Adorno, working directly from sources in Marx and Freud, and later phenomenology**

**as it was developed by Heidegger, flourished with various combinations of Freudian-Marxism, and Heideggerian-Marxism in the works of Eric Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Wilhelm Reich.**

**Both the French and German lines were also strongly influenced by the avant-garde in art and literature. First, Dadism, then Cubism followed by Surrealism under Andre Breton, exercised a healthy skepticism of the visual based on perpectivist epistemologies and tried to break through bourgeois morality by means of a depth psychology of images. Breton, working from a marriage of Freud and Marx, tried to break with the 'realism' and popular hold that bourgoise morality had on the imagination and on the taken for granted world of 'the individual.' The lasting influence of this mixture of Freud and Marx in surrealism had a continued influence on the French novel. *Nadja,* Breton's second novel, published in 1928 begins with the question 'Who am I?'. Through automatic writing and altered states the surrealists tried to reveal the workings of the unconscious self. They revolutionized French literature and influenced a generation of writers and poets: Jean Cocteau, Jacques Prevert, Pierre Reverdy, Antonin Artaud, Henri Michaux and Rene Char.**

**The Frankfurt School from its beginning was heavily influenced by the German tradition of the *Bildungsroman* and its early secular humanism evidenced in thwe works of Eric Fromm as well as Adorno and Horkheimer recorded its intellectual indebtedness to the concepts of *Bildung* itself as it influenced German philosophy and life more broadly, fostering a set of kindred concepts for thinking – autonomy, authenticity, duty, responsibility and obligation – even if these were open to questions and themselves the object of suspicion 'after Auschwitz'.**

**What became 'postcolonial studies' in the 1970s had its origins in two areas: the phenomenology of Hegel, once again, that in the tradition of Memmoni, Lacan and Sartre transformed itself into the *phenomenology of racism, of the racialized self* under the influence of Frantz Fanon who wrote works like *Wretched of the Earth, Black Skin, White Masks* and developed and inspired a psychopathy of colonization.**

This felt I was on the right track. Intuitively I felt my instincts were close to the heart of the matter but I again faltered. The scope was too large even if it pinpointed the phenomenological beginnings. It spanned across the whole of nineteenth century German philosophy and twentieth century French and German philosophy to focus on the different accounts of power put forward by the Frankfurt school philosophers and the contemporary French thinkers like Foucault.

Here was a note I made to myself once on the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (*DSM*) and its text revision in 2000, known as the DSM-IV-TR. I was anxious to try to lend some contemporary and reputable guide as a basis for my thesis. The DSM-IV organizes each psychiatric diagnosis into five levels (axes) relating to different aspects of disorder or disability:

• ***Axis I****:* Clinical disorders, including major mental disorders, and learning disorders

• ***Axis II****:* Personality disorders and mental retardation (although developmental disorders, such as Autism, were coded on Axis II in the previous edition, these disorders are now included on Axis I)

• ***Axis III****:* Acute medical conditions and physical disorders

• ***Axis IV****:* Psychosocial and environmental factors contributing to the disorder

• ***Axis V****:* Global Assessment of Functioning or Children's Global Assessment Scale for children and teens under the age of 18

I noted to myself and excerpted the following section that focuses on early childhood, identifying especially with "**Reading Disorder, Mathematics Disorder, Disorder of "Written Expression, and Learning Disorder Not Otherwise Specified"** and wondering how nobody had ever diagnosed my learning disorders:

The provision of a separate section for disorders that are usually first diagnosed in **Usually First Diagnosed in Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence Learning Disorders.** These disorders are characterized by academic functioning that is substantially below that expected given the person's chronological age, measured intelligence, and age-appropriate education. The specific disorders included in this section are **Reading Disorder, Mathematics Disorder, Disorder of Written Expression, and Learning Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.**

**Motor Skills Disorder.** This includes **Developmental Coordination Disorder,** which is characterized by motor coordination that is substantially below that expected given the person's chronological age and measured intelligence.

**Communication Disorders.** These disorders are characterized by difficulties in speech or language and include **Expressive Language Disorder, Mixed Receptive-Expressive Language Disorder, Phonological Disorder, Stuttering, and Communication Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.**

**Pervasive Developmental Disorders.** These disorders are characterized by severe deficits and pervasive impairment in multiple areas of development. These include impairment in reciprocal social interaction, impairment in communication, and the presence of stereotyped behavior, interests, and activities. The specific disorders included in this section are **Autistic Dis-**

**order, Rett's Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, Asperger's Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. Attention-Deficit and Disruptive Behavior Disorders.** This section includes **Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder,** which is characterized by prominent symptoms of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity. Subtypes are provided for specifying the predominant symptom presentation: **Predominantly Inattentive Type, Predominantly Hyperactive-Impulsive Type, and Combined Type.** Also included in this section are the Disruptive Behavior Disorders: **Conduct Disorder** is characterized by a pattern of behavior that violates the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules; **Oppositional Defiant Disorder** is characterized by a pattern of negativistic, hostile, and defiant behavior. This section also includes two Not Otherwise Specified categories: **Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Not Otherwise Specified and Disruptive Behavior Disorder Not Otherwise Specified** (pp. 37–8).

Actually I was/am dyslexic and also suffer from ADHD. My attention span is very short. Anybody who knows me can identify that I suffer from **Oppositional Defiant Disorder.** These I take to be my philosophical dispositions and tools. I never grew out of the developmental disorders.

In another take I started the paper with a couple of quotations from Wittgenstein:

> What is your aim in philosophy?
> –To show the fly the way out of the fly bottle (PI 309)
> --Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*
>
> I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden;
> he says again and again "I know that that's a tree",
> pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives
> and hears this, and I tell him: "This fellow isn't insane.
> We are only doing philosophy."
> --Wittgenstein, *On Certainty* § 467

And then continued (text in italics):

***Introduction***

*Wittgenstein was strongly influenced by Sigmund Freud, Karl Krauss, and William James. He famously develops a therapeutic view of philosophy as one that sees philosophy as a parasitic and infectious discourse feeding on the use of words in ordinary language and failing to get a clear view of the way we talk about the world. Philosophy is not only destructive (or deconstructive) in the sense of dismantling pseudo problems, it has therapeutic effects and philosophy can act as a kind of purgative enabling us to stop doing philosophy thus freeing us from philosophical pathologies.*

*Linguistic therapy can defuse and neutralize miscreant theories and it can also free us from the dominant or ruling metaphors that hold us captive. Wittgenstein alerts us to the way in which very general pictures of how we view the relation between language and reality easily become part of our philosophical illusion and a fit subject for pathology of the intellect. In an obvious sense these broad philosophical assumptions that govern the discourses of the human sciences, of the humanities and social sciences, constitute a clear picture of academic pathologies based on the kind of confusion that takes place when language goes on holiday. In this context as Wittgenstein demonstrates often philosophical understanding is a matter of will rather than intellect.*

*Wittgenstein once said he regarded himself as a disciple of Freud. Indeed, Jacques Bouveresse in* Wittgenstein Reads Freud*, argues that 'Wittgenstein is the "disciple" of Freud who seems to do nothing but raise objections to his master' (p. 41). And while Wittgenstein attacked the scientific status of psychoanalysis he did also believe that Freud had invented a line of thinking. Wittgenstein's view of Freud was tempered by his own reappraisal of positivism and his view on the purity of language came from the Viennese satirist and critic Krauss who in the journal* Die Fackel *wrote 'Psychoanalysis is that spiritual disease of which it considers itself to be the cure.' Krauss believed reason to be instrumental and values to arise out of creative imagination and Wittgenstein came under his spell in seeking to clarify and purify language, linking language to ethics as a critique of culture. Russell Goodman (2002) has argued that Wittgenstein learned a great deal from William James'* The Principles of Psychology *which he first read in 1912 and* The Varieties of Religious Experience *and shared a set of commitments: "to anti-foundationalism, to the description of concrete details of human life, to the priority of practice over intellect, and to the importance of religion in understanding human life" (p. 5).*

*The term "pathology of philosophy" also has been applied by Donald W. Livingston (1998) in relation to* Hume's Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium*, a book that seeks to explore Hume's answers to the questions' what is philosophy?' and 'what is the philosophical life?' on the basis of virtues of the true philosopher who understands that philosophy springs from the mystical polytheistic religion that provides us with the first understanding of themselves and the world. Hume seeks the origins of philosophical practices in the dispositions of human nature and sees the culture of Europe as progressively shaped by secular modes of thought (p. xiv).*

This was followed by a version of Hegels' influence on critical theory and I ended with the note to myself:

*Continue by reference to Adorno's* The Authoritarian Personality *ending with a tentative typology of disorders of (the academic) self.*

*Horkheimer's Preface:*

> *The central theme of the work is a relatively new concept – the rise of an 'anthropological' species we call the authoritarian type of man. In contrast to the bigot of the older style he seems to combine the ideas and skills which are typical of a highly industrialized society with irrational or anti-rational beliefs. He is at the same time enlightened and superstitious, proud to be an individualist and in constant fear of not being like all the others, jealous of his independence and inclined to submit blindly to power and authority. The character structure which comprises these conflicting trends has already attracted the attention of modern philosophers and political thinkers. This book approaches the problem with the means of sociopsychological research.*

This, as you can witness, was a more sustained attempt. I was trying to develop a philosophical concept of "academic pathologies" that owed something to a line of critical though with its basis in Hegel and phenomenology and flowered into a critical psychoanalysis. It made a central place for Wittgenstein.

Adorno's "authoritarian personality" referred to a cluster of traits reflecting a desire for order, a kind of rigidity, unquestioning obedience, respect for authority, a desire for highly structured command, scapegoating and a highly conventional outlook. The authoritarian personality theory was devised to explain racism and the F-scale that Adorno et al. designed is no longer used partly because group loyalty is seen as a commonplace and ethnocentrism and stereotyping are also seen as common and ineradicable psychological processes.

In another version I entitled the essay: "Academic Pathologies: Power, Identity and the Political Psychology of Institutions". Clearly, I was trying to focus on institutional power relations as a crucial factor in the development of academic pathologies. In part I was motivated by my own very personal observations in different university institutions around the world of the simple truism concerning the effects of administrative power on individuals: how suddenly the power and status of an administrative position would transform the personality of an individual and how it led often to the effects of the exercise of administrative reason and academic life, deforming it, regulating it, counting it. I wanted to theorize this condition or at least I wanted to ensure that any theory of academic pathology could take account of this common observation. I tried to understand the larger institutional forces at work in terms of academic reason, sometimes cross-cut and disruption by administrative reason and increasingly by commercial or entrepreneurial reason.

Then I started, perhaps, more conventionally under the same title with a return to early Western origins (text in bold):

**On Temple of Apollo at the Theatre of Delphi in the valley of Docis in Greece-- the site of the Delphi Oracle, perhaps the most famous in classical Greece--three inscriptions were carved into the lintel of the Temple:**

> **γνωθι σεαυτόν (gnothi seauton = "know thyself")**
> **μηδέν άγαν (meden agan = "nothing in excess")**
> **Εγγύα πάρα δ'ατη (eggua para d'atē = "make a pledge and mischief is nigh")**

**These maxims are attributed to the Seven Sages. The inscriptions reputedly have their origins in prehistoric times and in the worship of the Goddess Gaia. There is some archeological evidence to suggest occupation of the site around the 8th century BC. Apollo spoke through the Oracle, generally virtuous older women known as the Pythia. The Oracle was consulted on all major occasions and made prophecies. Dr E. Partida, the archaeologist at the Hellenistic Ministry Culture's web-site at the archeological ruins suggests:**

> **Between the sixth and fourth centuries BC, the Delphic oracle, which was regarded as the most trustworthy, was at its peak. It was delivered by the Pythia, the priestess, and interpreted by the priests of Apollo. Cities, rulers and ordinary individuals alike consulted the oracle, expressing their gratitude with great gifts and spreading its fame around the world. The oracle was thought to have existed since the dawn of time…**
>
> **The rise of the Rationalist movement in philosophy in the third century BC, damaged the oracle's authority, yet its rituals continued unchanged into the second century AD, when it was consulted by Hadrian and visited by Pausanias.**

**'Know thyself' is the founding expression of the relation between the subject and truth as Foucault notes in *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* and 'know thyself' has a fundamental relationship to 'care of oneself' (*epimeleia heatou*).**

**Foucault suggests that the inscription 'know thyself' 'did not prescribe self-knowledge, neither as a basis of morality, nor as part of a relationship with the gods' (p. 3). The inscription only gathers the significance concerning self-knowledge much later. At the time it meant something like 'don't ask too many questions' or 'as a mortal don't presume too much of the gods'.**

**Only when it appears in philosophical discourse (such as the *Apology*) with Socrates does it take on added significance, especially when coupled**

**with 'take care of yourself'. Indeed, Foucault maintains that the latter – 'take care of yourself' – is the ground or foundation for the former – 'know thyself'. Thus, 'take care of yourself' was, according to Foucault, 'a fundamental principle for describing the philosophical attitude in Greek, Hellenistic and Roman culture' (p. 8). Epicurus uses the Greek word 'therapeuein' meaning both medical care (therapy for the soul) as well as service to a master. This attitude became the principle of moral rationality in Greek culture and even permeated Christianity, appearing especially in Christian asceticism.**

**Within the Western philosophical tradition the self has been posited as an objective, unified and universal entity – both ahistorical and acultural – that transcends particular historical and cultural contexts. The concept has grown out of religious and theological discussions where the enduring part of the essential, "true" or authentic self focussed upon the soul, spirit or mind – an immaterial aspect – that survived the body. In modern Western societies, beginning with Descartes, Hobbes, Locke and Kant, the sovereign self has been assumed to be a separate, individual, autonomous and rational being existing independently and logically prior to society. Indeed, this tradition of the rational, autonomous subject has taken two influential forms: the Kantian ethical subject and the self-interested individual of liberal political economy established by Adam Smith and David Ricardo – so-called *homo economicus*, based on assumptions of individuality, rationality and self-interest. Both lines of development have been responsible for founding and structuring the central institutions of liberal culture synonymous with modernity. Not only is this concept radically individualist, rationalist and possessive but it is also assumed to be given and unchanging – an essential self that is not historically or culturally constituted.**

**While socially and politically progressive in its day – when these related conceptions first received their formulation – a number of telling critiques have been mounted against the self as sovereign individual. These critiques have come from all quarters. Radical feminist philosophers, from Simone de Beauvoir on, have argued that the dominant Western concept of self is both patriarchal and masculinist and they have substituted most often a relational notion of self, based on the ethic of care. Marxist and socialist critics have drawn attention to the ideological nature of the subject underlying liberal political economy insisting that the self is a set social relations defined largely by underlying economic forces. Scholars from psychoanalysis have criticised the assumptions of rationality and individuality positing relational modes of analysis that recognise more fully the role of emotions and desire. Communitarians have criticised the liberal individual as the atomic**

**political sub-stratum beyond which one cannot go to invoke a communitarian view of the polity. Critics from other cultures have questioned the ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism of Western notions of self and the way it has been advanced as the basis of a universalist global society. Some of these strands of critique share with postmodernist and post-structuralist accounts the radical working assumption that the Western concept of self is an historical and cultural construction – an historical ontology – that is inextricably bound up with questions of power. On this view Western concepts of the self have shifted over time.**

The rest of this attempted and failed essay goes on to explore themes similar to those recounted above and finishes with the following notes for different sections on Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard I took this passage from Jens Glebe-Moeller's (1997) "Notes on Wittgenstein's Reading of Kierkegaard:"

> Wittgenstein told his friend Maurice Drury that Kierkegaard was the most profound author of the nineteenth century and a saint. Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein regard philosophy as an ethical pursuit in which analysis and conceptual clarification are to be employed not in the service of speculative thought, but to identify self-deception and dispel illusion in order to make it possible to live an authentic life.

At this point and in reflection of where I have been I realize that there are at least two lines of argument I would like to add to this mélange. First, a new insertion from Judith Butler's (1997) *Excitable Speech* that introduces the gender dimension into the speaking, writing, thinking subject – a not so obvious a category before Simone de Beauvoir's (1948) *The Second Sex*. Butler drawing on this philosophical tradition demonstrates that gender is a *performative* category rather than a fixed or stable identity and in this work she explores the phenomenon of "hate speech" in the US. "Excitable speech" is a metaphor for the complex interrelations between language, identity and agency. Butler maintains we are all linguistic beings and become ourselves through the continual and forever risky negotiation with the very linguistic system that permits our semiotic identity to emerge. For Butler linguistic being proceeds from the intersubjective nature of language that is both enabling and disabling, with great power to wound but also makes possible the speaking and writing time of the subject. If the notion of "anxieties of knowledge" applies at all most certainly it applies with regard to the discursive (self)positioning of women that up until very recently have often been reduced to silence.

Second, and in relation to educational and philosophical themes that run so deep in Aotearoa (New Zealand), what I am going to call the "imperial writing subject". I cannot do justice to the complexity of this topic here but

let me say briefly: Maori children who are fluent speakers of the Maori language who grew up of marae in isolated rural areas like Pungaru were forced at school to "write" te reo Maori rather than "speak" it in NZ School Certificate Examinations prior to 1988. Successive generations of Maori children fluent in te reo Maori were failed at the subject "Maori" because it was an examination that examined only written Maori (i.e., the anglicized, alphabetized English literate form) and for many this was equivalent to failing at their own culture. The pathological consequences have been enormously damaging for Maori students.

## In Lieu of a Conclusion

This paper and the presentation based on it has been a history of my failed attempts to manufacture a usable concept of "academic pathology" that does not simply rest of disorders of the individual academic self, or to problems surrounding the anxiety of knowing or the fear of writing. I have tried to address the collective and institutional dimensions of the anxieties of knowing that address institutional power relations. Throughout the essay and during its writing it became clearer to me that the *positionality* of the subject was important but also and increasingly one might say the cultural specificity of the subject became a central aspect in my thinking for how fear is experienced, how anxiety manifests itself, and how power relations perceived are all matters that can only be described under the category of difference. For instances, how does the fear of writing manifest itself in traditionally oral cultures? How are women textually represented and how do they represent themselves? What of the writing and speaking subject in the process of becoming an academic self, especially for women, for Maori, for cultural minorities, for immigrants, for those for whom thinking and writing in ideographs is the cultural norm?

To deal adequately with these anxiety disorders – anxieties of knowing – we need to locate them firmly within the wider psychological ecology of the culture of the self and to encourage a ongoing set of reflections on the question of academic self-knowledge. In this way we may come to understand more deeply that knowing has its own pathologies.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

This paper was first given as an inaugural professioral lecture at the University of Waikato on March 26th 2012 and also appears as a published monograph by the Wilf Malcolm Research Institute, the Faculty of Education, under the title "Making a Difference: Academic Pathologies and the Anxieties of Knowing" (2013) at http://www.waikato.ac.nz/wmier/publications/books/making-a-difference-academic-pathologies-and-the-anxieties-of-knowing.

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 77–82, ISSN 1841-2394

# THE EU'S NORM-DRIVEN PRACTICES

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ABSTRACT. Applying new conceptual and methodological approaches, this study advances to the next level research on the role of community in transnational processes, the EU's policy of democracy promotion, the characteristics of normative power, and the universal standing of EU norms. The literature on the role of transnational processes and communities, EU's attempt to construct its image as a normative power, the relation between norms that guide internal practices and those that guide external practices, and the essence of the normative power concept is relevant to this discussion.

Keywords: EU; norm-driven practice; normative power; community

## 1. Introduction

This study is grounded in the considerable body of scholarship examining the EU's international identity, the role of the supranational community, the different forms that normative power can take, and the norms projected by the EU in world politics. This article aims to gain a deeper understanding of the normative power of the EU in world politics, the EU's constitutive norms, and the limits of the EU normative impact. The purpose of this study is to examine the coherence of the EU decision-making system, the importance of *subjective sharing of relationships* in the origins of European communion, different forms of normative power, and the production of normative power identity. In this paper I am particularly interested in exploring the significance of European communion, the defining characteristics of normative power, the EU's system of governance, and normative power representations of the EU.

## 2. The Normative Power of the EU in World Politics

The notion of sharing or "communion" provides a better means of theorizing the EU as a political object rather than "integration" or "cooperation" (the project, process and product of EU is based on sharing): the contemporary processes of EU are primarily characterized by a recognition of "sharing" involved in a more global EU. The concept of European communion helps identify the emergent political entity as constituted through economic (Popescu, 2014), social and political processes. The emergent consolidation of the EU is better characterized by the concept of European communion (communion involves the *subjective sharing of relationships*), there is a distance between being the same and being different in which European communion sits, whereas European communion does not presume a process towards a new political unit or the creation of an organic community of similar people, or a continued process of contractual relations. Member states serve as the most appropriate and legitimate political communities for sharing European communion (discursive practices construct and legitimate difference in and through EU). Political theory of EU provides a means of theorizing the EU as a political object: the notion of communion captures the multiple nature of the EU as a political object between imagined communities and cosmopolitan enactments. (Manners, 2013)

The United States, China, Russia, and Europe represent huge territorial units with sizable power resources across various fields, applying them to influence domestic politics in their respective peripheries. Europe's polycentric system of governance is better suited to creating institutional structures (Georgescu, 2010) and setting up rules of legitimate behavior. The EU lacks some of the essential structural features of a state, has no effective monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion, has an ambition to spread democracy and human rights (Pera, 2014), and is a kind of post-modern polity with no single centre of government (it has acquired military capability, becoming involved in several military or civilian-military operations in three continents). EU borders undergo regular adjustments, both in territorial and functional terms. Successive enlargements have allowed the EU to acquire new territory, but have produced more variable geometry. The EU's relations with its external peripheries are largely about the export of EU governance to these countries. The governance system exported by the EU envisages a high degree of shared sovereignty. The fuzzy nature of the EU's borders makes it exposed to developments in its immediate periphery (the EU's territorial acquisitions take place by invitation). (Zielonka, 2011)

*Normative power* is attributed to a political entity that *diffuses its norms in the international system*: it is a political entity whose norms guide its internal and external practices, being an *identity* of a political entity in the

international system (the normative power ideal-type has both inclusive and exclusive identity features). Norms that are diffused are not *by definition* universal. Neither universal norms nor a particular set of instruments are ontological necessities for normative power. A normative power's norms define the appropriate practices (Lăzăroiu, 2013) and objectives in the international system generally. A normative power possesses the ability to shape conceptions of the normal (it diffuses norms in world politics). A normative power identity depends on the recognition of others (recognition by outsiders is essential for a normative power). The spread of European norms contributes to the EU's security (a normative power has an interest in spreading its norms). The contingency and dynamism of norms (Hunter, 2013) defy the search for a fixed set of norms for a normative power. (De Zutter, 2010)

## 3. The EU's Constitutive Norms

The EU defines its relations with the rest of the world through normative commitments to norms and multilateral frameworks (Nica, 2013b), and usually utters the importance of the core norms when conducting various relations. The principles and norms the EU is based on are cosmopolitan, the normative power argument strongly relates to the presence/actorness and capability of the EU in world politics, and the EU's normative power and its actual implications in a globalized era are closely interlinked. (Whitman, 2011) The EU represents a normative power in world politics (its existence, its commitments and its actions challenge the status quo of world politics). "Normative" is part of being honest about why and how foreign policy is conducted. Rethinking ethical foreign policy should be located in normative debates (Peters and Besley, 2013) about policy-making and analytical honesty. (Manners, 2006)

The EU's normative power is a practice by which the EU seeks to spread its core norms: its role as a normative power is related to its distinctive nature as a political organization. The practice of "othering" is an activity by which EU officials construct the EU's identity as a normative power and exert power in its external relations: othering is a practice by which the EU constructs its identity, and is a transformative action with "real" consequences, having a strong connotation of *disempowering the other* and *empowering the self*. The practice of empowering involves a variety of practices and power resources (Bacalu, 2013): empowering others may empower the providing as well as the receiving end, can be pursued for strategic reasons, and depends on the purpose for which the capacities that a third party is provided with are used. The EU's international behavior is largely consistent with its identity building process. The EU has built its profile as an advocate

of international law and as a supporter of developing countries, trying to empower developing countries as actors in the international relations. The limits of the EU normative impact may undermine its international identity as a normative power. (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2008)

The EU's norms are a product of its emerging and changing institutional and legal frameworks. Norms that appear in various cases (Pera, 2013) constitute a normative power's identity. Historical narratives, legal and institutional contexts, and internal and external practices are relevant for determining a normative power's norms. The EU's self-image as a normative power seeks to diffuse its norms and to assimilate others. A normative power defines itself against an Other by positing its norms against those of political entities in the past or present: it distinguishes itself from other political entities with different roles, but diffuses its norms by shaping "conceptions of the normal" in world politics. The Other's norms become competitors to those of the normative power. (De Zutter, 2010)

## 4. The Limits of the EU Normative Impact

A distinguishing feature of a "normative" power seeks to overcome power politics through a strengthening of cosmopolitan law. The EU's constitutional norms embody the principles of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. The EU aims to develop a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order (there is a potential tension in the EU's external policy between its emphasis on multilateralism and on human rights). All international relations should be subordinated to a common judicial order (Nica, 2013a) that would transform the parameters of power politics (Petcu, 2013) and redefine the concept of sovereignty, whereas the international order should move from an emphasis on the rights of sovereign states within a multilateral order to the rights of individuals in a cosmopolitan order. An important indicator of the EU as a "normative" or "civilizing" power is linked to what kind of legal principles its external policy is based upon: a focus on strengthening the cosmopolitan dimension to international law (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014) indicates a "normative" or "civilizing" power (a "normative" power breaks with the "traditional" foreign policy practice of great powers). (Sjursen, 2006)

The norm-diffuser role pushes the EU beyond being a passive presence in the international system. Active norm-diffusion becomes a legitimate course of action. The norm-diffuser's role depends on the successful construction of its norms as universal. All normative powers have a self-image as a norm-diffuser. The inclusive aspect of identity refers to the assimilative character of a normative power's ideal-typical role. The link between stated norms and actual practice is not self-evident. Other political entities are the

recipients of a normative power's norms. Normative power diffuses its norms through its own norm-guided practices and their adaptation by others. The analytical concept of normative power may be applied to different political entities, the instruments of a normative power range from imitation to military intervention, a normative power seeks to project its norms into the international system, and a successful normative power has an impact on the practices of other political entities. (De Zutter, 2010) The EU has forged a political community from diverse national starting points, creating a collective identity founded upon a distinct set of values and norms. EU foreign policy is driven by the normative values ascribed to it and understood by EU and national foreign policy makers. (Cavatorta and Tonra, 2007)

As Birchfield puts it,

> The formation of policies that have both external and internal dimensions, as most of the EU level foreign policies increasingly do (e.g., environmental and energy policies as well as immigration issues), is not well understood in the current policy or the general EU studies literature. Related research puzzles may necessitate more complex policy models that take both issue and institutional complexity into account as they address critical aspects of the policy process from the formation to the implementation and the evaluation stages. (Birchfield, 2013)

## 5. Conclusions

Research on the normative and value-driven features of the EU, the role of deliberative politics in EU, and the impact of EU norms in world politics has yielded fairly consistent findings over the past decade. This research makes conceptual and methodological contributions to the manifestation of EU as a political process, the concept of European communion, the relationship between the EU's stated norms and its external practices, and the process of EU identity building. The findings of this study have implications for the forms of normative power, the instruments the EU uses in its external relations, the mechanisms through which norms are diffused, and the EU's propensity to spread its norms in world politics.

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 83–95, ISSN 1841-2394

# JAPANESE ENGLISH LEARNERS ON THE EDGE OF 'CHAOSMOS': FÉLIX GUATTARI AND 'BECOMING-OTAKU'

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ABSTRACT. This paper constructs a language learning perspective derived from the philosophical work of Félix Guattari, which enables a re-evaluation of the ways in which Japanese university students learn English in Japan. The implementation of Guattarian pedagogic practises into the English teaching environment at university in Japan has distinct advantages, which will explored throughout this article by close examination with respect to Guattari's arguments on language and technology. Applying Guattari in the English teaching and learning classroom at university does not neutralise the clash of cultures between the East and West as such, but rather dramatises the collisions and encourages 'mutant outgrowths' for the purposes of language learning. The reason for exploring these impacts in language learning environments is found in the theory of affect that one derives from Guattari. The deployment of Guattari in this context creates the possibility for an identity-based English learning agency open to a technologised and globalised subject, which is at the same time indelibly Japanese.

Keywords: Japanese language learners; identity politics; English teaching; ESL; Félix Guattari; technology and language learning

## 1. Introduction

How do Japanese university students learn English in Japan? Research in this field (see Gorsuch, 2001) has uncovered a host of communicative approaches, which have prioritised the ways in which English pronunciation, grammar, spelling and vocabulary have been rendered comprehendible and learnable to the Japanese subject. This paper will put forward a new approach to teaching English in Japan based on an identity politics (Norton, 2000)

that is mediated through the philosophical lens of Félix Guattari, and which determines the detailed subjective transformations that the Japanese learner encounters as primary to the language teaching and learning process (Kubota, 1999; Miyahara, 2000; Gilmore, 2011). Rather than positing a process of English learning on and through the Japanese learner, this study looks within the broad scope of Japanese society for learning, and at the break out points and ways in which Japan has 'taken on speed' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 268) in terms of the morphogenesis of learning values, for example, due to the affordances of technology and globalisation, sometimes understood as 'superdiversity' (Vertovec, 2007; Blommaert & Rampton, 2011) and 'supercomplexity' (Barnett, 2000). The focus of this paper elucidates upon the ways that language learning in Japanese society is accelerating, and how changes have come about due to the multivariant influences of technology and capitalism (see MECSST, 2002), here understood as the 'chaosmos', which is defined as a composed chaos pregnant with inaugural virtuality, but one consistent with semiotic influence. Traditional Japanese connections to nature through the practice of Shinto, the native religion of Japan, now co-exist alongside advanced technological innovation and global capital markets. These pressure points are access routes to forms of 21st century Japanese subjectivity and how they are presented in the contemporary context. The traditional collectivity and expression of what it means to be Japanese is undergoing a prolonged identity politics, enhanced and enacted with digital technology and capital flows (cf. MECSST, 2000). English teaching and learning in Japan must allow for and negotiate with these changes in the Japanese mind-set, if the content and style of English education in Japan is to be in any way meaningful.

Embedded within recent changes to Japanese subjectivity, and which should be taken into account by a 'social-cultural-affective' theory of language learning, is the nature of the English teacher. The introduction of the French theorist, Félix Guattari, into this role is in many ways a radical and playful move, which specifically questions the ways in which Japanese society conceives and respects 'the teacher'. The roles of the teacher and student can be reversed (according to Guattari) – through a reconsideration of the semiotic and autopoeitic nature of the classroom (see Cole, 2010; 2011). Power is henceforth an attribute of the group. There are interlocking planes between the teacher, knowledge, students and learning, and these are opened up by and through exploring the unconscious (see Guattari, 1984a & 1996b). This is why this paper specifically names learning as a Japanese '*becoming-otaku*': "The otaku, the passionate obsessive, the information age's embodiment of the connoisseur, more concerned with the accumulation of data than of objects, seems a natural crossover figure in today's interface of [English] and Japanese cultures. I see it in the eyes of the Portobello

dealers, and in the eyes of the Japanese collectors: a perfectly calm train-spotter frenzy, murderous and sublime. Understanding 'otaku-hood', I think, is one of the keys to understanding the culture of the contemporary world," (Gibson, 2001, p. 23). The 'becoming-otaku' as learning in this paper is not an alternative means to content the current English learning methods in Japan, but designates the non-representative politics and affect that this study translates into pedagogy via Guattari (see Azuma, 2001, 2009; Bradley, 2012). The English teacher's role henceforth involves working with and through the flows of desire that emanate from and in the collective Japanese audience. For example, mobile phones can be employed to navigate the educational consequences of 'MSpace' (see Cole, 2012), the international fashion industry can be interrogated for the latest trends in Japanese style, the ways in which Manga is read and produced can be used for English literacy purposes (see Cole & Yang, 2008). The students 'become-otaku' as they engage with lessons that are guided by Guattarian pedagogy and are empowered in their learning to realise hidden and mute parts of their identities (otaku).

## 2. Félix Guattari and Language Learning

Although Félix Guattari was not a traditional linguist, in his writings, both alone and with Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 75–111), there is a sustained and important engagement with language through 'material semiotics' – influenced by Hjelmslev, Peirce, Labov among others – and which shall be taken forward in this paper with respect to the identity politics of university English learners in Japan. The starting point for understanding Guattari's approach to language is that one cannot understand language 'in-itself', as mere form only. Rather, comprehending the ways in which the language works comes about through looking at the multiple material codings of language use that a culture or society exhibits (cf. Genosko, 2008). Guattari proposed a non-signifying, a-signifying linguistics, and a pragmatics of language, that studies in depth the controls and limitations that language presents, not just in words, but in signs, images, gestures, sounds, implications, meanings and in the collective articulation of desires through identity. The idea of group enunciation, which is in contrast to individualised or subjective learning, was of paramount importance to Guattari, as he analysed psychiatric units for the ways in which they functioned and related to mental health issues:

> There is a dimension opposite and complementary to the structures that generate pyramidal hierarchisation… this dimension can only be seen clearly in certain groups which, intentionally or otherwise, try to explore the meaning of their praxis and establish themselves as subject groups. (Guattari, 1984b, p. 23)

The point here is not that we should liken language learning to psychiatric treatment, but that there is a complementary dimension to all learning that acts as a marker to allow group dynamics to work (Guattari, 1984b). The Japanese university language learners are paradoxical with respect to this promotion of the group as subject, in that they do not exhibit the ego and power based subject hierarchies that Guattari was attending to at *La Borde* psychiatric unit (Guattari, 1984b). Rather, the Japanese learners have a collective consciousness, based on a long history of Japanese tradition and hierarchy. This 'Japaneseness' could work against the articulations of the group subject, in that the abandonment of the teacher as leader in the Japanese hierarchy is unimaginable for many Japanese students. Rather, the naming of *becoming-otaku* as learning should encourage assemblages as Deleuze & Guattari (1987, p. 71) name them, which are social and political, and inclusive of non-human gatherings of forces, and that deal with the ways in which power permeates and is distributed in and by the identity politics of the group. In the context of Japanese students learning English at university, which could be reduced to a subjective performance or a passive collective rite, seen as necessary in the context of globalisation, the production of the assemblages add direction and weight to group functioning. An example to use in this context might be the recent international manifestations of the 'Occupy' movement (see Masny & Cole, 2012). The Japanese students could analyse and discuss what has happened with respect to the Occupy movement, and come to a group consensus that relates to the relevance of Occupy and its potential for understanding economic-spatial dynamics. Japanese students could assess their job prospects, *raison d'etre* for life at university and views from abroad regarding perceptions of Japan as a cold, death-in-life war machine (see Bradley & Cole, 2014).

The manifestation of assemblages in places of higher education as groups of learners with political messages is complexified and augmented by the use of new technology (Masny & Cole, 2012, pp. 149–179). Guattari was an activist, who founded a free radio station, and who deliberately took his intellectual understandings out of the academy and onto the streets (see Genosko, 2002).[1] This movement of thought is exemplified and accelerated by what is happening today with social media and mobile devices that have produced a ubiquitous 'MSpace', whereby connectivity to electronic networks is flexible, transversal and potentially liberating (Guattari, 1995a). For example, much of the organizational work of the Occupy movement is performed online and through social networks that allow agents permanent connectivity and camouflage (Masny & Cole, 2012, p. 156). The Japanese students can organise around relevant 'social-political-affective' issues such as the nuclear accident at Fukushima after the 2011 tsunami.[2] The point of the exercise is to deploy networks in meaningful and ecologically focused

ways, in this case to understand the full extent of nuclear contamination. The students can share information and map the places of contamination and explore the known and possible consequences of the nuclear disaster. The group of nuclear investigators are henceforth learning language through an engaging and relevant affective-cultural project. In other words, the students are a technological assemblage, enacting knowledge on a discursive and local level that will be of direct relevance to the future of Japan and how it functions in the 'chaosmos'. The point isn't that words mean more than before or lead to para- or meta-linguistic performance (cf. Cole, 2011), but that the group as subject now has a voice that overrides the particular concerns of individual English speakers. Another example of Guattarian pedagogy for Japanese English learners and an application of Guattari's non-signifying semiotics exists in the arrows in airports:

> The airport's arrow is an asemic figure … to read the semiotic technologies of the airport itself. The arrow is both a tool and a trope for the imperatives of global transit: it turns place into passage, striates space into controlled flows, and urges the traveller to 'move on.' It is a point sign that leads the way to a consideration of the technologies, both semiotic and a-semiotic, that provide the navigational and behavioural guidance that is increasingly in evidence, not only at the airport but in all public spaces. (Fuller, 2002, p. 231)

The ways in which one reads and learns in an airport is a good example of the educative and philosophical experiences Guattari proposes. The meaning of the arrow is a type of controller of space, telling us where to go, what to do and how to get to where we are going. The airport arrow does nothing but sit in a pre-designated spot, herding us into channels and creating flows. The airport arrow is not a metaphor, but, along with other signs on roads, in cities, or on the internet, is now an important part of our lives as we are increasingly herded and shuttled around public and private spaces by spectacular and cybernetic signs (Fuller, 2002). The point is to openly read and discuss these signs, and to not let them become an uncritical part of our unconscious. In *1000 Plateaus*, Deleuze & Guattari (1987) use the term, 'order words', which are critical markers for the ways in which language works with and through the fields of power that one may encounter. The order words set up regimes of enunciation, assemblages of thought and virtual ways in which incorporeal transformations, or non-human becomings take place in and through the identity politics that the 'order words' initiate. For example, it could be argued that we are turned into cyborg travellers in airports, obeying the signs without thinking or understanding what these actions do to our bodies. Guattarian pedagogy asks us to unpack the signs, to make maps of their influences, and to regain conscious control of our-

selves in order to once again be able to use affect in depth transactions and in the 'joy of living'.

Guattarian pedagogy is fundamentally about excavating the presuppositions contained in identity to get to the 'art of life'. In the context of teaching and learning English in Japan, this means looking in detail at how the transformation of cultures in-between the East and the West is occurring and has occurred over the last decades. This clashing of cultures produces in Guattari's (1996a) terms, a form of 'indirect discourse' that permeates the classroom, and activates unconscious markers that infiltrate the affective atmosphere through the 'order words' as mentioned above. The great danger with this project as English language teaching and learning in Japan is that the concentration on conflict might reinstate anthropomorphic humanism, or put into place a centralisation and resubjectivation contained in the clashing of cultures. Such a subjectivating effect would have a negative impact on the classroom and the group because the students could henceforth react against English culture and mores, and centralise their characters and group identity on reactive 'Japaneseness', rather than process the point of impact as dynamic articulation and the movement of affect as put forward by this article about 'becoming-otaku' in the 'chaosmos'. For this reason, the Guattarian notion of the machine is vital to ward off the reinstatement of protective humanism involved with notions such as 'Japaneseness', and to keep alive the plane of otaku-becoming that generates the transversality, creativity and interaction which we are searching for in pedagogy with and through the otaku. Guattari explored notions of the machine such as the abstract machine (1996a) to work through and against a humanised notion of the self, and in particular with reference to 'a-signifying' machines:

> [A]-signifying machines continue to rely on signifying semiotics, but they only use them as a tool, as an instrument of semiotic deterritorialization allowing semiotic fluxes to establish new connections with the most deterritorialized material fluxes. These connections function independently of whether they signify something for someone or not. (p. 150)

A-signifying machines are present as fluctuating, unstable, rhizomatic structures in discourse, and are present in the ways in which conversations start, evolve and finish (see Cole, 2011). The a-signifying machine provides break out points and connections between meaningful instances that define dialogic progression and relationships with 'the other.' In the example of Japanese students learning English at university, one could say that the other is the unresponsive student, unable to process the Guattarian pedagogy and identity politics as proposed by this paper. A route into the psychology of the potentially closed student, and the ways that he or she could be subjectivated by the expectations of Japanese schooling and obeying authoritarian

lines of flight (see Cole & Hager, 2010) is through dance. The student who has been conditioned into robotic and predictable responses by schooling, and is not open to the experimentation of investigating conflicts between East and West as a machine, could potentially be opened up by dance: "This suggests to me the position of a Butoh[3] dancer such as Min Tanaka when he completely folds in on his body and remains nevertheless hypersensitive to all perceptions emanating from the environment. But more simply it will suffice to remark here that we see such intrinsically structured objects every day and that they do not work with the exterior environment any less" (Guattari, 1994b, p. 133). The othered student has been turned mute by the conditioned environment and the machinic influences of the Japanese education system and culture in relation to the 'chaosmos'. Yet there is simultaneously opportunity here, as such othering can be explored and unpacked, or, the internalisation of learning mores is an interiority that can lead to art. Butoh dancing is an art form that inspires a form of aesthetics of silence, or understanding of how muteness is also an extreme type of listening and sensitivity to the aural environment. Deleuze & Guattari (1987) analysed the works of Franz Kafka and Samuel Beckett in this context, and literature that includes such minor becoming would be useful in teaching Japanese students English in Japan. The next section of this paper takes the philosophy of Guattari and applies it to technology and language learning.

## 3. Guattari, Japanese Language Learners and Technology

Guattari (1995a, p. 97), who was concerned with the ambiguous effects of technology on subjectivity and thought, conjectured that the era of the digital keyboard would soon be over. Quite presciently, after its demise, humans would speak into their machines rather than type in instructions. As a critic of the political abandon of postmodernism, and a witness to the sweeping techno-scientific mutations underway in the early 1990s, Guattari envisaged the emergence of new social, political, aesthetic and analytical practices aiding the production of transversalist plural and polyphonic subjectivities in the 'chaosmos', which he saw as liberated from the shackles of empty speech and any ensuing erosion of meaning, e.g. by introducing 'becoming-otaku' for the collective language learning practises of Japanese students. Guattari was opposed to the mass media's "infantilising subjectivity" (Guattari 1996b, p. 272), and to what he termed as the will to "neuroleptise subjectivity" (Guattari, 1996b, p. 215), that is to say to make subjectivity treatable by anti-psychotic drugs. Guattari described how the textuality of machinic ontology decentres the idea of the subject and moves emphasis to the question of subjectivity and its production in semiotics. This focus has clear pedagogical import for Japanese language learners at university as processes

of subjectification permeate, work upon and transgress the 'subject' – for better or worse. Aspects of life traverse the 'subject' and are constitutive of memories, desire and the mind. As such, this transversal relay and operation is relational, network specific and affective in nature. Guattari argues that it is impossible to consider such machinic evolution in any simple binary fashion – that is to say either straightforwardly positively or negatively – because one must, first of all, situate its articulation within *collective assemblages of enunciation (les agencements collectives d'énonciation)* – in the case of this article, Japanese students at university, their 'becoming-otaku' and in relation to the 'chaosmos'. Communication and information devices produce subjectivities on both signifying and affective registers, prepare new modulations of expression, and engender 'new universes of reference'. These universes are what Pierre Lévy (2001) describes as 'dynamic ideography'. Guattari foresaw the emergence of a post-media era, in which informatic subjectivity is capable of breaking writing away from old script forms to inaugurate hypertextualities, or new cognitive and sensory writings. For Genosko (2002), Guattari breaks fresh ground in thinking the shift from scriptural semiotics to hypertext and is thought-provoking in explicating the nature of a-signifying part-signs and how they function in relation to the machinic phylum. For Guattari, 'unprecedented' plastic universes offer the possibility of new modes of living as well as more dead-ends: "more death-in-life, more of the same from the *steamroller of capitalistic subjectivity*" (1995a, p. 91). Through the prism of the ethico-aesthetic paradigm, Guattari saw potential in tearing asunder the relation of sign and signified in identity construction, in deterritorialising the domain of signification to approach the plane of machinic consistency, in leaving behind a free-floating sign adrift of context and territory, and in the context of this article such a movement in thought involves 'becoming-otaku' in the 'chaosmos'. Whence coupled and connected with other a-signifying signs, Guattari saw the possibility to generate and be creative with material flows and fluxes.

On the matter of the machinic phylum, or technological lineage, and the machines to come, Guattari (1995a) argues that the universe of reference pertaining to the word-processing machine *completely* changes humanity's relationship to expression – whether it is in writing, the alphabet, printing, computing, image banks or telecommunications. As machines inform universes of reference, Guattari (1995a) claims that students learning languages with a word-processor are thereby situated in incipient universes of reference, which are distinct cognitively and affectively from previous formats. It follows that students attuned to use new media and technological devices are learning in singular universes of reference. Enthused by this idea, Guattari in a short piece entitled 'On Machines' (1995b) suggests that the 'autopoietic' and 'hypertextual' position of the machine possesses a pragmatic

potential to challenge 'the ontological iron curtain' – also an expression deployed by Lévy (2001) – in separating the subject and things. The notion of the machinic phylum is made clearer here by understanding the futural way in which different generations of machines open up the lines of machinic alterity and virtualities of other machines to come. As a general trend, computers and technologies aid learning through connectivity, for example, a Japanese English student unable to speak in English, can connect with machines through online multigame environments. Here, the Japanese student forges a subjective composition according to the consistency of different online gaming assemblages, and he or she henceforth engages with 'becoming-otaku' in the 'chaosmos'. Each new technical machine carries latent possibilities to transform existential territories and engender new universes of reference. In other words, the mechanosphere, represented here by the virtual multigame, constantly reengineers the situation as the Japanese student learns English through gaming and articulates through this gaming context.

Writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Guattari goes so far as to claim that humanity, sited at an 'unavoidable crossroads' (Guattari, 1995b), must confront its fetish with technology to extract the positive momentum from it or risk entering into cycles of repetition of a more-deathly variety, the being of the machine in inertia, or a machine in nothingness. While balking at a romantic return to some form of primate territoriality, Guattari (1995b) claims it is important to think the mechanosphere through the prism of 'meta-modelisation', as this model does not signify as such, but rather produces 'diagrams'. Such a move aids the understanding of *agencements* in ontological heterogeneous universes, in which allopoeitic machines, built from the outside in, and, autopoeitic, self-creating machines – 'live together in the chaosmos'. Comprised of ontogenetic, which pertains to the developmental history of an organism within its own lifetime and phylogenetic elements – the evolutionary history of a species – technological machines are caught in a 'phylum', that is to say, preceded by some machines and succeeded by others. New universes of reference can help reorganise existential corporeality and promote creative possibilities, but they are equally at risk of being appropriated by the peddlers of the 'deadening influence' (Guattari, 1995b, p. 5), i.e. the mass media. For Guattari (1995a & b), the vital question is how to escape the repetitive impasses so as to resingularise singularity, which is here termed through learning about 'becoming-otaku'. Guattari envisaged a post-media era affirming the reappropriation and resingularisation of the use of media. But the question arises: How does one extricate oneself from the perceptual fascination with the luminous, 'overexposed' (Crary *et al.*, 1988), almost hypnotic animations on our TV screens, computer screens or tablet devices? – a question also discussed by Sylvère

Lotringer (2009). To paraphrase Virilio in *War and Cinema* (1989), weapons are tools not just of destruction but also of perception. Moreover, they are stimulants in chemical and neurological processes, which affect human reactions and the perceptual identification and semiotic differentiation of objects. We read or decode images and composites of mental imagery in the 'blink' of an eye. This is important, because, according to Lotringer (2009), were it not for the 'blink', TV viewers would become so intimate with the present noological field, that they would hallucinate images in the 'chaosmos'. While the explanation for such phenomena is partly found in understanding the refrain that fixes the subject in front of the screen, Guattari (1995b) argues that computers, expert systems and artificial intelligence also contribute to, assist, and relieve thought of redundant or inert schemas. Furthermore, computer-aided design can lead to the production of images opening on to unprecedented plastic universes, and enabling Japanese students of English to study technologically mediated modes of expression as 'becoming-otaku'.

Whereas Guattari in his book *The Three Ecologies* (1996b) welcomes the "technological development of mass media, especially their miniaturization, the lowering of their costs, and the possibility of using them for non-capitalistic ends" (p. 65), he nonetheless warns of the "age of planetary computerisation" (p. 103) which is seemingly accelerating headlong into an era of "a monstrous reinforcement of earlier systems of alienation, an oppressive mass-media culture and an infantilising politics of consensus" (p. 103), and these statements define the ambiguity of technology in the chaosmos. The obverse of this is for Guattari (1996b) to view forms of thought assisted by computers as laden with mutant possibilities, relating to universes of reference such as rap music, and the modulations, variations and the becomings of minor patois and creoles. In corollary, further questions that one needs to ask with respect to the Guattarian-based identity politics of Japanese university students learning English with technology are: 1) How and why do events take place when groups wire themselves to machines in terms of identity, subjectivity and learning? 2) How does the engrossment in 'machinic funk' and addiction to machines lead to social reclusion (hikikomori), and to a kind of tearing away of consciousness, a *Zerrissenheit* of subjectivity or absolute dismemberment?[4]

## 4. Conclusion

Guattari's (1984a & 1995a) two-fold messages about the effects of the mass media and the machinic enslavement that watching too much TV or surfing the internet without critical intent, are relevant and concise with respect to the Japanese university English language learners. The students

at university use technology to communicate their messages about the stimulus material to learn English in a manner that is driven by the 'political-social-affective' energies of the assemblage. The groups of students became assemblages through the mediation of mobile and technological devices, with the idea of communicating their responses and when mobilising their desires in what may have been perceived by them as external forces. This is where the 'becoming-otaku' comes to the fore, and the character traits of the Japanese, such as the ability to organise themselves effectively in groups, and to effectively use sophisticated, technological means for communication in complex manners, is an aid and benefit in terms of English language learning. This aspect of the study is in opposition to, for example, writing a set piece, English essay as an assessment exercise, or completing an English examination based on linguistic understanding. The Japanese university students progress in their studies due to the hybrid mixture of intercultural communication, technological mediation, the affective and conflictive stimulation of the material (affect) and an identity-based understanding of 'Japaneseness' with respect to the assemblages produced and the pedagogy deployed. The quality of 'being Japanese' is understood here not in terms of an essential attribute of the subject, or a form of 'resubjectivation', but as being able to handle the potentially alienating and disavowing influences of capitalism, here termed as the 'chaosmos'. In other words, the Guattarian pedagogy that this article has described trusts the strength and reserves of the Japanese collective character to overcome the effects of contemporary everyday life. The Japanese subject in this article is encouraged to overcome any negative influences that may have been thrust upon them by chaotic yet universal globalisation and the individualistic and competitively driven task of learning English, and to surge ahead in terms of the contiguities of affect, technological networked augmentation, and the transversal means to become a coordinated underground of effective, Guattarian, 'otaku agents'…

## NOTES

1. Guattari was also interested in the free radio movement in Italy and Japan. See Tetsuo Kogawa's Translocal website: http://anarchy.translocal.jp/guattari/index.html.

2. On the notion of Guattari and technological devices as mediating thirds connecting the individual, school and community see Bradley (2012).

3. A brief explanation about Butoh dancing exists at this web site: http://www.mindspring.com/~rawvor/history.html

4. A particularly striking example of an obsession with English testing and social reclusiveness is Takehiko Kikuchi, a self-classed hikikomori, who has scored the maximum of 990 points in the Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC), an international English test for non-native speakers, 27 times.

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 96–120, ISSN 1841-2394

# OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES ATTRIBUTION

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ABSTRACT. The author presents a theory which helps to solve the popular skeptic puzzle: 1. If you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat, then you do not know anything, 2. You do not know that you are not a brain in a vat. Therefore: 3. You do not know anything. He claims that the concepts which we use to attribute propositional attitudes are notoriously ambiguous. Cognitive (belief, certainty, truth, justification, knowledge) and perceptual (impression and perception) concepts are analyzed. The author divides them into two divisions: subjective (belief (subjective truth, subjective knowledge), certainty (subjective justification), impression (subjective perception)) and objective (objective truth, objective justification, objective knowledge, objective perception). The basic claim is that only an external attributor may use the objective cognitive concepts toward the subject. The solution of the puzzle is that the second premise (2) is always false no matter if you consider it in the subjective or objective meaning and if the attributor believes or not that you are a brain in a vat. Kant's theory of understanding, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Tarski's theory of truth are mentioned too.

Keywords: knowledge; skepticism; belief; certainty; truth; justification; impression; perception; objective; subjective

What is objectivity and subjectivity? Some philosophers claim that subjectivity is a so much vague concept that it should be entirely rejected, hence every subjectivity should be replaced with impartial objective description of things. They think that any cognition which is made only from one point of view may not be true, because the truth lies beyond all the points of view, beyond all the perspectives—the truth is what the reality really is, without any particular bias of a knower. Therefore science may not be subjective. On the other hand we have so called humanities. They deal with

human points of view, hence subjective perspectives is what they work on every day. It seems impossible to remove the subjective aspect from their domain. Moreover even claims of an ultimately objective scientist are merely claims of a single man, and thus they are equally subjective as any other subjective claim. Science as society of singles is an object of humanistic research too.

The problem looks like an unsolvable antinomy. We believe that knowledge may be only objective but the only possibility to strive for it is our singular human subjective perspective. Thus it seems that knowledge would be impossible. Such conclusion is completely contrary to our everyday experience, because in fact we know many things, do we?

Take the popular skeptic puzzle (cf. Cohen 1986, DeRose 1995; Neta 2003a). That is a contemporary version of Descartes' evil genius problem (*Med.* 2).

1. If you do not know that you are not a brain in a vat, then you do not know anything.
2. You do not know that you are not a brain in a vat.

Therefore:

3. You do not know anything.

Let me remind briefly for clearness what the case of a brain in a vat (BIV) means. A human brain is put into a vat which maintains the brain's life. The levels of all the chemical substances solved in the blood which are important for the correct work and impressions of the brain are secured by the vat. A conjoined computer delivers electric impulses to the brain, and they are one and the same as impulses which a normal human brain receives from the senses. The impulses contain a projection of a reality, hence the brain has a delusion of a normal human life.

Easily you see that the person believes that he has got hands. Whole his experience is a vast consistent evidence for this belief. That is his subjective perspective. But in the same time you know that he is wrong, cause his hands do not exist after being destroyed. Objectively speaking his belief is only a delusion. It seems impossible that he knows all these facts, because his situation seems to be cognitively hopeless. But you (say you are the mad scientist who has put the person's brain into the vat (cf. Putnam 1981, p. 5) know all this things merely upon your own subjective perspective. How can you know that the brain, the vat and your own hands in fact exist? How can you know that you are not a brain in a vat yourself? It seems that such strange, a little disturbing riddles do not have any end. Do we know many things or not?

In the present article I give a theory which makes an important step toward the solution of these problems. Besides of the skeptic puzzle in paragraphs 1–3 I will present more riddles to be solved. Kant's theory of understanding and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* will be mentioned. At the end of the beginning remarks I will add some hints that helped me to formulate my theory (paragraphs 4 and 5). The presentation of the theory will take the paragraphs 6–27. I am going to discuss such concepts like belief, certainty, truth, justification, knowledge, impression and perception. Tarski's theory of truth will be noticed too. Afterward all the puzzles will be solved in paragraphs 28–30.

## INTUITIVE HINTS AND PROBLEM SITUATION

### 1. Qualia and Other Transcendental Elements

There are numerous other problems more or less similar to the above one connected with the objectivity an subjectivity dualism which are to be solved. Take the concept of qualia. The question may be raised how can anybody know about them if you never perceive them. When you see a chair for example in fact you do not perceive your visual qualia but merely you perceive the chair. If you were to say that you perceive your qualia in the same meaning as in the case of perceiving a chair the result should be that qualia are equally material objects as chairs, and usually a qualia theorist does not accept such a conclusion. For similar reasons you can never know about your qualia and have any other cognitive relation to them. On the other hand if you wanted to avoid the consequence you would commit an equivocation; it would be upon the concept of perception, belief, knowledge or any similar. Or you would have to make a distinction, and have object perception and qualia perception etc. No need to add that the latter would be extremely mysterious, smelling with the analogous meaning known from theology.

And do not think that you can easily avoid the problem with rejecting the concept of qualia at all. Sometimes it is really difficult to avoid them or at least something like them. Take Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit (*Investigations* part II, chap. IX). It seems very tempting to explain the phenomenon with a concept of some visual data which lie somehow under what we really consciously experience. These raw visual qualia could be schematized in various forms according to the schema actually being used by the subject's mind in the given act of perception. When the schema of a duck is used you perceive a duck and when the schema of a rabbit is used you perceive a rabbit. There may be also a schema of chaotic patches in the visual field as in the Dalmatian hidden within black patches against the white background case, or you can see it with the schema (pattern) of a dog if you can.

The chaotic patches could be a candidate for the raw qualia but in fact they cannot. When you finally catch sight of the dog you do not dress the chaotic patches which you have seen before in the pattern of a dog but simply the seeing chaotic patches is replaced in your mind with the seeing the dog. Chaotic patches is not something that is already to be schematized but it is one of possible results of schematization. And this kind of schematization is one of the most common. You always experience it when you see the surface of your sweater, of your skin, of the table in the front of you, of the lawn behind the window, when you see the leafage of a tree, sand at the beach etc. When you see a cloud in the sky which looks like president Lincoln's face the cloud and the Lincoln patterns are not in any hierarchical or logical relation they simply exist one near one. You may see a cloud, you may see Lincoln and perhaps it is possible that somehow you can be conscious of both these visions in the same time. The same situation is with any picture made with black patches on a white sheet of paper. You see the patches and the content of the picture (like a rabbit or a duck) "one near one".

Certainly you may insist that Dalmatian and Lincoln patterns are made upon the black patches and a cloud seeing respectively. No matter if you find qualia-like beings as hypothetical and lying somewhere in mind under what is really experienced or you find them as these lying on the surface of experience chaotic patches waiting for schematization the question still may be asked how can you know about them if in fact you see (know) merely sheets of paper with patches, chaotic patches on sheets of paper, drawings of rabbits, ducks or Dalmatians, clouds and clouds looking like Lincoln.

## 2. Kant's Unknowable Theory of Understanding

The conceptual problem which we can see here is of the crucial kind. Take Kant's theory of understanding. From one point of view it looks like a rousing stroke of genius when it explains step by step the way of cognition (even if many details need some further discussion and corrections), but on the other hand it includes many really strange statements and raises many serious questions which may be asked.

What is really breathtaking in Kant's work is his theory of understanding. It contains a theory of cognition. The theory explores one (explained in details) concept of knowing. According to it the way of cognition starts form the object which is to be known and ends with knowledge concerning it. The object somehow emanates the raw sensual data which are captured by the subject. In the mind the raw data are ordered into the form of external sense (space) (cf. *CPR* Bxxvi, B67), and afterwards into categories of understanding (like substance, number and causality) (A68ff.). Also they

are gathered together by schemata of understanding (concepts) into representations of objects (phenomena, appearances) (A137ff.). Phenomena are the basis for further cognition ending with physical laws.

Kant's idiom is difficult and not literally consequent in all details. Sometimes he commits statements which sound paradoxical. For example he claims that the thing in itself is unknowable. It is surprising when you remember that whole his theory is a theory of cognition starting with objects which are to be known, and the beginnings are just the things in themselves. So how can they be unknowable if whole the stuff concerns knowing them? The point is that Kant saying this paradoxical statement strives to say that it is not possible to know them without whole the mental machinery which he describes.

The objective and subjective problem appears when you notice that Kant is also speaking of other kinds of cognition. For example he considers the cognition performed by God:

> There is, moreover, no need for us to limit this kind of intuition—intuition in space and time—to the sensibility of man. It may be (though we cannot decide this) that any finite thinking being must necessarily agree with man in this regard. Yet even if this kind of intuition were thus universally valid, it would not therefore cease to be sensibility. It would remain sensibility precisely because it is derivative (*intuitus derivativus*) rather than original (*intuitus originarius*), and hence is not intellectual intuition. For the reason just set forth, intellectual intuition seems to belong solely to the original being, and never to a being that is dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (an intuition that determines that being's existence by reference to given objects). [*CPR* B72].

If intellectual intuition of an object did not rely on the sensual data coming out from the contact of the subject with the object, then what the kind of cognition this would be? How could cognition go on without any contact between the object and the subject and without any transfer of information from the proper to the latter? It seems impossible to think of any such relation as a relation of knowing.

The other question is similar to the qualia problem mentioned above. The question may be asked how Kant can know his theory of understanding. Not only how can he know about the sensual data but also about all the rest of the stuff like things in themseves, forms of sensibility, categories of understanding, schematization, imagination, appearances, ego etc.?

For example, how mathematics is possible? According to Kant, it comes out from intellectual analysis of the space as the form of external sense, but is it cognition or not? And what in fact it is? If mathematics would be knowledge then where is its object, were are the data coming from it to our

minds, where are the representations etc.? There is no room in Kant's theory for such questions. To tell the truth he writes quite much about the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding (A84ff.), also he describes quite minutely the way of mathematical cognition (A712ff.). Nevertheless his descriptions have nothing to do with the object-subject cognitive relation. Simply it means that mathematics is not knowledge in the basic meaning. There should be an entirely different concept of knowing for it. The questions:

"Do you know that Tom is in the kitchen?"

and:

"Do you know that two plus two is four?"

should apply some two entirely different meanings of the word "know," do they? Similarly as in the qualia problem the only alternative is equivocation.

Unfortunately Kant nowhere gives a sign that he understands the problem. On the contrary he considers the possibility of knowledge *a priori*, it is, knowledge before (without) experience. Strikingly he commits an equivocation here. From the point of view of his theory of understanding knowledge *a priori* is like dancing without a body, simply it is nonsense. Therefore if it were to have sense this should be something different.

### 3. Wittgenstein's Senseless *Tractatus*

Let us consider Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* yet. In more or less understandable manner he describes the way of reference: the way from a fact to the thought of it. It includes such concepts like a form of an object (2.025), atomic fact (2.0272), a picture of a fact (2.1), a form of representation (2.15), a logical form (2.18) etc. The problem is that according to the theory presented in *Tractatus* a sentence is significant only if it speaks of some objects or expresses some facts. Things like a form of an object or an atomic fact are not facts in the meaning of *Tractatus* thus all sentences concerning them are senseless. Wittgenstein himself admits this in his famous thesis 6.54:

> My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
> He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

Literally it means that his theory is irrational and not worth of attention of any rational researcher, as any other absurd speaking. Though Wittgenstein

poetically seems to deny it speaking of the ladder etc. Kant could have invented something similar. In fact he did. He invented the idea of concepts not understandable but possible to defend. This is what he writes of freedom (but the same could be written perhaps on any other concept of his theory):

> But freedom is a mere idea, whose objective reality can in no wise be established in accordance with natural laws, hence also not in any possible experience; for the same reason, because no example may ever be attributed to freedom itself in accordance with any analogy, freedom can never be comprehended, nor even can insight into it be gained. It is valid only as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being that believes itself to be conscious of a will, i.e., of a faculty varying from a mere faculty of desire (namely, of determining itself to action as an intelligence, hence in accordance with laws of reason, independently of natural instincts). But where the determination in accordance with natural laws ceases, there too ceases all explanation, and there is nothing left over except defense, i.e., aborting the objections of those who pretend to have looked deeper into the essence of things and therefore brazenly declare freedom to be impossible. [*Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* 459]

To make it clear my purpose is not to show that Kant and Wittgenstein were irrational writers but to expose the point in which the problem of the objective and the subjective touches their works. And because their theories are of conceptual kind (analytical) then the problem leads to inconsistencies. It means that if to remove the errors coming out form the problem and thus to improve these theories the inconsistencies would disappear, and only the valuable core of their theories would remain. Below I will show how to do this.

### 4. Impossible Self-Gettierization

An important observation that had helped me to formulate my theory is that it is not possible to formulate a Gettier case referring to oneself. If a Gettier case is to be correct the narrator is to be somebody else than the subject. Gettierization requires an external observation. In other case it is not possible to know that even if the subject works perfectly from his own point of view he was somehow mislead and his beliefs even if accidentally true and subjectively justified are not knowledge.

### 5. Contextualist External Attributor

Finally I admit that also helping was the stress which contextualists put on the presence of the attributor within the context that is important to inter-

pret the actual meaning of the concept of knowledge, and that the attributor is to be somebody else than the subject.

## PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY
### 6. Two Divisions of Mental Concepts

In general my theory is extremely simple. Nevertheless because of our conceptual customs and the complexity of the matter it is quite difficult to accept and understand it. However when you apply it with an adamant consequence lots of problems get solved. It goes as follows.

The discourse of our mental activities is notoriously ambiguous. Almost every concept which we use to describe propositional attitudes has two meanings, each of them belonging to one of two major divisions. The divisions I will call "objective" and "subjective."

Simply speaking the subjective division in fact serves to speak of propositional attitudes of subjects. What is interesting (and what is in fact the original part of my theory) concepts from the objective division seem to do the same but actually they do much more. Shortly in addition they serve to state the accordance (or discrepancy) between the subjective propositional attitudes of the subject and the propositional attitudes of the attributor. Intuitively the word "subjective" may be explained as "from the point of view of the subject," and the word "objective" as "from the point of view of the subject when it is in accordance with the point of view of the attributor."

There are words to name some of these concepts separately, without equivocation (like "belief" or "impression"), but most of them are ambiguous. The equivocations based on this fact lead to an incredible variety of philosophical problems. The analysis of them is in fact the aim of a large part of epistemology in the wide sense.

Let us take two examples to make my theory clear. The first one will refer to the concept of knowledge, the second to perception. Thus first consider such concepts like belief, truth, certainty, justification and knowledge.

### 7. Belief

The concept of belief is—as I have mentioned—unique in this family. It simply belongs to the subjective division without the said equivocation. Of course it is still polysemous because of some other problems which here we are not interested in. For simplicity I assume that a belief is a proposition that the subject is conscious and certain of and uses it as the basis for his actions. For weak beliefs, it is, such which are not certain, I will use the phrase "a view which is not certain".

In whole the article I will consider the propositional attitude of affirmation only. It is when somebody has a belief and expresses it in his utterance. When Tom says:

"There is a tree in front of me."

he means in fact:

"I (Tom) believe that there is a tree in front of me (Tom)."

Now of course it is possible that somebody else expresses the fact that Tom has got the belief. Say Jake could say:

"Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him."

Saying this Jake in the same time expresses his own belief concerning Tom's belief, thus his utterance means also:

"I (Jake) believe that Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him."

It means that speaking a sentence you always speak subjectively toward yourself, it is, you speak in the same time that you have a belief. (In fact the phrase "I believe that" could be infinitively iterated at the beginning of the sentence but this makes no problem. Simply all these sentences are logical consequences of the first one, and the question is connected with the so called closure principle, which is not our topic here.)

## 8. Subjective Knowledge

The rest of the enumerated concepts are essentially ambiguous (besides certainty). Therefore I will speak of subjective and objective truth, justification and knowledge. Subjective knowledge means in fact the same as belief. It is, the sentence:

"Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him."

Means the same as:

"Tom knows (in the subjective sense) that there is a tree in front of him."

This meaning of knowledge is used in such contexts like:

"According to astronomical knowledge before Copernicus the Sun circled around the Earth."

"Tom considered the situation quickly. He knew that a man was following him and striving to kill him. Panic-stricken he was looking for a way to run. In fact he did not know that the man was not watching him, and even had not heard about him ever, but merely by accident he was passing by."

In the second example the subjective use is performed in the phrase “He knew that a man was following him…,” if fact it means the same as “He believed that a man was following him…”, whereas in the phrase “In fact he did not know that the man was not following him” the word is used in the objective sense. The sentence about astronomers means in fact the same as:

“Before Copernicus astronomers had believed that the Sun circled around the Earth.”

### 9. Subjective Truth

The subjective truth means the same as subjective knowledge and belief. Thus the sentences above mean the same as:

“It is true for Tom that there is a tree in front of him.”

“For astronomers before Copernicus it was true that the Sun circled around the Earth.”

The phrases “true for Tom” and “true for astronomers” use the subjective meaning of truth.

### 10. Negation of Belief

The negation of a sentence concerning a belief means that there is not the given belief in the subject’s mind, it is, a negative belief means lack of the belief. Hence the following sentences mean the same:

“It is not true that Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him.”

“Tom does not believe that there is a tree in front of him.”

“It is not true for Tom that that there is a tree in front of him.”

“Tom does not know (subjectively) that there is a tree in front of him.”

“There is not in Tom’s mind (memory) the belief that there is a tree in front of him.”

### 11. Certainty and Subjective Justification

Certainty is one of the concepts which are not disemous in the involved sense. It belongs to the subjective division. The subjective justification means certainty.

### 12. Negation of Certainty

A negation of a sentence concerning certainty means that there is not certainty in the subject’s mind referring to the given view. The following sentences mean the same:

"It is not true that Tom is certain that there is a tree in front of him."

"Tom is not certain that there is a tree in front of him."

"The view that there is a tree in front of Tom is not subjectively justified for him."

"There is no certainty in Tom's mind toward the view that there is a tree in front of him."

"Within Tom's mind the view that there is a tree in front of him is not certain."

Notice that on the basis of my assumptions made above you cannot say anything like:

"Tom is not subjectively justified in believing that there is a tree in front of him."

because it suggests that Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him even if he is not subjectively justified in it. Such situation is excluded upon my assumption that beliefs are certain, so they are subjectively justified as well.

### 13. Objective Truth

As I will show the objective mode of speaking is reducible to the subjective mode. What is the objective truth? First we use the concept to state the accordance between our beliefs and a subject's belief. When Jake says:

"Tom's belief that there is tree in front of him is true."

He means in fact:

"1. Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him.
2. There is a tree in front of Tom."

The second point (2) means in fact that Jake himself believes that there is a tree in front of Tom. So in fact he means:

"1. Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him.
2. I (Jake) believe that there is a tree in front of Tom."

Perhaps the third point should be added:

3. These beliefs are the same.

Or simply add the word "also" in the second point (2). Another possible formulation is:

"1. Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him.
2. One of my (Jake's) beliefs is the same as this Tom's belief."

or:

"2. This Tom's belief belongs to my (Jake's) beliefs."

## 14. Absolute Truth

The objective meaning of truth is used also when you state the truth of a sentence or a proposition in isolation from any subject. I call it the "absolute" mode of speaking the truth, because then you state the truth in disconnection from any particular subject. For example if Jake says:

"It is true that there is a tree in front of Tom."

He uses the absolute mode, and it is a kind of the objective mode. Such statements are elliptic and they refer in fact to any subject external to Jake which believed the proposition. (Of course it is still possible that Jake means his subjective truth here, and he has just omitted the phrase "for me," but usually he does not.) Thus such a statement means in fact:

"If anyone believed that there is a tree in front of Tom his belief would be the same as one of mine (Jake's)."

Of course in the same time such a Jake's statement means:

"The sentence <There is a tree in front of Tom> is true."

thus in the same time:

"If the sentence <There is a tree in front of Tom> were true for anyone his belief would be the same as one of mine (Jake's)."

or:

"If the sentence <There is a tree in front of Tom> were true for anyone his belief would be the same as my (Jake's) belief that there is a tree in front of Tom."

This formula (or some earlier above) should resemble Tarski's definition of truth (1933). His way to avoid the liar paradox was that you must not speak of sentences belonging to a language in the same language. Therefore he introduced the concept of metalanguage and seeking for the correct formulation of his theory discovered his formula of the definition of truth (by the way the strangest definition in history of logic).

From my point of view his work were one of the first formulations of the idea of what the objective mode of speaking really is. Going beyond Tarski I claim that to avoid the liar paradox one must not speak of objective truth toward himself. The question of language separation is in fact not important, only you have to separate the subjects. Tarski's metalanguage is not in fact another language but simply the attributor's speech.

Generally Tarski's theory is not correct because it ignores the fact that there are no absolute sentences but sentences obtain their meaning only when used, and every use of a sentence is always a use by a subject. Therefore the question always arises who are the object language and the metalanguage speakers. When you realize this easily you see that what is to be separated is the subject's and the attributor's utterances but not their languages. In fact they might speak the same language.

Of course the formula works also reversely:

"If one of anyone's belief is the same as my (Jake's) belief that there is a tree in front of Tom then the sentence <There is a tree in front of Tom> is true for him."

Therefore my counterpart of Tarski's definition is:

"The sentence <There is a tree in front of Tom> is true for anyone iff one of his beliefs is the same as my (Jake's) belief that there is a tree in front of Tom."

Of course the statements of objective truth mean in the same time the belief of the attributor. Therefore Jake's statements:

"Tom's belief that there is a tree in front of him is true."
"The sentence <There is a tree in front of Tom> is true."

imply:

"I (Jake) believe that there is a tree in front of Tom."

or:

"There is a tree in front of Tom."

For such formulae Tarski's theory is literally correct, given that the separation of language and metalanguage you interpret as separation of subjects (and given that you ignore the fact that he insisted that his theory applied for artificial languages only (cf. 1933, p. 164)).

Therefore the absolute truth statements are equivalent to subjective belief statements of the speaker. Actually this is the correct core of the disquotational theory of truth.

## 15. Negation of Objective Truth

A negation of objective truth means that there is not within the attributor's beliefs a belief the same as the given subject's belief. Thus when Jake says:

"Tom's belief that there is a tree in front of him is not (objectively) true."

he means the same as:

"1. Tom believes that there is a tree in front of him, but
2. There is no such belief among my (Jakes) beliefs."

And when Jakes says:

"It is not (objectively) true that there is a tree in front of Tom."

he means:

"If anyone believed that there is a tree in front of Tom his belief would not be the same as one of mine (Jake's)."

### 16. Objective Justification

Now let us take the objective justification. If Jake believes that there a tree in front of Tom, he is sure of it. He has obtained his sureness upon some reasons. In simple cases Jake would say that Tom's belief that there is a tree in front of him is objectively justified when their reasons for certainty were basically similar, e. g. both they saw the tree. In more difficult cases it may be that their reasons are different, it could be that Tom is blind but he touches the tree, or that merely he is told about the tree by a trustworthy person (it could be even Jake himself). The general idea is that it is necessary that if Jake believes that:

"Tom's belief that there is a tree in front of him is (objectively) justified."

or:

"Tom is (objectively) justified in believing that there is a tree in front of him,"

he in fact believes that:

"1. There is a causal connection between a tree and Tom's mind and that
2. The causal signal contains enough information to draw the conclusion that there is a tree in front of Tom, and that
3. Tom has drawn the conclusion from his perceptions in the proper way."

In other words it is to be excluded from Jake's point of view that Tom's cognition has been Gettierized (cf. Gettier 1963).

### 17. Negation of Objective Justification

One of the presuppositions of objective justification statements is that the subject believes in the relevant objective truth. In other case there would be no possibility to consider the way from the real state of affairs to the subject's belief. The content of the objective justification statements is that the cognition went correctly. Thus the negative statement claims that it did not,

it is, that one of the three conditions was not fulfilled, even though the subject believes the objective truth. When Jake thinks that:

"It is not true that Tom is (objectively) justified in believing that there is a tree in front of him."

In fact he thinks:

"1. There is no causal connection between the tree and Tom's mind or
2. The causal signal does not contain enough information to draw the conclusion that there is a tree in front of Tom or
3. Tom has not drawn the conclusion from his perceptions in the proper way."

### 18. Objective Knowledge

Objective knowledge is an objectively justified objectively true belief. And because it is hard to think that a belief which is objectively justified is objectively false it is enough to say that objective knowledge is an objectively justified belief. It is so because, as I have just written above, the truth belongs to the presuppositions of objective justification. Thus if Jake claims that:

"Tom knows (in the objective sense) that there is a tree in front of him."

He means that:

"1. Tom's belief that there is a tree in front of him belongs to mine (Jake's) beliefs and
2. I (Jake) believe that this Tom's belief is (objectively) justified."

### 19. Negation of Objective Knowledge

When we say that somebody does not know something we mean that there is a fact to know, but that the subject has no knowledge of it. When Jake believes that:

"Tom does not know (in the objective sense) that there is a tree in front of him."

he means:

"1. The belief that there is a tree in front of Tom is one of mine (Jake's), and (one or two of the following)
2. Tom does not believe that there is a tree in front him or
3. Tom's belief that there is a tree in front of him is not objectively justified."

These are the basic statements concerning the group of cognitive concepts including belief, truth, certainty, justification and knowledge. Now let us focus on two concepts of perception.

### 20. Impression, Subjective Perception

Impression (quale, pl. qualia) belongs to monosemous concepts like belief. What is ambiguous is the concept of perception, and all the concepts referring to particular senses, like seeing. Thus the sentences:

"Tom perceives (in the subjective sense) a tree."
"Tom sees (in the subjective sense) a tree."

mean the same as:

"Tom has an impression of a tree."
"Tom has a visual impression of a tree."

We use the perception words in the subjective sense when we describe dreams, imaginations, memories, and when a suspicion arises that the subject's perception does not work well, like in the sentence:

"Tom sees a tree but there is no tree in front of him."

In the subjective sense Jake can say also that:

"Tom perceives (in the subjective sense) the tree."

It means that Tom's impressions collected in his memory make a system within which he differentiates at least two trees. Therefore such saying means that in the given moment Tom has got the impression of the given one of the trees from the system.

### 21. Negation of Impression

The negation of subjective perception means that there is not the given impression in the subject's mind. The sentences:

"Tom does not perceive (in the subjective sense) a tree."
"Tom does not see (in the subjective sense) a tree."

mean the same as:

"Tom has no impression of a tree."
"Tom has not a visual impression of a tree."

The statement:

"Tom does not perceive (in the subjective sense) the tree."

means that in the given moment Tom has not got any impression of the given one of the trees from his memory system of impressions.

## 22. Objective Perception

In the case of perception the situation is a little different than in the case of knowledge. Speaking objectively you do not state the accordance between your impressions and the impressions of the subject. Rather you state the accordance between the impressions of the subject and your beliefs related to the content of these impressions. When Jake says:

"Tom perceives (in the objective sense) the tree."

In fact he means:

"1. There is a tree which I (Jake) have on my mind, and
2. Tom has got an impression of a tree such that:
a. The tree interacted with Tom's sensory organs, and
b. The impression of a tree is the result of the interaction.

The objectivity of such saying relies on that Jake himself believes that the tree exists. (In fact the first condition may be omitted because the existence of the tree which Jake has got on his mind is a supposition of the interaction of the tree and Tom.)

In the objective sense you can also say that somebody perceives any object of a kind. Jake may say:

"Tom perceives (in the objective sense) a tree."

He would mean then:

"Tom has got an impression of a tree such that:
a. There is a tree which interacted with Tom's sensory organs, and
b. The impression of the tree is the result of the interaction."

Jake may also speak of Tom's perception of properties of objects:

"Tom perceives (in the objective sense) that the tree is an oak."

He would mean then:

"1. There is a tree which I (Jake) have on my mind, and which is an oak, and
2. Tom has got an impression of a tree such that:
a. The tree interacted with Tom's sensory organs, and
b. The impression of a tree is the result of the interaction, and
c. The tree in the impression is an oak (the impression of a tree is an impression of an oak).

(Notice that when you speak of objective perception of properties of objects you assume that these objects are perceived by the subject and the only question is if the properties are perceived too.) (A problem arises if Tom can distinguish an impression of oak from an impression of elm or beech or even trees from people or cars, but I am not going to analyze it here.)

In sum when you talk about yourself all the objects which you perceive are your own impressions, whereas when you speak of somebody else you may talk about his impressions or about his objective perception.

### 23. Negation of Objective Perception

When we say that somebody does not perceive an object we claim that there is an object to perceive but the subject has not a proper impression of it. It is, when Jake claims that:

"Tom does not perceive (in the objective sense) the tree."

In fact he means:

"1. There is a tree which I (Jake) have on my mind, and
2. Tom has got no impression of a tree such that:
a. The tree interacted with Tom's sensory organs, and
b. The impression of a tree is the result of the interaction.

Jake might also say that:

"Tom does not perceive (in the objective sense) any tree."

He would mean then:

"Tom has got no impression of a tree such that:
a. There is a tree which interacted with Tom's sensory organs, and
b. The impression of the tree is the result of the interaction."

Again it is worth to add that the objectivity of such statement is based on this that the question of the existence of the trees Jake refers to his own believes.

Referring to properties of objects Jake could say:

"Tom does not perceive (in the objective sense) that the tree is an oak."

He would mean:

"1. There is a tree which I (Jake) have on my mind, and which is an oak, and
2. Tom has got an impression of a tree such that:
a. The tree interacted with Tom's sensory organs, and
b. The impression of a tree is the result of the interaction, and
c. The tree in the impression is not an oak (the impression of a tree is not an impression of an oak).

## 24. Recap

Therefore we have two divisions of concepts. (Intentionally I avoid the word "families" not to mix my idea with Wittgenstein's family meaning.) The subjective division contains the following:

Belief (subjective truth, subjective knowledge)
Certainty (subjective justification)
Impression (subjective perception).

The objective division contains:

Objective truth
Objective justification
Objective knowledge
Objective perception.

For technical purposes it is worth to introduce some order into the vocabulary. The aim is such simplification that the labels "subjective" and "objective" would become not necessary and any ambiguity would disappear. Therefore let me decide that from now I will use the terms in such a manner that the words "truth," "justification," "knowledge," and "perception" will mean only the concepts from the objective division. Also all the detailed kinds of perception, like seeing, hearing, smelling etc., will belong to this. On the other hand the subjective concepts will be belief, certainty and impression. Sometimes I will use the term "subjective justification," because it is useful to isolate the justificationary segment of certainty. The labels may be also used to underline the objective or subjective aspect of a concept.

The presented concepts are the most important for the epistemological puzzles but the divisions are larger. (I call "epistemology" here the wide domain where all the problems of the objective and subjective are discussed.)

## 25. Two Minds, Objectivity and Knowledge

The most important conclusion from the theory (partially already mentioned above) is that objective speech of knowledge, justification or truth requires two minds. I will call them "objective cognitive concepts." One cannot say that some of his beliefs are true or justified. He cannot say that he knows anything. Only he can say that he has such and such beliefs or that he is certain of something. The use of these objective predicates requires the presence of the second person—the second mind, second subject—and without this it is logically senseless. Only the second person can use these concepts, when talking of a subject.

On the other hand it is possible to talk objectively about one's perception, because it is possible to have impressions contrary to one's beliefs. I will elaborate this point below.

### 26. Self-objective Mode of Speech

Of course the statement above that the use of the objective cognitive concepts requires the second person may not be entirely true, because otherwise we would not be able to understand what other people speak of our knowledge when they use the objective mode. If we are to understand them we have to be able to use the objective concepts toward ourselves. The remark is right that we cannot use them referring to ourselves directly, but we can use them as if somebody external to us would do it. Thus the self-objective mode of speech requires that we in a way create a fictional person in our mind and put the words in his mouth. Usually it is something like an our *alter ego* because he has got all our believes, his mind is a copy of ours. For instance Tom can say:

"I know that there is a tree in front of me."

and this would mean that:

"If there were a well informed attributor then
1. My (Tom's) belief that there is a tree in front of me (Tom) would belong to his beliefs and
2. He would believe that my (Tom's) belief was objectively justified."

The phrase "well informed" means here "having the same beliefs that I have."

If Jake said to Tom:

"You do not know that there is a tree in front of you, cause you are blind. Thus only you guess it."

Tom could answer:

"I know that there is a tree in front of me, cause I hear its leaves rustling in the wind and I feel its shadow on my face."

The controversy would concern Tom's justification, therefore Tom would give Jake arguments that in fact even if he is blind he could be justified on the basis of some other perception. The point is that saying this Tom would use the objective meaning of knowledge. He would not mean merely his belief:

"I believe that there is a tree in front of me (Tom)."

Because it would be pointless. Jake did not undermine his belief or his certainty but his justification, therefore a reminder that Tom actually believed that there is a tree would not work. He would have to say something what could be convincing for Jake, hence he would have to look at himself from Jake's point of view, which in fact is the point of view of an external attributor, and he would have to say something relevant to the objective meaning of knowledge.

### 27. Negative Self-objective Mode of Speech

Nevertheless it does not change the fact that self-objective mode of speaking concerning knowledge, truth and justification is only "as if" speaking, and the logical content of such utterances may never go beyond the beliefs of the subject, because all the beliefs the subject can put into the fictional external attributor's mind may be only his own beliefs. That is the reason why even when the self-objective mode is used you still cannot think out a Gettier case referring to yourself. You cannot because you cannot say about yourself that you do not know something. Such attempt would mean that you claim that:

1. You have a belief that is not one of your beliefs or that
2. You have a belief which is not justified from your point of view,

or both. Point (1) is a simple contradiction. Point (2) would mean that you have some beliefs which in fact undermine your certainty of the given belief. The certainty would not be possible and you would not have the respective view as one of your beliefs. Therefore you never use the objective mode in negation. If Tom says:

"I do not know that there is a tree in front of me (Tom)."

he always means it in the subjective sense:

"I do not believe that there is a tree in front of me (Tom)."

On the other hand you may formulate negative self-objective statements if they do not concern knowledge, but for instance perception. Say you see a spoon in a glass of water. It seems bent to you, but on the other hand you believe that it is not, and that only your eyes are mislead by optical properties of the glass of water. You could say then:

"I do not see that the spoon is straight"

In fact you would mean:

"1. There is a spoon which I have on my mind, and which is straight, and
2. I have got an impression of a spoon such that:

a. The spoon interacted with my sensory organs, and
b. The impression of a spoon is the result of the interaction, and
c. The spoon in the impression is not straight.

It is possible to speak like this because an impression does not imply the respective belief, thus it is possible to have impressions contrary to one's own beliefs.

## SOLUTION OF THE PUZZLES

### 28. The Skeptic Puzzle

As I have promised after presenting the theory now I will solve the puzzles mentioned at the beginning. Let us start from the skeptic puzzle. I will show that the second premise of the reasoning is always false. Let us analyze the sentence:

"You do not know that you are not a brain in a vat."

If the verb "know" were in the subjective meaning here, the sentence would mean:

"You do not believe that you are not a brain in a vat."

or:

"There is not the belief in your mind that you are not a brain in a vat."

This would be simply false because if you believe that you are a man with hands etc., this means automatically that you believe that you are not a brain in a vat. The result is on the basis of the so called closure principle, which I am not to discuss extensively here. Similarly you believe that you are not a tomato or an elephant, because you believe that you are a man. With the second premise false the reasoning stops to be disturbing.

If the verb "know" were used here in the objective sense an additional attributor would be necessary. The sentence would mean:

"1. The belief that you are not a brain in a vat is one of mine (the attributor's), and (one or two of the following)
2. You do not believe that you are not a brain in a vat or
3. Your belief that you are not a brain in a vat is not (objectively) justified."

Let us consider two cases. In the first one the attributor believes that you are a man, and in the second he believes that you are a brain in a vat. In the first case (1) is true because the attributor believes that you are a man. (2) is false as we saw it a while ago. (3) is false two because the attributor believes that you have basically similar reasons to believe that you are a man as he has. Thus whole the sentence is false. In the second case (1) is

false and hence whole the sentence is false too. Therefore the premise is always false, no matter if you consider it in the subjective or objective meaning and if the attributor believes or not that you are a brain in a vat.

Probably the seducing strength of the premise relies on this that you seem to be forced to know objectively that you are not a brain in a vat because otherwise you would not know anything (according to the first premise). But knowing that the subjective perspective of your own beliefs can never give you the objective knowledge of your situation you feel that you have to agree that you cannot know if you are not a brain in a vat. The error lies in it that you do not realize that there are two meanings of knowledge and thinking this way you mix them. Especially the idea that you could know anything objectively is senseless.

### 29. The Puzzle with Kant

The solution of the problem with Kant relies on the observation that in fact his theory is an objective theory of cognition, it is, this is a theory of knowing from the point of view of an external attributor (or it is spoken in the self-objective mode). Of course the remark is strikingly contradictory with Kant's explicit words that an external theory of mind is not possible. Kant even goes as far as to say that thanks to the distinction between the thing in itself and the appearance he can, without any contradiction, speak of causality and freedom in reference to one and the same object, i.e. human being (*CPR* Bxxviii).

But as I have sketched above Kant's theory in its historical version is paradoxical and it is obvious that it contains some errors. I do not want to say that these are some simple mistakes. In fact Kant's theory is a stroke of genius, but usually even the genius cannot know everything. (The concept of freedom is to be explained in a different way, but I am not going to discuss it here.)

Thus the attributor, say Jake, can see a subject, say Tom, and an object to be known by the subject, say a tree. Jake can analyze the object and subject as physical objects as deeply as he wants. As the results he will obtain some beliefs concerning the tree and some concerning Tom. Analyzing conversations with Tom Jake can have a theory of cybernetic (functional, psychological) structure which stands behind Tom's utterances, even if Jake cannot know it directly upon the analysis of Tom's brain. The theory would be the theory of Tom's mind. In this way Jake would be able to know what processes go on in Tom's mind when he sees consciously the tree. Kant's theory is one of possible theories concerning such processes. It includes sensual data, space as the form of external sense, categories of understanding, schemata of understanding, and representations of objects

(appearances) etc. The idea of qualia lying under a duck or a rabbit is another one of the same kind, though it is more fragmentary. All of these objects are real objects existing in the cybernetic structure of mind. (These claims concern the mind-body problem, but I am not going to discuss it here. It is enough to say that if I speak that a subject has got an impression of a tree, it is necessary that I can believe this upon my beliefs concerning his body.) Let me add here that if we are to say that we know mathematics in the same meaning of knowledge as the being discussed here, then there is to be an object which is known within this domain, and according to Kant reinterpreted in the proposed manner the object should be the mind (cybernetic structure of the brain). Mathematics would be the theory of some properties of the mind.

Therefore this is the solution of the riddle. Kant's theory is a very interesting, worth to analyze, theory of cognition, but he was wrong saying that the subject may not be known upon the appearances of a human body containing it, and in fact Kant's theory is an example of possible results of such knowing.

## 30. The Puzzle with Wittgenstein

The problem with senselessness of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is in fact very similar to the problem with Kant. Wittgenstein also assumes, though it is hard to find a statement in his text which would be literally the same (cf. 5.541ff., 5.641, 6.423), that you cannot speak of the mind, or that the mind is not one of the objects which you can speak of. Therefore you cannot speak of this how a mind can think of objects or facts.

But in fact *Tractatus* is an objective theory of speaking of objects and facts. Wittgenstein's error is in fact the same as Kant's. Thus you can save it by the statement that in fact the subject may be known by the facts, and this is the way how one (Wittgenstein for instance) could formulate this theory. Wittgenstein may be right in his theory of speaking of objects and facts, but for sure he is wrong in his thinking that the mind and the processes going on in it are not facts that it is possible to speak of. Actually he does it himself. Merely it seems that saying that his *Tractatus* is senseless Wittgenstein strived to express the intuition that the subject cannot speak of himself objectively.

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 121–139, ISSN 1841-2394

# '*ART*', HABITUS, AND STYLE IN HERDER, HUMBOLDT, HAMANN, AND VOSSLER: HERMENEUTICS AND LINGUISTICS

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ABSTRACT. I show how a consistent line of anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian philosophies established by Herder, Humboldt, Hamann, and Vossler transformed the sign-character of human expressions into an expression of style by concentrating on the German term 'Art' as a sort of habitus. Especially Humboldt concentrates on the non-natural and non-functional character of language in defining it as a cultural product. Herder, Humboldt, Hamann, and Vossler recognize the insignificance of grammar as long as it is regarded as an abstract foundation for linguistics. Style is of utmost importance for all of them since they undermine the representation-theory by means of an "open rhetoric" using flexible rules and defining a sort of creative structural analysis. "Die Art" or the "how" of language gives linguistic expression the status of something spiritual and non-static. All four thinkers formulated their opposition to philosophical abstractions in terms of a "philosophy of life" and attempted to read "signs" as expressions of a historical and cultural reason.

Keywords: Wilhelm von Humboldt; Gottfried Herder; Johan Georg Hamann; Karl Vossler; structuralist stylistics; representation theory

## 1. Introduction

In this article I show how a consistent line of anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian philosophies established by Herder, Humboldt, Hamann, and Vossler attempted to transform the sign-character of human expressions into an expression of style by concentrating on the German term '*Art*' as a sort of habitus. First, this is opposed to Kant's view, which dismisses language in favor of purity of reason. However, it is also different from contemporary structuralist stylistics. In the twentieth century, structuralists concentrate on language as a cultural product, but they do so only in order to find a kind of "pure reason" in language. The paradoxical character of this constellation will be

made clear through an examination of style, habitus, and the German term "Art." Charles Taylor held that the main work of linguistic understanding is "to see the place that representation has in that culture" (1985: 291). For Taylor, the skepticism of the above three philosophers of language (whom he calls the HHH) towards any autonomy of linguistic representation corresponds exactly to the skepticism modern philosophers have towards (linguistic) norms. As a matter of fact, the essential critical part of the HHH-philosophy consists in undermining the representation-theory by means of an "open rhetoric" using flexible rules and defining a sort of creative structural analysis. On the other hand, the French linguist Oswald Ducrot is able to point to Humboldt's linguistics as an initial movement of a structuralist variation of stylistics relying on the theory of representation or sign theory when writing: "For Humboldt (…) a language's organizational mode, even though arbitrary, is a means to fulfill its representational function. It is, in a way, the style and the way any people choses to express the most universal spiritual power." Ducrot concludes "that nineteenth century linguistics had a concept of structure or a system (these two words are central for linguists of this époque)" (Ducrot 1973: 32).

This is surprising if one considers that Humboldt's dynamic "innere Form" has indeed been used as a weapon *against* static methods of French linguistic theories focusing on "external" structures (cf. Hutton 1998: 19). Most commonly, Humboldt's anti-sign linguistics has been opposed to Saussure's structuralist linguistics (Trabant 2001) because "inner form" implies that the word is not a copy of the object but a mental image produced by the speaker, which links language to "ways of thinking." The paradox is that the "innere Form" remains a *form*; there is nothing in Humboldt suggesting a romantic unity of language and people producing mystical, intimate connections between both or even the formulation of a national soul as advanced by Fichte and Schelling later (cf. Risager 2006: 61).

Clearly, Humboldt does not believe in language as a representation of signs, nor do Herder and Hamann. Style, on the other hand, is of utmost importance for all three of them, and here Ducrot is right. The present article will show how, through those thinkers, cultural style has been made accessible not through an abstract sign system but through devices inspired by a hermeneutic tradition relying on the German word 'Art.' The idea that linguistics should consider the "spiritual" side of language is once again taken up in the twentieth century by the German romance philologist Karl Vossler through the concept of *doxa.*

## 2. Johann Gottfried Herder

Similar to Giambattista Vico, Herder contrasts grammar with sound, and static form with living contents. The language of the first humans was natural and living, it was not an intellectual gift of God but has been produced by humans themselves. The expressive sounds that primitive humans made excelled so much in originality that for a long time no intellectual power could force them into the formalized schedule of an alphabet. Like Vico, Herder sees language as something non-formalizable which has flown as a creative invention out of an imaginative human activity and not as an answer to practical questions of utility, out of conventions and agreements. Herder's (like Humboldt's) theory of the origin of language resembles that of Rousseau who held that the "first invention of speech is due not to need but passion. (...) One does not begin by reasoning but by feeling." Rousseau points to the circularity that the assumption of a univocal "need" of language would represent:

> The natural effect of the first needs was to separate and not to reunite them. It must have been that way, because the species spread out and the earth was promptly populated. Otherwise mankind would have been crammed into a small area of the world, and the rest would have remained uninhabited. From this alone it follows clearly that the origin of languages is not at all due to people's first needs. It would be absurd to suppose that the means of uniting them derived from the cause of their separation (1966: 11).

Insisting on the living character of language as a product of human life, Herder meets the same difficulties as Vico, finding himself confronted with a circular reflection. Vico had asked how man could find his language without knowing already what language is. The first humans could not have agreed on something (on words) which they did not yet know (Sc. N., Sec. 412). Herder speaks of a "Kreisel" (circle) implying that "without language the human being has no reason, and without reason no language. Without language and reason he is incapable of any divine instruction, and yet without divine instruction he has no reason and language..." (1966: 121). A conventional way out of this dilemma would be to postulate that language has been received directly from God, a path taken by Herder's opponent Süssmilch. However, for Herder there is an other solution, which appears in the form of a "divine economy," a kind of Platonic idea showing man how to make the first step out of primitiveness. In the *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* Herder writes: "A divine economy has certainly ruled over the human species from it's first origin, and conducted him into his course the readiest way" (1808: 230). However, the gift

of God represents only a directive idea helping man to orientate his mind towards civilization; in their elaborated forms, language and culture should be considered as the works of humans and not as divine gifts: "But the more the human powers have been exercised, the less did they require his superior assistance, or the less were they susceptible of it" (ibid.).

Herder is uncompromising in maintaining his theory of language as a "natural invention." He looks for arguments within the conditions of the human mind aside from any "outside" religious inspirations. "Besonnenheit" which corresponds more or less exactly to the term "self-reflexivity" used by contemporary philosophers, implies not only that the subject thinks, but also that it thinks that it thinks: "Certainly as I know that I think, yet know not my thinking faculty; as certainly do I see and feel that I live, though I know now what the vital principle is" (1808: 321–22). Faculties like speaking and thinking could arise only from this self-referring rupture. It is the *Besonnenheit* which makes possible the logical impossibly of creating within one cultural act a cultural phenomenon like language. Language is not metaphysical or divine at all: "All our science of metaphysics is properly metaphysics, that is an abstracted systematic index of names following observations of experience. As a method, and an index, it may be very useful (...) but considered in itself, and according to the nature of things, it affords not a single perfect and essential idea, not a single intrinsic truth" (1803: 421).

In the *Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache* one believes to see indicators of the anti-Kantianism which Herder exposes twenty-seven years later in the *Metakritik of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Nevertheless, Kant's critique appeared only nine years after Herder's early *Abhandlung*. In the *Metakritik*, Herder attacks Kant's condition of "space" and "time" supposed to represent necessities for everything we want to understand. Herder admits that space and time form a principle of human thinking, but since they are abstract categories they are not sufficient to grasp any object of the human sphere in its concreteness. Like logic, space and time suffice for the classification of objects, but for its understanding and for its creation they do not: "No object receives through space so little of a principle of existence, shape or other qualities as the symbols written by the mathematician on the empty slate, from which the symbols receive their principles" (Verstand und Erfahrung: 53. All translations from this text are mine). This is what Herder wrote already in the *Abhandlung*: that the creative mind, which invents images, and the thinking mind, which systematizes them, belong together. At the same time, they should not be confused: "The sensitive and pictorially creative soul and the thinking soul, which establishes principles are capacities that will create different results" (*VE*: 19).

### 3. *Art*, Habitus, and Style

Herder's alternative is a *Gestalt* requiring more original power of knowledge (Erkenntniskraft) able to perceive concrete objects in the form of an original unity. Herder calls this original power a "complete concept" ("vollständiger Begriff"). It will perceive a totality composed of many single elements not synthetically in composing a whole out of several elements but it will perceive the totality and the elements immediately: "I compose neither the smell nor the color of the rose but from its picture and its smell I derive the characteristic unity that distinguishes for me the rose from everything which is not a rose" (*VE*: 86). During the search for the "characteristic unity," the understanding mind is looking for neither an object nor an abstract rule about this object (in the form of space and time) but it is interested in an immediate hermeneutic unity composed of the one and the whole. Herder finds a special expression for this process of understanding: "It means to feel common natures as well as kinds (Arten), descendances and origins intimately and quickly" (ibid.).

This is how the German word '*Art*' (kind, manner, habitus), acquires in Herder, Humboldt a central position. "Erkennen der Art" means for *Geisteswissenschaft* to understand an object inside its environment without deriving the object from its environment (or vice versa) in a logical fashion. To understand the *Art* means to perceive the one and the whole immediately as one expression. This particular hermeneutical unity can be obtained neither by matters of abstract calculations like addition or derivation nor by emotional impressionism:

> By adding, even if I would add infinitely, I will never obtain the One that is necessarily the foundation of any addition. Likewise the unity that reason sets up for itself, has not been acquired by adding something to some secondary representation but it has been given to me simply through itself by recognizing each time anew the unity within the multiple. (*VE*: 93)

Herder sees in the "*Art*" of things (or in the "innere Art," as he also calls it, and which comes close to Humboldt's "innere Sprachform") a center within which become obvious the relations of the object to its environment. This contradicts radical conceptions like that of Michael Morton who holds that for Herder "there is no such thing as prelinguistic consciousness and (…) that there can be no such thing as an extra-linguistic reality external to us" (Morton: 1993: 159). It is rather that those relations – which constitute our reality – become obvious without being defined. The species, the genus, or the *Art* of any object can only be understood by seeing the single object "hermeneutically" as a product of its environment and at the same time by seeing the environment as a product of the object. Signification and expres-

sion are thus mixed, as makes clear Formigari's description of the process: "From the activity of reflection [Besonnenheit] arises language, which allows humans to recognize the objects that appear marked by one or more distinctive traits. The genesis of internal language is the very act whereby we identify or recognize a representation through a sign. We move from internal language to expressed language" (Formigari 2004: 126).

It remains true, as Taylor says, that "through language (…) we bring to explicit awareness what we formerly only had an implicit sense of" (Taylor 1985: 257). However, the *Art* cannot be derived logically from a context with the aid of comparisons and systematizations. *Art* is always "*innere Art*" because it describes an inner mutual relationship of the individual with the general. It cannot be grasped by means of derivation or by means of descriptions of qualities (Eigenschaften) or exterior qualities (Äußerlichkeiten). In this sense, for Herder, language is not merely "expressivist" (which Taylor opposes to "designative" theories of language) because it is also said to shape the content of our consciousness. If the aim of understanding is to perceive hermeneutic unities, the most original form of an understanding of life and its living expressions becomes an understanding of the *Art*. Only an understanding of the *Art* preserves the hermeneutic relationship of the individual and the general:

> One was proceeding from genii and species to the recognition of the 'Art'. (…) The more one was observing the latter drawing conclusions about their *Art* of being, the more comprehensive could be the judgment, the more successfully could be judged the One within the Many. (…) Therefore we should not classify the category of the question "of what kind is a thing" or about its quality by using empty logical functions but we should use concepts of reason through which will become visible the objects' effective fundamental law which is "to recognize the One in the Many". (*VE*, 104–105)

Also Taylor points to the term *Lebensart* (form of life) in which linguistic practices are embedded. *Lebensart* concerns extra-linguistic factors reaching from national culture to climate. However, Herder is also a "critical" philosopher who refuses self-enclosure. The truth about *Lebensart* must rather be looked for in the "anti-foundationalist picture" (Morton 1993: 100) of how facts and meanings are produced. Here it is important to insist on the hermeneutic-stylistic input (which, by the way, does not appear in Wittgenstein's parallel term that Taylor mentions, 1995, p. 93) and to show that Herder's concept of *Art* transgresses the schedule of mere expression.

## 4. 'Art' and Play

The German word *Art* as well as the English or French words "art" come from Latin *ars* as well as from the Greek *arête*. To have a certain way of life (*Lebensart* in German) is not due to a skill or a craft and not even to the skill of exact imitation. It is rather the *mimesis*, the playing imitation (only obtainable through educational play) which produces *Art*. The specialist of play, historian and anthropologist Johan Huizinga draws a parallel between play and *Art* when attempting to define the principal quality of games. The English word 'fun' describes for him best what gives a game its particular attraction, as fun corresponds more or less to the Dutch word *aardigkeit*: "The Dutch *aardigkeit* perhaps comes nearest to it (derived from *aard*, which means *Art* and *Wesen* in German, and is thus evidence, perhaps, that the matter cannot be reduced further)" (Huizinga 1970: 21).

However, in German the word *Art* still has a second sense, that of the sort, the species, the kind in the sense of "man*kind*." There are different *Tierarten* (animal species) and the whole mankind is one *Art*, the *Art* of mankind, which is distinguished from the first by what is called the state of "civilization."

It is Nietzsche who points us in *The Gay Science* to this use of the word *Art*:

> 'The species [Art] is everything, an individual is always nothing' has become part of humanity and this ultimate liberation and irresponsibility is accessible to everyone at all times. Perhaps laughter will then have formed an alliance with wisdom; perhaps only 'gay science' will remain. At present, things are still quite different; at present, the comedy of existence has not yet 'become conscious' of itself. (Nietzsche 1968: 26–27)

Nietzsche was affected by moral conceptions of the aristocratic and military tradition of the 19th century. Nietzsche's conviction that Prussia was the "strongest modern state" (Nietzsche 1982: 225) can be understood not only as the manifestation of a brute and archaic militarism but also as a sketch of a certain cultural conception since Prussia represented for Nietzsche – though in a relatively subtle way – the ideal post-romantic "Culturstaat." The writer Friedrich-Georg Jünger notes that a good officer is not only skillful in the craft of war but that he is also a man "of good *Art* and education. (…) But all *Art* and education which deserves this name is based on the representation of imitation" (Jünger 1953: 155). For Jünger the production of style in humans can only happen through the aesthetic play of imitation (effectuated through education); only through *mimesis* will human beings inherit a virtue that represents more than merely skill and correctness. It is virtue that makes the good officer, this Prussian legend of a man who is a

kind of playing warrior: "The rank of a warrior manifest itself in imitation. Without imitation he is merely an adventurer, a looter and a capturer, a skillful hooligan and assassin" (156). The warrior sees his profession as a kind of art (this time the English word art) and only this gives him the real style and virtue of a warrior.

Herder answers the question: "welcherlei ist ein Ding?" (of which kind is a thing?) by saying that the "quality" of a thing has to be looked for in its *Art*. Style and *Art* are the most original manifestations of "living expressions." The expression "the rose" is not perceived synthetically: it is not composed by the receiver out of its single elements like color, smell, etc. The receiver comes across the expression in the form of a "characteristic unity," which contains everything that is characteristic for the recognition of a rose (see *VE*: 86). Here poetic language is more useful than notions or concepts as it constantly works (like everyday language) with "illogical" associations: sound and color, appearance and feeling are often connected in language correctly even though a logical, rational link between any of those elements does not exist. Our principal intellectual tool, language, is already an artistic expression. However, only through *Besonnenheit*, that is, by thinking by means of our language about language, do we realize that our language does not correspond to any absolute, abstract, ever-valid form of grammar but has arisen out of human life like a work of art.

## 5. Wilhelm von Humboldt

It is true that "the two main representations of language from which Humboldt was trying to liberate himself were those of the vehicle model and the mirror model of language" (Underhill 2009: 58). However, like Herder, Humboldt sees language as the fundamental component of man's circular-hermeneutical condition in the world: "Man is only language; but in order to invent language he had to be human already" (Humboldt 1963: 11). Humboldt attacks representation theory from a particular angle: given the circular relationship of language and consciousness, words can never be seen as signs or sounds but must be understood as expressions of *Weltanschauungen*. Like Vico, Humboldt thinks that the only power able to bring about real knowledge and real understanding of *Weltanschauungen* is a rhetorical use of language ("rednerischer Sprachgebrauch"), which he opposes to scientific and social language ("wissenschaftlichem und geschäftlichem Sprachgebrauch") (1963: 22). Speaking is creative by nature because it constantly transgresses forms (50). It is true that forms are essential for linguistic communication. The capacity to think (*Denkvermögen*) can obviously be improved by increasing our capacity to connect different linguistic forms. However, these forms are not absolute but have been created by humans within personal, cultural

contexts. Two languages are different not only because of different grammars and forms but also because of different moods of the mind, because of different ways of thinking and of feeling (80).

The spoken word expresses these psychological conditions, moods, and atmospheres more efficiently than the written word. "Thought" is not a matter of formal logic but a "way of thinking," which is for Humboldt, once again, the "Art des Denkens" or "Denkart." Words do not suggest formal patterns as does mathematics but bring forward "living expressions." Writing, the science of signs *par excellence*, on the other hand, weakens the expressive force of language: "Writing, which is supposed to be the sign of the sign, becomes simultaneously the sign of the object and weakens, by introducing its immediate appearance, the effect" (1963: 87).

The conception of a "living expression" dependent on sound and life makes Humboldt a main representative of what Derrida calls "phonocentrism." However, the *phonè* is not a direct representation of the world but rather the manifestation of aesthetic appearances. Humboldt's aesthetic phonocentrism prevents intuitive or logical, mechanization through aesthetic dramatization: the mischief of translations, for example, is that here intuition (Anschauung) is confined to the visual aspect of language excluding the aural one.

It becomes clear that in no case the "expressivist" component should here be played out against the "designative" one. For Humboldt expressions are an *Art* that has been aesthetically determined by using playful methods. Humboldt refers, for example, to rhythm and the "musical feeling of language" (97). Further, Humboldt sees understanding, like Dilthey, as a process of transformation from one state of mind to the other or from one aesthetic form to the other. Dilthey writes that "the raw material of an experience will be heated and melted into the shape that appears to be meaningful to the receiver" (1984: 101) and Humboldt holds, very similarly, that "language cannot be perceived as something material. The perceiver must pour it into the mold he has prepared and that's what is called understanding." Rhetorical speech is not seen as a natural stage of authentic life properly *expressed* by language but rather as an intellectual modulator: words are not cries granting a direct psychic communication but have undergone the modulating shaping of *Denkformen*.

This is indeed similar to Wittgenstein's view of language in which the "cry" is seen through a double perspective once as a purely primitive, subjective and spontaneous phenomenon and then as an *objective and descriptive* manifestation of "mental life" (Seelenleben): "A cry, which cannot be called a description, which is more primitive than any description, for all that, does the service of a description of the psychological" (PU Sec. II, 361).

For Humboldt, the "intellectual nature" appearing as the speaker's "urge" (Zwang) through rhetorical speech (162) is a paradox. Language is conventional in the sense that every individual has to adopt certain linguistic rules in order to make him/herself comprehensible. But the process of convention does not function through a transfer from a subjective to an objective state of language. In language, object and subject penetrate each other ("gehen in einander über," 226), conventions are not objective "by nature" but they have been subjective creations of other subjects beforehand. The creation that is produced by the subject becomes an object only afterwards: "In itself, the whole humanity's subjectivity becomes something objective" (20). Language, and especially phonetic language, is objective and subjective, a free creation and a restriction at the same time: "Language belongs to me because I bring it forth as I do; and since the ground of this lies at once in the speaking and having-spoken of every generation of men, so far as speech-communication may have prevailed unbroken among them, it is language itself which restrains me when I speak" (1999: 63).

Humboldt's linguistics examines language at the moment when the living, creative and constant development called language is neither a web of well-defined, objective signs, nor a direct manifestation of interior, subjective psychological states (like some animal sounds). The "intellectual perception" ("geistvolle Auffassung") is a science not merely founded on the rational, systematizing observation of conscious linguistic elements but also on the evaluation and appreciation of unconscious expressions. The subject of Humboldt's scientific aesthetic is thus style or *Art*: "A tone of moral feeling is imparted to it, and the soul gleams out in the style" (170). The examination of style in particular can help to understand subjective intellectual developments within the objective form of language; it can show the corresponding meanings of an expressive and creative language and not only of linguistic signs: a stylistic contemplation sheds light on "the intuition of an inner evolution – of which style is merely a reflection" (173).

One of the main motives in German human science arises here in Humboldt: that "in a human expression gesture and fright are not juxtaposed, but a unity" (Dilthey 2002: 229). Language appears as an expression neither of nature nor of intellect but as a theatrical "expression of the eyes and the gestures," all of which are subsumed in the word "style." Thoughts are received not as fixed semantic quantities but as "ways of thinking," which is in German *Denkarten.* Style does not only communicate conscious information but also psychological and artistic contexts around it. Therefore, for Humboldt, the understanding of style responds to the hermeneutic relationship between the individual expression and its general context. The articulated, spoken sounds stimulate the divination of a totality hidden behind each of these individual expressions:

> The articulate sound is torn from the breast, to awaken in another individual an echo returning to the ear. (…) For the intimation of a *totality*, and the endeavor towards it, are given immediately with the sense of *individuality* (…) since every individual bears within him the collective essence of man, though only on a single line of development (1999: 41).

The interpretative divination ("das Ahnden") remains always incomplete. The totality of the linguistic context is the pre-condition and, at the same time, the interpretative consequence of this expression. For Humboldt, sound does not represent an original, present event but sound is conceived in connection with a *hermeneutically circular relationship* of "expression" with its "context," or of the "particular" with the "general." Underhill very aptly highlights this tension between the individual and the general: "Even when we conceive of a language as something belonging to a community we should not forget that it remains personal and present" (Underhill: 59). Humboldt breaks with "philosophies which conceived of languages as products of society and objects of study" (Underhill: 60).

In Humboldt there is little to suggest a progressive movement from poetry to reason. This makes him different from Rousseau who held that "as man's first motives for speaking were of the passions, his first expressions were tropes. Figurative language was the first to be born. (…) At first only poetry was spoken; there was no hint of reasoning until much later" (Rousseau 1966: 12). For Humboldt the hermeneutic-circular condition of linguistic understanding will not be eliminated by reason. Every "word" of this sound-language represents a non-limited field of sense abstracted from a large general context. From Derrida's deconstructive point of view this language is still a form of phonocentrism. However, it is questionable whether aesthetic unities such as *Weltanschauungen* or *Art* can be reduced to logocentristic ideologies of *phonè* in the sense of an absolute presence, since the sounds the first humans made had no authentic, original, signifying sense at all, but were closed unities of contents, embracing – quite illogically – the general and the individual at the same time: "When we dare to descend to the origins of language, man always intimately associated with every sound uttered in the form of language a complete sense, that is, a closed sentence [and] did not merely represent a single word." (1963: 535) The guessing (Ahnden) through which this "complete sense" (vollständiger Sinn) is grasped contradicts, through its game-like circular movement, every ideology of logocentrism.

## 6. Johann Georg Hamann

Hamann accepts Humboldt's claim about the aesthetic character of language and concludes that there must have been an aesthetic form of writing at the origin of all writing: "Sounds and letters are therefore pure forms a priori in which there is met nothing which belongs to sensation or to the concept of an object and the true aesthetic elements of all human knowledge and reason. (...) The oldest writing was painting and drawing" (2007: 211). In the words of Formigari, for Hamann "words are the evidence of an inescapable division between intuition and thought, between the concreteness of *sensibilia* and the abstraction of signs. They are an essential instrument in the search for objective truth, yet they obfuscate the more profound 'truths' achieved by intuition" (Formigari 2004: 129). Hamann also concurs with Humboldt's hermeneutic condition of words which obtain their sense only through their use within their general context: "Words (…) are entitled, in the original text of pure reason, aesthetic appearances; therefore (…) words as undetermined objects of empirical concepts are entitled critical appearances, specters, non-words or unwords, and become determinate objects for the understanding only through their institution and meaning in usage" (215–16).

Hamann's affinities with Derrida's Jewish modes of interpretation suggest themselves at some points of his writings: "The book of nature and of history are nothing but ciphers, hidden signs requiring the key that interprets the Holy Scriptures" (188). Betz finds that "what connects Hamann to Derrida is to a great extent what connects him to postmodern thought in general: from his suspicion of metaphysics and all allegedly 'pure thought,' to his corresponding emphasis upon the metaphorical play of language, to his novel, proto-deconstructionist metacriticism" (Betz 2009: 340). Obviously, whereas Hamann critiques the notion of "pure reason," Derrida critiques the notion of "pure speech."

Hamann gives his chapter "Aesthetica in Nuce" the subtitle "A Rhapsody in Cabbalistic Prose" (189) and regrets what he sees as the main characteristic of Christian philosophy and metaphysics: "Christianity therefore does not believe in the doctrine of philosophy, which is nothing but an alphabetical script of human speculation (...). It does not believe in (...) symbolic elements and password signs (...) not in pythagorean-platonic numbers" (2007: 184). Christianity is against the "theorist" (278) whereas he praises the rabbi of divine reason (Rabbiner göttlicher Vernunft) as the "accomplished man of the letters" (vollkommenen Buchstabenmenschen) (281). Further affinities with Derrida's stylistics arise in comments on the style of mimesis: "In a mimetic style dominate a stricter logic and smoother connections than in intuitions invented by agitated heads." Finally, Hamann suggests that "what other people call style is for me soul and the faculty of judgment and digestion."

## 7. Karl Vossler

It is interesting to see how a modern linguist could adopt a similar agenda intended to transform signs into expressions of style by highlighting still another phenomenon: that of *doxa*, which is a sort of habitus. As a philosophical literary critic, Vossler has defined the limits of linguistics. His scientific perspicuity combined with the comprehension of a cultured *Geisteswissenschaftler* put him into an extraordinary position to do so. Apart from his relationship with the New Stylistics, his life-long friendship with Benedetto Croce had important repercussions for his main project: the formulation of a literary stylistics. Similar to Humboldt, Vossler bases his critical attitude towards linguistic representation on a particular theory of the origin of language or even of thinking.

Also Vossler concentrates on the non-functional character of language and refrains from defining it in terms of pure reason. But, strictly speaking, with his concept of *doxa*, he stays away from anything that could be called structuralist stylistics. Vossler admired Humboldt's idea of language not as a thing (ergon) but an action or energy (energeia). And obviously, he "recruits Humboldt for his fight against positivism" (Fryba-Reber 2000: 13). Also, for Vossler language and thinking flow out of an awareness of the imperfect, non-representative character of language. More radically, the creation of language is due to a self-reflexive doubt about itself. In *Geist und Kultur in der Sprache*, Vossler explains his version of the origin of human language and thinking:

> Man mastered things not by force, but by the power of its speech alone, which was a spiritual eye and a spiritual hand at the same time. But the charm is shattered by the curse of reality; and in reply to the names by which we invoke her, the world remains petrified and dumb. And now doubt begins to assail the power and with it the concept-forming (1925: xx).

The first phase of Vossler's work is characterized by an unbroken belief in positive formalism. While working on positivism and idealism (*Positivismus und Idealismus in der Sprachwissenschaft*, 1904), Vossler underwent dramatic changes of mind, especially concerning one of his main topics, the phenomenon of style. At the time of his first important work, the stylistic analysis of Benvenuto Cellini's *Vita* (1899), Vossler has been fascinated by stylistics as a discipline advancing systematic organization of linguistic elements in a formalistic manner. His *Cellini's Style* reads like a gigantic structuralist enterprise written with the same enthusiasm which later nourished some French and Russian authors of the fifties (though it also contains already some of his later, fundamental thoughts about the distinction between language and logic). However, contrary to those French or Russian authors,

Vossler abandoned his faith in formalistic components quite early. The reasons for this change of mind can be traced to certain conceptual contradictions in his Cellini analysis that are first of all due to the particular character of Cellini's work itself. Cellini's *Vita* is not a literary work because Cellini was not a writer. Cellini dictated his adventures, intelligently arranged, to his apprentice. He used his own dialect and non-standard language. From this non-literary character of literature (or the literary character of non-literature) follow some of the principal problems for a stylistic-linguistic analysis. The first one concerns the relationship between style and grammar. Cellini's personal style is not always "creative" but imposed by his environment because the type of language he used was probably the only type of language he mastered. How can stylistics pay tribute to this mutual interlocking of the general and the individual?

The subtlety attained by the relationship style-grammar in the case of Cellini recalls the linguistic problems related to the relationships of *langue* and *parole* and which Derrida has presented as determined by a mutual dependence (1982: 141). At the time Vossler wrote *Cellini's Style* he was not aware of these questions. Benedetto Croce writes him in a personal letter that the distinction between grammatical/logical and aesthetical expression will necessarily lead to false judgments about the text (1951: 14). Vossler's conceptions of expression and of "genius" are narrow: an expression can be either logical or aesthetical. Finally Cellini's style is declared to be aesthetical and a-logical. But can a "personal use" of grammar be called a-logical? Would it not be right to say that Cellini used his own grammatical conventions, which were not his own creations but which he had received through his social class and which were for him "grammatical"?

The young Vossler tries to discard this ambiguous identity of aesthetic values: "The great linguistic artistic masterpieces that are subjects of literary history are most of the time – though not always – creations of geniuses. Their originality or the aesthetic value can only be explained in them through the genius and not through contemporary taste" (1899: 15, my transl.). Croce's conception of genius as identical with taste could have widened Vossler's description of Cellini's style. An artistic expression, even if it is that of a genius, is an expression of taste. It includes the *Zeitgeschmack* as well as individual creativity.

Some years later, in his *Positivismus und Idealismus in der Sprachwissenschaft*, Vossler confesses the narrow spirit in which his work on Cellini was written and admits that he "dissected according to syntactical formal criteria" and "missed out on the aesthetic interpretation." Vossler recognizes the insignificance of grammar as long as it is regarded as an abstract foundation for linguistics. From now on, the attempt to grasp the *geistige Leben* of language and "the way [Art] how this speaking happens

and is made" (1923: 66) will advance more and more towards the center of his analysis. "Die Art" or the 'how' of language gives linguistic expression the status of something spiritual and non-static. Here Vossler (like the contemporary art historian Aby Warburg) begins to use "linguistics to reconceptualize the well-established eighteenth and nineteenth-century aesthetic term style" (Guillemin 2008: 608). True, Vossler believes that linguistics should "give up any search for general laws. The notion of 'scientific' linguistics has been a contradiction in terms; the history of languages could only be reconstructed through the study of individual linguistic creations" (Formigari: 151). However, while he rejects the analytical methods of positivism (which examine sounds, inflectional forms, words, sentences, etc.) he discovers a subject of research that is much more complex.

In several of Vossler's texts the elaboration of "die Art" encounters a decisive problem, which is the entanglement of conscious and unconscious actions in language. Language is neither the conscious side of an ever-sleeping unconscious (which would be a metaphysical conception) nor can it be considered as being purely conscious (which would be a positivist conception). If one sees language as "a way of speaking" (Art zu sprechen) then grammar becomes poetry and poetry grammar. The definition of stylistic language as something "undetermined" (unbestimmt) appears in Vossler's later works on stylistics. A stylistic comment on an extract from Verlaine's *Confessions* illustrates the supposed absence of the conscious and the unconscious in artworks:

> "On m'a demandé des "notes sur ma vie." C'est bien modeste "notes," mais "sur ma vie," c'est quelque peu ambitieux. N'importe, sans plus m'appesantir tout simplement – en choisissant, élaguant, éludant? pas trop – m'y voici.
>
> Does the question mark plus the answer 'pas trop' go with *éludant* only? With *élaguant* and *éludant* or with all three? Does Verlaine know the answer himself? Does he want us to know? Can he? He dazzles and delights in this uncertainty. (1923: 126)

Style is perpetually opposed to grammar. Language arises through the tension between (general) grammar and (individual) psychological dispositions (137).

## 8. Vossler's *Doxa* and *Art*

Vossler expresses what the above authors called style or *Art* by the word "Meinen" ("to mean" but also "to signify"). *Meinen* is the activity of the stylistic speaker or writer. The releasing of an opinion through the Meinen is individual thought that has not yet found a general grammar or any other fixed notions to express itself: "*Meinen* is something intimate and individual

that is on the brink of expressing itself and becoming general" (168). *Meinen* is not mere representation or signification. It is a Platonic intermediary able to lead out of the hermeneutic circle: the *doxa* as the right opinion (Meno 99c) shows the way towards truth without being truth itself. Perpetually indeterminate, *Meinen* fractures grammar and concepts without ever becoming a concept itself. *Meinen* and style make it possible to know already what we want to know. In Platonic terms, style (especially in its relationship to linguistic science) should be regarded – just like the *doxa* or the several other Platonic intermediaries leading towards knowledge – as "something which is and which is not, this thing which keeps the place between pure being and absolute nonbeing and which is an object neither of science nor of ignorance, but a faculty which appears between ignorance and science" (Republic 478d). A language composed of signs and symbols regarding itself as "natural" leaves no space for an undetermined *Meinen* but only for imitation and repetition of what it thinks already to be true. However, "imitating is the task of the parrot. But the parrot has no style" (Vossler 1904: 38).

Humboldt had suggested that a linguistics based on imitation cannot explain why language developed. An open field of creative reflection within language and thought can only exist if one allows historical, phonetic, poetical or psychological elements to slip into language and linguistic contemplation. Linguistics does this in admitting language to be style and *Meinen* because "the psychological value of language resides in the *Meinen*" (105) and all elements which go beyond grammar and which create a *Meinen* are subsumed in the notion of style.

Vossler holds that philosophy of language must settle between the two extremes of positivism and idealism. Here he joins Hamann who saw as the first aim of philosophy a "twisting out" of itself of a system opposing extremes such as idealism and realism: "Idealism and Realism, Christianity and Lutheranism: in my eyes the former are ideal, the latter real. What is lacking is a medium between both that I would like to call Verbalism. My twins are not extremes but allies and closely related" (Hamann 1921:339). For Vossler, idealism is the abstract philosophical power capable of creating all-embracing systems; positivism, on the other hand, as a descendant of Romanticism, is an individualizing power attempting to depict facts (by means of thought) in their full originality: "Thanks to Romanticism and Positivism living and acting human beings have once again become the main actors of history" (1923: 52). The paradoxical synthesis is called "Critical Idealism." Humboldt (and, of course, also Croce) are credited with putting linguistic science back "on the ground of critical idealism" (1904: 16). Vossler's paradoxical critical idealism represents a means of understanding the "spiritual expression" (geistiger Ausdruck) or the *Art* of life.

## 9. Conclusion

The above thinkers have made considerable efforts to see the sign-character of human expressions as an expression of style. They are part of a tradition believing in functional relationships between art and science, a line of thought that starts with Vico and which has been adopted by various modern thinkers, for example Lessing and Tolstoy (cf. Kokochkina 2000: 113). The link between these philosophical currents is represented by a stylistic definition of the 'how' as a new form of expression in human science. Be it Humboldt's *Art*, Herder's "lehrreiche Anmut" or Vossler's *Meinen*, those thinkers were looking for a new form of scientific exposition of facts able to transcend mere structuralization. They were not against signs but attempted to read signs as expressions of a historical and cultural reason and refrained from turning this historical reason into an abstract conceptual instance. They formulated their opposition to philosophical abstractions in terms of a "philosophy of life" or hermeneutic philosophy and suggested to change the philosophical grammar in order to attune it to the needs of more "vitalistic" conceptions. Still, they were far from simply reversing the theory of representation because, as has been shown, the idea of *Art* prevents any simplistic opposition of the organic and the mechanic. Language is not a system of signs nor is it mere "expression" but language interferes in the spiritual dimensions of life by creating styles and *Denkarten*. Betz believes that Hamann's most fundamental point is "that the transcendent God is kenotically hidden within language" (Betz 338). I would refrain from such theological terms but say that something spiritual or cultural is hidden in language. This is why, on the one hand, language cannot be transcended, but on the other hand, language does not confine us to a "prison house" either. A solid string of thinkers from Humboldt to Gadamer maintained this position. True, for Humboldt, languages were "a priori frameworks of cognition" (Underhill: 68); however, it is better to think of this framework not as a prison but as a Heideggerian "house of being." Henningfeld, in his article on Humboldt, explains that the concept of "language as a world view" produces a paradoxical constellation: first it helps humans to discover their world through language; second, reality can be concealed by language (Henningfeld 1976: 435). Herder thus creates a paradoxical link between Enlightenment and the Sapir-Whorfiens, as has been pointed out by Jacques Galinier (2006: 116). The thinkers discussed in this article suggest an existential definition of style by producing a spiritual definition of language that is supposed to bridge the gap stretching between 'liberty of expression' and 'rule following.' This is how they bridge the gap between art and science.

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 140–151, ISSN 1841-2394

# LINGUISTIC DATA AND FICTIONAL CHARACTERS

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ABSTRACT. According to abstract creationist views, fictional characters are contingently existing abstract entities. Thomasson and others have showed that creationism can be successfully defended against standard objections. I will argue, however, that the main claims of creationism are flawed in light of the available linguistic data. After delineating the basic problems of this view, I will briefly consider two alternative approaches. An important advantage of these alternatives is that they are able to provide a more adequate description of the origin of fictional characters.

Keywords: fictional characters; abstracta; authorial creation; linguistic data

## 1. Fictional Characters as Created Abstract Entities

The bare claim that fictional characters such as Anna Karenina or Sherlock Holmes are products of artistic invention sounds quite natural in most contexts of literary discussion. Are fictional characters created through the artistic activities of storytellers? Many of us would probably say *yes* to this question without hesitation.

Amie L. Thomasson was among the first to show that this claim can also be given a firm philosophical foundation. In her seminal work *Fiction and Metaphysics* (1999), Thomasson provided a comprehensive and detailed theory of the supervenience base of fictional characters and other artistic artifacts. The essential point of this theory was that artistic artifacts are created on the basis of the independent physical world and the intentional acts of human beings. According to Thomasson, the ontological status of fictional characters follows directly from the structure of their supervenience base. Since Anna Karenina and Sherlock Holmes were created by the intentional acts of storytellers at a given stage of literary history and their persis-

tence depends on the copies of literary works in which they are represented, they have to be regarded as contingently existing abstract entities.

Although Thomasson's main points (e.g., that fictional characters are created and that they are abstract entities) may seem intuitively self-evident, the creationist theory has been recently challenged with attractive arguments.[1]

A typical kind of objection concerns the explanatory link between Thomasson's two points: if fictional characters are abstract entities, it is hard to understand how they can be created, because abstract entities cannot enter into the causal process of creation. Another often-heard objection is that fictional characters frequently behave like real people: they walk in the garden or smoke a pipe, but if Anna Karenina and Sherlock Holmes are abstract entities, they cannot do such things.

In the next section we will see that creationists have enough conceptual resources to defend themselves against these familiar kinds of argument.[2] In the second part of the paper, however, I will argue that, despite its explanatory strength, Thomasson's framework is unable to provide a coherent description about the way storytellers create fictional characters. Finally, I will briefly consider two alternative accounts of authorial creation.

## 2. Standard Arguments against the Creationist Theory

Contemporary ontologies often define abstracta as things which fall outside of space and time.[3] Numbers, sets and functions are considered traditionally as incontestable examples of abstracta. Such objects of pure mathematics exist without occupying any determinable region of spacetime. We cannot descriptively identify a concrete location *l* and time point *t* and say that a particular number is located at *l* at *t*.

If a thing falls outside of space and time, it must also fall outside of the scope of the laws of causality. The reason for this is that causal laws can exert their effects only on objects that are able to enter into spatial and temporal relations with each other. So it can be said that the property of lacking a particular spatiotemporal position entails the property of being causally inert.

If true, the latter entailment presents a puzzle for abstract creationists. For it appears that they have based their view on two theses which are jointly inconsistent. On the one hand, they acknowledge fictional characters as genuinely abstract entities like numbers or sets. On the other hand, they conceive such abstract entities as products of authorial creation. But the process of authorial creation arguably incorporates a great number of spatially and temporally determined constituents. The intentional acts of the author, just to mention one example, can be thought of as located at a particular region of spacetime. Thus the process responsible for the origin of fictional

characters must be subjected to the laws of causality. On the basis of these considerations, one can offer the following argument against abstract creationism:[4]

ARGUMENT FROM ABSTRACTNESS: Authorial creation is a causal process. Abstract entities cannot enter into causal processes, so fictional characters cannot be authorially created.

Abstract creationists might want to reject this argument by claiming that the second premise rests on a false presupposition. One can assert truly that abstract entities cannot enter into causal processes only if one presupposes that abstracta make up a uniform ontological category. Thomasson (1999, 2003a) dismisses this view as obviously wrong. While all existing abstract entities may be seen as falling outside of space and time, says Thomasson, there is a significant distinction to be made between necessarily existing and contingently existing abstracta. In contrast to objects of pure mathematics which are necessary existents, fictional characters belong to the second subcategory of abstract ontology. Anna Karenina and Sherlock Holmes are then genuine abstracta in the most basic or definitional sense, but their modal profile is different from that of mathematical objects. The difference lies in the nature of their supervenience base: the existence of fictional characters depends on contingent features of the spatiotemporal world, namely on the intentional acts of their authors. With this subcategorial distinction in the abstract ontology of art at hand, Thomasson and her followers may insist on their original idea and maintain that fictional characters do come into existence through a causal process of authorial creation.[5]

Abstract creationism has also been frequently criticized for implying counterintuitive consequences concerning the properties and behavior of fictional characters.[6] Human characters are depicted in realistic novels as if they belonged to the set of living beings of our actual world. For example, in reading a passage of Conan Doyle's novel *The Hound of the Baskervilles*, we come to know that Sherlock Holmes has, in a very remarkable degree, the power of detaching his mind at will. In order to make sense of our reading experience, we have to conclude that the character Holmes is a person who, like many of us, has the property of being able to detach his mind at will. The case is similar for other properties. Since fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes are depicted as behaving in the same manner as real persons, readers may rightly think that they *are* persons. Following this line of thought, one can present a serious challenge for abstract creationists:

ARGUMENT FROM PROPERTIES: Fictional characters have personhood-involving properties. Abstract entities cannot have such properties. If so, fictional characters cannot be abstract entities.

If Thomasson's ontological theory of art is correct, two things follow. First, Sherlock Holmes is not a detective, because abstract entities cannot be detectives. Second, readers are systematically in error when they conceive literary characters like Holmes as persons. Both of these consequences might be counterintuitive enough to reject abstract creationism.

In response, Thomasson might contend that the first premise of the above argument is ambiguous and therefore neither true nor false. When we talk about the properties of fictional characters, we should employ a familiar distinction between two types of contexts. In internal contexts we are talking about properties which are merely ascribed to characters in stories and novels. Of course, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. But this can be interpreted so that the property of being a detective is a property that Conan Doyle merely attributes or ascribes to Holmes in his writings. In contrast, if we talk about Doyle's writings from an external point of view, we may flatly deny that Holmes has any personhood-involving property. In external contexts Holmes is taken to be what it *in fact* is: a fictional character. Such contexts allow us to describe Holmes in terms of purely theoretical constructions. A literary critic, for example, may say that Sherlock Holmes, as a fictional character, has the properties of being an abstract entity and of being created by Doyle.

It seems, then, that the ARGUMENT FROM PROPERTIES has little chance to succeed, at least if stated in this form. Perhaps it could be strengthened somewhat by removing the ambiguity from its first premise. But it is not entirely clear, how the intended force of the argument would be preserved after such a move.

## 3. Some Harder Problems

Although the above two types of argument can be successfully rebutted by abstract creationists, I think they have a harder time defending their position against other attacks. One of the most serious problems is associated with the concept of authorial creation.

Thomasson (1999, 2003b), Goodman (2004), Lamarque (2010) and Walters (2013) are more or less in agreement with respect to the core questions of authorial creation. The proposed view consists roughly of the following three claims: (i) authorial creation involves pretense, (ii) fictional characters may be individuated in an indexical manner, and (iii) there are

close analogies between the creation of fictional characters and the creation of other abstract artifacts.

For one reason or another, all of these claims are problematic. Let us consider first the case of pretense. Abstract creationists argue, rather surprisingly, that fictional characters are created in a pretenseful way. The surprising effect arises from the fact that advocates of the pretense theory are antirealists with respect to the ontology of art and therefore explicitly deny the existence of fictional characters. But let us bracket this issue. What concerns us here is rather the question of whether there is any role for acts of pretense in the process of authorial creation. Thomasson describes the relation between pretending and creating in the following way:

CREATING CHARACTERS INVOLVES PRETENSE: In order to create a fictional character in a work of literature an author has to make pretenseful claims involving a relevant description or a name.[7]

If we follow Thomasson's lead and say that nothing more is required for creating fictional characters, then this becomes a quite strong claim: we are invited to think of pretense as a constitutive part of authorial creation. Thomasson's claim has two possible interpretations corresponding to two possible types of pretense.

First, we might think that creating characters involves *de re* pretense. Perhaps, in using a definite description or a name an author pretends *of* a fictional character that *it* is a real person. Perhaps, in writing down the proper name Sherlock Holmes for the first time Doyle does two things at once. He creates a fictional character (i.e. an abstract entity) and pretends to claim that it is a real person (i.e. a detective). It is hard to see, however, how something like this could happen. If authorial creation proceeds entirely within the context of pretense, how can Doyle intend to create a fictional character and not merely to pretend to create it? The source of the difficulty lies in the logical ordering of the process of authorial creation: it seems that the fictional character Holmes must already exist before Doyle can pretend to make any *de re* claim about it.

Alternatively, we might think that authorial creation involves *de dicto* pretense. This interpretation does not fare much better, since *de dicto* pretense concerns not abstract artifacts but people. Of course, in writing his novel, Doyle may pretend that there is a clever, pipe-smoking detective who lives on Baker Street. He may also pretend that this detective is called Sherlock Holmes. But making claims about a detective in a context of *de dicto* pretense is clearly insufficient for creating an abstract entity. To think otherwise would mean that we misunderstand the content of Doyle's intentional acts.

Even if we are wrong about Thomasson's account, there arises a further problem: the problem of the missing entailment relation between the intentional acts of pretending and creating. In this regard, Sawyer (2002: 194) makes an illuminating remark: "In the absence of an argument to the contrary, there is no reason to suppose that we could not simply pretend that there existed a man named 'Sherlock Holmes', without this committing us to creating an abstract artifact that we pretend is a man." Sawyer's remark concerns *de dicto* pretense, but I think it might be extended, with some modifications, to the *de re* case. The general point is obvious in both cases: if there is no reason to think that an act of pretense entails necessarily a corresponding act of creation, then Thomasson's view about character initiation remains, at best, incomplete.

Let us turn now to the second claim. According to abstract creationists, fictional characters may be individuated in an indexical manner. The thesis is sometimes formulated in terms of indexical baptism:

INDEXICAL BAPTISM: Proper names of fictional characters are introduced in a work of literature by a quasi-indexical baptism.[8]

The idea behind this thesis is relatively simple. The first sentential occurrence of a proper name of a fictional character in a literary work functions as an indexical reference to the character whose existence is founded on that very sentence. On this view, the first occurrence of the proper name Sherlock Holmes in Doyle's work can be conceived as a kind of initial baptism of a fictional character. The process may be called quasi-indexical, for there is no contextually identifiable entity to which Doyle could have directed his attention. Doyle merely writes down the sentence *You don't know Sherlock Holmes yet*, and by using *that* very sentence he performs a naming ceremony.[9] Thus the success of this ceremony depends essentially on there being a fictional character that can be baptized as Sherlock Holmes. Since Doyle's sentence *You don't know Sherlock Holmes yet* brings a new fictional character into existence, this last condition also holds.

Unfortunately, any such account is threatened with some sort of circularity. Let us assume that the above sentence is indeed an instance of initial (quasi-indexical) baptism. Then the proper name Sherlock Holmes serves here as a means of character individuation. But there is no way to identify this character without reference to the same proper name: the character of the clever detective does not exist before the sentence *You don't know Sherlock Holmes yet* occurs in Doyle's novel. So the only thing we know about the character to be baptized as Sherlock Holmes is that it is Sherlock Holmes. In order to provide a plausible account of character individuation, this circularity must somehow be avoided.

Finally, let us consider the third claim. This claim suggests that there are close analogies between the creation of fictional characters and the creation of other abstract artifacts. Thomasson's view can be summarized as follows:

ARGUING WITH ANALOGIES: There is a close analogy between fictional characters and other abstract artifacts like marriages or laws. All of these entities are created through the performance of linguistic acts that represent them as existing.[10]

The problems with these alleged analogies are twofold. First, they are incompatible with the act of pretense, and, second, they make the distinction between internal and external contexts unintelligible.

Let us concentrate here only on the example of marriage. According to Thomasson, "the celebrant of a marriage pronounces a couple husband and wife, a pronouncement that itself creates the couple's new status as husband and wife."[11] In other words, a marriage is created just in case an authorized judge performs an illocutionary act which represents an unmarried and competent man and woman as married. For there to be an analogy with fictional characters, the performance of the illocutionary act should be thought to be ontologically sufficient for creating an abstract entity.

If Thomasson's line of thought is correct and marriages are indeed creatable abstracta, then it is natural to ask how deep the analogy runs, and whether it provides any explanatory advantage at all. As we have already seen, abstract creationists maintain that the process of authorial creation involves pretense. When Doyle uses the proper name Sherlock Holmes referentially for the first time, he merely pretends that it can be used in that way. He merely pretends to assert that Sherlock Holmes is a person. Compare this with the creation of a marriage. Is it reasonable to think that when the judge utters the sentence *I now pronounce you husband and wife*, then she utters this sentence with the intention of pretending to perform an illocutionary act? This is very close to nonsense, of course, for the marriage would be invalid, if the ceremony were performed in the mood of pretense.
The distinction between external and internal contexts is also essential for understanding fictional characters. How can this distinction be applied to the case of marriage? From an external point of view, the ontological status of marriages is obvious; they are contingently existing abstract entities. The analogy ends, however, when we try to analyse marriages form an internal point of view. It is easy to understand that according to the internal point of view of the novel *A Study in Scarlet*, Sherlock Holmes is a person. But it is hard to see what would be meant by speaking of an internal point of view in the analysis of marriages. Are marriages concrete objects in internal contexts? Or are they not objects at all, but rather some sort of real properties?

Until this issue is clarified, I would suggest that the external/internal distinction cannot be properly applied to the concept of marriage.

I think the lesson generalizes. Even if laws, contracts and other abstract artifacts are created through the performance of linguistic acts, they seem to have very little in common with fictional characters. In fact, the dissimilarities are so striking, as to render Thomasson's analogies unwarranted.

## 4. An Alternative Proposal: Creating Characters without Pretense

As we have seen in the previous section, the Thomassonian account of authorial creation runs into a number of serious difficulties. In my view, the difficulties arise from a common cause: to say that in using definite descriptions or proper names authors create abstract entities is to make an inference which goes far beyond the available linguistic data. Thomasson and her followers would probably accept the inference from (P) to (C) as valid:

(P) Sentence *s* introduces a new fictional character *c* into the literary work *w*.

(C) In using *s* the author of *w* creates an abstract entity *c*.

It is questionable, however, whether the linguistic data included in (P) support the creationist conclusion (C). Howell (2010), for example, has recently worked out an alternative theory of authorial creation which accepts (P) but rejects (C). Howell, apparently taking at face value (P), agrees that the first sentential occurrence of the proper name *Sherlock Holmes* introduces a new fictional character into Doyle's novel *A Study in Scarlet*. The central point of disagreement between Thomasson and Howell concerns the ontological status of the introduced character. While Thomasson regards Holmes as an abstract entity, Howell thinks that Holmes is a person. Without further qualification, this claim might seem highly counterintuitive. Persons are denizens of the spatiotemporal world, and we know with certainty that we cannot meet Holmes in that world.

The needed qualification is, according to Howell, that Holmes is a person only relative to a hidden set of *assumptions*. In reading Doyle's novel, we assume, usually non-consciously, that there is a world where the proper name Sherlock Holmes denotes a person. If we evaluate the sentence 'Sherlock Holmes is a person' at the world of the novel *A Study in Scarlet*, it will turn out to be literally true. Evaluated at our spatiotemporal world, it it will be either false or meaningless, because in our world the name Sherlock Holmes belongs to the set of non-denoting singular terms. But it is important to note that to make a claim on the basis of an assumption is not the same as to pretend to make a claim. We do speak about the properties of

Holmes literally, without playing any game of pretense. When we assume (non-consciously) that there is a world of the novel *A Study in Scarlet*, we actually assume that there is an independent domain of objects and this domain of objects contains a person called Sherlock Holmes.

Howell's argumentative strategy seems to be successful on two counts. First, in referring to the idea of hidden assumptions, he can convincingly argue that we do not need to (and cannot) infer from (P) to (C). Second, in giving a semantic interpretation to the notion of assumption, he can show, contrary to the common opinion of abstract creationists, that it is possible to make literally true claims about fictional characters without invoking the notion of pretense.[12]

## 5. A More Narrow View: Creating Characters Is Nothing More than Creating Linguistic Representations

Although Howell's assumption-centered theory comes much closer to the available linguistic data than any creationist view inspired by Thomasson, I think we can go a little step further in this direction. Notice that each of these theories shares a methodological feature: in describing the existence conditions and properties of fictional characters they are committed to applying mutually exclusive perspectives. Abstract creationists try to persuade us that when we see Sherlock Holmes from a fiction-external perpective, it will be a fictional character. On the other hand, when Holmes is viewed from a fiction-internal perpective, he will appear to be a person. Howell has a similar distinction in mind when he claims that Holmes may be regarded as a person with respect to a hidden set of assumptions. But when we occupy an opposite perspective, which is free from these assumptions, our talk about the properties of Holmes will be false or meaningless.

What should be clear at this point is that such a double-perspective approach is not mandated by (P) itself. Some sentences introduce new fictional characters into literary works – this or something similar may be taken as a minimalist starting point in theorizing about the origin of fictional characters. Thus, if we wanted to know how authors create their characters, (P) would provide a natural, single-perspective answer: they create linguistic representations. On any reasonable semantic interpretation, linguistic representations are, of course, kinds of abstracta. Doyle's sentence *You don't know Sherlock Holmes yet* expresses a semantic content in its actual context of occurrence which contains, as a constituent, the representation of Holmes (i.e., it contains a denoting expression that belongs to the category of proper names). Whether and how this content can be evaluated for truth and falsity is a subsidiary question for the present considerations.[13] It is more important to draw attention to the observation that authorial creation does not

exceed this abstract level of representation. Fictional characters do not come into existence *through* the making of contentful representations, for the simple reason that they *are* these representations. Compare the following two statements about Holmes:

$HOLMES_F$: The fictional character Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle.

$HOLMES_A$: The abstract entity Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle.

Abstract creationists (and perhaps also others) would say either that $HOLMES_F$ states the same thing as $HOLMES_A$ or that $HOLMES_F$ entails $HOLMES_A$. Neither of these interpretations seems entirely convincing. If we are on the right track, the fictional character Sherlock Holmes *is* the linguistic representation of Holmes, whereas the abstract entity Sherlock Holmes is an abstracta which is not merely linguistic by its nature. This indicates that $HOLMES_F$ and $HOLMES_A$ make different statements about Doyle's authorial activity. Moreover, once we realize that the terms 'fictional character' and 'abstract entity' are not synonymous, we can recognize that $HOLMES_F$ does not entail $HOLMES_A$. So it seems to be impossible to proceed from $HOLMES_F$ to $HOLMES_A$ without providing some additional argument. The good news is that if we think of fictional characters as linguistic representations, there does not arise any need to proceed in that direction.

## 6. Conclusion

We have given some indications of why abstract creationism, at least in its present form, is unable to provide a consistent picture of the origin of fictional characters. Howell's assumption-centered theory has made significant progress in this regard, but I think there is an alternative view which can provide a simpler and more plausible explanation of authorial creation. The view holds that authors create fictional characters as they create linguistic representations. One obvious advantage of this unsophisticated, single-perspective approach is that it devotes more attention to linguistic data than its rivals. More precisely, it makes clear why the available linguistic data do not allow us to draw wide-ranging inferences about the ontological status of fictional characters. It follows from this that the most important task of future research is to try to determine the nature of the relation between linguistic data and theoretical claims about fictional discourse.[14]

## NOTES

1. For substantive criticism of the creationist theory, see Yagisawa (2001), Brock (2010), Sainsbury (2010), and Hazlett (2012). The creationist view in its pre-Thomassonian stage was attacked heavily by Deutsch (1991).

2. Thomasson's theory has been defended recently by Goodman (2004), Lamarque (2010), and Walters (2013).

3. Of course, it is not a trivial task to say what the quasi-sortal term 'thing' denotes in this concise definition. To explain the exact meaning of 'space' and 'time' would also require considerable effort. In spite of these difficulties, this definition is satisfactory for our present purposes.

4. As far as I know, the first formulation of this argument is to be found in Deutsch (1991).

5. It is worth mentioning that the ARGUMENT FROM ABSTRACTNESS may be constructed in a variety of ways. For an overview, see Walters (2013).

6. See, among others, Sawyer (2002) and Sainsbury (2010).

7. An additional requirement is that the introduced name does not have to be associated with a chain of communication in which it refers to any real person. Cf. Thomasson (2003a). For more details, see below.

8. Cf. Lamarque (2010).

9. This is, in fact, the first sentential occurrence of the name Sherlock Holmes in Doyle's novel *A Study in Scarlet*.

10. Cf. Thomasson (1999).

11. Thomasson (1999, 12).

12. A similar view is expressed by Sainsbury (2010). According to Sainsbury, 'Sherlock Holmes is a clever detective' may be conceived as a genuine (and true) assertion under the *presupposition* that Holmes is a person. When reading we readily accept such sentences, but we are aware that it would be a mistake to attribute real properties to Holmes in presupposition-free contexts. Since both Howell and Sainsbury reject (C) and the pretense account of authorial creation, it would be interesting to know whether there is any difference between assumptions and presuppositions as they impact the semantic content of fictional sentences. The detailed task of investigating the relatedness of these phenomena I leave for another occasion.

13. On some aspects of the truth evaluation of fictional sentences, see Vecsey (2013).

14. According to an influential view within theoretical linguistics, data are statements which supply plausibility values to theories. Initial plausibility values depend, in turn, on the weighing of the reliability of the sources of the data. Presumably, this type of framework could also be fruitfully applied to the exploration of fictional representations. For the details, see Kertész and Rákosi (2012).

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 152–157, ISSN 1841-2394

# COGNITIVE FEATURES OF LINGUISTIC MEMES

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ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the major trends in scholarship about the organizational implications of linguistic memes, the processes by which one can generate and disseminate memes online, the concept of memetic evolution, and the role memes play in developing culture and creativity. I am specifically interested in how previous research investigated the dynamics of meme transmission, linguistic memes as coordinating mechanisms in organizations, the process of transmission of memes between individuals, and the effectiveness of the internet as a meme carrier.

Keywords: linguistic memes; language evolution; human mind

## 1. Introduction

The mainstay of the paper is formed by an analysis of the relationship between memes and the human mind, the nature of the representational content that forms the basis of memes, and the memetic theory of language evolution. The theory that I shall seek to elaborate here puts considerable emphasis on the nature of memes, cognitive and emotional features of successful linguistic memes, the potential of memes as a new literacy practice, and the key characteristics of successful online memes. The results of the current study converge with prior research on memes as a powerful force in human evolution, memetics as a means of studying human society, social practices of propagating "memes," and "memes" as inheritable units of cultural information.

## 2. The Memetic Theory of Language Evolution

Cognitive neuroscience can apply considerable weight to the investigation of memetics. Cognition reproduces/replicates biologically and reproduces behaviors that support reproduction (learning and memory are cognitive functions). The traces of the neural processes (Armstrong, 2013) involved in

memetic replication and storage within the central nervous system (CNS) are measurable. The point of interaction between the meme rich environment that we live in and our body is the brain. Memes are the primary driving force for the development of human intellect, replicate within the environment of human behavior using human imitative behavior, and are extremely compliant to experimental manipulation. (McNamara, 2011) Memes may be responsible for the fast development of human society and its subsequent dominance of the ecosystem (they can be transmitted between any two individuals in the span of minutes). The number of individuals that can take over a meme from a single individual is almost unlimited. Individuals can come into contact with more different sources of novel memes. If it is reproduced, a meme reaching an agent will be transmitted in a changed form. For memes there is no equivalent for the traditional distinction between *genotype* and *phenotype*. Simulations of cultural evolution are usually limited to the mutation and spread of simple memes. Selection at the transmission stage happens through either elimination of certain memes, or through differential multiplication. It is possible to make analytical models of the propagation of memes across space or across networks. The memes best adapted to the underlying cognitive and communicative processes will spread farthest. (Heylighen and Chielens, 2009)

A linguistic meme is a unit of language that encapsulates a core idea and that is transmitted among individuals (linguistic memes are effective at communicating ideas). The attributes of linguistic memes differ from other forms of language in organizations. Linguistic memes may be created by the managers at the top of an organization (Popescu, 2014), representing a key component of organizational culture. Linguistic memes can label people, helping to constitute a group (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014), and can be direct in framing appropriate actions. A self-propagating linguistic meme should not exceed the available space of an individual's working memory. Abstract strategies may benefit from having a meme that is cued by appropriate situations. (Heath and Seidel, 2005) *Memes* provide the mechanism for the evolution of culture (the units of cultural selection are elements that share the important properties of genes). Memetic evolution is consistent with a world of intentional, conscious and responsible free agents. Memes are replicators, and their content is preserved in a particular way. Memes' information must be preserved in such a form that it may have a phenotypic effect, via which it can be selected (much information will have a restricted impact on the meme pool). Memes should be specified by their *representational content* that accounts for the mechanisms of memetic heredity and for memes' power over their phenotypic effects (representational content provides the mechanism for memetic evolution). Memetic mutation and the recombination of memetic alleles can be observed in the growth and change

of human culture. Memetic success depends on the content of the meme itself; the way in which it fits with other memes; and the external environment. A vast array of memes is competing for the limited resource of human attention (memetic fitness depends on the ability to gain and retain attention). (Distin, 2005)

## 3. The Relationship between Memes and the Human Mind

Linguistic memes may evoke emotion through association (Pera, 2014), can create status by associating identities with positive attributes and distancing them from negative attributes, may succeed by giving people a way of distancing themselves from negative associations (Bratu, 2013), and can create feelings by forming simple associations with positive or negative stimuli (Fost, 2013), and complex emotions by evoking emotional scripts. Informal mechanisms like memes may be more important when other coordination mechanisms are less available. Linguistic memes are important when organizations must change (Nica, 2013a) and coordination mechanisms do not keep pace with the speed of change (Georgescu, 2010), may serve as a kind of "quick culture" that alerts people that change is needed, may be helpful at solving coordination problems, and may be an outstanding component of how individuals take appropriate actions to coordinate with others in their organizations. (Heath and Seidel, 2005) A meme is the fundamental unit of cultural transmission (the duplication of memes takes place through the social transmission of information). Its role as a *replicator* in culture makes the meme concept special as an account of cultural evolution. The primary repository of memes is brains (memes explain cultural change). To jump the gap between minds, memes must use a signaling system. Message receivers must reconstruct a meme from the information contained in the signals it produces. Memes occupy slots in the brain for different cultural traits. Memetics can take off once we have a better idea of how brains manage information (it is in search of subject matter). (Aunger, 2006)

A meme is the simplest unit of cultural replication. Meme theory can explain the workings of traditional referentiality, anaphora, and the use of repeated metrical patterns. When one person imitates a behavior of another, a meme replicates itself by being copied from one human mind to another (imitation spreads memes throughout cultures). Memes that can imitate certain established styles are more likely to be replicated. The memes that are best at getting copied may be most effective at combining with other memes (those memes that are better at getting copied will outnumber those that are not). A tradition is a combination of several smaller memes. Repeated memes tend to be mnemonically stable than unrepeated ones. In a culture that includes repeated traditions, memes may be encoded and transmitted in

significantly compressed form. Conjoined meme complexes can exist at a nearly infinite number of nested and interpenetrating levels. There are specific memories (memes) in the minds of various specific people (Faiella, 2013) in a social group. A new meme is not part of an existing traditional complex of memes. Memes are the atoms, whereas their combinations are the molecules of culture. (Drout, 2006)

## 4. The Nature of the Representational Content that Forms the Basis of Memes

Memes directly shape and generate key actions and mindsets of a social group (Nica, 2013b), and require networked human hosts in order to survive (the concept of "meme" has explanatory power with respect to cultural development). Successful memes may have a significant online presence that registers with well-known search engines (the internet is an effective conductor for memes). Outstanding attention hooks and susceptibility factors in successful online memes are tied to identity matters. Understanding successful online memes can contribute to identifying the limitations of narrow conceptions of literacy and new technologies. (Lankshear and Knobel, 2005) Ordinary human consciousness (Pera, 2013) is an illusion created by memes for their own propagation (memes distort consciousness into an illusion rather than constitute it). Memes creates the illusion of self (Petcu, 2013) for their own survival and replication. Human development is a process of being loaded with, or infected by, large numbers of memes. The memetic theory claims that the only evolutionary "turning point" or "threshold" to be crossed is the ability to imitate (all you need for language to arise is a community of imitating creatures, or meme machines). (Blackmore, 2002)

Memetic evolution is not entirely reliant on random chance for innovation. Knowledge and ideas can evolve more or less independently of their human-agent substrates (ideas can be developed without human comprehension or deliberate interference). (Bryson, 2008) Memes are a form of information: they are true replicators, possessing replication, variation, selection. Memetics may prove useful for explaining our unique attributes and the rise of our elaborate cultures and societies. (Blackmore, 2000) Memetic variation connects micro to macro evolution in a way analogous to modern genetics. A memetic theory of the firm may contend that the intentions of all employees may not add up to something maximizing value. Memes vary and are selectively retained (many memes vary even in short periods of time). Memes vary relatively quickly during social interaction. Routines are organizational memes that rarely change. (Shepherd and McKelvey, 2009) Memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to

brain via imitation (imitation is how memes *can* replicate). Memes are more successful in the meme-pool than others. Some memes achieve short-term success in spreading rapidly, without lasting long in the meme pool (the success of a meme may depend critically on how much time people spend in actively transmitting it to other people). The meme pool has the attributes of an evolutionarily stable set, which new memes find it hard to invade. (Dawkins, 1976)

Representational content is able to account for memes' general applicability (a meme will be generally applicable *because of* the nature of its content). Representations must be replicable if they are to count as memes. Memes must be able to exert their effects if they wish to be selected (the nature of representational content will enable them to do that). In order to replicate, memes need to *pass on* and to preserve their content. Teaching and other means of communicating are forms of meme transmission. In order to survive, memes form coadapted complexes which display their integrative tendencies. Memes are integrative, doing best when they fit in with the others around them (they are copied on an ongoing basis throughout our lives). Memetic replication is a process of assembly (the essence of memetic replication must be a process of assembling representational content). Memetics can account for the preservation and replication of complex cultural information. Memetic mutation displays no intrinsic bias towards increased fitness. Memes' mutation rates may be influenced by events external to themselves (the intrinsic tendency towards mutation will vary from meme to meme). Cultural changes can be sometimes be characterized as memetic recombination. (Distin, 2005)

## 5. Conclusions

The findings of this study have implications for complex representations that might count as memes, the mechanisms of memetic replication, the multimedia nature of online memes, and cognitive skills as part of a whole evolving "memetic system." This paper seeks to fill a gap in the current literature by examining human cognitive capacities which facilitate memetic evolution, meme processes and effects as new forms of social influence, and the prevalence of changes in memes.

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*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 158–163, ISSN 1841-2394

# CHALLENGES FACING SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING

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ABSTRACT. The main objective of this paper is to explore and describe the shape and form of academic knowledge ecologies, the excessive cost of commercial journal content, escalating costs of scientific periodicals, and the benefits of facilitating access to research data and outputs. Applying new conceptual and methodological approaches, this study advances to the next level research on the construct validity of peer review as a test/process, adverse impacts of predatory publishing in scholarly work, and the rise of open access journals.

Keywords: predatory publishing; peer review; open access

## 1. Introduction

Research on the changing geopolitics of knowledge production, the danger of "predatory journals," the development of new publishing processes, and the economics of production has yielded fairly consistent findings over the past decade. This study is grounded in the considerable body of scholarship examining the phenomenon of predatory publishing, the complexity of social interactions among actors involved in peer review, and citation counts as a measure of scholarly value. This research makes conceptual and methodological contributions to the social processes and relations of knowledge production, the changes transpiring in scholarly publishing, shady new journal operations, and the problematic nature of many "article processing charge" (APC) supported open access journals.

## 2. The Complexity of Social Interactions among Actors Involved in Peer Review

The process of publication is an integral aspect of the business of knowledge-making. The publication system defines the social processes through which knowledge is made. Changes in the journals system are symptoms of, and catalysts for, transformations that are underway in the knowledge ecologies. Academic knowledge entails a kind of systematicity that does not exist in casual experience. Every text is integrally interconnected with other texts within evolving bodies of knowledge. Scholarly knowledge-making is the only secular system of systematically validated knowing in modern societies. There is no deterministic relationship between technology and social change. Technological change may create an opening for essentially social affordances. The "social web" and interactive potentials intrinsic to the new media point to more collaborative knowledge futures. Open access journals rely on the unpaid labor of scholars assuming the role of amateur publisher. Universities and research institutes face important challenges to their role as producers of socially privileged knowledge. The logic and logistics of knowledge production (Hunter, 2013) may be disruptive of the traditional values of the scholarly work. The epistemic modes that gave shape to the heritage academic journal are being broken apart. Interdisciplinary approaches are needed for the practical application of disciplined understandings (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014) to the actually-existing world. When academic journals escape their heritage constraints, there will be more knowledge collaborations between knowledge creators and knowledge users (knowledge-making will be more collaborative and social). (Cope and Kalantzis, 2014)

Threats to the impartiality of review threaten peer review's psychological and epistemic legitimacy, whereas the charge of bias threatens the social legitimacy of peer review (peer review is necessary for the vetting of knowledge claims). Many manuscripts are accompanied by large amounts of supplementary materials that require careful scrutiny. Reviewers need to be ever alert to the possibility of fraud, credit misallocation, and potential conflicts of interest in the publications they evaluate. Reviewer bias is the violation of impartiality in the evaluation of a submission. Impartial reviewers arrive at identical evaluations of a submission in relation to evaluative criteria. Bias as a function of reviewer characteristics challenges the impartiality of peer review. Errors in identifying the true quality of submissions violate the ideal of impartiality in peer review. Improvement in peer review practices (Lăzăroiu, 2013) may involve developing the reliability with which reviewers identify the true quality value of submissions. Double-blind review ensures greater fairness for authors and protects reviewer identities to promote frank commentary. Open peer review may induce transparency in the scholarly

communication process and speed up the process of vetting new work. (Lee et al., 2013)

## 3. The Phenomenon of Predatory Publishing

Academic knowledge is made available in three principal resourcing modes: at a price paid for content purchase; for free; and using a rapidly emerging, new model, at a price paid by the author. The large journal publishers make up the bulk of the journals market, and the resulting profits are a consequence of artificial scarcity created around the prestige of well-positioned journals (the primary work of quality assessment and content development is with unpaid academic authors and peer reviewers). Large publishing conglomerates have increased their subscription rates lately. Also, bundling' of multiple titles into larger packages has tended to squeeze small and non-commercial publishers out of library purchases. The move to electronic subscriptions has not opened up cheaper access options, publishers still basing their charges on the economics of traditional print publishing. The publication process is often slow, and the final product is hidden behind subscription walls. Even if its cost structures are lower, open access publishing is bedeviled by problems of resourcing: without some kind of fee structure, it has to rely on academic volunteerism or cross-subsidy. Given today's digital infrastructure costs (Popescu, 2014), subscription fees or per article purchase prices should not be so high. The system of peer review is the moment at which textual representations of knowledge (Pera, 2013) are independently evaluated, being a critical step towards knowledge becoming socially validated. Speed of publication in the digital era may reduce the significance of peer review in today's knowledge systems. The discursive features of the peer-review process track the linearity and post-publication fixity of text manufacturing processes in the era of print. Pre-publication processes lead to publication of a text in which readers are unable to uncover the intertextuality (Georgescu, 2010), whereas in the post-publication phase there is little chance for dialogue that can have an impact upon the statement of record beyond subsequent publication of errata. In the review narrative, the tropes of objectivity can hide a multitude of ideological, paradigmatic and personal agendas. (Cope and Kalantzis, 2014)

Publishing research in academic journals is a "key performance indicator." The tightening grip of knowledge commodification and the "publish or perish" syndrome has become a metastasizing phenomenon (publishing research and conceptual papers in academic journals has become part of the "politics of knowledge production"). The pressure to publish permeating into university structures is leading to a huge proliferation of publications, and has spawned a growing number of academic e-journals charging high fees

to authors. Research produced on "periphery" to the higher-income capitalist "core" hegemonic knowledge production sites is appearing increasingly. Many young academics in developing lower-income economies under pressure to publish relatively fast with minimal peer review are likely to opt for the new "pay-big-to-publish" outlets. There may be two kinds of "rackets:" established elite, based on extortionate subscriptions for individuals and institutions, and "start-up" upstart OA predators. There is an exponential growth in cyber-journals galore of questionable quality and dubious origin. (Truth, 2012) Predatory publishers publish counterfeit journals or journals of dubious quality and ask authors to pay (they sometimes are to shell out exorbitant fees), mimicking the behavior of legitimate journals and having websites that look as respectable as properly indexed journals. Predatory publishers offer guaranteed and quick publication without the hassles of peer-review: they will cease to exist if there are no demands for their services. Such publishers print flawed, erroneous and low quality research articles (quality control and quality assurance are absent). Predatory publishing is flourishing because of social and economic factors (Nica, 2013a) obtaining in the academic world. Minimizing demand by providing no incentives (Nica, 2013b) may have limited impact and cannot succeed in eliminating predatory publishing. (Padua, 2013)

## 4. Citation Counts as a Measure of Scholarly Value

The relation between interface and infrastructure of openness are structural manifestations of human action (Petcu, 2013) involved with creating and using digital communication media. Scholarly cultures contribute to communication practices (Pera, 2014) in a networked environment. Collaborative sharing at early stages of scholarship is made possible through the social bookmarking functions of some reference management systems. (Jankowski and Jones, 2013) The establishment of new journals and publishers at an increasing pace affects the scientific record as a whole. Some of the publishers name nonexistent people as their editors and editorial board members. (Haug, 2013) When evaluating a scientist, the evaluators look at the amount of research output, the amount of citations, and the place of publication. Peer selection of publications is the prevalent mode of establishing scientific credentials. (Haspelmath, 2013)

The ISI Web of Knowledge dominates other citation counts as a measure of the scholarly value of a journal article. Citation counts and weighting the value of published articles by the Journal Impact Factor (JIF) are a poor measure of epistemic impact and value, citation count being a flawed proxy for knowledge value. The time frame for the JIF refers to citations made within one year to the previous two years, being biased to favor disciplines

with more transitory knowledge (Peters and Besley, 2013) and faster uptake, and also shooting stars. Averaged values for journals can be influenced by a few blockbuster articles in a particular two-year stretch. Citation is an integral part of the process of making knowledge claims. The intellectual qualities of new and derivative citations may be clarified on a close reading of the text. The single number reductionism of citation counts oversimplifies human knowledge. Impact uses a simplistic quantity as proxy for the qualities of knowledge. Citation counts work on the assumption that aggregate demand is a correlate of quality (popularity is inappropriate as a measure of knowledge), reflecting network biases and amplifying the effects of circumstantial positional power. They often come to measure academic network positions and active network moves. A popularity measure of knowledge (Bacalu, 2013) values work which has hooks designed to reach a broader audience. Editors may choose one's paper if it has features which make it more popular, thus enhancing their journal's impact factor. Open access papers are more frequently cited as more people can access them, and more readily, without being deterred by subscription walls. Editors may select articles that are more likely to enhance their journal's impact factor. Citations are the degree to which an author and a text have been noticed and have positioned themselves to be noticed. The citation count business is damaging to the principles of scholarly work and the values of science (the raw citation counting practices of today's impact factor are flawed). Citation is a key mechanism for making the associative links that constitute webs of knowledge. (Cope and Kalantzis, 2014)

## 5. Conclusions

The current study set out to identify developments in knowledge dissemination, the social processes of knowledge-making, tools and support mechanisms for web-based publishing, and the fast rising number of predatory publishers. The implications of the developments outlined in the preceding sections of this paper suggest a growing need for a research agenda on the relationship between predator and prey in the context of academic publications, the range of affordances in digital technologies that open new possibilities for knowledge-making, the representational processes of today's academic journal, and the transformation of scholarly communication.

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 164–169, ISSN 1841-2394

# SOCIAL RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN THE EU

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ABSTRACT. The aim of the present study is to examine and evaluate EU cooperation on asylum and migration matters, the internationally guaranteed rights of refugees, and the perception of refugees as a public good. The theory that we shall seek to elaborate here puts considerable emphasis on the morality of refugee quota trading, the role of social connection in enabling integration, and the experience of migrants in the EU labour markets.

Keywords: social right; asylum seeker; refugee; EU

## 1. Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been increasing evidence describing the development of EU integration in asylum matters, the patterns of burden sharing within the EU, and refugee burden sharing. The paper generates insights about the development of EU cooperation on asylum matters, aspects of the reception of asylum-seekers in the EU Member States, and the shaping of EU and ENP policies towards refugees.

## 2. Aspects of the Reception of Asylum-seekers in the EU Member States

Rational states may not be incentivized to absorb refugees as part of a voluntary quota trading scheme (states are incentivized to accept payments for refugee protection or are willing to pay other states for refugee protection). Refugee quota trading might be considered unethical even if it succeeds in protecting refugees. International law sets the general standards for asylum processing (Nica, 2013c) within the EU. Member states can voluntarily agree to accept refugees who have received refugee status from the UNHCR. Different countries offer various levels of assistance to ref-

ugees. Funds for EU countries may not be enough to encourage voluntary acceptance of asylum-seekers. States view accepting refugees as a burden, making them vulnerable to deportations. Cash transfers play some role in refugee policy, as refugee protection creates non-excludable benefits for states and non-rival benefits. Many EU states are not interested in receiving a significant number of refugees in the near future. (Gerver, 2013)

Harmonization aims to avoid refugee flows between EU Member States based solely on differing levels of protection: regional harmonization of refugee law must take place within the framework of international norms. EU citizens who are refugees must be able to have their claims assessed on the basis of international law. Obligations assumed under international human rights and refugee law must not be abrogated for "regional interest" reasons. Western States affirm the principle of asylum while devising mechanisms to prevent asylum seekers from entering their territories. Member States have devised interception and deflection strategies to prevent asylum seekers from reaching their territories, and should not retreat behind a corporate veil to pursue policies which are at odds with international refugee law. International protection is a legal duty grounded in States' obligations under international human rights and refugee law. UNHCR and the Council of Europe have a mandate to protect refugees and human rights. Those affected by the EU's restricted asylum laws tend to be affected by the limitations on freedom of movement. (McAdam, 2007)

A lower labour participation of migrant women (Bratu, 2013), higher unemployment rates (Nica, 2013a), and a high concentration in disadvantaged employment sectors and low-pay jobs can be found in most EU labour markets (labour migration policies generally focus on "economic migrants"). Cross-country differences in migration regimes may explain differences in immigrant labour market outcomes. Migration policies shape migrant patterns of labour market incorporation across the EU, influence the size and attributes of the migrant workforce relative to the jobs in demand in the economy, and tend to affect the migrant experience in the host labour market by regulating access to the labour market of the different categories of non-national workers. The socio-demographic background and other observable attributes (Georgescu, 2010) explain a part of immigrant participation and employment differentials. Migration policy-making in Europe is largely dominated by national policy frameworks. (Cangiano, 2014)

## 3. The Shaping of EU and ENP Policies towards Refugees

Outsourcing of asylum processing prevents new refugees from entering the EU, leaving them in ENP countries. Once refugees have stayed in the country for a particular time, then the status quo is one where refugees are now

in the country. Refugee quota trading is worse than the hiring of mercenaries and the outsourcing of one's moral obligations. With refugee quota trading, the accepting state is being paid. Quota trading awards countries for "voluntarily" accepting refugees. With refugee quota-trading, the final country to receive refugees is rewarded for not breaking the law. Any country that rejects refugees passes the buck to another country to accept the burden and the latter has the legal obligation to accept the refugees. Refugee quota trading rewards countries for fulfilling an obligation that ought to be punished if transgressed. The EU threatens to demote trade relations (Petcu, 2013) with countries that have poor records in human rights. The trading of refugee quotas may not be ethically sound even if more lives are saved. The idea of quota trading may appear more ethically sound compared to today's unequal distribution of contributions towards refugee protection. (Gerver, 2013)

For refugee children schools are the most important place of contact with members of local host communities: their experience of education (Peters and Besley, 2013) is impacted by insufficient support for learning (Pera, 2014) the host-society language, isolation and exclusion. The areas of employment, housing, education and health (Popescu, 2014) may be key aspects of integrating into a new society. To develop an effective policy on integration, governments need to articulate policy on the rights accorded to refugees. Articulating refugee rights defines the foundation of integration policy, to which governments are accountable (some integration policies acknowledge responsibilities on the part of refugees). In an "integrated" community (Pera, 2013), refugees should have the same rights as the people they are living amongst ("connecting" refugees to relevant services is a major task in supporting integration). Being able to speak the main language of the host community is central to the integration process. Fostering community integration (Peters, 2013) may mean reducing barriers to key information (Hunter, 2013) through the provision of material translated into the languages of refugees (community stability is potentially an important facilitator of integration). Assessing outcomes for recent asylum-seekers require various metrics than for cohorts of refugees who have lived for longer periods in the receiving society. (Ager and Strang, 2008)

Migrants who are successfully integrated in the labour market tend to stay in the country of destination for longer periods. Policies to increase labour participation, reduce unemployment and provide adequate training may be alternative responses to labour migration in addressing labour and skill shortages. The decrease in the share of humanitarian migration is the result of changing routes of asylum flows. The legal channels through which migrants enter the country of destination may characterize the migrant integration pathway in the receiving society. There is significant variation in

labour market participation and access to employment by immigration status on entry. Descendants of emigrants and family migrants are more likely than local labour market entrants to be unemployed. Long-established refugees may have benefited from labour market integration measures that are in place in many EU countries. Female migrants experience higher inactivity rates than men in all immigration categories. The distribution by level of education of the male migrant workforce is similar to that of the "home-grown" cohorts of labour market entrants. (Cangiano, 2014)

## 4. The Development of EU Cooperation on Asylum Matters

The switch to the EU venue has allowed policy-makers to develop more restrictive provisions on asylum: an asylum-seeker should have access to an asylum procedure in one of the EU Member States on the basis of responsibility criteria. The move to the EU for asylum policy-making has led to an improvement of asylum standards across the EU (the role of the EU institutions has been strengthened in the asylum policy area). The absence of restrictive standards as an outcome of EU integration in asylum is explainable by a gradual process of institutional change. The development of the EU asylum policy has not led to the adoption of more restrictive asylum standards overall. There have been several institutional changes that have increased the role of more "refugee-friendly" institutions, whereas an increasing "judicialisation" of asylum has strengthened the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees. (Kaunert and Léonard, 2011)

A sharp fall in employment prospects is likely to deter prospective immigrants, immigration attenuating the ups and downs in labor market pressure (deep recessions may deter immigrants). Unemployment rates are substantially higher for immigrants than for nationals (unemployment for immigrants increases by more in a recession and falls by more in a recovery). In a recession, the burden of unemployment falls disproportionately on immigrants (immigrants have borne a disproportionate burden of job loss in the great recession). Immigration flows have been as responsive to the business cycle as in the past. (Hatton, 2014) EU citizens do not enjoy unfettered mobility and residence rights throughout the EU (the free mobility and residence rights of EU citizens is overstated as a matter of law). Realization of the norm of equal EU citizenship is compromised by Roma's unequal citizenship at the domestic level, the feasibility of persecuted Roma relocating to another EU Member State is enhanced by the principle of freedom of movement, whereas the mobility rights of EU citizens figures prominently in the rhetoric deployed to discredit Roma asylum seekers. Canada's array of deflection and deterrence strategies has succeeded in repelling asylum seekers. (Macklin, 2013)

In most EU member states, statelessness is predominantly or exclusively a migratory phenomenon (statelessness may make persons without nationality invisible, living on the margins of society). Asylum and immigration have gained importance as an area of cooperation and harmonization in the EU. EU legislation foresees clear protection obligations and joint minimum standards for certain categories of forced migrants. The EU does not have an explicit entitlement to adopt legislation or common measures on statelessness as a specific issue. Stateless migrants can benefit from a range of protection statuses throughout the Union, and can count on diverging forms and levels of protection in different member states of the EU. Most European countries have been lacking awareness about stateless persons' protection needs. A number of EU member states accept their protection obligation *vis-à-vis* stateless persons. (Gyulai, 2012)

Almost all immigration categories experience some loss of their skill potential relative to the conditions prevailing in the labour market of their country of destination. The economic sectors with the highest reliance on the migrant workforce are often the same across different national contexts. the composition by category of entry of the migrant workforce across EU receiving countries reflects the differences in national migration policy regimes. The decreasing inflow of asylum seekers is the result of both restrictive asylum policies in the traditional EU destinations of forced migrants and a change in their regions of origin. Migrants entering via labour migration channels have higher employment rates (Nica, 2013b) than the domestic workforce. The migrant workforce are employed at occupational levels often below their educational skills (a high education level is not a sufficient condition to access the most qualifying jobs). (Cangiano, 2014)

## 5. Conclusions

The overall results provide strong evidence for EU legislation on migration and asylum matters, the relationship between refugees and host communities, and the development of the EU asylum and migration policy. As a result of these earlier research findings, this study sought to determine the admission and status of persons seeking asylum in the EU, the forces that influence immigration policies, and the processes that may facilitate integration.

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 170–175, ISSN 1841-2394

# THE ROLE OF HOSTILE AND INSTRUMENTAL AGGRESSION IN SPORT

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ABSTRACT. In the present paper, I focus on psychological and social factors leading to abnormal aggression, the association between aggressive behavior and injury in ice hockey, situational factors that affect the probability of aggression occurring in sporting events, and the neural mechanisms underlying the execution of aggressive acts. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the current literature by examining the relationship between athletic activity and off-field aggression in everyday life, the problem of aggressive behavior in hockey, the distinction between hostile aggression, instrumental aggression and assertiveness, and the roles of learned and innate factors in human aggression. The objective of this paper is to emphasize neural circuitries that mediate reactive aggression, the effects of observing violence on aggressive behavior, and the neural circuits that influence aggressive behaviors.

Keywords: hostile; instrumental; human; aggression; sport; behavior

## 1. Introduction

The aim of the present study is to examine and evaluate the nature and role of aggression in sport, the distinction between hostile and instrumental aggression in sport, and the relationship between aggression and sport performance outcomes. The purpose of this article is to gain a deeper understanding of the complexity of aggressive behavior, the importance of cognitive processes (Faiella, 2013) in the relation of provocation to aggression, the use of social learning (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014) to reduce aggression, and the relationship between displays of hostile aggression and performance outcomes. The findings of this study have implications for the social and psychological factors underlying human aggression, brain mechanisms that

underlie natural forms of aggressiveness, the relationship between contact in sport and aggression, and the causes and processes of aggressive behavior.

## 2. The Nature and Role of Aggression in Sport

Aggression is an act of harm-doing inflicted consciously (Pera, 2014) and intentionally upon an unwilling victim. Proactive aggression is instrumental in nature, reactive aggression is a response to some provoking circumstance, and affective aggression is a response to an aversive change in the person's environment. Humans share with lower animals certain dispositions to aggress that are transmitted genetically (similar brain mechanisms may contribute to aggression in humans). The activity of the cerebral cortex (Nica, 2013b) is important in human aggression. Both biological inheritance and learned tendencies (Armstrong, 2013) are predisposing background conditions for aggression. Brain mechanisms and the activity of hormones are also background factors in human aggression. (Geen, 2001) Human aggression is a matter of survival and inclusive fitness under certain conditions (threatening with physical harm is an aggressive act per se). Aggression includes neither accidental harm nor harm inflicted for positive ends, and is based on the delivery of or threatening with harm. Aggression against objects is part of "verbal" aggression when its aim is intimidation and displaced aggression when it serves to channel off emotions. Body language and verbal threats are graded versions of "verbal" aggression. Instrumental aggression is controlled and goal directed, being usually associated with low levels of arousal (Bratu, 2013), and may make the individual successful in competitive situations (aggressiveness is a means of competition). Relational aggression involves harm in psychological meaning (intimidation and relational aggression are used as means of competition). (Haller, 2014)

An individual's aggression when taking part in sport may result from some complex interaction between one's personality and the sporting situation (some people display aggressive behavior during sport, even though they do not appear aggressive in other situations). Sport may reduce aggression in society, giving us a legitimate way to express our aggressive instincts, giving us a release for our frustrations, and helping us to acquire self-discipline. (Jarvis, 1999) When retaliation takes place, levels of violence may involve more unsanctioned aggression. Intimidation and retaliation are forms of unsanctioned aggressive acts committed in team contact sports. If the emotional rewards from thrill violence (Petcu, 2013) are strong enough, players may develop excessive appetites for unsanctioned aggressive acts. Players involved in competition enter into a kind of contract in the pursuit of aggression between consenting adults. Sanctioned aggression in sport is an inherent aspect of play in team contact sports. The unique status given to

sanctioned aggressive acts characterizes the special nature of team contact sports (sanctioned acts of aggression in sport are willingly sought by athletes as a primary source of pleasure). (Kerr, 2005) Sporting events may be causally related to violent or aggressive acts, college football games may lead to aggressive and violent behaviors among spectators, whereas banning alcohol may dampen the relationship between football games and aggressive fan behavior. (Rees and Schnepel, 2009)

## 3. The Distinction between Hostile and Instrumental Aggression in Sport

Hypothalamic mechanisms are involved in the control of human aggression (there is a region in the human hypothalamus that controls aggressiveness). The prefrontal cortex exerts an inhibitory control over aggression. Orbitofrontal lesions decrease aggression, whereas aggressive behaviors activate the prefrontal cortex. Abnormal forms of aggression are not necessarily associated with amygdala deficits (the execution of aggressive acts requires an input from the amygdala). The hypothalamus contributes to the expression of abnormal aggression. Abnormal reactive aggression is a response to provocation or threat. Abnormal aggression may result from a variety of brain alterations, and has no unitary underlying mechanism in humans. Each form of abnormal aggression is associated with particular changes in brain function. Understanding the mechanisms of aggression control may require neuron-level analysis of functions. Neurochemical and anatomical mechanisms of aggression control cannot be separated. (Haller, 2014)

We may shape young athletes' aggression by the proper application of reinforcement and punishment, frustration may be one of the major contributors to sporting aggression, and under certain circumstances instrumental aggression may help performance. An innate predisposition towards aggression, learning of aggression and response to frustration can explain sporting aggression. The modeling of aggressive behaviors by the athletes may influence the increased hostility of spectators. Sport is cathartic (prolonged and hard training may reduce aggression), but the effects are temporary. (Jarvis, 1999) Athletes with high levels of life aggression tend to have high levels of sport hostile aggression and low levels of sport instrumental aggression (sport instrumental aggression for both men and women is not related to assertion in daily life). There is a significant positive relationship between both men's and women's sport hostile aggression scores and their total life aggression scores. (Keeier, 2007) In instrumental aggression, the player tries to inflict physical damage as a step towards winning, whereas in hostile aggression, the player is bent on physically harming an opponent. Contact sport athletes may be more aggressive off the field than no contact sports

athletes. Contact sports tend to provoke aggression, providing many aggressive cues. Hostile aggression is a function of physical size and not athletic participation. (Lemieux, McKelvie, and Stout, 2002) Displays of hostile aggression may help basketball players in aspects of their game that require power and energy (basketball's technical fouls do not include instrumental acts of aggression that contribute to successful performance outcomes). The greater number of turnovers experienced by players with more technical fouls indicates that the aggressive players may be prone to recklessness. Players who are dispositionally high-arousal tend both to react aggressively against perceived slights and to perform well in those aspects of the game requiring high energy or arousal. (Zitek and Jordan, 2011)

## 4. The Relationship between Aggression and Sport Performance Outcomes

Reactive aggression is more impulsive, whereas instrumental aggression is more purposeful and goal-oriented. The controlled–instrumental subtype of aggression is regulated by higher cortical systems. Reactive aggression is governed more by serotonergic pathways: increasing serotonergic activity decreases reactive aggression. Exaggerated aggressive responses can be observed in both high- and low-arousal states. Many neurochemical systems have evolved to regulate species-specific aggressive behaviors. (Nelson and Trainor, 2007)

The emotion that is felt by a parent or coach following on-ice player aggression may lead to increased verbal and physical aggression, players learn to be aggressive from being reinforced by significant others and by modeling, and aggression may occur when one's goal attainment is hindered in a socially acceptable manner. Hostile aggression is executed with the goal of hurting someone, whereas instrumental aggression is characterized by aggressive play with a non-aggressive goal (instrumental aggressive behaviors in hockey may lead to puck retrieval and scoring opportunities). An intervention to reduce aggression is most effective if a variety of techniques assists the athlete. Hockey elicits much emotion in its participants, but with this emotion comes the possibility of aggression. The player's general type of aggression can be linked to a pattern of antecedent conditions. Players must be more aware of their personal antecedents to aggression, whereas coaches must be aware of their potential influence in teaching and facilitating aggressive behavior (the negative effects of aggression far outweigh any benefits). (Lauer, 2005)

Some athletes use unsanctioned aggression and violence to physically dominate or injure opponents. People who agree to take part in sports involving aggressive contact are aware that they may be injured. The incidents

of angry retaliation (Popescu, 2014) which occur as the result of provocation in team contact sports are examples of hostile aggression, whereas "professional foul" is an example of instrumental aggression (participating in or watching sport may act as a kind of safety valve). The act of retaliatory hostile affective aggression is often seen and punished by game officials. In team contact sports, physical aggression is an essential component of success. (Kerr, 2005) Athletes in heavy contact and collision sports learn to use aggression as a strategy to achieve competitive success (Georgescu, 2010) on the field. Women become more tolerant of rule violations (Pera, 2013) and aggressive actions on the playing field (female athletes in contact sports engage in aggressive and violent acts). Participation in sports can teach people to control aggression. (Coakley, 2004) Aggression may have an impact on sport performance outcomes (Nica, 2013a), may help athletes in some aspects of sport performance, and may hurt performance in sports that require more carefulness and less explosive energy than basketball. Aggression or an aggressive disposition can improve sport performance outcomes in a non-obvious way. In-game aggression is positively associated with individual athletes' success. Instrumental aggression in the context of sports often has as its ultimate goal winning the competition. Technical fouls are a strong indicator of hostile aggression, and are associated with performance decrements in aspects of the game that require precision and carefulness. (Zitek and Jordan, 2011)

## 5. Conclusions

The current study has extended past research by elucidating the mechanisms of aggression control, aggressive behavior within the context of competition, the effects of sport on aggression, and cognitive processes associated with aggression. The results of the current study converge with prior research on the brain control (Fost, 2013) of aggression, the potential for aggression in sport, the neurobiological mechanisms of aggression, and the relationship between athletic participation and aggression. Our analysis complements the growing literature on the functioning of neural mechanisms of aggression, the neuroanatomical organization of aggression, the complex nature of aggressive behavior, and the neurobiological mechanisms of aggressive behavior.

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Addleton Academic Publishers
*Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*
Volume 13, 2014, pp. 176–190, ISSN 1841-2394

# BOOK REVIEWS

**How Literature Plays with the Brain:**
**The Neuroscience of Reading and Art**
Paul B. Armstrong (Brown University)
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 221 pp.
ISBN 978-1-4214-1002-9, 2013

Armstrong holds that literature plays with the brain through experiences of harmony and dissonance that help to negotiate oppositions that are fundamental to the neurobiology of mental functioning (play is integral to the aesthetic experience). Welcoming and challenging the expectations readers bring to texts based on their habitual patterns of consistency building is a way literature may play with the brain. The brain is structurally predisposed to acquire language, constructing meaning by engaging in reciprocal, mutually formative play between cortical regions. The to-and-fro play through which neuronal assemblies form is the neurobiological basis of the hermeneutic circle. Metaphor functions by invoking and frustrating the brain's quest for constancy, playing with the brain's contradictory need for both constancy and flexibility. The playfulness of the brain is inherently temporal. The capacity of narrative to organize action brings into play the relations between language and our motor system.

From this, it is evident that the *neuronal recycling* through which reading emerged shows that the brain can be written on in a variety of ways, one should not expect neuroscience to become a machine for producing readings, and neuroscience can deepen our appreciation of the materially grounded processes that occur when we read and interpret. Reading brings into relation a complex assembly of visual and auditory processes that translate letters into sounds and the latter into letters and associate signs with meaning. Reading is an important vehicle of specieswide cross-generational transmission of the contents of culture and of its forms, requires the reciprocal, variable interaction of vision and sound networks, is a process of building and of breaking consistency, is characterized by the creation and dissolution of patterns as we navigate our way through a text (reading a text requires the recognition of patterns), and only develops through repeated practice. Reading deploys memory through the recollection of specific contents and in the way we build substantial patterns and fill in indeterminacies based on

past experiences with literature and life. Reading is both a cognitive and an emotional experience, is a temporal practice, oriented toward the future, is an experience of doubling, and entails a paradoxical duplication of consciousness, is a solipsistic and intersubjective experience, enacting and overcoming the paradox of the alter ego, and can enact the paradoxical doubling of self and other in an unpredictable variety of ways.

As Armstrong puts it, reading is an activity that responds to the implied action in language (linguistic representation sets off correlative motor activity in the brain). Language holds in readiness the patterns of activity that reading reanimates, and is an embodied social practice that is exemplified by conversation. When readers disagree about the meaning of a text, they may think they are dealing with different kinds of linguistic artifact. The reading brain must translate phonetically and graphically linked units into formal structures with semantic significance. Cortical functions that originally evolved for invariant visual object recognition have been adapted to reading conventional graphic signs. The neuroscience of reading draws evidence from cognitive psychology's studies of word processing and language comprehension. The lived experience of reading and its aesthetic manifestations may relate to fundamental neurological processes, the complications of reading are a useful indicator of the dynamics of brain functioning, the neuronal recycling through which reading repurposes preexisting cortical structures grafts itself onto the visual system, and the neurological consequences of reading are a result of repeated exposure to patterns that form habitual responses.

In sum, there is considerable theoretical support for the notion that the brain tends to routinize repeated operations and is able to reorganize itself in response to novel stimuli: its capacity to alternate between conflicting readings is a reflection of its normal functioning. Different works are characterized by the particular kinds of blanks and indeterminacies they offer to the reader, whereas different readers will fill gaps and make links across a text's blank spaces in various ways. In reading, blockages to our quest for consistency may help us become aware of our typical habits of pattern making and gap filling, the immersion of effortless reading may be a deployment of expertise that is inherently pleasurable, and the way that repeated experiences of processing form patterns of neural assemblies may explain how particular reading practices can become inculcated. Our past experiences of the world can make us read differently if they have become wired in our patterns of cerebral processing. Literature may change a reader's consciousness: repeated experiences alter cortical wiring in a way that reflects our personal and cultural history. Existing neural patterns are set in motion in response to novel phenomena in reading, a single reading of one particular book is unlikely to transform neural structures, and a lifetime of reading a variety of texts will push and pull readers in many different directions.

Armstrong claims that we can have a sense of living in another, quasi-real world when we read as we employ analogous processes to knowing others in life, reading texts and discussing them with other readers provides a laboratory in which the brain can experiment with its social skills, the question of how a story is "focalized" calls attention to the doubling of the reader's consciousness with the perspectives we occupy in the text, which areas of the brain get activated in a particular reading experience is fluid and complex, the doubling of me and not-me in reading is not a mystical out-of-body experience. The graphic and phonetic processes of word recognition depend on vision and hearing. The comprehension of written linguistic texts is a neurological hybrid that draws on an array of brain processes. The linguistic sign is constrained by our visual apparatus and by the workings of the auditory system. Narrative is a literary form that is based on the brain's nonsimultaneity. The genre of a text provides an anticipatory understanding of the whole into which we should fit its details. The consequences of our encounters with literature are likely to be buffered and diminished by non-literary influences. Sentences are manipulable artifacts that bear traces of human agency. The hermeneutic circle is at work in visual letter and word recognition.

One of the key conclusions to emerge from this discussion is that if someone has an aesthetic experience, it must involve neuronal and cortical processes of some kind, experiments about brain functioning in aesthetic situations are linked to lived experiences of art, and neurological processes and aesthetic experiences are connected but distinctive. The polarity between harmony and dissonance is a universal feature of the aesthetic. What counts as harmony or dissonance is contingent and historically variable. Aesthetics of harmony appeal to and reinforce the brain's need for synthesis and pattern: aesthetics of harmony and aesthetics of dissonance are mutually defining and can take on different values. Harmonious art is a paradoxical system of similarities constructed out of differences. Harmony may be based on fundamental cognitive capacities for recognizing certain kinds of distinctions. Art is a matter of learned conventions, and may announce its presence by provoking an aesthetic emotion in the perceiver, the materials that the conventions of art manipulate are constrained by fundamental structures and processes of the brain, and the ways in which art's harmonies reinforce or rewire neuronal assemblies may influence modes of perception and cognition. Harmony can be just as sensitizing as dissonance can be: the pain of a dissonant disturbance can prompt withdrawal unless it can be integrated. Both harmony and dissonance can be pleasurable, meaningful aesthetic experiences (harmony is differentiated, replete with multiplicity, and temporally variable). The familiarity of well-known art may not breed contempt but repeated exposure may diminish a work's aesthetic effect. The making and

breaking of neuronal connections stimulates the expression of neurotransmitters associated with pleasure in ways that affect aesthetic experiences. The goal of neuroaesthetics should be a differentiated understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of various aesthetic experiences. The disciplinary divide across which neuroscience and aesthetics can talk with each other is a case of conflict between terministic screens.

Armstrong contends that the technological revolution in brain imaging has opened new horizons for understanding mental processes, noise is a neurobiological constant, reflecting the limits of the organism's sensory apparatus, and the hermeneutic circle has deep foundations in the cognitive functioning of the brain. The brain is not an agent with goals and purposes, but is capable of astonishing transformations, is an ensemble of simultaneously firing neurons that interact multidirectionally and get organized in a particular manner for specific tasks, and makes sense of the world by forming neuronal assemblies: its quest for stability and its openness to instability are inherent in the paradoxical powers of metaphor. The brain is complexly balanced between inertia and openness to novelty and variation.

It follows from this that our inherited cortical architecture is universally open to individual and cultural variation, the reciprocal interactions between cortical regions produce provisional configurations of constancy, and the symmetries and resonances of cortical parallel processing can manifest themselves in different kinds of phenomena (there may be limits to what the auditory system can assimilate). The way that *opioid receptors* are structured in the brain facilitates both consistency building and responsiveness to novelty. Patterns are essential in order for all of our sensory systems to provide stable constructions of data from an outside world perpetually in flux. The hermeneutic processes of vision have evolved because of their pragmatic usefulness in negotiating our way through it: vision is a binding of separate processes in different, relatively autonomous regions of the visual cortex, we have meaningful visual experiences as a result of reciprocal, to-and-fro interactions between interconnected cortical areas, visual experience is fundamentally hermeneutic, entailing both selection and combination, and vision produces color by processing wavelengths emanating from the external world. Color is a diacritical and synthetic production of meaning based on selection and combination, whereas color constancy uses the unchanging ratios between surfaces to create the useful fiction of stability. Color is a construction of constancies out of a flux of inputs that illustrates how the brain creates regular patterns for pragmatic aims. The visual word form area is characterized by configurative processes.

On Armstrong's reading, the regularities in the irregular details enable the hermeneutic construction of patterns that create meaningful relations between parts and wholes. The value of constancy depends on the brain's

effectiveness in managing the changeableness of its inputs, whereas it can only identify a significant change against a background of constancy. What is familiar to two different brains will vary according to their past interpretive experiences. Our brains differ in what they know and in how they know it, the brain's sense of the world's constancies reinforces itself over time, and the neuronal assemblies that the brain is capable of creating are flexible. The different configurations of meaning that ambiguous, multistable images invoke demonstrate the brain's capacity to reshape its internal connections and construct opposing patterns of meaning. Brain processes are durational, the brain is a complex ensemble of multiple cell assemblies, and patterns are created by reciprocal connections between different neurons in different parts of the brain. Bodily based emotions can have an important hermeneutic function, emotions and cognition operate by analogous configurative processes, and reason and feeling are linked by their participation in the hermeneutic circle as embodied processes of cognition (perceiving and processing are integral aspects of the same operation of making sense of the world). The possibility of constructing opposing mutually exclusive configurations of meaning is a reflection of processes in the brain that negotiate the competing claims of constancy and flexibility.

The important point here is that graphic gestalts allow auditory forms to be recognized that are invisible in the flux of phenomena: graphic forms give the brain an anticipatory sense of the patterns into which phonemes will form. The interaction that produces metaphoric meaning requires both disruption and new coherence. The experience of construing novel, puzzling states of affairs can promote epistemological self-reflection. Interruptions in consciousness may become an incitement to self-consciousness. The coherence of lived time as an integrated structure of differences is a fundamental, self-evident aspect of experience. Consistency building and the to-and-fro movements of the hermeneutic circle are temporal processes that manifest the paradoxes of lived time. The vital importance of the capacity to integrate disparate perceptual moments may be best illustrated when it breaks down. Habit-forming repetition is inherently ambiguous and can have opposite consequences, the unconsciousness of habituation may be a neuronal foundation of aesthetic joy, dehabituation has meaning and utility against a background of established habits and conventions, and the workings of habit suggest that memory and learning are distributed throughout the brain (memory occurs where learning happens).

Armstrong argues that brain structure alone does not fully explain how we respond to novelty. The self is a process and an event. The temporality underlying selfhood is always slipping away and is never at one with itself. The displacements, disjunctions, and disunities that characterize consciousness are based on the topographical and temporal decenteredness of the brain.

The neurobiology of our cognitive functions is intertwined with social interactions that shape and are shaped by them. The immediate, unproblematic understanding that I have of another's actions is based on resonances between my motor system and the actions I observe. The experience of primary intersubjectivity is something motor mirror neurons provide. The strategies and devices through which texts manipulate our identifications with characters set in motion the habits and assumptions through which we deal with the social world. Theorizing about a character, an author, or a text is likely to involve to-and-fro interactions among a variety of neural networks. Canonical mirror neurons are involved in our response to cultural objects of all kinds. We may experience bodily resonance with others through a whole range of artifacts that are part of the human motor repertoire.

*How Literature Plays with the Brain: The Neuroscience of Reading and Art* is a highly informative and carefully argued book. We recommend a close reading of it.

**Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity**
Brady Bowman (Pennsylvania State University)
New York: Cambridge University Press, 280 pp.
ISBN 978-1-107-03359-7, 2013

According to Bowman, Kant holds that the logic of finite cognition is marked by an essential negativity which may divide reason against itself. The categories and logical forms of the understanding lead to antinomies when applied to the unconditional. Transcendental logic is fundamentally an investigation into the *categories* in which experience becomes intelligible, succeeding in taking up the categories as functions of synthesis. The categories must be grasped as rooted in a single, underlying structure, and they systematically lead into forms of error when we try to apply them to the unconditioned (the categories cannot be identical with the structures of transcendental reality). The Kantian categories, qua functions of unity, constitute the objectivity of the sensible manifold as an object of possible experience (the categories are forms of *possible objects*). Kant's categories of the understanding are distinct, independent functions of synthesis. The form of possibility consists in the logical compatibility of internal determinations which make up the content or material element of possibility. Reason, like the understanding, is a faculty whose basic function is unity. In its purely formal or "logical employment," reason is a faculty of inference. Reason is continuous with and subordinate to the faculty of understanding. The concepts of reason have a merely regulative function.

What matters for the present discussion is that diagnosing the fatal weaknesses of classical metaphysics is a step towards its rehabilitation. Kant distinguishes between *metaphysica specialis* as a (specious) body of scientific knowledge and *metaphysica naturalis* as a natural disposition of the human mind. The manifold of sensible intuition is given prior to all thought. Kant introduces the distinction between reason and the understanding: understanding is a *spontaneous* faculty whose activity arises from within and does not need to be produced by external impulse. A concept is a *function*. The activity of the understanding consists in the formation and combination of concepts by way of *judgment*. Kant correlates ontology with the understanding and special metaphysics with reason. Understanding and reason are faculties belonging essentially to finite, discursive minds, being as permanent as the human species itself. The ideas of reason are just concepts of the understanding that have been "freed" of their legitimate limitations. Objectivity is a function, a product, of the synthetic activity through which consciousness brings about its own apperceptive unity. Objectivity is a *metaphysical condition* of the formal reality of the I. Representation is the genus of all mental content. Conceptual synthesis comprises multiple functions of unity that work together to produce objective, unified representations. The pure concepts of the understanding are substantively with the subset of traditional ontological categories that are authentically conceptual.

Bowman points out that Kant rejects the geometrical method as an appropriate form for philosophy: philosophy is a discursive discipline concerned with the adequate analysis and elucidation of given categories, and mathematics has a superior source of evidence in *a priori* intuition and can define its objects into existence. The geometric method is an inappropriate means of realizing the scientific ideal for philosophy. The axioms of geometry are principles only in relation to what can be given in intuition (they are principles only in relation to the form of outer intuition which is itself non-discursive). Kant emphasizes the epistemic qualities of mathematical cognition.

The point of interest here is that Kant systematizes the contradictions at the core of metaphysical discourse, deriving them from the form of (finite) thought itself. Kant systematizes the contradictions inherent in the finite determinations of the understanding, and recognizes the necessity with which those contradictions arise. Scientific cognition of the infinite is impossible on the basis of the cognitive forms the understanding has to rely on. Attempts at scientific metaphysics lead the understanding into antinomies and other logical embarrassments. The finite things of the empirical world are entities constituted solely by relations. Kant insists on the necessary relation of the finite mind to the infinite, that is, on the necessity of metaphysics. Kant recognizes the impossibility of carrying out the traditional metaphysical

project, but remains committed to the paradigm of finite cognition constitutive of that project. Space and time are purely subjective and contingently human forms of intuition (the doctrine of transcendental idealism). Space is a single, unique, infinite, given magnitude. A plurality of intrinsically determined, finite substances is necessary to account for change and the existence of the spatio-temporal order. A supremely real being necessarily exists. Existence is not a real predicate. Cognition of the real possibility of an object is synthetic. Individual empirical things are relational entities even as regards their *essential possibility*. We cannot grasp the primordial being as in any way *composed* of finite things. *Things in themselves* are intrinsically individuated as real entities by unique combinations of real determinations. The contradiction between the thesis of the natural world's totality and that of its infinity is moot. The unconditioned cannot be known by subsuming it under the categories or finite thought-determinations. Certain *contents* are beyond the limits of discursive thought (their necessary unknowability can be demonstrated using only the means available to discursive thought itself).

Bowman writes that Kant's transcendental critique focuses on the conditions of possibility of objective, discursive knowledge. Kant provides an account of the finite forms of thought and their role in constituting finite subjectivity, grasps apperception itself as the ground of the categories, and stresses the aspect of apodictic certainty. Kant makes an important contribution to the Cartesian theory of truth, analyzing the conditions under which it is possible for there to be any such reality as objective reality. Truth lies in the adequate correspondence between objective and formal reality. Kant requires the notion of an original manifold if he is to account for the material determination of content. Self-conscious spontaneity is originally present to itself in and through the activity of objective determination.

Bowman says that Hegel's substantive discussion of the content of special metaphysics comes in the *Doctrine of the Concept*. Time is the nonconceptual existence of the Concept itself and is the form in which the "I" is sensuously present to itself. Hegel restricts the scope of truly rigorous science to the *a priori* unfolding of the structure of the Concept. Nature and natural science are metaphysically dependent stages in the self-actualization of the Concept. All of Hegel's operative concepts can be understood as so many modifications of the Concept and absolute negativity. The human search for laws of nature is a manifestation of the life of the Concept itself in a decidedly non-metaphorical sense of *life*. Human beings seek out laws of nature out of a rational instinct to actualize unconditioned reason. Philosophical critique is one of *finite cognition* (a necessary phase or expression in the unfolding of the Concept). Our ordinary concepts are in some sense *abstract* and divorced from the authentic concept of the Concept. Ordinary

concepts, including the pure concepts of the understanding, are *abstract universals*. *Sache* ("reality") and *Begriff* ("Concept") are co-referential expressions: the reality of things is identical to their Concept. The Hegelian *Sache* is the unqualified reality of which objective and formal reality are distinct aspects. Formal and objective reality (substance and subject) are moments that achieve determinate existence solely through the unfolding of the logic of absolute negation.

The basic idea here is that Hegel maps finite thought-determinations onto the component relations of the Concept, and reduces the categories of *metaphysica generalis* to determinations of the Concept, transforming the ordinary meaning of those categories. The authentic forms of being and intelligibility are the complex relations constitutive of the Concept. Mathematics is the highest possible form that the Concept can take within the sphere of finite cognition. Systematic properties of mathematical investigation ("real definitions") *produce the external reality* of the relevant mathematical objects from their *concepts*. Any attitude toward reality which is committed to the categories of traditional ontology is committed to the finite determinations of the unrealized Concept. Hegel's metaphysics of the Concept provides a determinate place for the genesis of finite cognition. Hegel associates metaphysics with the faculty of understanding as distinct from reason. Hegel's methodological views on the rationalist ideal of mathematical rigor are a paradigm for all knowledge.

Bowman claims that Hegel is committed to the identity of thought and being, and focuses on the primacy of subjective self-determination and the relative underdetermination of traditional conceptions of causality. Determinateness must be spelled out in terms of the relation between formal and objective reality. Mediation is the "dissolution" of an existence or determinate being. Self-identity is pure abstraction, whereas pure abstraction is what thinking is (substance is identical in its essence to thinking). We should grasp finite cognition and nature as metaphysically correlative terms. The determinateness of substance *just is* the existence of subjectivity. The absolute must be grasped as *substance* and as *subject*. The logic of absolute negativity models the way substance (formal reality) and subject (objective reality, content) mutually necessitate each other. The finite world has no authentic being or existence in itself, and is marked by a pervasive underdetermination. Finite things and finite determinations generally have their identity or being in an opposed other and thus are what they are not.

We should bear in mind that the system, in its fundamental and paradigmatic shape, is the dynamic of absolute negativity. The absolutely negative structure of the Hegelian true means that knowledge of the truth is *necessitated* by the truth. Existence itself (*Dasein* or determinate being) is structured at its core *as* truth. Hegel works out the ways in which geo-

metrical cognition both intimates and falls short of the full structure of absolute negativity. Hegel's *speculative theory of content* is metaphysically constituted through absolute negativity. Hegel associates negation, i.e. the relation of negativity, with the idea of *content*. Negation, properly understood, reveals a positive content intimately connected with it. Autonomous negation is a primitive methodological operation for generating all the content of classical logic. Classical logic sets limitations on Hegel's presentation of speculative science. The means of classical logic are insufficient for a genuinely adequate representation of absolute negation.

Bowman maintains that Hegel interprets finite cognition in its most explicit theoretical manifestations as corresponding to the structure of absolute negativity and to distinct moments within its dynamic. The determinateness of substance is identical to the existence of the *understanding* or *finite cognition*. Hegel rejects the *mos geometricus* as an appropriately philosophical mode of cognition. Geometric cognition is a "subjective act lacking in objectivity." Cognition must be directly involved in the *genesis* of the cognitive object. The objects in whose genesis thinking is directly involved are the pure thought-determinations (thought itself in its self-production is the exclusive "object" of truly "objective" thinking). The axioms of geometry are synthetic propositions. Geometry has its "truth" in speculative logic. Hegel brings into play the features constitutive of geometry's finitude as a form of cognition in his critique of mathematical cognition. Hegel accords a high status to geometry within the sphere of finite theoretical cognition. The link with sensible intuitions preserves an ineliminable moment of self-externality in geometrical thought.

One thing that is clear is that Hegel rejects the geometric method as inappropriate to philosophy, focusing on certain formal and architectonic features of the geometric method. Geometry is the highest form of finite theoretical cognition. Geometrical objects are abstract determinations of space. In the case of empirical sciences, a presentation *more geometrico* begins with definitions and principles serving to individuate the specific field of discourse, going on to an increasingly thorough individuation and concretization of the objects specific to its field. Geometry is the highest form of knowledge within the sphere of finite theoretical cognition. The sequential presentation of the inferential relations obtaining among the various truths of Euclidean geometry subserves the manifestation of the identity of concept and reality. Hegel focuses on mathematical cognition as a form of rational existence, emphasizes the self-contained character of mathematics and its ability to generate determinacy from within a closed system, and dismisses constructibility in sensible intuition as the source of mathematics' particular excellence. The essential element of mathematical rigor lies in the fact that individuation and concretization of the objects are

developed out of the definitions and principles from an external source. Space is a "non-sensuous sensuous" – an object of sensibility that has been stripped of all its sensuous qualities.

Bowman asserts that, for Hegel, dialectical experience consists in the emergence of the new object *from the initial object itself*. The forms of finite, discursive reason, when conceived as the exclusive and irreducible forms of cognition, distort and conceal the true character of freedom. Hegel criticizes the form of finite cognition, not merely the illicit extension of that form to a content that necessarily destabilizes it. Hegel retains certain aspects that are associated with transcendental idealism, even as he *objectifies* them, by interpreting them as features of things themselves. Transcendental idealism reduced the I to a mere representation that must be able to *accompany* all my other representations. There are real analogies between the levels of mind and natural phenomena. Hegel affirms the *thoroughgoing underdetermination* of the finite sphere as a *metaphysical principle*, and denies that the authentic skepticism of the ancients is a form of *doubt* at all.

It is worth emphasizing that Hegel treats persistent difficulties with the concept of causal laws of nature as reflections of metaphysical limitations inherent to natural objects as such. Hegel describes the critical philosophy as an *imperfect* form of skepticism. The classificatory and explanatory weaknesses in even our best theories are indicative of a metaphysical indeterminacy in nature itself. To accompany all my representations, sensations, actions, etc., is to be merely common to them all. The pure concepts of the understanding are in the first instance *modes of synthetic activity*. Dogmatism has nothing to do with the supposedly "naïve" commitment to conceptual realism. Philosophy has a right to adopt the language of ordinary life in order to designate its concepts. Speculative science has consequences for the nature of truth, the place of mind in the natural world, or the possibility and reality of human freedom. Speculative science gives substantive and rigorously argued answers.

Bowman remarks that, according to Hegel, metaphysics treats its "predicates" as distinct from one another. Metaphysical thinking is unconscious of its "opposition" to being when being is represented as a world of things, objects. Hegel associates the term "metaphysics" exclusively with thinking in finite relations. Hegel's idealist metaphysics claims that mind and reality as a whole are of essentially the same structure. Hegel's own *speculative* metaphysics is emphatically *revisionary*. The concepts of the understanding are specifications and limitations of reason's unconscious, speculative conviction of its inner affinity or identity with the absolute itself. Metaphysical understanding of the unconditioned is an instance of the mind's failing adequately to realize what the first condition of all understanding truly is. Understanding includes two complementary moments, one uncon-

scious and infinite, the other conscious and finite. The "substantial basis" of the content of religion is "the absolute essence of spirit." Hegel intends a derivation of the traditional categories and forms of thought that guarantees their necessity and validity within well-defined limits. "Consciousness" is our ordinary view of how we are related to the world in cognition. Nature or finite being objectively corresponds to the limitations of finite cognition. The right kind of logical reflection on finite cognition is able to reveal its origin in the structure of the absolute itself.

The point of interest here is that Hegel rejects the idea that the basic forms of intelligibility and/or being are categorial in nature (the categories are not truly forms of intelligibility). Hegel is committed to a strong form of rationalism that identifies being with intelligibility. The traditional view of logic or the conception of intelligibility is incompatible with insight into the unconditioned. Hegel maintains the ideal of a self-grounding *speculative* science. The whole sphere of essence is characterized as the negation of being. The self-relation constitutive of identity must be construed as a negative relation-to-self. Determinateness entails opposition, negation, and finitude. Hegel's views on the nature of the finite objects of experience entail anti-essentialism in regard to them. "Real possibility" is the totality of actual conditions upon the existence of a finite object, being equivalent to an actuality not of the finite object itself, but of *others*.

Bowman explains that Jacobi seeks to set limits to what philosophical rationalism conceived as infinite intelligibility. Discursive form tends inevitably toward formalism: demonstration or deduction is a procedure based on the construction of tautologies. Truly radical formalism is a conceptual impossibility. The encroachment of formalism on human life is the result of existential pressures on human survival. Discursive reason has by its very nature no theoretical purchase on the unconditioned. Fatalism, nihilism, and the denial of substantial individuality are implicit in every attempt to erect a metaphysical system of reason. The metaphysical individualism underwrites personal free will. Jacobi focuses on the ineluctable evils that ensue when functional explanation is hypostatized as a metaphysical doctrine, and insists on the sufficiency of immediate certainty as a guarantor of the reality of God, freedom, and personality. Finite cognition at its best distorts the nature of the unconditioned in ways that lead to determinism and nihilism. Mathematical forms of analysis and demonstration are the unique form of scientific rigor. The mathematical ideal of knowledge leads necessarily to a particularly extreme version of formalism. The forms of scientific cognition necessarily construe their objects as conditioned, dependent, externally determined. The infinite being in no way transcends or is really distinct from the finite things that are its *modes*. Spinoza makes an infinite and unique substance the fundamental category and reality of his philosophy. The

exclusive object of cognition is the unconditioned itself. A real definition should specify the essence in such a way that all the essential properties of the substance may be derived from it.

*Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity* is a bold and engaging book, and a welcome addition to the literature.

**The Sublime in Modern Philosophy**
Emily Brady (University of Edinburgh)
New York: Cambridge University Press, 227 pp.
ISBN 978-0-521-19414-3, 2013

Brady holds that the sublime involves a relation between the sublime thing and a particular aesthetic experience in the subject. Aesthetic judgments are grounded in the subject's response to aesthetic properties. The humility and self-awareness of the sublime characterize the human subject as part of nature. The sublime in art is secondary (artworks cannot be sublime in and of themselves). The sublime belongs to a set of categories which identify more difficult forms of aesthetic appreciation. Experiences of grandeur lack the more mixed "negative pleasure" of the sublime. The admiration we feel in the sublime can feed into new forms of self-knowledge and potentially ground respect for nature.

As Brady puts it, Baillie says that the sublime features of poetry and painting are commonly descriptions or representations of what is found in nature. A proper understanding of the concept should begin with an inquiry into qualities which are found sublime. The sublime is a function of the magnitude of objects. The object of the sublime must remain uniform and cannot be broken up. The imagination's expansion depends upon an equally expansive, uninterrupted magnitude. Uncommonness is novelty brought into the context of the sublime. Different minds have different kinds of foci. Sublimity in nature is something like the "original" sublime. Painting is sublime only through representation of sublime events or passions. The sublime begins with nature and the natural sublime has a greater affect on us. Gerard claims that the pleasure associated with the sublime arises from an expansion and enlivening of imagination. Objects are sublime if they possess quantity and simplicity together. Material qualities in nature provide the main reference point for acts of association. The sublimity of nature is prior to that of art. The effects of art may be nearly as strong as our responses to the actual objects depicted. Style is important to achieving sublime effects (something can be depicted as great through certain techniques). Palaces and pyramids possess magnitudes comparable to those found in naturally sublime objects. The length of music contributes to the work's

effect of amplitude on the listener, the "gravity of the notes" expands the mind, and music that is imitative of sublime "passions or objects" evokes these feelings in the listener. Poetry is sublime through the images and ideas of sublimity evoked in the mind of the reader. A passion becomes sublime through a range of associations with "its causes, its objects and its effects."

According to Brady, Burke extends the sensory modalities associated with the sublime to include both smells and tastes. The sublime is the strongest of our passions. The source of the Burkean sublime is terrible objects. Even small things can be terrible, and thus sublime. Sound is an independent quality that may attach to different kinds of things. The sublime is a form of aesthetic appreciation that is difficult and uncomfortable. Alison puts it that the beautiful and sublime are distinct aesthetic categories. Sight is not the only sense concerned with beauty and sublimity. The material qualities of objects produce only sensations (they become capable of arousing emotions). Objects experienced through sight and hearing acquire sublimity through their association with particular ideas. Architecture is the most sublime of artefacts. Magnitude and vastness are significant in expressing qualities of the sublime. Imagination is engaged in making associations between some object and cultural events.

Brady claims that Mendelssohn links the sensuous experience of the beautiful to order and symmetry. The order or "homogenous" character of beauty can be taken in by the senses. The senses alone are overwhelmed. Immensity of magnitude applies only to extended things, whereas immensity of strength applies to unextended things. Boredom and revulsion are associated with immensity which is monotonous or undifferentiated. Mendelssohn associates the sublime with perfection. Nature is the original sublime. The objective sublime refers to the original qualities of an object of artistic representation. The skill and genius of an artist can further elevate sublime qualities. The artist can create an ideal beauty. Nature's beauty is unsurpassed by art. The impact of the sublime on the mind produces a state of stupor.

Brady contends that Kant emphasizes the human mind and freedom as sublime. Sublimity opens out to an awareness of our freedom as autonomous beings. Kant's theory of the sublime links the sublime as a form of aesthetic experience with the sense of freedom possessed by moral beings. The sublime is the "counterweight" of the beautiful, involving a feeling of admiration about ourselves. The sublime is awe inspiring and involves feelings of admiration. Something can be both sublime and beautiful at the same time. The beautiful and the sublime are both types of aesthetic judgment, involving only indeterminate concepts and being singular judgments with subjective universal validity. They involve appreciation of the aesthetic object for its own sake. The beautiful is associated with the form of an object, whereas the sublime is associated with formlessness and limitlessness. The sublime

calls forth a free play in which imagination and reason conflict. The feeling associated with the sublime involves a mix of pleasure and displeasure, involving both attraction and repulsion. The sublime is marked by a "movement" of the mind, imagination's activity in the sublime is "serious," and the sublime carries with it necessity, demanding universal assent. The sublime judgment is a priori, with its foundation in human nature. The mathematical and the dynamic categories of the sublime put us in touch with our moral capacities, revealing to us, through sensible experience, our capacity for freedom. The sublime is at a meeting point between aesthetic experience and freedom.

It follows from the preceding analysis that, for Kant, the feeling directed at the sublime object is one of esteem or admiration. The causes of the sublime can be brought back to natural objects and phenomena. The sublime reflects *both* human independence from nature and our place within it, and is an elevated feeling in response to awe-inspiring objects. Sublimity is most properly found in the elevated mind, and is improperly ascribed to natural objects. The sublime is formless and limitless and cannot be taken in by the senses and imagination. Thus, the sublime is properly found only in a state of the expanded mind. The mind and its powers are the true object of the sublime (the mind is the true sublime object). Art is capable only of beautiful presentations of the sublime. Artworks are the kinds of things that can be taken in. The negative pleasure of sublime feeling is only "occasioned" by natural objects. In the dynamically sublime we experience nature's power.

Brady reasons that the Kantian sublime is other-regarding. The beautiful prepares us to love nature, whereas the sublime prepares us to esteem it. The beautiful involves the single feeling of delight or "liking." Imagination mediates between subject and natural object. The sublime is occasioned by natural objects in virtue of their formal indeterminacy. Kant develops the expansion of imagination through an opening out of reason and an aesthetic apprehension of freedom. In the case of the dynamically sublime, we experience fear in response to imagining or entertaining the thought of being when nature harms us. Despite the failure of imagination to take in the sublime, it is enlivened and quickened.

*The Sublime in Modern Philosophy* is a thought provoking book, opening up much fertile ground for future work.

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ISSN: 1841-2394