

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE ASSOCIATION • NEW YORK

# Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations

VOLUME 14 | 2015



AN INTERNATIONAL PEER-REVIEWED  
ACADEMIC JOURNAL

NEW SERIES

INSTITUTE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES  
IN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES • NEW YORK

# **Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations**

**VOLUME 14 • 2015**

ADDLETON ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS • NEW YORK



## ***Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations***

An international peer-reviewed academic journal

Volume 14 / 2015

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***Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations*** (ISSN 1841-2394) is published yearly by Addleton Academic Publishers, 30-18 50th Street, Woodside, New York, 11377. All papers in this journal have undergone editorial screening and anonymous double-blind peer-review.

Associate Editor: Adam M. Croom, University of Pennsylvania

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## WORKAHOLIC BEHAVIOR PATTERNS IN ORGANIZATIONS

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**ABSTRACT.** My aim in this paper is to examine the construct of workaholism, organizational outcomes of workaholism, external requirements that may further workaholic behavior, and the perceptual processes related to workaholism. The material gathered in this study provides a rich and diverse context for understanding the possible effectiveness of cognitive schemes in diminishing workaholism, autonomous and controlled motivation as determinants of workaholism, and the intrinsic motivations of workaholism. These findings highlight the importance of examining the prevention of workaholism, types of individual guidance and treatment of workaholics, and the behavioral and cognitive features of workaholism.

**Keywords:** workaholism; organization; behavior pattern; cognition; motivation

### 1. Introduction

Workaholic employees work strenuously to attain success and to prevent failure, tend to be neurotic (Bacalu, 2014), and to pursue avoidance objectives. They are driven by avoidance incentive that is the indication of a prevention concern, and are responsive to the lack or existence of negative outcomes. They employ avoidance schemes, being likely to prevent discords to their work objectives (Drumea, 2011a) that incorporate their duties. Workaholic employees follow conflicting work goals, varying from their obligations and responsibilities to their standards. Workaholism is negatively related to job satisfaction and job performance, and positively related to turnover intention, being a harmful type of heavy work investment. Workaholic employees may assess their own performance as inferior, even if other individuals would evaluate it as being satisfactory or good. (van Beek et al., 2014)

### 2. The Construct of Workaholism

Workaholic employees work more strenuously than their fellow workers and than is needed for the purpose of satisfying organizational or economic

criteria (Nica and Potcovaru, 2014) (they are impelled to work). Workaholism is irrelevantly associated with real liking of one's work or with an authentic inclination to be instrumental in organizational objectives. Workaholic employees have a superior demand to prove themselves compared to non-workaholic employees. The social context plays a significant function when it comes to workaholism, supplying workaholic employees with an awareness of self-respect and dignity. Workaholism is positively related to extrinsic motivation (Burke and Crozier, 2014), signifying that workaholic employees undertake their work activities for their conducive value. (van Beek et al., 2012) The trends to toil may be stimulated by qualitatively dissimilar kinds of motivation, providing conflicting connections with employees' welfare. Toiling concerns actual conduct. By working long hours and being ineffectual in detaching from work (Drumea, 2011b), workaholics may require enough time and opportunity to recuperate from work, but being involved in one's work can be psychologically gratifying in and of itself. Working compulsively is health-impairing (Popescu, 2015), associating positively to tiredness. Excessive work might generate both positive and negative connections with employees' welfare, linking positively to both fatigue and vitality, being determined by the motivation mobilizing the immoderate work conduct. Employees might toil because they appreciate a specific undertaking or are entirely engaged in a thought-provoking or captivating task. (van den Broeck et al., 2011)

Toiling may be an indication of work dependence. Effective schemes for hindering or handling workaholism should concentrate on setting rational and feasible objectives, improve the workaholic's cognizance that (s)he has a trouble and should clarify it, straightforwardly focus on the immoderate work conduct and concentrating by implication on the repercussions of work dependence, and not be too time-devouring. Workaholics toil far beyond what is demanded. A standard work addict is stimulated by a compulsive inner motivation that (s)he cannot oppose. Workaholism encompasses a powerful internal drive to work and toiling. The latter constitutes the behavioral element that implies that workaholics are likely to apportion an extraordinary quantity of their time and determination to work and that they toil to satisfy organizational or economic prerequisites. Workaholics are preoccupied with their work and constantly think about it, even when not at work. In assessing advancement toward their work objectives, workaholics depend considerably on how much they have done. (van Wijhe et al., 2010) Their control demands can be so exaggerated that they impact their environment with immoderate needs. Obstinance and rigidity are chief features of workaholics. The latter are typically embarrassed with emotions, creativity, and spontaneity. The predisposition to be rigid in employment circumstances makes life tough for the workaholic's colleagues and may make his/her activity slipshod. Workaholics' control demands impede them from counting on other individuals to get things

done. For them, the excessive predisposition for perfectionism diminishes operational efficiency (Petcu, 2014) and is partly responsible for mental stress. There is a positive link between job involvement and workaholism, and a negative link between safe attachment and workaholism. (Tziner and Tanami, 2013)

### **3. Organizational Outcomes of Workaholism**

Workaholism may negatively influence the work setting. The perception of workaholism as a multidimensional concept has given way to a more unidimensional perception that gives precedence to the drive feature as the core of workaholism. The latter may be perceived subjectively as a deficit of control, the workaholic persisting in work notwithstanding established negative repercussions. The essential constituent of workaholism, *inner obsessive work drive*, is related to various negative signs. Employers can institute standards and values that gratify work involvement and efficiency rather than workaholism. If workaholic conduct is recompensed, it can bring about a fertile setting for workaholism, whereas if toiling is not satisfied with a positive feedback, workaholic conduct will be moderated. (Schou Andreassen, 2014) Controlled motivation relates to toil, whereas both controlled and autonomous motivation (Mircică, 2014) associate with immoderate work. Individuals toil because they are interested in extrinsic recompenses and sanctions, or as they would be embarrassed if not working, thereby threatening their welfare. Toiling may be stimulating rather than exhausting when individuals find their activity effective and absorbing. Toiling tends to have health-impairing correspondents as it is boosted by a qualitatively inferior kind of motivation, but it may not be associated with ill-health in case it is impelled by a qualitatively superior kind of motivation. Their motivation might be partly of poor quality, thereby conceivably causing suboptimal performance. Toiling is a necessary but not sufficient condition of submitting to the syndrome of workaholism. (van den Broeck et al., 2011)

Workaholism influences employee welfare via role disputes, being separate of workers' perceptions of their task demands, incorporating a powerful internal drive and toiling. Workaholic employees tend to assign an unusual extent of their time and activity to work and they function beyond what is fairly required to fulfill organizational or economic preconditions. They spend a disproportionate quantity of time working to the detriment of non-work activities. Restoration from work is condemned to be unsuitable for workaholics granted their diminished non-work life and the complementary work-home dispute. Intra-role discords in operation further exhaust the workaholic's strength and may generate burnout. Role conflicts have a comparable mediating function in the case of workaholism and task requirements: the effect of

workaholism on negative and positive results is autonomous from external job demands. Workaholism leads increasingly to clarifying burnout and welfare beyond emotional, cognitive and organizational needs. Workaholism in association with significant task requirements may generate burnout via increased inter- and intra-role discord. (Schaufeli et al., 2009)

#### **4. Behavioral and Cognitive Features of Workaholism**

Work addicts are likely to have impractical and perpetual inventories of activities to do. A compulsive appetite for work goes together with unwanted feelings. Workaholics toil out of an internal pressure (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014) and their work setting may have a significant function in impelling their work dependence, being recognized and recompensed for their immoderate work conduct. Organizations may lead to the preclusion of workaholism by altering the organizational culture. The incentive to modify addictive behavior is a significant requirement for handling workaholism. (van Wijhe et al., 2010) Extremely motivated workers may either undergo welfare and perform in an optimal way (Ștefănescu-Mihăilă, 2015), or are deficient in well-being and advance questionable positions towards work, being determined by the kind of regulation implicit in their behavior. Motivation concerns a more vague inclination towards one's job, whereas workaholism is a more particular position towards work. Working compulsively and working excessively are related to qualitatively dissimilar kinds of work motivation. The tendency to work compulsively associates with ill-health (i.e. exhaustion) as it is connected with feelings of pressure (i.e. controlled motivation). Excessive work goes together with experiences of satisfaction and concern (Drumea, 2012) or cognizance of the importance of their job (i.e. autonomous motivation) and hence links positively with employees' welfare (i.e. vigor). (van den Broeck et al., 2011)

Workaholic employees undergo an internal drive to work strenuously and not an external constraint. They toil to prevent negative feelings or to achieve ego improvements, and appreciate their activity as they equate themselves with its conducive value (Lăzăroiu, 2013): they may experience some dominion of their conduct. Workaholic employees toil as it generates a distinguishable result (extrinsic motivation), and not for the reason that they appreciate their task (intrinsic motivation): they are chiefly impelled or pressed by a powerful demand to prove themselves (Macfarlane and Macfarlane, 2015) and as they rate work outcomes. Workaholics are primarily extrinsically motivated and undertake tasks for their instrumental value. (van Beek et al., 2012) They have a powerful appetite for work as they only feel reliable when toiling and perfectly well, whereas work engagers are toiling as they like work (workaholics are stimulated by an uncontrollable internal urge they cannot resist).

Motivational dissimilarities between workaholics (stimulated by introjected purposes) and work engagers (stimulated by integrated purposes) can be justified by self-regulatory shortfalls and self-regulatory capabilities. Workaholic employees can become intrepid and struggle for their excessively high levels of excellence: unattainable standards maintain them active and distracted from negative feelings. Unhealthy employees may exhibit more workaholic conducts and healthy employees exhibit more enthusiastic conducts. Individual dissimilarities in the capacity to self-regulate emotions (i.e., action vs. state predisposition) are powerfully related to workaholism and work engagement. The notion of self-regulatory capabilities may be a significant starting point for interferences at the individual and organizational level (Nica and Molnar, 2014) to hamper and to handle workaholism. (Wojdylo et al., 2014)

## 5. Conclusions

Workaholism describe those individuals who work numerous hours and/or toil, leading to substantial degrees of optional work endeavor, entailing a relevant or immoderate input of work effort (Popescu, 2014) well exceeding what is typically demanded by an organization. The effect of workaholics' substantial degree of work on other individuals is based on *how* they accomplish this work (various kinds of workaholics will have diverse spillover consequences on colleagues). Workaholics that exhibit perfectionist predispositions tend to generate a tense workplace atmosphere for other individuals working for or with them. (Douglas, 2006)

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## KANT, HEGEL, AND HUSSERL ON THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

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**ABSTRACT.** Applying new conceptual and methodological approaches, this study advances to the next level research on Kant's conception of history as a learning process, Hegel's constructivist conception of history, and Husserl's investigations of history and historicity.

**Keywords:** Kant; Hegel; Husserl; historical knowledge; humankind

### 1. Introduction

Kant points out that history is determined originally by providence and subsequently, with growing self-awareness, by human beings. If the natural predestination of humanity is to be accomplished, republicanism is an essential aspect of historical progress. Republicanism is the most functional type of social organization (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014a) for optimizing national sovereignty in the modern epoch. The forces of nature associate with the practical goals and moral duties (Popescu, 2015) of humankind (Olssen, 2014) to bring about an implacable progress of republican forms of government. (Taylor Gaubatz, 1996) On Hegel's reading, "history" signifies both the flow of human events, and the redaction that attempts to perceive them and impress their importance upon human consciousness (Petcu, 2014); the former alters human consciousness, whereas the latter permeates the contributions we make to the continuing flow of events. (Dudley, 2009) Husserl's intentional history is history solely within the fabric of the epoché. History is the crucial drive of the coexistence and blending of original sense-formation and sense-sedimentation (inner history is the transcendental-immanent history of the whole world). The examination of the lifeworld is practically unaffected by mundane history. (Ströker, 1993)

## 2. Kant's Teleological View of History

Kant asserts that the development of republicanism will generate everlasting peace to a conflict-torn world: the moral significance of peace associates with the fundamental forces of nature and the practical advantages of democratic social organization to impel republican growth. Nations will embrace republican types of government out of a craving to optimize their own power. The legitimate "civil state" necessitates exemplary institutions, the preservation of individual rights, and the separation of legislative and executive powers. The seeking of peace is essential to morality. War can be a force beneficial to democratization. History has begun to bring out the prevailing outlines of the plan of nature. Only in considering modification on the aggregate level can we start to recognize the questionable models of history. The moral responsibility to establish political entities that can improve individual freedom (Uhrig, 2015) is autonomous of the practical advantages of democracy. We cannot essentially notice the workings of providence in history. (Taylor Gaubatz, 1996) Kant's telos of history indicates not improvement in the judgment of separate persons but growth in the cognitive capacities of the whole species. The aim of history is the fulfillment of human potentials. The impelling force of the trend towards the end of history in the realization of human capacities is the unsociable features of mankind. Kant argues in opposition to monarchy and in support of a federation of nations and the ideal of cosmopolitan public law. Freedom and the moral perspective are the consequence of an effort of individuals to find solutions to problems originating from their situatedness both locally and globally. Kant's practical premise of freedom is related to public law in the just nation that allows its subjects freedom whereas simultaneously determines and confines it. Individuals are torn between the craving not to lead a completely unsociable life and the inclination to have everything function the manner they want it to function. This unsocial gregariousness operates as an incentive to the enhancement of the capacities of the species. (Allen, 2009)

Kant observes that individuals' particular psychological feature, "unsocial sociability," is an equivocal tendency to social interplay (Nica, 2015) *and* to solitude and discord. The moral law is universally prescriptively sound. Our faculties of assessing and functioning morally, which are available in an unpolished form, are progressively enhanced and reinforced. Ordinary individuals all through history have had an unsophisticated but fundamentally good sense of moral duty. After creation the necessary potentialities with which members of a species are born do not alter. Both in persons and in the species, the extreme evil in human character reveals itself in the very first employment of reason. Peace is a prerequisite for the *full* improvement of *all* human potentialities. The Enlightenment provided pedagogical methods that

stimulate children to judge for themselves and be morally self-governing. The normative soundness of the moral law is not determined by its being subjectively perceived as such. Our understanding of morality should experience a historical process. Kant raises the absolute strength of the moral principle above historical contingency. Every individual has a fundamentally appropriate sense of moral duty. Kant argues for progress on moral reasons. Identifying our obligation involves viewing it as possible to do it, which then requires presuming the presence of the circumstances of this likelihood. (Kleingeld, 1999)

### 3. Hegel's Analysis of History

Hegel focuses on finitude as the historicity of beings. Human history no longer occurs *in* a world which is fundamentally its other, but takes place in consonance with the appearance of this world without depleting its fundamental oneness in this process. *Mediation, presupposition, and posited being* are the intrinsically historical categories of Hegelian ontology. The history of beings attains culmination in the freedom and truth of an individual that grasps, in the Being of the "Idea," and is entirely dissimilar from historicity as the ontological meaning of human life. (Marcuse, 1987) According to Hegel, by grasping and bringing to consciousness the required undertaking of reason within the world, the philosophy of history operates as a theodicy. Individuals are completely historical creatures. Our historical character is obvious in all of our attempts. The faculty and craving for freedom are decisive of humanity, and all individuals strive to set up the circumstances in which they can be free. History uncovers the realization of freedom, and everything that substantiates freedom is "rational." The agents of reason whose actions do the most to advance the realization of freedom are "world historical" persons and peoples. Mankind's accomplishment of a satisfactory comprehension and actualization of freedom (Drumea, 2011; 2012a; 2012b) is "the end of history." (Dudley, 2009)

Hegel tackles historical phenomena as developing from a set of human undertakings. Philosophy brings reason to history, the former unveiling itself in history, via which individuals mature and know themselves. History is rational as by inference everything that individuals do (Nica and Potcovaru, 2014) is intrinsically rational. We have knowledge of human history because we create it. History is essentially teleological: its teleology is the growing consciousness of the concept of freedom (advancement in history is the consciousness of freedom, history being the fulfillment of the concept of freedom). History is comprehensible as the increasing disclosure of the notion of human freedom forming the foundation of the historical process. Human history advances via the performances of finite human beings, whose goal is

frequently dissimilar from what takes place. There is a type of reason functional in history: as everything individuals do is rational, history is rational, and thus we can know history and fulfill our purposes in the historical setting. (Rockmore, 2013) Hegel states that the genuine history of Spirit is the process of the *totality* of individuals. Spirit emerges as historical only for the purpose of sublating its own historicity as historical being. Historical facticity is a required point in the history of the Being of Life. The realization of self-consciousness implies the *historical* process of Life. Along with the realization of self-consciousness via history, the “world” arises in its actuality: the realization of self-consciousness is by definition a historical process (historicity is the basic feature of the actualization of self-consciousness). In the shift from rational self-consciousness (Mircică, 2014) to Spirit, the latter reaches its own full *truth* via the history of Life. The history of Spirit is the one of a real world, and the history of Life accomplishes itself in the history of Spirit. Spirit recognizes that nothing can overtake it in history such as to threaten its being-by-itself. Spirit which appears in history is ceaselessly available in *otherness*, uncovering and preserving its freedom. (Marcuse, 1987)

#### **4. Husserl on the Phenomenological Nature of the Problem of History**

Husserl’s history of sense is a history-so-to-speak, and cannot deny an allusion to history in the conventional, worldly sense. Husserl starts with mundane history for the purpose of investigating its sense of being in the epoché or with the transcendental category of monads as a historical one for the purpose of making mundane history comprehensible as its established arrangement. The in-itself is influenced by consciousness and the ego, and has the sources of its sense in the *sense-history* of subjectivity. Every dynamically created unity has *sense-history*. *Sedimented history* exemplifies the transformation from the characterization of dynamic formation as an essentially performed formation in the temporal fashion of the “now” to the grasping of its provenance from foregoing sense-bestowals. Husserl portrays philosophy as a history of the frictions between scientific objectivism and the endeavor to overcome the latter via a philosophical theory of subjectivity. (Ströker, 1993) Husserl’s considerations on history almost subvert the notion of transcendental phenomenology he attempts to substantiate by their means. Phenomenology has a significant role in the understanding of history. Husserl emphasizes the relevance of *Geschichtlichkeit* and of the indispensability for a new attitude to history. The “teleological-historical” observations act as a preamble to transcendental phenomenology. In reflecting on consciousness, Husserl is eventually compelled by the *Sache selbst* to consider history seriously. Once this happens, phenomenology cannot be solely a philosophy based on reflection.

The concept of the lifeworld develops from Husserl's historical analysis, and is employed by him for two irreconcilable notions, that of the perceptual world and that of the cultural world. We are historical beings as we are conscious ones: our conscious life resides in establishing itself "in the unity of a history." (Carr, 2009)

Husserl's pure phenomenological analysis of historicism differentiates the historical and the *a priori* essentially, establishing the dissimilarity and opposition between history and essences. Husserl identifies a link between the objective soundness of knowledge and its historical roots. Historical facts imply the bounds that characterize empirical cognition and historicism. The revelation of the "historicity" of knowledge does not cause an antagonism between the contingency of history and the universality of knowledge. Husserl's turn to history is impelled by his persistent concern in the question of explaining evidence that uncovers the source of ideal meaning configurations that are rational. The phenomenological problem of history does not entail the issue of how the facticity of history is consonant with the contention of phenomenology to generate perceptions of unconditionally universal essences (Husserl discloses the fundamental link between the "facticity" of history and the "apriority" of essences). (Hopkins, 2014) Husserl brings mundane history unswervingly into play, without first having made transcendental-phenomenological investigations into the nature of its soundness (his history should not be grasped as a fragment of the mundane history of ideas). Husserl's inner history is intentional examination continued to the point of total depletion of its methodological potentialities as intentional history. (Ströker, 1993)

## 5. Conclusions

Kant prevents heteronomous reliance of morality on the philosophy of history. We cannot achieve knowledge of the general direction of history as a unit. History is typified by the expansion of the rational potential of humanity. The capacity to employ reason improves steadily. The advance of human rational abilities is a *learning process*. Nature occasions individuals to utilize their reason and practice their freedom of will. (Kleingeld, 1999) Hegel perceives history as human history, constituted by, and therefore comprehensible by, limited individuals. His view of history as graspable is originated in his idealist notion of history as constructed (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014b) and thus knowable by human beings. History turns on the advance of the concept of freedom. (Rockmore, 2013) History does not have a role in Husserl's method of pure phenomenology, being incongruous with the phenomenological adherence to *a priori* cognition. The "facticity" of history is a premise positioned in the way of a "pure" phenomenology. (Hopkins, 2014)

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## LATER WITTGENSTEIN ON THE INVENTION OF GAMES

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**ABSTRACT.** Wittgenstein in his later posthumous writings investigates the meanings of names as a practical activity of rule-governed language game playing. Rules for language games, as for all games in Wittgenstein's frequent analogies, are determined in turn by the "point" and "purpose" of the games. Wittgenstein also famously maintains that a game could not be invented without being played, or even having been played only once, in the absence of a cultural context embedded in a form of life in which games and the playing of games is already an established practice. This essay examines Wittgenstein's general concept of the invention of games, their dependence on rules as part of his general later remarks concerning the nature of meaning, and proposes an interpretation by which it is not only intelligible but inevitable that on his approach it should be impossible for a game to be invented that is never played or played only once in lieu of a games-playing component to a prevailing form of life. The solution to the problem of understanding Wittgenstein on this topic derives from a further application of his concept of a criterion of correctness, generally thought to belong exclusively to his so-called private language argument.

**Keywords:** Wittgenstein; rule; language game; invention; meaning

### 1. Language and Other Games

Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* is concerned to understand how a given name refers to a particular object. It is a question that Wittgenstein in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* explicitly maintains does not need to be answered in order to explain the meaning of language. Shortly after returning to philosophy in 1929, Wittgenstein repudiates the disposable *Tractatus* semantic infrastructure of logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and general form of proposition. He appears to have decided, among a package of insights gained from the dismantling of the *Tractatus*, that, symptoms aside, the project's spectacular failure was fundamentally due to its inability to explain the naming of simple objects by simple names at the foundations

of the *Tractatus* analysis of thought, world and language in Wittgenstein's early account of the possibility conditions for expressing determinate meaning in a language.

The first sentence of *The Blue Book*, compiled from Wittgenstein's first lectures dictated to students at Cambridge University in 1930, accordingly asks: "What is the meaning of a word?"<sup>1</sup> In sharp contrast, only a decade previously, leaning heavily on Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions in "On Denoting," Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* had argued that name-object semantic coordinations were strictly unnecessary in light of the designation of specific objects by definite descriptors:

5.526: One can describe the world completely by completely generalized propositions, *i.e.* without from the outset co-ordinating any name with a definite object.

In order then to arrive at the customary way of expression we need simply say after an expression 'there is one and only one *x*, which...': and this *x* is *a*.<sup>2</sup>

The starting point for his later masterwork, *Philosophical Investigations*, is predicated on Wittgenstein's having rejected the three pillars of the *Tractatus*. He nevertheless remains ultimately engaged, as in the early thought, in a bold effort at turning philosophy against itself. *Philosophical Investigations* seeks another, radically different and even more revolutionary account of how language functions in the expression of thought. Wittgenstein investigates the philosophical grammar of terms and expressions extracted from their normal usage where they give rise in endlessly complicated ways to gratuitous philosophical problems. Perspicuous representations of the philosophical grammar of philosophically problematic language are detailed by the later Wittgenstein in the expectation that in another way his new pragmatic explanation of language will also undermine the traditional concept of philosophy as a search for truth in a specific field of genuinely meaningful propositions.

Wittgenstein replaces metaphysics of logical atomism, the picture theory of meaning, and the general form of proposition with a more comprehensive understanding of what language does and how it works to express meaning, involving the later philosophy's adaptable apparatus of language games, forms of life, family resemblance predications, and rule-following. There are many different language games, the later Wittgenstein believes. Language is not devoted exclusively to the single *Tractatus* function of making to ourselves true or false propositional pictures that describe existent or nonexistent logically contingent states of affairs. Tautology and contradiction are brought along for the ride in *Tractatus* as limiting cases of propositions, even though they do not meaningfully picture any of the facts (*Tatsachen*) by a structure of which a world is constituted (4.46–4.463). The early Wittgenstein also allows tautology and contradiction by courtesy to be included as propositions under

his somewhat unsatisfying technical distinction, senseless (*sinnlos*), because they do not picture facts in the world (4.462), but not nonsensical (*unsinnig*), because they are “part of the symbolism” (4.4611). Anything else falling outside the exactly drawn perimeter that is neither a logically contingent true or false picture of the constitutive facts of a world, nor a tautology or contradiction, is not a meaningful use of language in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. Language serves only the interest of descriptive science, although its logic is also important for mathematics, while whatever stands outside the exact recursion established by the general form of proposition, including things of the greatest value or importance in our lives, is nondiscursive, in many instances concerning things like value and logical, pictorial and representational form transcend linguistic expression, implying that our thoughts about them are inherently ineffable.<sup>3</sup>

The later Wittgenstein in contrast is sensitive to the fact that we can do many more kinds of things in language than merely describe a choice of logically contingent facts about the world. We can, just to scratch the surface, give orders and obey them, he says, tell jokes, speculate about an event, buy five red apples at a store, make up and narrate a story, deliver a eulogy, issue instructions in an organized activity like building a structure from blocks, pillars, beams and slabs (§§2, 11, 23–27).<sup>4</sup> Wittgenstein regards such practical language-related activities as among the language games our cultures have evolved and in some sense invented to serve a diverse family of particular pragmatic interests, the rules for which are determined in turn by the “point” and “purpose” of each language game’s rules (§§562–567).

Language games are invented by devising a system of rules, and they are played by following the rules (§567). We must follow the rules strategically under changing circumstances in order to play a game successfully, including simple and complicated language games, in order to win against a competitor, when that sort of winning is defined by the rules, including the lexical and philosophical grammatical rules, or to have some kind of satisfactory outcome. Wittgenstein’s specific application of family resemblance predications to the example of games alerts us to the fact that we should not expect all games to have any single nature. Some games will have a conspicuous feature where it exists at all, and other games will not (§§69–71). Comparisons of language games and board games or sports-related games can only go so far, and we cannot criticize language games because they do not share what may seem at first to be indispensable from the limited perspective offered by the particular subdomain of games that we may happen to have in mind. Language games like board games have rules, even if not all games are rule-governed activities in the sense of having their rules printed on the inside of a box cover.

The question as to what rules are, in the case of games generally and language games in particular, is therefore an indispensable part of Wittgenstein's post-*Tractatus* inquiry into the meaning of language. The question leads Wittgenstein to the more basic problem of understanding the origin and existence conditions of rule-governed games, and hence of the invention of games. Games do not grow on tendrils waiting for the hook, but are invented by thinking human subjects involved in a variety of activities instantiating a form of life (§§19, 23, 241; II pp. 174, 226). Problems about how games are invented, what it means to invent a game, and the invention of games by means of the establishment of rules, systematic and calculated, evolved, or of another description, are accordingly appropriately addressed by Wittgenstein as germane to his pragmatic theory of meaning in the later philosophy. Wittgenstein in the later as opposed to the early period believes that there can be no complete account of the conditions for meaningful expression in a of language without a searching investigation of where games including language games come from, and of what is or is not needed in order to institute the rules by which games are defined.

## 2. Why Once Is Not Enough

Wittgenstein considers the conditions for inventing a game in three main passages of *Philosophical Investigations*. He remarks, first:

204. As things are I can, for example, invent a game that is never played by anyone. — But would the following be possible too: mankind has never played any games; once, however, someone invented a game — which no one ever played?

When Wittgenstein says “as things are,” he refers to the extant culture in which games have a role in human social life. There exist games of different kinds, even leaving language games out of account for the moment as the principal focus of interest until we understand something more about the nature of games in general. This fact about how our form of life has been instantiated makes it possible for us to invent or to conceive of the inventing of a game that is never actually played.

Presumably, the invention of a game that is never played is accomplished by applying our understanding of what is to count as a game. We possess such understanding by virtue of having participated in existent games, and we create a new game by devising a set of rules that had previously not been instituted or imagined. The rules are fixed, at least in the game inventor's mind, but as it happens no one ever plays the game. Perhaps the world comes to an end just then, or, having invented the game by working out its rules, the game is not played because of lack of interest or other distractions. Such

a scenario Wittgenstein finds conceivable. We can project the possibility conservatively by beginning with a known game, such as chess, and then proposing a new set of rules for a game other than chess, in which, for example, the king is permitted to move three steps rather than just one step in any direction.

The fictional putative “rules” are designed and checked, and may even be written down or in another way recorded, but we are to suppose that they are never actually implemented. They are never put into action in the actual playing of precisely this game as a variant of standard chess. Such an occurrence is thinkable, Wittgenstein seems to believe, because the possibility of a new game that is never played supervenes on our understanding of the existence of games that are constituted by different sets of rules that are actually followed when those games are actually played. It is only from the perspective and with the benefit of our social involvement in a culture of games that we can imagine game inventors in the circumstances Wittgenstein describes inventing a game that is never played when its rules are never followed. Significantly, for Wittgenstein’s understanding of the philosophical grammar of “game” and “rule,” an unplayed game is conceivable for us gamers as the devising a set of rules for a game, but only because we have the relevant concepts assimilated from our own game-related practices. We know what games are. We play games, and in the course of learning to play games and familiarizing ourselves with this family of activities, we also acquire, if we have not already done so from another context, the concept of what a rule is, as we learn how a rule is followed and how it is broken or violated in playing a game. Armed with this knowledge, it is then no heroic stretch for us to imagine a game inventor in a games-playing culture who cooks up a set of rules for a brand new game, which, as fate would have it, is never actually played.

Wittgenstein rhetorically asks the philosophically more interesting question whether it would then be possible, if there had never been any games at any point in human history, in very different circumstances from those in which we find ourselves “as things are,” for someone to have invented the first and only game by formulating a set of rules for a game that is never actually played. Wittgenstein thinks there could be no such game, and we must wonder why in order to understand what Wittgenstein means by a game and by rule following in a game, including the language games that are the ultimate target of Wittgenstein’s inquiry.

Why should we not be able to combine the two scenarios Wittgenstein describes? We know that games are invented, even if they are shaped-up out of other kinds of activities, such as practicing for the hunt. If we think back to the origin of games within human culture, then there must have been a first game, even if it only involved trying to throw stones in order to see who

of several participants can strike nearest to a fixed mark. If there are games as a historical fact about our species, then there must have been a first game. It would appear, if all games are constituted by rules designed in the service of a particular point and purpose, as Wittgenstein declares, then the first game must also have had such rules. We project an imaginary state of affairs involving only some of the real facts about the occasion on which the first game in our prehistory is about to be played. After the event occurs, we can probably agree with Wittgenstein that the first game upon actually being played has actually been invented. Wittgenstein wants to deny that the game was invented when an ancestor had the first bright idea for a rule that we in our culture today and as things are would recognize as a rule for a game. The question for criticism is whether or not Wittgenstein is right. For now we further combine the second major feature of Wittgenstein's thought experiment, by supposing that just prior to the moment when the first game is about to be played for the first time something intervenes to prevent its happening. The world comes to an abrupt end, as previously proposed, or suddenly there are more pressing needs and no leisure opportunity for game-playing. So the whole idea of playing a game at least temporarily dies on the vine.

The revised thought experiment appears just as intelligible as the one Wittgenstein describes under prevailing circumstances, "as things are." Wittgenstein, however, must draw a sharp distinction between the two cases, denying that there could conceivably be a first game constituted by rules that is never actually played, when considered against a background in which games and game-playing by rule-following have not already evolved as part of any human form of life. We must nevertheless ask, given the close analogies between the two thought experiments, why for Wittgenstein it could not be the case that, just as the very first game was about to be played, circumstances intrude to prevent what would have been the first game with all its constitutive rules intact from actually being played?

Wittgenstein might answer that, in the imagined circumstances where no game has ever been played, the concept of game as we know it can have no application. If the event in question would have been the first playing of a game, a playing of the first game, then the unexecuted idea for the game is not an idea for a game, even within the confines of the thought experiment assumptions, but only something ineluctably subjunctive that would have been an idea for a game, if only there had been such a thing as a game for the idea to intend. A game as an activity is a practice, and practice means that the activity has actually been engaged in. Otherwise it is only an idea or an intending of the activity, or of the rules for a rule-governed activity, which is not yet a practice. The philosophical grammar of the word "practice" assures that we can only be talking about an activity that, to speak redundantly, has actually been put into practice. We do not chop wood merely by intending to

do so, even if we must intend to chop wood in order to chop it as an action we at least try to perform. There can accordingly be no practice of chopping wood unless someone actually chops some. By analogy, there can be no practice of game-playing unless some games have actually been played. If games, including language games, as activities are practices, then the thought experiment in which the rules for a first unplayed language game is imagined or intended by a first language game inventor is unintelligible.

The only way to break Wittgenstein's chain of reasoning as interpretively reconstructed would then be to deny that games are activities, that activities are practices, or that practices as opposed to merely imagined or intended practices must have actually been engaged in, actually put into practice. If practices by definition are actually exemplified, as it seems right to say, even independently of Wittgenstein's grasp of the philosophical grammar of these terms, if that part of Wittgenstein's remarks does not invite criticism, then we could only object to the assumption that games are practices.

Does Wittgenstein here fall victim to his own philosophical disease diagnosed in §593, a one-sided diet of examples? Could he be thinking only of actual games, and not of merely imagined or intended games? Why not say that actual games are actually played, generally more than once in order to satisfy the requirements of an actual practice, while virtual games are actually imagined or intended, but not actually played, in order to satisfy the requirements of a virtual practice? Again, Wittgenstein need only reply that he is interested in the family resemblance concept of game, rather than the concept of virtual game, in his efforts to understand the conditions for the meaningfulness of moves made in a wide variety of language games. Additionally, however, Wittgenstein argues that the phrase "virtual practice" blatantly violates the philosophical grammar of these two words by juxtaposing them incoherently. If a practice is merely virtual, it is not a practice. Wittgenstein does not consider a virtual practice to be a kind of practice, but something other than that, just as he might not consider fool's gold to be a kind of gold. A practice, if we rightly interpret Wittgenstein's perception of its philosophical grammar, is something that has actually been put into practice, just as an activity is something that has been activated. We reserve these kinds of words to mark precisely that tautology about this type of event, whereas we have another distinct and typically derivative vocabulary to refer in the abstract to something that may or may not actually be instantiated, as when we speak of a merely virtual activity or virtual practice, an idea for a merely imagined or intended activity or practice.

The mistake Wittgenstein detects in thought experiments about an unplayed merely imagined or intended first game is in trying to extend our understanding of the relevant concepts to a situation in which the idea of inventing a game merely by thinking up a set of rules could not constitute even hypo-

thetical rules for a game. Wittgenstein must nevertheless grapple, as he does, with the scope and limits of intentionality in the invention of games. If intentionality alone were sufficient to invent a game, then it could also do so in the special case of language games. If intentionality alone were sufficient to invent the rules for a game, however, then it should be able to do so in every case, including the case of the first game. This is impossible in the case of the first game, Wittgenstein argues, which reflects back on the falsehood of the assumption that intentionality alone is sufficient to invent a game. For, grammatically, there are no games in the sense of extant practices at that hypothetical stage in the thought experiment's imaginary human history for the first game inventor to intend.

Intentionality, however, by reputation is supposed to be capable of linking thought to both existent and nonexistent objects. So, what difference can it make if Wittgenstein is right to insist that there are no games until some games are actually played, and that these games must even be played more than once in order to establish game-playing rule-following as an activity and practice, if a first invented game could be intended but never played? A critic might argue that this is how human invention generally works. At one time there were no motorcars but someone had the idea for such a vehicle and channeled the necessary materials, time and energy into making one.

Such an argument appears at first to challenge Wittgenstein's conclusion, but on reflection it merely constitutes more grist for Wittgenstein's mill. Wittgenstein would also want to hold that if the inventor who first intended to make a motorcar before any motorcars actually existed or the entire culture had perished that the motorcar would not have thereby been invented. The idea for a motorcar would have been invented, in a loose sense of the word, but a motorcar would not have been invented. Alternatively, Wittgenstein could reply that since there exist vehicles and there exist engines in the actual history of the motorcar's development, so there is no violation of philosophical grammar in imagining that an inventor in a comparable thought experiment might intend to make a new kind of engine-powered vehicle that is never actually built. By analogy, the putative first game inventor in the thought experiment in which the game is never actually played has not invented the first game, but at most and in a similarly loose sense would only have invented the idea for a game.

If this is a correct explanation, at least of what Wittgenstein might need or want to say about the problem, then, with reference to the imaginary context in which the example is supposed to occur, we cannot even truthfully say that such thoughts could occur. If the game inventor must intend that a certain set of rules provide the basis for a *game*, then the inventor must already know what kind of thing a game is or what kind of thing it would be, and this is precluded by the terms of the thought experiment itself, under

which the very first game has yet to be played. Wittgenstein amplifies the thought experiment in this way:

200. It is, of course, imaginable for two people belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games should sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and even with all the appropriate mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we should say they were playing chess. But now imagine a game of chess translated according to certain rules into a series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate with a *game* — say into yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose those two people to yell and stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game? What right would one have to say so?

We might nevertheless wonder if approximately the same kind of limitation plagues other types of intentions for inventions. Suppose there are as yet no stone axes, and an early hominid arrives at the idea of shaping a naturally occurring stone and attaching it to a wooden haft in order to make one, but is somehow prevented from acting. Shall we also conclude in such a case that the idea was not actually an idea for an axe, since there are as yet no axes?

Doubts might be raised, because, although the putative axe inventor would not have the concept of an axe in anything like the way that we understand it, we might nevertheless reasonably suppose that the imagined inventor would still have had the idea of a stone attached to a stick that could be used to pound or cut. Arguably, that development might be close enough to our idea of a primitive axe to constitute the first hypothetically unrealized idea for or intention of making an axe, thwarted, as the thought experiment has it, before being put into practice. It seems accidental to the *concept*, after all, whether or not the idea is put into practice. And it is the *concept* of a game that Wittgenstein invokes in order to explain the conditions of meaningfulness for expression or effectiveness in many different kinds of language games.

Thus, we return to a problem that we may otherwise have seemed to put to rest, given Wittgenstein's larger project in *Philosophical Investigations*. Why we should not say the same about the thought experiment ancestor who thinks of a rule for an Ur-game that is also not actually brought to fruition by actually being played? Why is the projected event of having intended the rules for a first game that is never actually played, since we can intend both existent and nonexistent objects, since such an intending reflects possession of the relevant concept, and given that all Wittgenstein needs in order to explain the meaning of language use is the concept of a rule-governed game?

The answer has to do with the relation between games and their defining rules, and with Wittgenstein's understanding of what it means to obey a rule as an aspect of the practical activities that constitute a form of life:

199. Is what we call 'obeying a rule' something that it would be possible for only *one* man to do, and to do only *once* in his life? — This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression 'to obey a rule.'

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood, and so on. — To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs* (uses, institutions).

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.

Wittgenstein's alter ego, the interlocutor, who may be legion, who frequently questions Wittgenstein's temptations and inclinations to say one thing or another in the ongoing dialogue of remarks and counter-remarks in the text, poses a similar concern, focusing in the subsequent passage on one aspect of the real underlying subject of Wittgenstein's inquiry. The suggestion is made that the power of intentionality overrides the facts of historical anthropology:

205. "But it is just the queer thing about *intention*, about the mental process, that the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not necessary to it. That, for example, it is imaginable that two people should play chess in a world in which otherwise no games existed; and even that they should begin a game of chess — and then be interrupted."

But isn't chess defined by its rules? And how are these rules present in the mind of the person who is intending to play chess?

Looking ahead to the main direction of Wittgenstein's later thought, and to the context in which these questions about the conceptual presuppositions of games, rules for games, and game-playing belong, it is clear that Wittgenstein must deny that intention is sufficient to explain semantic phenomena, and most fundamentally to explain the conditions under which it is possible for a given name to refer to a particular object.

Do we achieve the designation of things by words simply by intending the word to represent the thing? Wittgenstein denies this most vigorously, and, again, we must struggle to follow his reasoning and understand why he should be unwilling to allow the intentionality of thought to serve as a primitive, conceptually irreducible explanation of the connection made between names and named objects at the foundations of meaningful expression in language. Returning to the case of games in general, it can only be intel-

ligible for someone outside any games playing culture to intend a set of rules for a first game, the innovator must be able to intend specifically to create a game. The objection from Wittgenstein seems to be that no one can have such an intention unless or until games as activities and game-playing as a practice are already on the scene. Wittgenstein in this suite of comments accordingly makes explicit at least a main part of the philosophical grammatical connection between rule-following and the private language argument:

202. And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to *think* one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately:' otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.

### 3. Pragmatic Origins of Games and Rules for Games

How, then, does the first game get invented? We might compare the origin of games in Wittgenstein's account with what Spinoza says about the origin of tools in his (1677) *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* (*On the Improvement of the Understanding: Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding and on the Way in Which It May Be Directed Toward a True Knowledge of Things*).

Spinoza asks how the invention of tools can possibly get started, when it appears that one must already have a tool in order to make one. His pragmatic down-to-earth answer is that there have been naturally occurring tools, stone, bone, tree bark, grasses, branches of wood, and the like. These objects can be used just as they are for certain purposes, and then turned upon one another in order eventually to make more modern implements. Spinoza explains the problem and its commonsense solution:

The matter stands on the same footing as the making of material tools, which might be argued about in a similar way [as the apparent circularity in efforts to gain knowledge]. For, in order to work iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no power of working iron. But as men at first made use of the instruments provided by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other things more difficult with less labor and greater perfection; and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, with small expenditure of labor, the vast number of complicated mechanisms which they now possess.<sup>5</sup>

We find a stone, which after all in many places are literally thick on the ground, and through trial and error we work it with another stone into what experience teaches might be a desired shape. The process leading toward the creation of the most sophisticated kinds of tools is thereby underway with no magic required. The fact that we can often not point to a specific moment at which a first tool and the concept of a tool enters a culture, the exact event when a naturally occurring object along the continuum becomes a tool, or, by analogy, when a naturally occurring activity becomes a first invented game, only highlights the fact that games and rules for games, including language games, cannot be essentialistically defined, but are family-resemblance related, grading off imperceptibly from a background of originating activities that are only distantly related to the practice of game-playing.

Invoking Spinoza in this connection is not farfetched, because we know that Wittgenstein read and was influenced by Spinoza in his early period. The impact is seen in the *Tractatus* 6.45 references to Spinoza's concept of the world seen *sub specie aeterni*. A further conspicuous point of contact is Wittgenstein's frequent mention of tools and using tools, of the different words in a language as like the different tools in a tool kit with different purposes. These examples may also relate to Wittgenstein's engineering experience and perhaps to his practical efforts to communicate concepts to schoolchildren during the years between the *Tractatus* and *The Blue and Brown Books*. The point that Wittgenstein would probably want to emphasize is that the making of tools is a process that begins without intending as such to make a tool. The early hominid cannot intend to make a tool until naturally occurring objects that can be used as tools are incrementally modified for specific purposes and a cultural institution of tool making and using is set in place.

What, then, if anything, do the first tool-makers intend? They may intend to shape a stone, or to use a stone or piece of wood to accomplish some purpose without thinking of it being a tool, and without intending to make a first tool, but rather as a natural rather than artifact utilizing activity, just as some birds use thorns to extract grubs from under tree bark presumably with no tool-related intentions. Or the first tool-makers and users might intend simply to crack open a coconut and pick up a stone to do the work, without intending that the stone thereby become anything in particular. We act experimentally, so to speak, in many such instances. Only later do we understand what has worked and what has not worked, and as a consequence we are capable only afterward of intending to repeat a successful type of action in order to make or invent something new of like kind. We can intend to split apart a coconut, and we can intend to do so with a stone. The stone that we use for the job may thereby become the first *de facto* tool. Once we have things that we use regularly as tools, when we have acquired the concept of a

tool and are familiar with at least some of its instances, then we can also intend to repeat our successful actions by inventing and making more tools. If Wittgenstein is right, however, then we cannot intend to make a tool before there are any tools. For our intention could be about or directed toward no specific existent or nonexistent object, and there could be no answer to the question as to what we were intending that involved tools generally or a particular kind of tool as intended object. Since intending without intending any definite object is conceptually incoherent, we are confused if we believe that such intentions are conceivable.<sup>6</sup>

Can we not rather say, then, that the inventor of the first game may have merely intended to pass the time in a structured way, that the structure for such a time-passing activity is what we now call a system of rules, and that such rules define what we now call a game? If Wittgenstein's objection to the first merely intended invention of an unrealized game is not to amount to a mere lexical quibble, then there must still be something more fundamental underwriting his observation that it would not be possible for intending alone to create a first system of rules for a first game that is never actually played, and hence for a first language game.

#### **4. Philosophical Grammar in the Invention of Games**

Later in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein provocatively writes:

492. To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistently with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game.

Here I am stating something about the grammar of the word 'language,' by connecting it with the grammar of the word 'invent.'

Undoubtedly Wittgenstein is saying something about the grammar of the word "language," and undoubtedly he is somehow connecting it to the grammar of the word "invent." What, however, is he exactly saying? The problem of explaining the grammatical connections that Wittgenstein finds obvious, let alone tracing out his reasons for supposing that such grammatical linkages exist, is among the most rewarding interpretive problems presented by Wittgenstein's difficult text.<sup>7</sup>

We may easily find ourselves echoing Wittgenstein's question borne of impatience and frustration at the problems of understanding these deeply interwoven relations within language, and the practical activities with which language games are integrated, when Wittgenstein demands, in §37 previously quoted: "What is the relation between name and thing named? — Well, what is it?" What indeed? The later Wittgenstein, in stark contrast to the semantic

transcendentalism of the *Tractatus*, seems to think that, since “everything lies open to view” and “what is hidden...is of no interest to us” (§126), we need only “look” at instances of naming and the teaching of names in order to “see” how names name things in specific correlation. The effort is nevertheless no easier for Wittgenstein than it is for us in trying to understand the conclusions at which he finally arrives.<sup>8</sup>

Wittgenstein does not like to take us by the hand from A to B, or even to C. Instead he pounces, leapfrogging over what he takes to be obvious fine points, from A to K. He does so perhaps because he already knows where he thinks he is going. We as readers, on the other hand, must then try to figure out how he thinks he gets there by piecing together the most likely or reasonable intervening steps. Wittgenstein says, perhaps tongue in cheek, in the Preface to *Philosophical Investigations*, vi: “I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking.” Certainly the book on the whole has not done that. With so many things left open, with tantalizing dangles on every page, Wittgenstein’s remarks have been preordained to inspire multiple conflicting interpretations of his ideas, as has frequently occurred.

An exercise for another occasion would be to line up and compare competing readings of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*, about what he is trying to do in the book, of the aim and structure of the so-called private language argument, and all the other content of the text, to argue for some interpretations as more faithful to the writings than others. Instead, for the moment, we propose, develop and defend an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* remarks on the invention of games that explains why, despite appearances, it is actually unintelligible, in the sense of being philosophically ungrammatical, to imagine that a game as we are to understand this kind of activity is not invented merely by intending a set of rules, and hence why intention alone is inadequate to explain the rules for language games whereby specific objects are named by particular names.

A merely intended set of rules for a first game in a world where rule-governed game playing does not exist and where no game has ever actually been played does not make sense for Wittgenstein, because it stands in violation of the word’s philosophical grammar. A game is something we do, an activity, rather than an idea for engaging in an activity or an abstract construction of rules for an activity. If I play a game, then I must intend to do so; but I do not play a game merely by intending to do so. Where language games are concerned in the naming of things and calling for them by their names or shopping for five red apples in the market, or the like, Wittgenstein emphasizes that the rules for naming and using other linguistic instruments from the tool box in corresponding language games cannot merely be intended, but must instead be part of an established practice. If mere intending were enough for the invention of an activity such as a game,

including any pragmatically explicable language game, then there would be a straightforward “spiritual” answer to the question of how it is that names and named objects get paired-up. We simply intend that this name refer to this object, and the work is done. This Wittgenstein staunchly denies. We have in part already seen why. But further, regardless of Wittgenstein’s own rationale, to whatever extent it might be recovered from his reflections, what good reasons can possibly support the conclusion that new games cannot be invented merely by intending a new system of game-defining rules?

The previously missing step in this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s line of reasoning now explains why Wittgenstein should want to hold that games cannot simply be invented “in the head” by invoking the criteria for correctness that in similar application are supposed to disallow the possibility of a private sensation language. The explanation is complex, but we explode it into a series of distinct steps, as though in an argument, and we include brief discussion of what seems to be the exact motivation for Wittgenstein’s discussion of the invention of games, as we understand it, to fit the interpretation being advanced.

(1) Wittgenstein introduces the topic of the invention of games in order to refute the “spiritual” (*geistlicher*) suggestion that the naming of objects can be accomplished psychologically by inner rather than external behavioral ostension, as a first move in a language game undertaken entirely by intention or intentionality, merely by intending that a certain name should name a certain object.

(2) Wittgenstein maintains, as a principle of philosophical grammar with immediate implications for philosophical anthropology, that the invention of a very first game (of any kind, language games included and of particular interest) could not be accomplished entirely by intention or intentionality, merely intending that a certain rule should be followed.

(3) Criteria of correctness are needed to name objects, as illustrated by Wittgenstein’s invoking their absence in “going through the motions” of trying to name an individual sensation as *S* in a private sensation diary. Satisfying criteria of correctness in this sense means being able in principle to ascertain that the same object designated by the same name is encountered on multiple occasions. This, Wittgenstein maintains, cannot be done in the case of putative private sensations like recurring pains at different times and places. We cannot answer the question whether a pain in the right forefinger experienced yesterday is the same individual object, identically the same pain, or a different numerically distinct pain albeit with phenomenologically indistinguishable properties from yesterday’s sensation, or even the same pain that has moved from one place in the subject’s body to another, and so we cannot name private mental events in the way that we can name a child, a

dog, a goldfish, building, cruise ship, or the like, for which the use of names has a pragmatic point and purpose.

(4) Wittgenstein offers this restriction on naming as part of the philosophical grammar of naming. To name something is to establish a one-one relation between a name and an object, and, in the case of private mental events such as pains purport to be, we cannot even in principle determine whether or not we have access to the same mental event from one occasion to the next. Since we cannot name them, private mental events, including acts of intending, equally cannot serve as naming relations, as mental psychological names or namings or intendings to name that can connect the private mental event of intending in the act of naming to a specific object. The object outside of thought, the child or hamster or goldfish that we propose to name, cannot be named Augustine-fashion by pointing at the object and uttering its name, because of the referential underdetermination of pure behavior ostension. Something more is required. Nor can the object be named merely by intending that the name should refer to precisely this object, however the object is practically individuated.

(5) The instructive reason seems to be that pure intending or a pure act of intention as a private mental event is itself incapable even in principle of being practically individuated as a single nameable thing, as we learn from the private language argument which precedes the discussion of inventing games in Wittgenstein's text, and the unavailability of criteria of correctness for the naming of private sensations such as purported pain sensation *S* as an individual nameable object. If the pure intending or pure act of intention were not private, then we should have to handle it as §36 carves things up in roughly Cartesian style, as a bodily or *körperliche* rather than spiritual or *geistliche* answer to the riddle of how names name. Wittgenstein's distinction is thus construed as a variation on the deep and perennial philosophical divide between externalism and internalism in the philosophy of mind reflected immediately in the only viable philosophical semantics.

(6) If private mental events, including pure intendings or pure internal acts of intention considered in isolation from any accompanying external actions, are not capable even in principle of being practically individuated, then they cannot serve as they would need to do if intention were sufficient in and of itself to invent a first game. If pure intention is inadequate to invent a first game, then it is inadequate to explain the origin of games in general, including those most basic language games in which objects are named. To conceive of such a possibility, we would need to correlate a particular imagined act of intending a particular rule for a first unplayed game with the unplayed game itself, and this we cannot do if we lack identity conditions for particular intendings in the form of criteria of correctness.

(7) Not only are there no individual instances of unfollowed and unbroken or unviolated rules for a first ever unplayed game to be invoked, but equally there are no acts of intention, construed as private mental events and as such incapable of being named as individuals, by which the rules for an unfollowed and unbroken or unviolated set of rules for a first ever unplayed game. We would need to correlate such particular intendings with particular uninstantiated rules, satisfying criteria of correctness to provide identity conditions on both sides, in order to make sense of such a hypothesis. Wittgenstein concludes on the contrary that outside of our actual cultural development, in the rarefied extra-pragmatic extra-practical-activity atmosphere in which the *geistliche* intentional solution is imagined to take place, we lack any such identity criteria for particular intendings or acts of intention. If the imagined act of intending cannot be named because it does not satisfy Wittgenstein's grammatical criteria of correctness requirement, then no such correlation is conceivable, because there is no individually nameable psychological event to be correlated with what we may otherwise want to think of as the first unplayed game.

(8) Hence, games generally are not invented purely by intending a corresponding new system of rules. They must be rules for a game, and if games are practices, then the very fact that everything comes unglued if the game is never actually played is testimony to Wittgenstein's conclusion that intention alone is never sufficient to invent a game, or, therefore, to name an object by an intentional act of inner ostension. We cannot understand the naming relation purely as a correlation between name and named object, if the correlation is supposed to be accomplished entirely in the abstract in each case by a particular intention or intending act.

## 5. Rules for Games in a Form of Life

The Augustinian "bodily" or *körperliche* account of naming is roundly defeated by the referential underdetermination of pure behavioral ostension. The (Brentanian? Husserlian?) "spiritual" or *geistliche* solution is equally defeated via the private language argument by undermining the essential particularity requirement for correlating the intention to use a particular name to refer to a specific object as mediating between the named object and its name.

When both body and spirit are exhausted, we have no "pure" possibilities remaining, neither pure behavioral ostension nor pure intending. Philosophical semantics, as informal and unsystematic as it appears in Wittgenstein's later writings, must combine movement and intention in a concept of action pragmatically understood, in which language use is one among many tools for accomplishing a wide variety of purposes, in language games with rules

whose point and purpose are fixed by practical circumstantial needs, and with its own distinctive natural history.

If we (speech) act, then in some sense we must intend to verbally behave. We decide, however automatically much of the mechanism functions, to move our vocal cords, tongue, lips, etc. But we do not (speech) act merely by intending to do these things. Thus, we cannot adequately explain the relation between a name and the object it names by referring exclusively either to our bodily movements or to our private intendings in the intentionality of our thoughts as we name something or think about or try to teach its name to another language user. If the purity of the body and spirit approaches fail, then we must get dirty instead in the actual world of what it is we do and try to do with language as a powerful tool.

We must look instead to the impure mixture of body and spirit in the actions by which we communicate, beginning with the acts of naming that Wittgenstein compares to the setting out of pieces on a chess board as something we do first as a preparation for play. When we understand why neither pure behavioral ostension nor pure intentionality can adequately explain the naming of objects as the most fundamental first step in engaging in even the most primitive of our pragmatically rooted language games, then we may come to appreciate that another kind of explanation for rule-governed game-playing generally and language game-playing in particular is required. Wittgenstein sketches the landscapes afforded by such actual language games as though in a travel notebook, voyeuristically encountering what it is that people do when they engage in linguistic exchange. He reflects finally on the implications of pragmatically grounded activities for the nonexistence of philosophical language games, of philosophy as a meaningful practice, previously declared in *Tractatus* 4.111 on very different grounds as standing “above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.” From a very different perspective than that afforded by the early philosophy, Wittgenstein in the later writings is thereby positioned to pronounce all putative philosophical concepts, questions, answers, principles, and propositions, as meaningless, deeply and often almost inscrutably in violation of the pragmatically originating and justifying philosophical grammar of terms and phrases in the toolkits of genuine language games.<sup>9</sup>

## NOTES

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”*, edited by Rush Rhees, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960), p. 1.

2. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, edited by C.K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), 5.526 (all parenthetical references to and translation from this edition).

3. On ineffability in the *Tractatus*, see, among numerous other recommended sources, P.M.S. Hacker, “When the Whistling Had to Stop,” in *Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears*, edited by David Charles and William Child (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 13–48. A.W. Moore and Peter Sullivan, “Ineffability and Nonsense,” *Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 77, 2003, pp. 169–193 (Part I, Moore); pp. 195–223 (Part II, Sullivan). All the literature surrounding the work of the “New Wittgensteinians,” efforts to deploy the saying-showing distinction to make sense of the semantic role of aspects of meaning conventionally understood that are excluded by Wittgenstein’s general form of proposition, and the controversies involving “resolute” versus “irresolute” readings especially *Tractatus* 6.54 and 7 in context are relevant to the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s text as involving the ineffability of at least some of what Wittgenstein declares to be literal nonsense, including all the sentences of the *Tractatus* itself.

4. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, edited by Anscombe and Rhees (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1968) (all parenthetical references to and translations from this edition).

5. Benedict de Spinoza, *On the Improvement of the Understanding* in Spinoza, *Ethics, Preceded by On the Improvement of the Understanding*, translated and edited with an introduction by James Gutmann and interpretive essay by Frederick J.E. Woodbridge (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1949), p. 11.

6. It is sometimes said that intentional states need not be directed toward a specific object, as in cases where we fear something, but nothing in particular. The general case is made for intentionality as the direction of thought upon a specific object if we include as intended objects such states of affairs as “That something unwanted might occur.” This object is unambiguous enough to make the argument for the specificity of intention, without in this application supposing that the intending subject necessarily knows what specific unwanted occurrence might transpire. It is a distinct intended object, in the sense that it is phenomenologically different from other general objects of thought, such as the state of affairs as “That something pleasant or satisfying might occur.” Specificity at such a level of intended states of affairs is all that the present argument requires.

7. Wittgenstein further argues against the adequacy of Augustinian pure behavioral ostension as a method of naming and communicating the meanings of names, in a section of text that is not often discussed. He maintains in §28: “Now one can ostensibly define a proper name, the name of a colour, the name of a material, the name of a point of the compass and so on. The definition of the number two, ‘That is called ‘two’ — pointing to two nuts — is perfectly exact. — But how can two be defined like that? The person one gives the definition to doesn’t know what one wants to call ‘two’; he will suppose that ‘two’ is the name given to *this* group of nuts! — He *may* suppose this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake; when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might understand it as a numeral. And he might equally well take the name of a person, of which I give an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of the compass. That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in *every* case.” If there are such individual entities as numbers that we can name but not point

to, then pure behavioral ostension will obviously not serve to explain all naming, teaching and designations of names. Wittgenstein does not pursue the argument in any depth, perhaps because of perennial realism-nominalism controversies and the questionable ontic status of abstract entities. See also §§29–35. In §33, Wittgenstein observes: “— And what does ‘pointing to the shape,’ ‘pointing to the colour’ consist in? Point to a piece of paper. — And now point to its shape — now to its colour — now to its number (that sounds queer). — How did you do it? —.”

8. Wittgenstein suggests in several places that pretheoretical observation of language game-playing ought to be sufficient to reveal the workings of language generally and naming in particular. He writes in §66 that we should not assume that all games have something in common, but rather “*look and see* whether there is anything common to all.” In §654, Wittgenstein writes: “Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a ‘proto-phenomenon’. That is, where we ought to have said: *this language-game is played*.” See also §§144, 340.

9. I am grateful to an anonymous journal referee for useful comments and suggestions leading to an improved version of this essay. I thank my recent Wittgenstein seminar students at Bern in Spring semester 2014, for providing a sounding board and offering their reflections on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

## **MARX, EDUCATION AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF A FAIRER WORLD: REVIVING RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY THROUGH FOUCAULT**

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**ABSTRACT.** Although this paper constitutes a revision of a paper originally published in 2007 (see note 1), the editors are pleased to republish this paper due to its theoretical importance for the critique of Marxism as well the interest it creates for establishing the possibility of a new political economy based upon the work of Michel Foucault. The paper documents and interrogates the contradictions between postmodernism and poststructuralism with Marxism. Starting by documenting the crisis of the Left at the start of the twenty-first century, an attempt is made to radically critique and reappraise Marxism in a direction set out by Foucault. The paper is not so much an attempt to meld Marxism and poststructuralism but rather to generate a new poststructuralist historical materialism which still has equality and fairness as its central concerns, but which goes beyond the traditional problems of Marxism based on its adherence to outmoded methodologies and theoretical modes of analysis. Echoing well known critiques of Marxist historical materialism, the paper focuses on forms of articulation drawn from the revolution in language influenced by post-modernism and by historically more recent post-quantum complexity theories.

**Keywords:** Marxism; the Left; political economy; poststructuralism; Michel Foucault; historical materialism; complexity; global politics; neoliberalism

It is clear, even if one admits that Marx will disappear for now, that he will reappear one day. What I wish for is not so much the defalsification and restitution of a true Marx but the unburdening and liberation of Marx in relation to party dogma, which has constrained it, touted it, and brandished it for so long (Foucault 1998, p. 458).

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Marxism, we are told by politicians and the popular press is dead. The Left, as a historical movement tied to the labor movement, is frozen over, caught between the collapse of actually existing communism in Eastern Europe and the triumph of global market forces. Union membership in the traditional industrial economy in the United Kingdom is dwindling as multinationals relocate offshore; even insurance, information, banking and call-centre jobs of the “new economy” are increasingly outsourced to India and other emergent economies literate in information and computing technology and English. China has joined the World Trade Organization and committed itself to a post-socialist market economy. At a time of an intensification of inequalities between regions and, perhaps more significantly, between North and South – between the developed world and the developing world – the Left in Britain, the USA and most of Europe seems ideologically gutted by the Third Way preoccupation with the social market and with citizenship “responsibilities” rather than with traditional concerns of equality and advancing rights. The best offer on hand seems to be a *socialization* of the market and an acknowledgement of its moral limits. Neoliberalism, in the age of privatization reduces the state’s role more and more to one of regulation, rather than provision or funding of public services. The US–UK neoliberal model of globalization has dominated the world economy and world politics for the last 20 years, defining the present crisis of fundamentalisms and restyling imperialism as a new age of barbarism. In this age, American-style democracy is exported alongside the ideology of “free trade.” Yet many Americans have shifted their view since the Vietnam War on whether the USA is a force for good in the world or an imperialist power, and this is so despite Bush’s recent election victory. Even the philosophers of ‘68 have given way to a new breed of fashion-conscious savants, who now turn their attention to extolling the virtues of liberal individualism or sneer at the last great generation of Left-Nietzscheans, such as Foucault and Derrida.

The Left has certainly been marginalized and even in the home of European socialism it seems confused and crisis-ridden. Europe itself is fighting to establish a new identity, reshaping its territory through enlargement and integration, and desperately competing with the US juggernaut of global power and the rising stars of East Asia – not only China, but also Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea – which seem destined to develop a trading bloc at least as powerful as that of the USA and the European Union. The traditional Left, wedded to the rise of the industrial working class, some observers have remarked, is also tied to its demise. Is the Left history? Has it simply become an academic form of analysis or does it have the seeds to reconfigure itself as an organizing force once again?

In terms of emancipatory futures there are all sorts of oppressions to overcome; many of these oppressions have intensified in the neoliberal era. The question that Steve Brier asks is:

How do we position ourselves as a movement in relation to all the particular forms of oppression experienced by specific communities and people, defined by race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, etc., especially at a time when no unified working-class movement exists that encompasses these communities and fights to eradicate the special injustices they face? (Brier 1999)

The question of unity becomes paramount. Against identity politics and certain forms of postmodernism we need to inquire: what is the unifying principle? Is it the concept of “class” or even an overlapping set of concepts? Brier was writing at a time that had not yet seen the neoconservative hegemony in the White House or its consolidation after the re-election of Bush for a second term. In this environment of voter fraud and corporate corruption it is difficult to see the flourishing of social democracy even though the White House wants to export American-style democracy to the world as part of its neoconservative agenda. In these circumstances is it really enough to talk of “beyond left and right” as the future of radical politics as Tony Giddens (1994) has done? Or does Alex Callinicos’s (2003) *Anti-Capitalist Manifesto* define a way forward?

These are weighty questions that do not admit easy answers. But it is clear that even in this environment of world politics there are new lines of struggle emerging that coalesce with the old articles of faith. There *are* expressions of new forms of socialism that revolve around the international labor movement and invoke new imperialism struggles based on the movements of indigenous and radicalized peoples. There are active social movements, perhaps less coherent but every bit as powerful as older class-based movements, such as the anti-capitalism, anti-globalization movements, women’s and feminist movements, and environmental movements. These new expressions do require engagement and re-theorizing by the Left. One obvious challenge for Marxism and the Left more generally is its engagement with Islam and the enslavement of women.

There is also a host of struggles around the socialization of the market and a question of whether this can be pursued successfully at the level beyond the state. Indeed, as many theorists have asserted, the future of the Left is tied up with the future of world democracy and with the development of left media cultures and centers. Part of the success of the Right has been its ability to privatize thinking and media, moving beyond the academy to set up dozens of new think tanks, private consultancies, and media centers that propagate partisan “news” or lobby and influence government departments at the highest levels.

## Marx's Radical Political Economy

This essay seeks to ask to what extent Foucault can provide a different vision of radical politics to that of Marx, and then to assess the implications of this for work in education, politics and ethics. Central to Marx's model of political economy was a particular materialist inversion of the Hegelian dialectic, giving rise in Western Marxism to a particular formulation of base and superstructure.

In his Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx 1971), (hereafter *CPE*) written in 1859, Karl Marx, as he says, examines "the system of bourgeois economy" and he gives a biographical account of how he first came to realize the position he adopts on the issue of the relationship of the economy to the cultural, educational, legal and political domains of society – a fundamental and stunning insight whose force has not diminished even though the sophistication of structuralist and poststructuralist arguments against the rudiments of a base/superstructure model now have to be accepted. He indicates that he had started thinking about these issues in 1842 and returned to a fresh examination of Hegelian philosophy of law in order to rethink the origins of legal relations and political forms. As his massive bibliographical studies across several languages led him to conclude legal relations and political forms can not be understood by themselves or as a product of the development of the human mind but only in "the material conditions of life," the totality of which Hegel called "civil society" and whose "anatomy" Marx argued must be sought in political economy.

In that remarkable work that took him over 17 years to bring to maturity, Marx addresses the question of the method of political economy and is clearly influenced in his construction not only by the history of political economy and especially the major figures of the eighteenth century (especially Smith and Ricardo) but also Charles Darwin from whom he takes a newly scientized view of historical evolution. Marx's view is tantamount to a form of *historical naturalism*, which assumes laws of historical development. Marx calls it a "materialist account of history" and Engels shortened it to "historical materialism." Thus, he argues:

Bourgeois society is the most advanced and complex historical organization of production. The categories which express its relations, and an understanding of its structure, therefore, provide an insight into the structure and the relations of production of all formerly existing social formations the ruins and component elements of which were used in the creation of bourgeois society.<sup>2</sup>

Clearly his model here is Darwin as well as Hegel. This is confirmed when later in the text he argues: "The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape." Marx claimed that all history should be thought of as the history of class-struggles over surplus-value. Engels described "being determines con-

sciousness” as the “law of evolution in human history” equating it with Darwin’s “law of evolution in organic nature.” The *Origin of Species*<sup>3</sup> was published in 1859 and Marx read it in 1860. Marx believed that Darwin’s book “contains the basis in natural history for our views.” In 1861 in a letter to Ferdinand Lassalle Marx wrote:

Darwin’s book is very important and serves me as a model for the class struggle in history... Despite all deficiencies, not only is the death-blow dealt for the first time here to ‘teleology’ in the natural sciences, but its rational basis is empirically explained (Marx & Engels, 1965, p. 123).

There is an oft quoted story that Marx sought permission to dedicate *Das Kapital* to Charles Darwin who declined the offer but this now seems suspect.<sup>4</sup>

Naturalism is the tendency to look upon the material universe as the only reality and to reduce all laws to uniformities in nature. To this end it denies the dualism of spirit and matter regarding the social and cultural as manifestations of matter that are governed by its laws. Naturalism, as Quine has suggested, is the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself; scientific method alone must judge the claims of science and there is no room for metaphysics or first philosophy. Naturalism is in this sense derived from materialism or pragmatism. Historical materialism explains changes in human history through material factors, for Marx, economic and technological. Where Marx is both a historical materialist and naturalist, Foucault is the former (although as we shall see he places no particular priority on the economic) but also firmly anti-naturalist when it come to the market as we will see in more detail in later sections. Naturalism, like empiricism and older forms of materialism which seek to represent the real or nature outside of discourse and independent of historicity fail to adequately recognize the contingent dimension of knowledge. For Foucault, knowledge, like the human subject is always already social and attempts to establish a foundation in nature to anchor knowledge or the operations of institutions independently of history are not possible.

For Foucault, also, the Marxist conception of relations between economy and superstructures were problematic. In the Marxist conception of historical materialism, educational, legal, political institutions, as well as ideologies and discourses, are represented as part of the superstructure of society which is split from material practices of the economic foundation or base, and are determined by it. In the same way, the mental operations of consciousness are represented as determined by the material base of society. As Marx (1971, pp. 20–21) expresses the point:

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of develop-

ment of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society – the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.

In the twentieth century one of the central issues addressed by western Marxists has been an attempted resolution and reconceptualization of the nature of the relation between the economic base and the cultural superstructure of society. In the classical Marxist model both the character of a society's culture and institutions, as well as the direction set for its future development are determined by the nature of the economic base, which can be defined as the mode of production at a certain stage of development (Williams 1980, p. 33). The simplest nature of this relation, as Williams (1980, p. 33) tells us, was one of "the reflection, the imitation, or the reproduction of the reality of the base in the superstructure in a more or less direct way;" that is, a relation in which the economic base and specifically the forces of production constituted the ultimate *cause* to which the social, legal and political framework of the society can be traced back.

In the attempt to reformulate Marxism in the twentieth century the economic determinist conception is challenged by those who see Marxism as granting rather more "independence" or "autonomy" to the superstructures of society. Hence a "dialectical" notion of the relation was stressed suggesting a relation of reciprocal influence. It was argued that, although the base *conditions* and *affects* the superstructure, it is in turn *conditioned* and *affected* by it. In all cases, however, in order to remain as Marxists, the ultimate priority of the economic base as the causal determinant of the social character of a society was safeguarded by maintaining that the economic factor is "determining in the last instance." Hence, it was maintained that the superstructure had only a "relative autonomy," and the theory of "relative autonomy," as a shorthand designation of the base-superstructure relation, became a central concept of twentieth century Marxism.

All of the Marxist studies on different aspects of education reflected the problematic determinism of the relations between the economy and the various cultural and ideological aspects of the society. If we consider the application of a particular case of Marx's base-superstructure analysis to education one important theme has been an understanding of the schooling system as a production system related to capitalism. The best known contemporary form of this kind of application is Bowles and Gintis' (1976) corres-

pondence theory that hypothesizes a set of correspondences between work and education at all levels: a subservient workforce, an acceptance of hierarchy, and motivated by external rewards.<sup>5</sup> In their later work they explain their original position as:

...schools prepare people for adult work rules, by socializing people to function well, and without complaint, in the hierarchical structure of the modern corporation. Schools accomplish this by what we called the *correspondence principle*, namely, by structuring social interactions and individual rewards to replicate the environment of the workplace (Bowles & Gintis 2001, p. 1).

In this later work they endorse the correspondence principle as more or less correct although they also mention shortcomings of the original work. Criticisms of structural over-determination of the lives of working class kids has been explored by Paul Willis (1977) in *Learning to Labour* and by many others at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham who demonstrate that working class kids choose to fail through the development of a counter-culture.

### **Foucault's Radical Political Economy**

Political economy has a much longer tradition than as used by Marx. The Greeks considered it as pertaining to the management of the household of the state, as did Jean Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith.<sup>6</sup>

Foucault's sense of the concept must be seen in relation to his way of conceptualizing social structure as well as his opposition to Marxism. In one sense, his own conception can be viewed as a form of "new political economy."<sup>7</sup> Foucault opposed both the determinism of the base-superstructure model as well as the Hegelian monistic conception of society and the Hegelian/Darwinian conception of progressive evolution of history through the unfolding of the dialectic to the communist utopia. Rather than seek to explain all phenomena in relation to a single centre, Foucault is interested rather to advance a polymorphous conception of determination in order to reveal the play of dependencies in the social and historical process. Hence, in opposition to the themes of totalizing history as found in Hegel, Foucault (1978, p. 10) substitutes what he calls a "differentiated analysis:"

Nothing, you see, is more foreign to me than the quest for a sovereign, unique and constraining form. I do not seek to detect, starting from diverse signs, the unitary spirit of an epoch, the general form of its consciousness: something like a *Weltanschauung*....I have studied, one after another, ensembles of discourse; I have characterized them; I have defined the play of rules, of transformations, of thresholds, of remanences. I have established and I

have described their clusters of relations. Whenever I have deemed it necessary I have allowed systems to proliferate.

In advocating pluralism in place of monism, Foucault believed Marxism to reflect theoretical rules inherited from its time of origins. As he says (2001a, p. 269):

Marx's economic discourse comes under the rules of formation of the scientific discourses that were peculiar to the nineteenth century...Marxist economics – through its basic concepts and the general rules of its discourse – belongs to a type of discursive formation that was defined around the time of Ricardo.

A central element of Foucault's critique of Marxism relates to the notion of "totalization." Essentially, for Foucault, Marxism was not just a "deterministic" but a "deductivistic" approach. That is, it directs attention not just to the primacy of the economy but it seeks to explain the parts of a culture as explicable and decodable parts of the whole totality or system represented as a closed system. Marxism, claims Foucault, seeks to ascertain "the principle of cohesion or the code that unlocks the system explaining the elements by deduction" (Thompson 1986, p. 106). This was the approach of Marx took from Hegel, which seeks to analyze history and society in terms of "totality," where the parts are an "expression" of the whole – hence the notion of an "expressive totality."

The dissociation between Marxism, and Foucault's own position became more apparent after Foucault's turn to genealogy and Nietzsche at the close of the 1960s. With his growing interest in genealogy, Foucault became more concerned with power and history, and the historical constitution of knowledge. In this process, there was however, no integrative principle or essence, and history was not periodized according to economic stages. If the genealogist studies history "he finds that there is 'something altogether different' behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms" (Foucault 1977, p. 142)

Foucault's objection to elements of Marxism explicitly reflects his Nietzschean heritage and his belief that certain aspects of Marxism distorted the liberatory potential of the discourse.

The interest in Nietzsche and Bataille was not a way of distancing ourselves from Marxism or communism – it was the only path towards what we expected from communism (Foucault 2001, p. 249).

It was in terms of the philosophy of difference and Nietzsche's conception of multiplicities through a rejection of Platonic hierarchies that Foucault enunciates a theory of discursive formations and rejects Marxist and Hegelian

conceptions of history. The utilization of Nietzsche signaled a rupture from Marxism in relation to a series of inter-related conceptual, theoretical and methodological precepts, including power, knowledge and truth, the subject, and the nature of historical change and determination.

Nietzsche focused on power in an altogether different way to Marx. In “Prison Talk,” Foucault (1980a, p. 47) states:

It was Nietzsche who specified the power relation as the general focus, shall we say, of philosophical discourse – whereas for Marx it was the productive relation. Nietzsche is the philosopher of power, a philosopher who managed to think of power without having to confine himself within a political theory in order to do so.

Power, for Nietzsche, was conceived as a relation of forces within an analytics of power/knowledge/truth, which became important for Foucault to understand in the later 1960s after the publication of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and his growing friendship with the Parisian Nietzschean Gilles Deleuze. Foucault accredits Nietzsche as the source of his interest in the question of truth and its relation to power. As he states, in “Truth and Power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 133), “The political question...is not, error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology, it is truth itself. Hence, the importance of Nietzsche.” Nietzsche’s importance to Foucault can be seen as “correcting” the Marxism developed after Marx, especially in relation to the linkage between power-knowledge-truth, and the functioning of knowledge as an instrument of power. As Alan Schrift (1995, p. 40) notes, Nietzsche’s influence drew attention away from “substances, subjects and things, and focused attention instead on the *relations between* these substantives.” In a related way, Foucault “draws our attention away from the substantive notion of power and directs our attention instead to the multifarious ways that power operates through the social order” (1995, p. 40). For Nietzsche, such relations were relations of forces. Foucault thus focused on new relations as the relations of forces that existed and interacted within social systems as social practices. These were forces of repression and production that characterized the disciplinary society; forces that enable and block; subjugate and realize, and normalize and resist. In this model, power is not a thing, but a process, a becoming.

Foucault rejects Marxist models of a determining economic base and a determined superstructure as well as refinements based on conceptions of totality by Marx’s twentieth century successors. Foucault is not interested in accounting for the practices of the social structure solely in terms of a model of economic determination. Although, like Althusser, he utilizes a model of complex and multiple causation and determination within the social structure, the specific elements and mechanisms of such processes, as elaborated by Foucault, differ in important, indeed crucial, respects. In Foucault’s concep-

tion of social structure, explaining the relations between discursive formations and non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes) is recognized as the ultimate objective. As he formulates it in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), for archaeology, in comparison to Marxism:

The *rapprochements* are not intended to uncover great cultural continuities, nor to isolate mechanisms of causality . . . nor does it seek to rediscover what is expressed in them . . . it tries to determine how the rules of formation that govern it . . . may be linked to non-discursive systems: it seeks to define specific forms of articulation (Foucault, 1972, p. 162).

Unlike Marxists, he sees no one set of factors as necessarily directing human destiny. Rather, the forms of articulation and determination may differ in relation to the relative importance of different non-discursive (material) factors in terms of both place and time. In the shift from a purely archaeological to a genealogical mode of enquiry, Foucault's concern with the relation between discursive and non-discursive domains is given a more historical and dynamic formulation, although, the concern with synchronic analysis is not abandoned. Throughout, however, as Mark Poster (1984, pp. 39–40) explains, Foucault's central aim is to provide a version of critical theory in which the economic base is not the totalizing centre of the social formation, whereby Hegel's evolutionary model of history is replaced by Nietzsche's concept of genealogy, and where causes and connections to an imputed centre or foundation are rejected in favor of exposing the contingency and transitory nature of existing social practices. In Poster's (1984, pp. 39–40) view, this presents us with a crucial decision. In comparing Foucault and Althusser, he maintains that "the theoretical choice offered by these two theorists is dramatic and urgent. In my opinion Foucault's position in the present context is more valuable as an interpretative strategy. . . Foucault's position opens up critical theory more than Althusser's both to the changing social formation and to the social locations where contestation actually occurs." While having a generally historicized view of the nature and development of knowledge, Foucault rejects the possibility of any "absolute" or "transcendental" conception of truth "outside of history" as well as of any conception of "objective" or "necessary" interests which could provide a necessary "Archimedean point" to ground either knowledge, morality or politics. Read in this way, historical materialism does not prioritize the economy in any necessary or universal sense, but is about the systematic character of society and how it might change. It is about the processes of change internal to social systems. It holds that societies are to varying extents integrated systematically through their material practices and discursive coherences, and break down and change as the component elements of the system change.<sup>8</sup>

## Governmentality Studies

Based upon this general social ontology Foucault utilizes the notion of “governmentality” as the basis of his “new” conception of political economy. The working premise of governmentality studies is based on Foucault’s insight and analysis of the modern regime of power in which power characteristically operates *internally* or subjectively in terms of a logic of “self-improvement” that demands the freedom of the individual. Governmentality is the key concept that links Foucault genealogy of the subject with his interest in political rationalities, i.e., between the government of the State and the government of the self, and in so doing “solves” the problem of agency (liberal political economy) versus structure (Marxist political economy).

Foucault’s overriding interest was not in “knowledge as ideology,” as Marxists would have it, where bourgeois knowledge, say, modern liberal economics was seen as false knowledge or bad science. Nor was he interested in “knowledge as theory” as classical liberalism has constructed disinterested knowledge, based on inherited distinctions from the Greeks, including Platonic epistemology and endorsed by the Kantian separation of schema/content that distinguishes the analytic enterprise. Rather Foucault examined *practices* of knowledge produced through the relations of power.<sup>9</sup> He examined how these practices, then, were used to augment and refine the efficacy and instrumentality of power in its exercise over both individuals and populations, and also in large measure helped to shape the constitution of subjectivity. Fundamental to his governmentality studies was the understanding that Western society professed to be based on principles of liberty and the Rule of Law and said to derive the legitimation of the State from political philosophies that elucidated these very principles. Yet as a matter of historical fact, Western society employed technologies of power that operated on forms of disciplinary order or were based on biopolitical techniques that bypassed the law and its freedoms altogether. As Colin Gordon (2001, p. xxvi) puts it so starkly: Foucault embraced Nietzsche as the thinker “who transforms Western philosophy by rejecting its founding disjunction of power and knowledge as myth.” By this he means that the rationalities of Western politics, from the time of the Greeks, had incorporated techniques of power specific to Western practices of government, first, in the expert knowledges of the Greek tyrant and, second, in the concept of pastoral power that characterized ecclesiastical government.

It is in this vein that Foucault examines government as a practice and problematic that first emerges in the sixteenth century and is characterized by the insertion of economy into political practice. Foucault (2001, p. 201) explores the problem of government as it “explodes in the sixteenth century” after the collapse of feudalism and the establishment of new territorial States.

Government emerges at this time as a general problem dispersed across quite different questions: Foucault mentions specifically the Stoic revival that focused on the government of oneself; the government of souls elaborated in Catholic and Protestant pastoral doctrine; the government of children and the problematic of pedagogy; and, last but not least, the government of the State by the prince. Through the reception of Machiavelli's *The Prince* in the sixteenth century and its rediscovery in the nineteenth century, there emerges a literature that sought to replace the power of the prince with the art of government understood in terms of the government of the family, based on the central concept of "economy." The introduction of economy into political practice is for Foucault the essential issue in the establishment of the art of government. As he points out, the problem is still posed for Rousseau, in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, in the same terms – the government of the State is modeled on the management by the head of the family over his family, household and its assets.

It is in the late sixteenth century, then, that the art of government receives its first formulation as "reason of state" that emphasizes a specific rationality intrinsic to the nature of the state, based on principles no longer philosophical and transcendent, or theological and divine, but rather centered on the *problem of population*. This became a science of government conceived of outside the juridical framework of sovereignty characteristic of the feudal territory and firmly focused on the problem of population based on the modern concept which enabled "the creation of new orders of knowledge, new objects of intervention, new forms of subjectivity and ... new state forms" (Curtis, 2002, p. 2). It is this political-statistical concept of population that provided the means by which the government of the state came to involve individualization and totalization, and, thus, married Christian pastoral care with sovereign political authority. The new rationality of "reason of state" focused on the couplet *population-wealth* as an object of rule, providing conditions for the emergence of political economy as a form of analysis. Foucault investigated the techniques of police science and a new bio-politics,

which tends to treat the 'population' as a mass of living and co-existing beings, which evidence biological traits and particular kinds of pathologies and which, in consequence, give rise to specific knowledges and techniques (Foucault 1989, p. 106, cited in Curtis, 2002).

As Foucault (2001) comments in "The Political Technology of Individuals," the "rise and development of our modern political rationality" as "reason of state," that is, as a specific rationality intrinsic to the state, is formulated through "a new relation between politics as a practice and as knowledge" (p. 407), involving specific political knowledge or "political arithmetic" (statistics); "new relationships between politics and history," such that political knowl-

edge helped to strengthen the state and at the same time ushered in an era of politics based on “an irreducible multiplicity of states struggling and competing in a limited history” (p. 409); and, finally, a new relationship between the individual and the state, where “the individual becomes pertinent for the state insofar as he can do something for the strength of the state” (p. 409). In analyzing the works of von Justi, Foucault infers that the true object of the police becomes, at the end of the eighteenth century, the population; or, in other words, the state has essentially to take care of men as a population. It wields its power over living beings, and its politics, therefore has to be a biopolitics (p. 416).

Foucault’s lectures on governmentality were first delivered in a course he gave at the Collège de France, entitled *Sécurité, Territoire, Population*, during the 1977–78 academic year. While the essays “Governmentality” and “Questions of Method” were published in 1978 and 1980, respectively, and translated into English in the collection *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Burchell et al., 1991), it is only very recently that the course itself has been transcribed from original tapes and published for the first time (Foucault, 2004a), along with the sequel *Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1978–1979* (Foucault, 2004b).<sup>10</sup> The governmentality literature in English, roughly speaking, dates from the 1991 collection and has now grown quite substantially (see, for example, Miller and Rose, 1990; Barry et al., 1996; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999).<sup>11</sup> As a number of scholars have pointed out Foucault relied on a group of researchers to help him in his endeavors: François Ewald, Pasquale Pasquino, Daniel Defert, Giovanna Procacci, Jacques Donzelot, on governmentality; François Ewald, Catherine Mevel, Éliane Allo, Nathanie Coppinger and Pasquale Pasquino, François Delaporte and Anne-Marie Moulin, on the birth of biopolitics. These researchers working with Foucault in the late 1970s constitute the first generation of governmentality studies scholars and many have gone on to publish significant works too numerous to list here. In the field of education as yet not a great deal has focused specifically on governmentality.<sup>12</sup>

Gordon (2001, p. xxiii) indicates three shifts that took place in Foucault’s thinking: a shift from a focus on “specialized practices and knowledges of the individual person” “to the exercise of political sovereignty exercised by the state over an entire population;” the study of government as a *practice* informed and enabled by a specific rationality or succession of different rationalities; and, the understanding that liberalism, by contrast with socialism, possessed a distinctive concept and rationale for the activity of governing. Liberalism and neoliberalism, then, for Foucault represented distinctive innovations in the history of governmental rationality. In his governmentality studies Foucault focused on the introduction of economy into the practice of politics and in a turn to the contemporary scene studied two examples:

German liberalism during the period 1948–62, with an emphasis on the Ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School, and American neoliberalism of the Chicago School. Foucault's critical reading of German neoliberalism and the emergence of the "social market" has significance not only for understanding the historical development of an economic constitution and formulation of "social policy" (and the role of education policy within it), but also the development of the European social model, more generally, and the continued relevance for Third Way politics of the "social market economy."

### Neoliberalism and the Birth of Biopolitics

*Naissance de la biopolitique* (Foucault, 2004b) consists of thirteen lectures delivered by Foucault at the Collège de France (10 January–4<sup>th</sup> April, 1979). It is helpful to see this course in the series of thirteen courses he gave from 1970 to 1984. The first five courses reflected his early work on knowledge in the human sciences, concerning punishment, penal and psychiatric institutions: "La Volonté de savoir" (1970–71), "Théories et Institutions pénales" (1971–72), "La Société punitive" (1972–73), "Le Pouvoir psychiatrique" (1973–74), "Les Anormaux" (1974–75). The remaining eight courses focused squarely on governmentality studies, with a clear emphasis also on the problematic (and hermeneutics) of the subject and the relation between subjectivity and truth: "Il faut défendre la société" (1975–76), "Sécurité, Territoire, Population" (1977–78), "Naissance de la biopolitique" (1978–79), "Du gouvernement des vivants" (1979–80), "Subjectivité et Vérité" (1980–81), "L'Herméneutique du sujet" (1981–82), "Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres" (1982–83), "Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres: le courage de la vérité" (1983–84). Even from this list of courses it becomes readily apparent that the question of government concerns Foucault for the last decade of his life and that for his governmentality studies, politics were inseparable in its modern forms both from biology – biopower and the government of the living – and truth and subjectivity. It is important to note that these same concerns in one form or another enter into Foucault's formulations in *Naissance de la biopolitique*.<sup>13</sup>

The *Ordoliberalen*<sup>14</sup> comprised a group of jurists and economists in the years 1928–1930 who published in the yearbook *Ordo*. Amongst their numbers were included William Röpke, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alexander Rüstow, Alfred Müller-Armack and others. Preaching the slogan that "inequality is equal for all" they devised a social market economy influencing the shaping of West German economic policy as it developed after the war. Foucault refers to these *Ordoliberalen* as the "Freiberg School" who had some affinities (of time and place) with the Frankfurt School but were of a very different political persuasion. While they held that Nazism was a consequence of the absence of liberalism, they did not see liberalism as a

doctrine based upon the natural freedom of the individual that will develop by itself of its own volition. In fact, for the “Freiberg School” the market economy was not an autonomous, or naturally self-regulating entity at all. As a consequence, their conception of the market and of the role of competition, says Foucault, is radically anti-naturalistic. Rather than the market being a natural arena which the state must refrain from interfering with, it is rather constituted and kept going by the state’s political machine. Similarly, competition is not a natural fact which emerges spontaneously from human social intercourse, as a result of human nature, but must be engineered by the state.

As a consequence of this, the traditional distinction between a sphere of natural liberty and a sphere of government intervention no longer holds, for the market order and competition are engineered by the practices of government. Both the state and the market are on this conception artificial and both presuppose each other. In Foucault’s view such a conception means that the principle of laissez-faire, which can be traced back to a distinction between culture (the artificial state) and nature (the self-regulating market), no longer holds. For the *Ordoliberalen*, the history of capitalism is an institutional, non-natural, history. Capitalism is a particular contingent apparatus by which economic processes and institutional frameworks are articulated. Not only is there no “logic of capital” in this model, but the *Ordoliberalen* held that the dysfunctions of capitalism could only be corrected by political-institutional interventions which they saw as contingent historical phenomena. What this means, says Foucault, is that the *Ordoliberalen* support the active creation of the social conditions for an effective competitive market order. Education thus becomes pivotal in this constructivism. Not only must government block and prevent anti-competitive practices, but it must fine-tune and actively promote competition in both the economy and in areas where the market mechanism is traditionally least prone to operate. One policy to this effect was to “universalize the entrepreneurial form” (Lemke, 2001, p. 195) through the promotion of an enterprise culture, premised, as Foucault put it in a lecture given on 14<sup>th</sup> February 1979, on “equal inequality for all” (Lemke, 2001, p. 195). The goal here was to increase competitive forms throughout society so that social and work relations in general assume the market form i.e., exhibit competition, obey laws of supply and demand. In the writings of Rüstow, this was called “vital policy” (“*Vitalpolitik*”) which described policies geared to reconstructing the moral and cultural order to promote and reward entrepreneurial behavior, opposing bureaucratic initiatives which stifle the market mechanism. To achieve such goals, the *Ordoliberalen* also advocated the redefining of law and of juridical institutions so that they could function to correct the market mechanism and discipline non-entrepreneurial behavior within an institutional structure in accordance with, and supported by, the

law. In this sense, the *Ordoliberalen* were not simply anti-naturalist, but constructivist.

In his analysis of neoliberalism, Foucault also directs his attention to the Chicago School of Human Capital theorists in America, focusing particularly on the works of Gary Becker. These neoliberals also opposed state interventionism when it was bureaucratic and supported it when it fostered and protected economic liberty. For Human Capital theorists the concern was the uncontrolled growth of the bureaucratic apparatus as a threat to the freedom of the individual. Foucault sees the major distinction between the German and US neoliberals existing in the fact that in the US neoliberalism was much less a political crusade as it was in Germany or France, for in the US the critique was centrally directed against state interventionism and aimed to challenge the growth of the state apparatus. In his lecture of March 28, 1979, Foucault discusses Hayek and von Mises (whom he labels as the “intermediaries of US neoliberalism”), Simons, Schultz, Stigler and Gary Becker, whom he says is the most radical exponent in the US. The US neoliberals saw the *Ordoliberalen* as representing the political as being above and outside the market but constantly intervening to correct its bureaucratic dislocations. From their viewpoint, they wanted to extend the market across into the social arena and political arenas, thus collapsing the distinction between the economic, social and political in what constitutes a marketization of the state.

As Foucault sees HCT, it is concerned with the problem of labor in economic theory. While classical political economy claimed that the production of goods depended upon real estate, capital, and labor, neo-liberals held that only real estate and capital are treated appropriately by the classical theory, and that labor needs greater illumination as an active, rather than as a passive, factor in production. In this sense neoliberals concurred with Marx that classical political economy had forgotten labor and thereby they misrepresent the process of production. In order to correct this deficiency, neoliberals theorize the role and importance of labor in terms of a model of human capital. In essence their theory starts with the human individual in terms of a classification of skills, knowledge and ability. Although, unlike other forms of capital, it cannot be separated from the individual who owns these resources, they nevertheless constitute resources which can be sold in a market. Becker distinguishes two central aspects to such human capital: (1) inborn, physical and genetic dispositions, and (2) education, nutrition, training and emotional health. In this model, each person is now an autonomous entrepreneur responsible ontologically for their own selves and their own progress and position. Individuals have full responsibility over their investment decisions and must aim to produce a surplus value. As Foucault puts it in his March 14, 1979 lecture, noting the educational implication, they are “entrepreneurs of themselves.”

Graham Burchell (1996, pp. 23–24) has noted the core distinction between classical and neoliberalism. Whereas for liberalism the basis of government conduct is in terms of “natural, private-interest-motivated conduct of free, market exchanging individuals,” for neoliberalism “the rational principle for regulating and limiting governmental activity must be determined by reference to artificially arranged or contrived forms of free, entrepreneurial and competitive conduct of economic-rational individuals.” This means that for neoliberal perspectives, the end goals of freedom, choice, consumer sovereignty, competition and individual initiative, as well as those of compliance and obedience, must be constructions of the state acting now in its positive role through the development of the techniques of auditing, accounting and management. It is these techniques, as Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996, p. 14) put it:

[that] enable the marketplace for services to be established as ‘autonomous’ from central control. Neo-liberalism, in these terms, involves less a retreat from governmental ‘intervention’ than a re-inscription of the techniques and forms of expertise required for the exercise of government.

Notwithstanding this rather crucial difference between the two forms of liberalism, the common element expresses a distinctive concern. For both classical liberalism as well as neoliberalism, what defines this concern is a common orientation concerning “the limits of government in relation to the market” (Burchell, 1996, p. 22).

In addition to a common priority concerning the scope of the market, both classical liberalism and neoliberalism share common views concerning the nature of the individual, as rational self-interested subjects. In this perspective the individual is presented as a rational optimizer and the best judge of his/her own interests and needs. Being rational was to follow a systematic program of action underpinned and structured according to rules. The rules were rendered coherent and permissible in relation to the “interests” of the individual.

In summary, then, central to neoliberals such as the *Ordoliberalen* and Public Choice theorists, the state actively constructs the market. Far from existing within a protected and limited space, market relations now extend to cover all forms of voluntary behavior amongst individuals. Rather than absenting itself from interfering in the private or market spheres of society, Foucauldian political economy points out that in the global economic era neoliberalism becomes a new authoritarian discourse of state management and control. Rather than being a form of political bureaucracy, which Weber (1921) saw as the supreme form of modernist rationality, neoliberalism constitutes a new and more advanced technology of control. It is both a substantive political doctrine of control and a self-driving technology of operations.

It incorporates both more flexible and more devolved governmental steering mechanisms than does bureaucracy. If, for Weber, bureaucracy constituted large scale organization comprising a hierarchy of offices and lines of control, enabling efficiency, predictability, calculability and technical control, then neoliberalism, while incorporating these factors, goes beyond them to enable an extension of control in more devolved forms and in more flexible systems. This enables the function of control to be differentiated from the function of operations, or to use Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) metaphor, "steering" from "rowing." It points to a more effective means of social engineering and control than classical bureaucracy, scientific management, or the Fordist assembly line. Its overall rationale is to measure the costs of, and place a monetary or market value on, all forms of human activity in order to render it controllable. It extends the market mechanism from the economic to the political to the social. Market exchanges now encapsulate all forms of voluntary behavior amongst individuals.<sup>15</sup>

### **Towards a Possible Foucauldian Politics**

If Foucault is critical of neoliberalism as being a new form of superstructural sociology, in many ways highlighting a new operating model of capitalism in a global era, his model of political economy also supports, and has affinities to, a particular approach to economics and politics that can be represented to tie in closely with "regulation school" approaches developed by writers like Michel Aglietta, Hughes Bertrand, Robert Boyer, Alan Lipietz and Jacques Mistrail. Aglietta has commented directly on Foucault's contribution in his conversations with Francois Dosse (1997, p. 291) where he describes Foucault's importance as being "because he raised questions about institutions and gave answers." Furthermore, as Dosse explains, Aglietta was especially influenced by Foucault's:

concern for micropowers, his shift from the centre to the peripheral, his pluralization of a polymorphous power that corresponded to the regulationists' desire to reach intermediary institutional bodies. Moreover, Foucault had made it possible to take some distance from 'the fundamental conception of Marxism' and to understand that this smooth growth curve depended on a system of conciliation and a concentration of interests. Until then, the antagonism between capitalists and workers was considered irreconcilable. (Dosse, 1997, p. 291)

The "regulationists" rendered structuralism dynamic and brought microstructures and human beings back into the orbit of the analysis. As well as incorporating much from the tradition of Marxism, they were also influenced by Keynesian economics through the consideration of real demand, and by

arguing for a consideration of money as an institution, and work as a relationship rather than a market. Robert Boyer (1986) and Alain Lipietz (1983, 1995) also accepted a “broad church” conception of the regulationist approach, distancing themselves from the more specific variations that also developed (see Dosse, 290–294).

Central to the regulation school approach was its rejection of the market order as a self-regulating entity, and its “openness to social and historical elements” (Dosse, 1997, p. 292). This presents the future as an always existing constellation of dangers, and has enormous implications for ethics and education. As with Foucault there was an appropriation of some features of Marxism (especially Althusserianism), a conception of holism/particularism; an appreciation that the laws governing economic tendencies are historically contingent, and a concern for institutional forms of power as they arose from divergent conflicts or from market processes. The emphasis on historicity meant that there was no recognition of predetermined universal categories or systems such as forces of production, in preference for a recognition of the historical variability of other economic institutions, such as money or markets. What resulted was a reinterpretation of economic phenomena in terms of dynamic schemas as responding to dynamic mechanisms. Individual behaviors and identities were forged out of complex wholes, hence individual behaviors and subjects were viewed in ways that did not embody methodological individualism, enabling a reintroduction of individuals in relation to groups and social categories.

### **From Governmentality to the Hermeneutics of the Self as Education**

The distinctiveness of Foucault’s emerging problematic of governmentality, formulated in the years 1978–79, also developed in a series of subsequent themes as “the government of the living,” “subjectivity and truth,” and “the government of self and others.” These themes were also of relevance to education as a practice of struggle and engagement, and as such help us to understand the differences between a Foucauldian political economy of praxis, and that of Marxism. Of particular significance here are the themes on the problematic (and hermeneutics) of the subject and the relation between subjectivity and truth. These indeed signify a different relation between individual and collective in Foucault’s work, compared to Marxism or Hegelianism. Although the individual subject is a product of social conditioning, they are always “free standing” in the sense they are never completely confined or defined by the determining structures from which they derive. Every convergence around culture or conditioning is also characterized by difference on the grounds that experience within space and time is itself both individuating and educative. Thus, while each individual is the product of class and

culture each also has a situated and dated uniqueness. As Jane Bennett (1996, p. 660) states, citing Foucault:

There is no *escaping* a regime of power, but this does not mean that subjectivation is simply subjection, for there is always the possibility of ‘practices of liberation, of freedom, as in Antiquity, starting of course from a certain number of rules, styles and conventions that are found in the culture.’ (Bennett is citing Foucault, 1989a, p. 313)

This theorisation of the individual within the whole as something which both reflects and yet exceeds it, is distinctive of Foucault correction to Marxism, forcefully expressed in theoretical terms in works such as *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972).

Another difference from Marxism, springing from the rejection of Hegelian conceptions of a unilinear and progressive history is Foucault’s distain for utopian ideas which aim for the realization of a perfected or harmonious future society. To aim for a specific ordered ideal written “only on paper” as something that could exist harbors dangers associated with both “radical and global” forms of theorizing. Foucault (1984a, p. 46) echoes liberal concerns with utopian engineering when he states that:

we know from experience that the claims to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.

Foucault puts more emphasis on local struggle and resistance on the basis that existing historical discursive systems (such as those concerning liberty, rights, democracy, etc) which can be seen *already* – in the present horizon – to harbor a “repressed” or “sedimented” utopian vision. Such existing discourses which always operate in local sites can be seen to constitute the complex outcome of struggles in history. And it is in this sense that local struggles can be seen as the basis of revolutionary activity. For Foucault, the revolution as Marxism conceived it as a single historical act of violence and transformation fails theoretically to be plausible in a global age because it can only be taken seriously within a unilinear and utopian frame of reference. What must be asked anew is how would such an idea of revolution can be conceived, planned for, and organized in an age which is both global and local. The notion of simultaneous and coordinated action across national contexts is no longer feasible in a global and “virtual” world. Indeed, to envisage a total sudden reconstruction or reordering of society given the dispersed digital character of financial and intelligence networks in advanced industrial nations boggles the mind. Hence, for Foucault, in a world which is

both global and local the drive for change must take the form of resistance and struggle in specific sites, utilizing complex technologies and intellectual tools.

In addition to operating in specific sites, Foucault also emphasizes the tasks of the “specific intellectual” as “sapping power” rather than “proposing alternative visions” or “telling people what to do.” A critical interrogation of power is thus central as the basis of a critical education. As Foucault (1977b, p. 208) explains to Gilles Deleuze:

The intellectual’s role is no longer to place himself ‘somewhat ahead and to the side’ in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘discourse.’ In this sense theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice. But it is local and regional ...and not totalizing. This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious. It is not to ‘awaken consciousness’ that we struggle... but to sap power, to take power; it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A ‘theory’ is the regional system of this struggle.

The impossibility of a discrete and total revolution also suggests the fact that on some issues and for some groups the revolution as Marxists conceived it might be considered in some senses as having already occurred. The theoretical task becomes in identifying those specific aspects or dimensions still not corrected such as climate change, the unjustified profits of many large multinationals, global inequality, the disadvantages of race, class, disability and gender both within societies and globally. The normative standards constitutive of a good for mankind are already present, in some cases manifest, in some repressed, within the existing horizon based upon what is necessary for both collective and individual survival. This is to say that complex historically generated discourses on such things as rights, equality, democracy and education for survival, already exist, and constitute the repositories of knowledge to become the curriculum for education for global citizenship in the future. Such a global polis is a thin, or de-centered community, rather than a unified mutuality in Hegel’s sense. It is motivated not by a model of the truth, but more pragmatically, by a normative conception of survival characterized by a common integrity and flourishing but which may take many different forms. Foucault’s fellow Nietzschean thinker, and lifelong inspiration, Georges Bataille, theorized the importance of survival as the pragmatic source and guide of ethics and education. For Bataille, like Nietzsche, the struggle for survival represents a specifically non-moral yearning once

“God is dead,” a goal that stretches out before one, as Bataille (2004, p. xviii) puts it, “independently of moral goals or of serving God,” and yet paradoxically itself becomes interpreted as a moral obligation, imposing an object “that surpasses all others in value” (xvii) and translating as a “demand for definite acts” (xvii). As in a complex global world people are interdependent, individual and collective goals are intertwined: the well-being of one is inseparable from the well-being of all. John Dewey’s model of problem solving for survival resonates a similar approach.

It is well known that Marx never theorized the nature of existence in the communist utopia in any detail, and he may well have lacked the tools for such an analysis,<sup>16</sup> but there is reason to believe that he held intuitively to a similar conception to Foucault. Foucault sees difference as manifesting itself, necessarily, within unity, the latter which is always precarious, always changing and never completely predictable. Just for instance, as “Britishness” defines a common attribute between a group of people, so within the group, and simultaneous or identical with it, there are a myriad of differences, pertaining to appearance, gender, age, or what have you. In this sense commonness and difference are co-present features of any phenomena. Within the existing horizon of survival, there are many legitimate yet different ways to live. It is in this sense also that in place of unilinear conceptions of change and causality, Foucault’s model of historical materialism is consistent with twentieth century conceptions of complexity theory. New realities, both physical and social, manifest themselves as emergent phenomena. While there is no necessary equilibrium which produces “happy endings” or “self-regulated markets,” within limits we can understand the *affects* that particular combinations, alliances and choices entail. Understanding possible *affects* of combinations, and alliances, is indeed the task of education and of ethics. To understand education as concerned with a *theory of affects*, is of course to draw off Deleuze, as well as Spinoza and Nietzsche.<sup>17</sup> Yet it is an extension which we think (or hope) Foucault might approve.<sup>18</sup> Certainly it extends his thought in a way which brings out the important differences to Marxism, in a way related to how ethics and education would be conceived to have a role in the new era which is both global and national and which confronts a world that still awaits to be transformed.

The different way individual and collective are related in Foucault compared to Marxism indeed suggests a new order of ethics. In his later books, *The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self*, as Jane Bennett (1996, p. 655) explains, Foucault considers ethics as both a “code of morality” and in relation to “subjectivation.” As a “code morality,” ethics relates to justified moral precepts and rules. Christianity comprised one set of these, yet today, the new demands of survival, centering on issues like climate change and the health of populations, presents a different set of precepts to guide action. In

addition, however, such rules will not dictate or define conduct for each individual for every situation. While the tasks and requirements of survival will dictate some general, although historically specific, precepts and “rules,” different contingent imperatives at different times and places will also operate, so the individuals’ mode of ethical comportment will also reflect decisions, choices and commitments which only he/she can decide in particular situations. For Foucault, as for poststructuralism in general, every action, like every statement, has a novel aspect, a situated and dated uniqueness, whereby ethical decisions and actions assume great importance for society and for the groups and individuals that comprise it. In this sense, as Bennett (1996, p. 655) explains, “Foucault finds ‘code morality’ insufficient.” She cites Foucault (1985, p. 28):

In short, for an action to be ‘moral,’ it must not be reducible to an act or a series of acts conforming to a rule, or a value. There is no moral conduct that does not [also] call for forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without ‘modes of subjectivation’ and an ‘ascetics’ or ‘practices of the self’ that support them.

One dimension of Foucault’s writings on ethics that assumes importance for education today relates to global activism. This is related to the propensity or preparedness of groups and individuals to speak out, take a stand, or to join together to protest. Foucault, in his own life, manifested a constant preparedness and concern with many causes including the rights of prisoners, of lawyers who defended radical groups, and of the poor. Hence, he voiced concern for the rights of those on the high seas, against piracy, where he speaks of “human rights” to “confront governments” which are beyond the limits of nationality.<sup>19</sup> As he puts it (Foucault, 2001b, p. 474),

There exists an international citizenship that has its rights and its duties, and that obliges one to speak out against every abuse of power, whoever its author, whoever its victims. After all, we are all members of the community of the governed, and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity.... It is the duty of this international citizenship to always bring the testimony of people’s suffering to the eyes and ears of governments....The suffering of men must never be the silent residue of policy. It grounds an absolute right to stand up and speak to those who hold power.

Foucault’s approach, as extended through concepts such as *parrhésia*, and contestation and resistance, also supports a model of global democracy and the role of grassroots critical social movements, which constitute a “bottom up” theory of the democratization of world order, and suggests a conception of education as instilling radical global citizenship. Such global protest movements constitute a check on nation states and put them under an obligation to

respect human rights, as well as to refrain from exploiting or persecuting individuals within their borders. It creates, also, the conditions where all nations actions are monitored, and rendered accountable, at supra-national levels, and where each are encouraged to adjust their own regime to accord with international standards and principles that have been deemed important at this time. Although the Iraq war has set back the cause of constructive international relations by decades, undermining the role of the United Nations, and having a hugely detrimental affect on producing a viable global approach to humanitarian intervention, notwithstanding such setbacks, it is towards a stable and just international order that Foucauldian political economy strives.

### Acknowledgements

This article was previously published in Anthony Green, Glenn Rikowski and Helen Raduntz (eds.), *Renewing Dialogues in Marxism and Education: Openings*. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, pp. 151–182, March, 2008. The editors and publishers are thanked for its reproduction in this outlet.

### NOTES

1. This introduction is based upon an editorial written for a special issue called “Marxist Futures” for the journal *Policy Futures in Education* (Peters, 2004).

2. References here and below except where otherwise indicated are from web site: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/index/htm> (accessed 12th Sept, 2005, transcribed by Tim Delaney).

3. The full title of Darwin’s masterpiece is *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* available at <http://www.literature.org/authors/darwin-charles/the-origin-of-species/index.html> (accessed 13th Sept., 2005).

4. While Marx did indeed send Darwin a copy of his famous work in second edition to Darwin in 1873 it remained uncut on his shelves and there is no evidence that he read it. It also seems likely that the source of the myth is a confusion over a letter by Darwin published in a Soviet newspaper in 1931 which does not mention Marx but declines the offer of a dedication. The letter concerned Edward Aveling’s (Marx’s son in law) *The Students’ Darwin* (Wheen, 1999); see also [http://www.evowiki.org/index.php/Darwin\\_and\\_Marx](http://www.evowiki.org/index.php/Darwin_and_Marx) (accessed 13 Sept., 2005).

5. See also Bowles & Gintis (2001), “*Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited*” at <http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/soced.pdf#search=%22Herbert%20Gintis%2C%20Schooling%20in%20Capitalist%20America%3A%20Educational%20Reform%20and%22>.

6. Political economy originally in the Greek had three related meanings: *oikonomia* meant the management of a household or family, *politike* meant pertaining to the state; and, *ta oikonomika* or economics, meant the art of household management. Thus *political economy* originally meant the management of the household of the

State. It was used in this sense both by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith. Rousseau in “A Discourse on Political Economy” in 1755 defines political economy as “the government of the State for the common good.” Rousseau says, “The word Economy, or OEconomy, is derived from *oikos*, a house, and *nomos*, law, for the common originally only the wise and legitimate government of the house for the common good of the whole family. The meaning of the term was then extended to the government of that great family, the State. To distinguish these two senses of the word, the latter is called *general* or *political* economy, and the former domestic or particular economy” (<http://www.constitution.org/jjr/polecon.htm> accessed 14 August 2005).

7. New political economy seeks to combine “the breadth of vision of the classical political economy of the 19th century with the analytical advances of twentieth-century social science;” to overcome old distinctions and divisions of the past (agency/structure; state/market) to provide an integrated analysis that draws on a range of concepts and methodologies without favoring adherence to one particular school, method or theoretical approach. New political economy might draw on a range of theory: institutional-organizational approaches in economics; comparative theories of institutional and economic change in economics and economic history; structuration theory and strategic-relational theory in sociology; critical theories in international relations. This is drawn from the Editorial by Andrew Gamble, Anthony Payne, Michael Dietrich, Ankie Hoogvelt and Michael Kenny for the journal *New Political Economy* when it was established in 1996.

8. This paragraph is reformulated from the book by Mark Olssen (2006a), *Michel Foucault: Materialism and Education*, Boulder, Paradigm Publishers.

9. In his *Résumé du cours* for 1979 (in Foucault, 2004b: 323) Foucault indicates that the method he will adopt is based on Paul Veyne’s nominalist history and in this respect he writes:

Et reprenant un certain nombre de choix de méthode déjà faits, j’ai essayé d’analyser le <<libéralisme>>, non pas une théorie ni comme une idéologie, encore moins, bien entendu, comme une manière pour la <<société>> de <<se\ représenter>>; mais comme une pratique, c’est-à-dire comme une <<manière de faire>> orientée vers objectifs et se régulant par une réflexion continue. Le libéralisme est à analyser alors comme principe et méthode de rationalisation de l’exercice de gouvernement-rationalisation qui obéit, et c’est là sa spécificité, à la règle interne de l’économie maximale.

10. The Foucault archives have been relocated from the IMEC (Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine) Paris address (9, rue Bleue, F-75009 Paris) to Abbaye d’Ardenne (14280 Saint Germaine la Blanche-Herbe), email: [bibliotheque@imec-archives.com](mailto:bibliotheque@imec-archives.com). <<Il faut défendre la société>>, a course Foucault delivered in 1975–1976, was translated into by David Macey as *Society Must Be Defended* was published in 2003 by Penguin (Foucault, 2003). While courses for 1977–78, 1978–79, as previously mentioned, and 1981–82 (<<L’Herméneutique de sujet>>) have been recently published (in the Gallimard/Seuill series), courses for the years 1979–80, 1980–81, 1982–83, 1983–84 are still only available from the IMEC Foucault archive as recorded tapes. Some work has still to be translated.

11. The governmentality literature has grown up around the journal *Economy and Society*, and includes the work of Cruickshank, Hindess, Hunter, Larner, Minson, O'Malley, Owen, and others, as well as those referred to above, most of who have published in *Economy and Society* (for aims and scope, and table of contents, see <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/03085147.asp>).

12. See Olssen, Codd, O'Neill (2004: 167–171); Olssen, 2006: pp. 29–30, 108, Ch. 10. Also see “Why Foucault?” (Peters, 2004) where Peters discusses Foucault studies in the English-speaking world by reference to the work of Marshall, Olssen, Ball, Popkewitz & Brennan, Besley, Baker, Middleton and myself. My work on Foucault's governmentality dates from Peters (1994), with additional work in 1996 (with Marshall), Peters (1996), Peters (1997), and Peters (2001a, b, c). For additional work on Foucault see Peters (2003a & b), Peters (2005a & b). A special issue of *Educational Philosophy and Theory* published a special issue in 2006 entitled “The Learning Society and Governmentality” edited by Masschelein, Bröckling, Simons and Pongratz.

13. As he writes in his *Résumé du cours* (in Foucault, 2004b: 323):

Le thème retenu était doc la <<biopolitique>>: j'entendais par là la manière don't on a essayé, depuis le XVIII siècle, de rationaliser les problèmes posés à la pratique gouvènement par les phénomènes propres à une ensemble de vivants constitues en population: santé, hygiène, natalité, longévité, races...

14. The remainder of this section is reformulated and drawn from Olssen, Codd, O'Neill (2004) *Education Policy: Globalisation, Citizenship, Democracy*. London: Sage.

15. This is the process which Ritzer (2000) describes as the “McDonaldization of Society.”

16. The reason usually given, but which in any case would be consistent with our statement here, is that Marx considered theoretical speculation of this sort unscientific, indeed, utopian, because economic and social conditions would themselves change in ways that were unpredictable.

17. See Deleuze's (1988) book called *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, where he articulates the theory of affects.

18. Types of affects might include desire, sadness or joy, as they did for Spinoza. However, the reader should entertain the possibility that Foucault would quite possibly object to this form of theorizing on the ground he eschewed normative theorizing of this sort. In extending Foucault in this way, it is thus in the spirit of the types of educational possibility and the types of normative theory that we are observing might “fit” with his Nietzschean approach. This seems to be a worthwhile way to extend Foucault if the possibilities of a Foucauldian radical political economy are to be developed.

19. The occasion for the statement cited here, published in *Liberation* in June 1884, was the announcement in Geneva of the creation of an international committee against piracy.

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## EXTERNALISTIC DEROGATION

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**ABSTRACT.** This paper argues that there cannot be non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of racial, homophobic or sexist slurs, contrary to what some authors have contended. I focus on two groups of alleged examples of non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of slurs that have been presented in the literature, and I argue that they are both misguided in one way or another. I especially concentrate on the second set of examples, arguing that it presupposes what may be called an Internalism about derogation, whereby whether the use of a term is derogatory is a matter that can be determined by the intentions of the speaker. I then set forth what I call Externalism about derogation, according to which whether a term is derogatory depends on the way and degree to which it expresses derogation at the level of its socially and culturally shaped communicative import.

**Keywords:** externalistic derogation; racial; homophobic; sexist slur

### Introduction

The question I will address in this paper is the following: is it possible for a speaker who does not belong to any particular discriminated group to use a slur in a non-derogatory way? I will understand the notion of derogation or of the derogatory character of an expression as the power that an (utterance of that) expression has to *produce a range of effects*, such as offending, insulting, denigrating, belittling, demeaning or ridiculing a certain subject or group. My consideration will be specifically restricted to racial, homophobic and sexist slurs, that is, terms that are typically used to insult, offend or denigrate a person or group only on the basis of factors like race, sexual orientation or gender. It is important that the slur is used by a speaker who does not belong to any of these targeted groups, otherwise the suspicion could arise that the use is *appropriated*, that is, that the slur has become part of the vocabulary of the target group itself, therefore losing its insulting charge (see Croom 2013). The question is therefore if there can be, borrow-

ing Hom's words, "non-appropriated, non-derogatory uses" of certain slurs (Hom 2008, 2010). I will argue that there cannot be.

Here is how I will approach the matter: first of all, I will examine two sets of examples of alleged non-appropriated, non-derogatory uses of slurs and I will argue that, for different reasons, each set of examples is misguided. I will then concentrate on the failure of the second set of examples and offer a diagnosis of it: as I will suggest, the problem is that what may be called an Internalism about derogation is assumed, which is shown wrong once the examples are more carefully scrutinized. I will then advance the opposite idea, that I will dub Externalism about derogation.

## **1. Alleged Non-derogatory, Non-appropriated Uses of Slurs**

**1.1 Pedagogical cases.** Some authors have recently contended that there can be non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of slurs. Christopher Hom (2008) gives much emphasis to this kind of uses and provides a fairly long list of them, while arguing for a purely semantic account of the communicative import of slurs. Indeed, the fact that there can be non-appropriated, non-derogatory uses of slurs is one of the main motivations for Hom's proposal: if the racist or homophobic import can be encoded semantically, then it can be explained how these uses retain their racist or homophobic meaning without expressing any derogation. Let us take a closer look to some of these examples. Hom introduces them as uses of a slur that may serve for *pedagogical purposes*. We could imagine that these sentences were uttered by a school teacher to her pupils (I here take a selection of the sentences listed by Hom):

- (1) Yao Ming is Chinese, but he's not a chink.
- (2) Chinks are (supposedly) despicable because of their race, but Chinese people are not.
- (3) There are no chinks; racists are wrong.
- (4) Thinking that Chinese people are chinks is to be radically wrong about the world.
- (5) Are Chinese people chinks?
- (6) Is Yao Ming a chink?
- (7) What is it to believe that Chinese people are chinks?
- (8) Am I racist if I believe that Chinese people are chinks?  
(Hom 2008: 429)

I agree with Hom that, in these sentences, the word "chink" does not derogate the target class. Yet I am not sure that the very same word in any of these sentences is *really used*. Here is why: although the written version of these sentences may appear acceptable even if the word "chink" is not between

quotation marks, it is likely that that very word will be somehow *prosodically marked* in speech: the teacher may raise her tone of voice while uttering the word; or she may lower it; she may change her intonation; she may pause briefly before uttering the incriminated word; or she may accompany the utterance with a facial expression (for example, raising her eyebrows, wrinkling her nose). These may be signals that the speaker intends the word and its meaning to be isolated from the rest of her speech and there is reason to think that that is not only because the teacher wants to draw attention on them. Given that the word expresses a content associated with judgments or values that she does not wish to transmit to the pupils, it is reasonable to think that she *does not wish her audience to take this as a genuine use of the word*. So she alters the prosody of the sentence in order to signal that she is not seriously using the word, and in order to distance herself from the derogatory force carried by it.

It could be objected that it is perfectly possible that these sentences are uttered with no prosody alteration whatsoever (I doubt this will happen often; but sure it's a possibility). In these cases, I take it that what settles the question between a genuine and a non-genuine use is whether or not the speaker's purposes are manifest and mutually known: if they are, then even in the absence of any prosody change it will be sufficiently clear to the audience that the word should not be regarded as seriously used.

But what does it mean that the word is not "really" or "seriously" or "genuinely" used? It does not simply mean that the slur is used but it is not accompanied by the intention to derogate. My suggestion is that the word's use is *merely mimicked*. Mimicked use does not give rise to certain commitments to which a real use does give rise, even if with that use the speaker has no intention to derogate. To see this difference, we could imagine a Racist Teacher who believes in there being "chinks" (associated with a bad stereotype and contemptible) and "Chinese" (associated with a good stereotype and respectable). With a pedagogical intent and with no intention to derogate, she could utter (1) "Yao Ming is Chinese, but he's not a chink," or any other sentence among (2)–(8) – with the only exception of (3). This, I take, would count as a *real* use of the word "chink" to the extent that it *presupposes that there are chinks*. With this use, even if the Racist Teacher does not intend to derogate, she *commits herself to the existence of chinks*. By contrast, we want the Antiracist Teacher not to give rise to any of these presuppositions and to take no commitments as to the existence of chinks. The mere absence of an intention to derogate is not enough, because the presupposition and commitments as to the existence of chinks could be still in place. What is needed is a mere *mimicry of use*, to which the teacher might appeal in order to distance herself from the suspect that her use is presupposing and hence committing herself to the existence of chinks. The mimicked use could be

signaled prosodically, as suggested earlier, with variations in the volume of her voice, intonation, rhythm; or with a change in facial expression.

I am aware that idea of a mimicked use has just been coined “from the armchair,” as it were (note that a similar idea may have been already been captured by the notion of “echoic use,” cf. Recanati 2010). Consequently, I would not predict that the teacher would explain herself by invoking the fact that she was “merely mimicking” the use of “chink.” Yet, if we understand mimicked use as simply “utterance that does not give rise to any presupposition/commitment associated with typical uses,” we may see that speakers could indeed invoke this notion when explaining or justifying their speech acts. Thus, the Antiracist Teacher could defend her use of the word “chink” in the classroom by explicitly denying presupposition of or commitment to the existence of chinks. She could say: “Yes, I said ‘chink’ but I didn’t mean that there are any chinks;” or “Yes, I said that Yao is not a chink, and I do not think that there are any chinks!”

The conclusion is the following: in Hom’s examples, there is no non-derogatory, non-appropriated use of the slur “chink,” because there is *no real use*, but only what I have called a *mimicked use*, that is, an utterance that does not give rise to any of the typical presuppositions and commitments of real uses. Mimicked use could be considered a *middle-way between use and mention*, because (like use) it does not need quotation marks, but at the same time (like mention) it is not associated with specific conversational consequences like the generation of presuppositions, or various commitments to which the speaker becomes answerable.<sup>1</sup>

It could be pointed out that even when a slur is not used – for example, when it is merely *mentioned* – it turns out as derogatory (Anderson and Lepore 2013a, b). So, I cannot really concede that the utterance is non-derogatory because it does not involve use, if even mentionings can derogate! Mention of a slur can sure be problematic: but I think this is just because slurs are *bad words*, to an extent that even mentioning them is perceived as dirty and unacceptable. Yet, it seems to me that, insofar as it is clear enough to the audience that the speaker is merely mentioning the slur, there will be no derogation. Something similar happens with mimicked use: as long as it is clear enough to the audience that the speaker is not endorsing racism and so she is only mimicking use, there will be no derogation, even though, admittedly, even mimicked use may cause a sense of squeamishness and dirtiness because the involved word cannot but be perceived as *bad*.

**1.2 Praising with slurs.** Let us now move to the second set of alleged examples of non-appropriated, non-derogatory uses. I will resume some examples from a recent article by Elizabeth Camp (2013), even though I should emphasize that Camp does *not* take them as non-derogatory. My arguments

will therefore *not* be directed at Camp's views. Still, I believe her examples are worthy of attention insofar as they are revealing of a popular way of thinking about slurs. To my knowledge, no author has ever endorsed this view officially. We should take it as a "folk view" of the derogatory import of slurs, which may probably be more widespread than we expect and that also implicitly enables the racist perspective. We may call this the *Just-Words* view. The Just-Words view states something along these lines: "Slurs are just words. If you do not have disparaging intentions, if you use them without contempt, they will not offend anyone." The defendant of the Just-Words view could therefore take the sentences enlisted by Camp as non-derogatory.

(9) I'm glad we have so many spics at our school: they always bring the best food to our fund-raising functions.

(10) I wonder whether Japs like to cuddle their babies as much as Chinks seem to.

(11) I have nothing but admiration for spics. I mean, they sure do look out for each other, and they know how to work hard and have a good time. You know, some of my best friends are spics.

(Camp 2013: 332–3)

The sentences above are supposed to be uttered by a person who feels no contempt for the target group and in fact feels affection or admiration; by uttering these sentences, the speaker wishes to praise the group, or some aspects (the food) or activities associated with it (cuddling their babies, looking out for each other, etc.). Against the "Just-Words" view, I wish to argue that uses of these sentences are derogatory. The reason is that the slurring word retains a derogatory force, which is likely to be noticed by hearers. Some perfectly reasonable reactions which the audience is likely to have suggest that the word maintains a derogatory power.

Listening to someone uttering a slurring word is likely to trigger some opposing reaction, unless the listeners share and endorse the values and standards underlying the word, and provided the circumstances do not discourage reacting: for example, listeners are not shy; they are not afraid of or intimidated by the speaker; or they don't fail to care. I will describe three of these reactions and argue that the best way of accounting for them is that the term still retains a derogatory force, irrespectively of the speaker's intentions.

The first reaction is *questioning the speaker* as to why, if she admires, respects or anyway has nothing against Hispanics or Chinese, she uses words like "spic" or "chink." If we put ourselves in the shoes of someone who hears this utterance, it seems we would be entirely justified in our reacting with questions like the following: "I understand that you do not mean to disrespect Hispanics; but then, why do you call them spics?". The best way to

explain this request of clarification is that the terms “spic” and “chink” still retain a derogatory force, no matter the kind intents of the utterer.

The second reaction is *criticism* or *reproach*: once again, if we put ourselves in the shoes of the listener, it seems we would be entitled to criticizing the speaker for her use of the slurs. In fact, reproach seems in place *precisely because* the exhibited attitude is so kind and benevolent. It therefore appears to me legitimate to manifest one’s disapproval to the speaker by saying something along these lines: “I think you should not be using these words, especially since you express respect for these communities.” Once again, the best explanation for a similar criticism or reproach strikes me as being that the word retains its slurring potential, no matter the intentions of the speaker.

The third reaction is *distancing*. From the hearer’s perspective, it might be perfectly justified to endorse the positive or neutral contents expressed by the speaker but reject the slurring expressions she has used. So, for instance, I take it that the following comments would be fully appropriate: “Yes, Hispanics do bring the best food, but I would not call them like you did;” “Yes, I too wonder if Japanese cuddle their babies as much as Chinese do... well, without using epithets;” and so on. Once again, I take it that the best explanation for the success of this distancing move is that the slurs retain their offensive charge, even though the speaker has no offensive attitudes or intentions (and the hearer recognizes that by endorsing the positive or neutral contents expressed by the utterer).

It could seem that these considerations merely beg the question against the “Just-Words” view, but really they do not. The arguments employed above share the same structure, which is the following: first, it seems that there can be non-derogatory (non-appropriated) uses of a slur. But some reactions, such as questioning, reproaching or distancing, seem to be perfectly reasonable if we consider the point of view of the hearer. The best explanation for these reactions is that the word retains its derogatory force no matter the intentions of the speaker. So, the use is *not* non-derogatory. The reasonableness of the three reactions listed above is something we appreciate pre-theoretically or intuitively if we put ourselves in the hearer’s perspective; it does *not* depend on previously accepting that the use is derogatory no matter the intentions of the speakers.

It could be objected that in the cases just analyzed, even though the term maintains its *disposition* to derogate, there is no *occurrent* derogation. Yet this distinction appears to me overly artificial and hardly testable. What predictions would this distinction allow to make? How could one test them? Perhaps one way to test the presence of an occurrent as opposed to merely dispositional derogation is to reproduce the whole scenarios of sentences (9)–(11) in front of a member of the targeted group and see what her reactions are. Supposedly, if the derogation is merely dispositional, the listener should not

complain about the use and not declare herself offended. Provided there is no way to predict whether every, most, a few or none of the targeted subjects would fail to have these reactions, I think we should look at whether the reaction itself (complaining and declaring oneself offended) would be intuitively justified or not. My hunch is that in the cases of (9)–(11) the target subject would be justified in complaining about the term’s use and in declaring herself offended. This seems enough to show that, even if there is a merely dispositional derogation, this does not differ from occurrent derogation when it comes to its conversational consequences and effects on the targeted group. So, the distinction does not help the proponent of non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of slurs.

Of course, there is always the possibility that the speaker is engaging in some sort of non-literal use. For example, the utterances in (9)–(11) could be cases of *irony*. Yet, as far as I can see it, this would not help the idea that the use is non-derogatory in any interesting sense. We have two ways of explaining this. The first option is to subscribe to a Grice-style conception of irony as *pretence* of use, which leads us back to talking about “mimicked use.” The speaker is merely pretending to use the word, but this (if the speaker’s intentions are correctly interpreted) is not meant to generate any dangerous presuppositions or commitments within the conversation. The second option is to consider those in (9)–(11) as real uses which somehow manage to “not offend anyone” due to the fact that the hearer is *so charitable* as to interpret the word as not insulting. How could this possibly happen? Here is a possible reconstruction: the hearer understands the word and is aware of its derogatory potential, but manages to “screen off” any derogatory effect out of charity considerations. Unfortunately, this does not mean that the slur’s use is non-derogatory “from the start,” which I guess would be the interesting claim at stake here. It means only that it can be understood as neutral as a result of the interpreter’s carrying out certain pragmatic inferences (be they conscious or merely sub-personal). This is a much more humdrum claim that anyone would likely be ready to subscribe.

A further, different possibility is that in the speaker’s circle (friends, family, church or neighborhood), these words are used as neutral or even as terms of affection. Yet, it would be misguided to think that in these circumstances we face standard uses of the slur. In fact, it is likely that what these people are using is a different *idiolect*, in which it is in some sense a convention that the word may be used in a “non-slur” modality.

## 2. Internalism and Externalism about Derogation

We are now in a position to attempt a diagnosis of what is wrong with examples (9)–(11): the problem may be identified with a background assumption

that seems to sustain them, which might be called *Internalism about derogation*. This may be spelled out as the idea that whether a word turns out as derogatory or not is a matter that can be determined by the feelings, attitudes and intentions with which the speaker performs an utterance of it. Thus, what seems to me wrong about examples (9)–(11) is that the “Just-Word” defender somehow supposes that, in virtue of the speaker’s feelings of admiration and desire to praise, the slurs “spic” or “chink” can lose their derogating power. As we have seen, at least three reactions that the audience might have (questioning, reproaching and distancing) strongly suggest that the slur instead retains this derogating power, irrespective of the speaker’s intentions.

In light of these considerations, exactly the opposite idea seems to hold: the derogatory force of a slur remains in place irrespective of the speaker’s feelings, attitudes or intentions. We may dub this *Externalism about derogation*. It is important that the thesis be understood as being about *derogation itself*: that is, very roughly, the power that a term has to produce certain effects, such as humiliating, denigrating, demeaning or ridiculing a group or an individual.

Very tentatively, the explanation for an Externalism about derogation may be spelled out as follows: slurs are, at a social and cultural level, tools with the clear function of producing effects like those previously listed: humiliating, insulting, denigrating, belittling, demeaning or ridiculing. As a consequence of slurs’ acquiring this function at a collective level, particular uses are most easily and spontaneously interpreted as giving rise to any of these derogatory effects, even though the feelings and intentions of the utterer are in fact divergent. In other words, since the derogatory function of slurs is, so to speak, institutionalized, uses of these words not accompanied by non-derogatory intentions are not immediately recognized by hearers who do not share the values that underlie use of a slur.

An important warning: This proposal is neutral with respect to a theory about the semantics of slurs, in that it only confines itself to assuming, non-controversially I hope, that slurs are normally used to derogate (and that they in some sense “perform this function” at a social-cultural level) and, on this basis, it states that derogation effects are externalistically established. It is a separate question whether the derogatory aspects associated with slurs are part of their *semantics* proper, whether they are part of what uses of slurs *pragmatically convey*, whether they are a mere *expression of attitudes* like contempt or hatred, or whether they are simply a consequence of slurs being *prohibited or taboo*.

Be that as it may, whatever theory one may favor, it seems to me one should be ready to take on board this form of externalism, and reject Internalism on derogation. Evidence suggesting that Internalism about derogation is false comes, as we have seen, from the failure of alleged cases of non-

derogatory, non-appropriated uses in which the speaker manifests praising intentions. Yet, I am inclined to think that it comes also from other considerations already advanced in the literature, as to the impossibility or extreme difficulty to avoid the slur's derogating effects in certain linguistic forms (Anderson and Lepore 2013a, b). I will devote the last paragraphs of this section to these phenomena.

The first case is that of *belief reports where the slur appears in subject position in the reported clause*. This type of case is telling because, generally, when a speaker reports someone else's thoughts, she needs not be answerable to the implications of uttering the words that occur embedded in the "believes that..." clause. This happens even if the reported words have the power to offend or hurt. For instance, suppose Mary utters "Jenny thinks black people have horrible taste for fashion." Jenny's thought is in some sense derogatory, in that it consists of a racially based generalization, completely ungrounded and most probably false (see Haslanger 2011); but there is no way Mary can appear as derogating black people by merely reporting Jenny's belief. Yet, if Mary were to utter: "Jenny thinks that niggers have a horrible taste for fashion," she would definitely count as endorsing the racist and derogatory perspective imparted by the term "nigger," despite the linguistic mechanism of belief report.

Something similar happens with *indirect speech reports where the slur appears in subject position in the reported sentence*. Again, if Mary uttered "Jenny said that black people have a horrible taste for fashion," she would not be answerable for having used the words "black people;" instead, if she uttered "Jenny said that niggers have a horrible taste for fashion," she would be answerable for having used the word "nigger" and, what is more, this would hold independently of whether Jenny used the word "nigger" in her original assertion (Anderson and Lepore 2013b: 30). Both phenomena are best explained with the idea that the derogatory power of the word "nigger" holds independently of the feelings, attitudes or intentions of the speaker, which we can assume as being neutral (at least towards the target group) in the above cases of belief and indirect speech reports.

Even uses that might appear at first sight "safer" carry the risk of making the speaker look complicit with the racist perspective expressed by the slur. The first set of cases is formed by *speech or belief reports where the slur appears in predicate position*. Suppose Mary utters "Jenny said/thinks that Craig is a nigger." The fact that the word "nigger" appears in predicate position seems to make the speaker's use slightly less risky than in the case where the same word appears in subject position. The reason is perhaps that, if used in subject position, it is easier to interpret the word as carrying a presupposition of existence. If the same word is in predicate position, the presupposition of existence may not arise, unless it is mutually known that

the speaker believes in there being niggers. Here the case seems parallel to that of the Racist and Antiracist teachers in the pedagogical context: if it is common knowledge that the teacher is racist, her uses of “chink” will be judged as presupposing the associated discriminatory perspective. If it is common knowledge that she is not a racist, the uses might be fine, even though I have contended they would be only *mimicked*. One could make a case that, if it is mutual knowledge that the reporter is not a racist, her uses of “nigger” are mimicked as well. Be that as it may, even though the use might not give rise to any presupposition of existence, it could still make either the speaker or her audience *extremely uncomfortable*.

A similar phenomenon may be observed with *direct quotation*: even direct quotations of slurs like “kike” or “nigger” might sound compromising and implicitly indicating a commitment to derogation, and might therefore be either unpleasant to hear or unspeakable. As mentioned in section 1.1, in my view quotations would not be strictly speaking derogatory: if it is clear enough that the speaker is merely mentioning a slur, no one should really get offended. Yet, it will be hard to avoid a sense of squeamishness, dirtiness or unacceptability even in the face of an evident instance of slur-mention. Once again, I am persuaded that the best explanation for the discomfort caused by both reports with slurs in predicate position and direct quotation is that derogation obtains as a matter of socially or culturally established conventions, to an extent that it almost infects even the most aseptic linguistic environments. Overall, this evidence pushes us in the direction of an Externalism on derogation.

Lastly, let me make clear that what is not possible, according to my proposal, are *isolated* non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of a slur. These isolated uses differ from the phenomenon of *accumulated* uses of a derogatory word that, as a result of social and cultural changes, gradually lose their offensive charge. I certainly do not think that such phenomena are impossible. It is known for a fact that terms like “gay” or “queer,” for instance, have gone from derogatory to neutral as a result of social, cultural and political changes. Let me say, however, that from the present perspective such a development seems implausible for other slurs, such as for instance “nigger.” In this respect, I side with a remark made by Hornsby: “When words – racist words, say – have been used too often in a way that purports to validate the attitudes they impart, there is nothing to be done except to find different words. [...] The choice of new words can signal our shunning of what we’d like them to supplant.” (Hornsby 2001: 133–4)

Slow, gradual, collective transitions of a word from derogatory to non-derogatory may be less attractive and convenient than the dismissal of the compromised, derogatory term in favour of a non-derogatory new word.

## Conclusion

It seems misguided to think that one can use a slurring word without somehow derogating anybody. Seeming examples of non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of slurs have been shown mistaken in one way or another. In some cases (Hom's examples), there is reason to think they are not genuine uses, but what I have called "mimicked uses." In some other cases (borrowed from Camp and associated with the "Just-Words" folk view), from legitimate potential reactions we learn that the word most likely retains its derogatory force despite the kind intentions of the speaker. The second set of examples seems to presuppose an Internalism about derogation. I have tried to convince the reader that the opposite holds: whether a slur is derogatory cannot be determined by the feelings and intentions of the speaker. This is tantamount to advocate an Externalism about derogation. Epithets can offend even if we have the best intentions in this world. This is yet another reason to weight our words before speaking them.

## Acknowledgments

Work on this article was possible thanks to the funding provided by project CONACyT CCB 2011 166 502 at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in 2014. I am grateful to the people that discussed this work with me at UNAM, especially Andrea Onofri.

## NOTE

1. Following a cursory remark by Williamson (2009), one could suggest that the teacher's uses of "chink" in (1)–(8) are an instance of *sense quotation*, where the word at issue denotes its own meaning (the idea is familiar from Frege and is revived by Kaplan 1969). The problem of sense quotation for "chink" is that it may still give rise to presuppositions concerning the existence of chinks. The presupposition may certainly arise in the following contexts where supposedly one has switched to sense quotation: "The word 'chink' means *chink*;" "Jenny believes *chinks* live in China". We need something substantially weaker than even sense quotation, which is compatible with the disavowal of any presupposition of existence. I believe the notion of mimicked use could suit this purpose.

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## **SOME VARIATIONS OF THE CERTAINTY OF ONE'S OWN DEATH**

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**ABSTRACT.** In principle, every mentally healthy adult in Western civilization should be completely convinced that he will die and that his death might happen at any time. In this paper, however, I bring up the work of two Spanish authors, the poet Antonio Machado and the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, to shed light on alternatives to the above-mentioned convictions like the impossibility of believing in one's own death, the feeling of the child who conceives himself as eternal, the belief of imminently going to die, the state of doubt between two beliefs about death, and the certainty that one will die so late that his possibility of dying seems to dissipate almost entirely in the short to medium term. To analyze in detail the characteristics of this last certainty, I will base myself on the late work of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose conception of "world-picture" I will criticize because of its static nature.

**Keywords:** death; belief; certainty; knowledge; Antonio Machado;  
José Ortega y Gasset; Ludwig Wittgenstein

### **1. Introduction**

There are many certainties or basic convictions which are shared by all mentally healthy people, for example: "I am alive," "I have a body," "People to whom I am now speaking do exist," etc. But none of these convictions are expressed through sayings or proverbs. Admittedly, it may be objected that it is completely normal that there are no sayings about these issues, for the oddity would have been that some saying confirmed our security of being alive, having a body, or speaking right now to people who exist. After all, these convictions are so glaringly obvious that it would be redundant and absurd to mention them. These things are so evident that folk wisdom does not even address them. But paradoxically, there are certainties which are

expressed through a number of sayings even though they are as unquestionable as the three convictions mentioned above. I am referring to certainties like “I will die” and “I may die at any moment,” which have been reflected generation after generation in sayings like “Nothing so certain as death,” “There is a remedy for everything except death,” “Every door may be shut but death’s door,” “Death keeps no calendar,” etc. Although it would be very difficult to precise why these sayings have been widely used over many centuries, I might venture that some generations have found in these sayings a way of not only expressing their anguish, but also of facilitating their resignation in the face of such an inevitable destiny. In short, it is normal that the acceptance that one has to die sooner or later generates suffering and resistances. Michelangelo, and above all Masaccio, tragically reflected Adam and Eve’s suffering when the Lord God announced them “for dust you are and to dust you will return” (*Gen.* 3. 19) just before banishing them from the Garden of Eden. If we were certain that we will die and that we can die at any moment, and hence showed the same lack of resistance to these certainties that we show to the certainties of being alive, having a body or speaking right now to people who exist, there would be no need to express the first two certainties through multiple sayings. If people were really certain that they will die and that they can die at any instant, it should not be so unexpected to them to be diagnosed with an imminent death, for such a possibility would *already* be implicit and taken for granted in the assumption that one can die at any moment. This leads me to wonder whether there are many or at least some people who do not really share the certainty that they may die at any instant, so that they would have different certainties about this issue.

In order to contrast diverse beliefs or certainties about our finitude, I will shed light on the remarks that Antonio Machado made on the belief in one’s own death by taking as reference José Ortega y Gasset’s distinctions between “living faith” and “dead faith,” and above all, between ideas and beliefs.<sup>1</sup> Thus, I will reflect on the consequences of Machado’s consideration of death as an object of belief: to be precise, I will criticize Machado’s claim according to which it is much more bearable to think of death than to believe in it. To complement this first approach, I will subsequently adopt the terminology of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty* to develop an *alternative* way of understanding certainties. My aim is to analyze the possibility that many or some people currently have a given certainty about their own death which would be substituted for another one as soon as the threat of imminent death was suspected. Finally, this exposition will also help to clarify how we could understand people with different certainties about death.

## 2. The Belief in One's Own Death according to Ortega and Machado

Ortega considers beliefs as anything we take for granted in our current way of acting without even thinking about it, whereas he describes ideas as thoughts we consciously build at a particular moment to cover the hole that has been opened by a doubt in the layer of beliefs (*IC*, pp. 35–36, 42–43, 54). From Ortega's standpoint, beliefs do not arise at a particular time on a particular day, for they do not emerge due to our thinking of them. In fact, beliefs are not contents of our life, but its very container. In other words, we are our beliefs because for us, they are mixed with reality itself (*IC*, p. 24). According to Ortega, every adhesion to any given thought already entails the intention of thinking about something. Since this adhesion depends on our will, it automatically ceases to be reality for us, for reality is *counterwill* ("*contravoluntad*"): namely what we encounter, but not what we furnish or make (*IC*, p. 31). In our beliefs we are, live and move. That is why we are not usually aware of them: they are latent in all we expressly do and think. In Ortega's opinion, when we really believe in something, we do not have the "idea" of such thing, but simply take it for granted. And all those things we take for granted in our life constitute our reality (*IC*, p. 29).

Upon reviewing the numerous remarks that Machado makes on "beliefs" (*creencias*) in his work *Juan de Mairena*, it is evident that he uses this term in an Orteguian way. This is not particularly surprising, since Machado was a great admirer of Ortega, to whom he dedicated a poem in which Ortega is described as an "architect" (Machado, 1928, p. 165): this expression is full of meanings, of which I wish to highlight the consideration of Ortega as an architect of the structure of knowledge. In fact, Ortega defined "world" as the architecture which is made up of those very convictions (*ETG*, p. 29) whose nature he clarified by distinguishing between ideas and beliefs. Furthermore, both authors agree in an important issue. According to Ortega (*ETG*, p. 111), people sometimes do not know or do not want to know what they really believe. Hence, they should clarify what they really believe in order to become authentic and to fit in well with themselves. Likewise, Machado uses his fine irony to fight against false beliefs, that is, against "the incredulity disguised as belief" (*JM*, p. 227). As we can see in the following quotation, it is a priority for Machado to distinguish between what we really believe and what we seem to believe:

Below what we think, is what we believe, so to say in a deeper stratum of our mind. There are people so deeply divided with themselves, that they believe the opposite of what they think. And this – I dare say – is the most common (*JM*, p. 209).

It goes without saying that this discrepancy between what people think and what they really believe makes Ortega's distinction between beliefs and ideas

specially relevant. For, as Ortega pointed out, we seek to build a picture of someone's beliefs when we want to understand him or his life (cf. *IC*, p. 23). The distinction between ideas and beliefs is, therefore, of paramount importance to discern what someone believes from what he thinks, for both things are very often confused. But among all beliefs, there is one particularly noteworthy for Machado:

(...) what is specifically human is to believe in death. Do not think that your duty as rhetors consists in deceiving people with their own wishes; for man loves truth to the extent that he accepts the most bitter of all truths in advance. (*JM*, p. 55)

Man has no other course but to surrender to the evidence by accepting that he will die sooner or later. Appropriately, Ortega also considers the belief in one's and in other people's death as a fundamental fact, to the extent that he claims "[t]he most basic fact of human life is that some die and others are born:" this is a fact he takes as a point of reference to provide in his late work a foundation for "the unavoidable need for changes in the structure of the world" (*ETG*, p. 44). But resuming the paragraph in which Machado affirms that man accepts even the most bitter of all truths, I want to stress that the fact that someone *accepts* in principle this truth does not mean that he really *believes* in it. In other words, the mere fact that someone admits in public that he will die sooner or later does not necessarily entail that this is a belief which decisively influences and is a crucial part of his world-picture. In this vein, Freud stated that nobody believes in his own death, that is, "in the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his immortality" (Freud, 1918, p. 20). But this is not the only great contribution Freud made in this field. In his own words:

We regularly lay stress upon the unexpected causes of death, we speak of the accident, the infection, or advanced age, and thus betray our endeavor to debase death from a necessity to an accident. (Freud, 1918, p. 21)

Of course, life can become more bearable for many people if they contemplate death as something that can happen only accidentally. From this point of view, we do not count at all on death unless an unexpected accident takes place; but this accident can be often regarded as avoidable: for example, many fatal traffic accidents could have been avoided by paying more attention to the road or by driving more slowly, some heart attacks might have been preventable by following a healthier diet and exercising more, etc. Although it will be a relief for many people to believe in death as if it were something that can happen only because of an unexpected accident, this relief will be even greater if it is believed that such accidents are avoidable, which may also entail to attribute the occurrence of one of these fatal accidents to fate or

bad luck, among other things. So, despite every mentally healthy individual being certain that he will necessarily die, Machado remarks that people often talk about death without believing in it:

Whenever I am aware of a poet's death, it comes to my mind this thought: How many times this man has referred to death, because of his profession, without believing in it! And what will he have thought, when he has seen it rising up from his own box of surprises? (*JM*, p. 288)

As I said before, acceptance that one will die sooner or later is one thing, but belief in it is quite another. From this point of view, someone might refer to his own death without believing that he will necessarily die. This problem can be formulated by using Ortega's notions of "living faith" and "dead faith." According to Ortega, an individual believes something with living faith if that belief has a constant and very active presence in him, because his life is spontaneously guided by such belief. However, something is believed with dead faith when, although we have not moved away from such belief, it nevertheless has no influence on our life. Proof of this can be seen in the fact that we constantly forget that we still believe in it (*HS*, p. 18). The way I see it, to have dead faith means, then, that someone shares a belief only seemingly, that is, as if it were nothing more than a mere opinion. Hence, an individual would believe with living faith that he may die at any moment if such belief had become part of his reality, whilst he would have dead faith in it if he considered this as an idea or opinion he holds but without it constituting reality for him. In short, and even contradicting Ortega, I hold that whoever believes something with dead faith has really given up believing in it.

It is not an easy task to discern which are some of the beliefs people can have regarding the *possibility* of dying. This is a complex problem, because there does not appear to be an only answer to it: in other words, there seems to be no single belief regarding this issue. To begin with, and even though Freud pointed out that nobody can believe in his own death, it seems evident that some people can believe in it under given circumstances. To give only two examples, if someone is diagnosed with a fulminant disease, or is completely convinced that he will commit suicide, he can really believe that he will die soon. It is, however, not unreasonable to pose that many people may believe they will die so late that their possibility of dying seems to dissipate almost entirely in the short to medium term, to the extent that in such short or medium term they might only die – according to this belief – due to an unexpected accident. Therefore, the possibility of dying would be restricted either to an improbable accident or to a future so distant that it seems to dissipate. In this sense, Machado remarked that young people do not even accept the possibility of dying in the long term. That is why he says that young people imagine themselves to live indefinitely by ignoring the great

abyss about which old people think (*JM*, p. 108). This belief in one's own immortality, however, may be violated when an unexpected event happens, which allows the individual to be aware of the possibility of dying soon. When someone is diagnosed with a terminal illness, he is often between two different beliefs: on the one hand, he hopes to die in a very distant future, but on the other, he is convinced that he is going to die soon. Not in vain Ortega describes genuine doubt as sinking into a sea of doubts, being shaken between two beliefs but without setting foot in any of them. When someone receives a fatal diagnosis, it is not unusual that he shouts "I am going to die!" as an expression of incredulity regarding the possibility of such death. In this case the individual is captured by a doubt which he cannot avoid at will. Indeed, he is then thrown back into a doubt which is as real as the reality which is grounded in beliefs (*IC*, p. 36). But this reality is so fearful that the individual wants to escape from it. Due to the enormous difficulty of living by believing that one might die at any moment, Machado claims we have learnt how to protect ourselves from the fear of death:

Are we so confident in our death that we have ended up not thinking about it? We think about death. Death is what we most often think about. It runs in our thoughts, in that innocuous zone of our soul where nothing is feared and nothing is hoped. The truth is that we have learnt to think of it and we have ended up not believing in it. (*JM*, p. 289)

Machado argues that we think about death because it would be almost unbearable to believe in it, whilst it is not so painful to take it as an idea. However, Machado is too categorical here, for he seems to leave no room for alternative options. In fact, I think that the belief in death can protect us from the fear of death much more than the consideration of death as a mere idea. After all, whenever we simply think about death and take it as an idea, we must necessarily be aware of this idea. And if we also bear in mind that Machado considers death as the idea we most often think about, it follows from here that we should almost constantly deal with the fear of death. In my view, Machado erred in taking our thoughts as an innocuous zone in which nothing is feared or hoped. It should not be forgotten that we fear and hope many things just and only when we think about them. It is not for nothing that the best way of preventing fear of something is to avoid thinking about it. Otherwise, if it is believed that one's own death will ensue so late that the possibility of an imminent or approaching death seems to dissipate into thin air, fear of death will be kept in check. Obviously, this does not in any way mean that the possibility of dying at any moment – even suddenly – is excluded; yet one will no longer need to work to convince himself that he still *might* enjoy a long life, for such a thing will have already been assumed. As seen before, Machado describes the belief in death as the "specifically human,"

so that man thinks about death in order to end up believing in it. Although Machado claimed that it was more bearable to think about death than to believe in it, he admits that death is so closely linked to the essence of the human being, that the very fact of thinking it or taking it as an idea already involves deforming it:

But death is an issue of the human monad, of the self-sufficient and inalienable intimacy of the human being. It is an issue one lives in rather than thinks about; or better said, there is hardly any way of thinking about it without unliving (*desvivirlo*) it. (...) Death goes with us, it accompanies us in our lives; it is a part of our body. And there is nothing wrong with imagining it as our own skeleton. (JM, pp. 161–162)

While Ortega held that our beliefs cannot be expressed without ceasing to be reality for us, Machado emphasizes that it is nearly impossible to think of death without deforming such idea. For death is as inseparable from the human being as the very skeleton which shapes us. If our skeleton were deformed, we would necessarily be deformed too; and if death is thought, we are then speculating about something that does not leave room for doubt: we will die sooner or later, and that is all we can surely affirm about this issue. Hence, Machado is unable to stop considering death as an object not of knowledge, but of belief:

We should not talk about the experience of death. Who can boast of having experienced it? It is an a priori idea; we find it in our thoughts, like the idea of God, without knowing from where and how we have received it. And this idea is an object of belief, not of knowledge. There are people who believe in death as there are people who believe in God. Some even believe alternately both. (JM, pp. 294–295)

Once more, it is evident that Machado's conception of belief is perfectly in keeping with Ortega's. According to Ortega, beliefs are a priori ideas inasmuch as they are already found but not created in our thoughts; for beliefs constitute a legacy that people receive without knowing how it became part of their lives. When Machado pointed out that death is what we most often think about, he meant that death, an object of belief, was deformed by its being considered as an object of knowledge. But Machado sheds more light on this question by saying that, even though people believe in death, they may alternately believe in God – and a life after death – too. These alternative beliefs in death and in God may well result in a state of doubt. This state of genuine doubt, which Ortega described as the immersion into a sea in which one is shaken between two beliefs without setting foot in any of them, is illustrated by Machado through the following dialogue:

- Do you believe in God?
- I want to believe; I am not able to believe. Sometimes I do not want to believe; sometimes I believe without wanting it. I believe today; tomorrow, I cease to believe. I doubt.
- But God either exists or does not exist; one has to believe in Him or to refuse Him; one cannot *doubt* Him.
- That is what you believe. (*JM*, p. 321)

Against this background, it is tempting to conclude that the individual trapped in such a crisis of belief does not believe in anything at all. But I think Machado's use of the expression "I doubt" here clearly shows that this individual's belief is just to doubt. For even though this doubt consists in being shaken between two beliefs, it places the individual before a reality that, despite its instability, does not cease to be reality for him. Hence, and however paradoxical this may sound, someone's belief regarding his own death might also be doubt. By the way, I am of the opinion that it would be interesting to consider whether this state of genuine doubt might even explain some cases of depersonalization and derealization which arise when someone is diagnosed with a fulminant and incurable disease.

### **3. The Certainty of One's Own Death through Wittgensteinian Terminology**

Among Wittgenstein's remarks and aphorisms on death, I would now like to bring up the following one: "If in life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health of our intellect we are surrounded by madness" (*CV*, p. 44). But it is evident that, even though life always runs into death, our intellect does not necessarily have to flow into madness. It might therefore be concluded from this that Wittgenstein here referred to what we may call "a constant danger" (Ariso 2012, p. 186). Perhaps Wittgenstein (*MS 127*, p. 222) tried to emphasize this constant risk when he later substituted the words "in the quotidian intellect" (*im alltäglichen Verstand*) for "in the health of our intellect" (*in der Gesundheit des Verstands*). William James made reference to this constant danger and our attitude to it in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, a book Wittgenstein knew very well. According to James (2004), what tears us to pieces is the fact that we can die and become ill; yet this anguish is not relieved even though at the present moment in time we are alive and feel good, so that we need a life that is not associated with death. Of course, I add, it is not in our power to separate life from death, but it might be a great relief for many people to share the certainty that they at least will not die in the short to medium term. Yet I would like to make it very clear at this point that the subjective certainty someone can show when having feelings like fear of death is one thing, while the objective certainty in which the possibility of

a mistake – for example, regarding the certainty of not dying in the short time – is “logically excluded” from our language-games (OC § 194) is quite another. By the way, Wittgenstein defined “language-game” succinctly as “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven” (PI § 7). Some examples of language-games are: “Giving orders, and obeying them,” “Reporting an event,” etc. (PI § 23). Hence, we just take for granted the existence of physical objects, among many other things, in the way we act and speak (cf. OC §§ 395, 431), to the point that the possibility of making a mistake with regard to it is not envisaged in our language-games. If anyone seriously stated that physical objects do not exist, we would be unable to understand him, because we “would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not” (OC § 231). That physical objects exist is one of the certainties which “constitute *what we mean by reality*” (Le Roy Finch, 1977, p. 222), for our certainties make up a “system” (OC §§ 105, 144) that constitutes a “world-picture” (OC § 93–95, 162). But it should not be forgotten that our world-picture is ungrounded; in fact, Wittgenstein regards certainty as an ungrounded attitude or way of acting because we cannot give any ground which is surer than the assertion of the corresponding certainty (cf. OC §§ 1, 243, 250).

Just as belief in Ortega’s sense does not depend at all on our will, it is impossible not only to avoid “the possibility of losing *any* certainty at *any* moment and under *any* circumstance,” but also to regain it at will (Ariso, 2013, p. 148). In fact, beliefs and certainties are shown in the spontaneity with which we use language and carry out the most basic actions. Hence, both terms seem particularly useful to account for what neuroscientists call “implicit memory.” Unlike explicit memory, which may be defined as the intentional or conscious recollection of something, implicit memory is said to be at work when information previously acquired is used unintentionally or nonconsciously (Schacter and Tulving, 1994), especially for performing automated tasks like riding a bicycle or playing the piano effortlessly (Schacter, 1996). As Moyal-Sharrock (2009, p. 23) pointed out, implicit memory closely resembles certainty – and, I would add, belief in Ortega’s sense – because this is “an attitudinal assurance that is either instinctual or automatic, and that should therefore be envisaged not as a product of memory (in any nontrivial sense), but more in terms of reflex action”. If memory is considered as the capacity “to use any type of acquired information” (Dalla Barba, 2000, p. 138) or “the use of knowledge retained” (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p. 156), the term “memory” proves so pervasive that it turns out to be meaningless: against this background, it would be appropriate to speak of memory only when there is “mnemonic effort” (Moyal-Sharrock, 2009, p. 22).

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that the concepts of “belief” and “certainty” are identical since, according to Ariso (2011), there

are important differences between both of them. To start with, for Wittgenstein it is essential to underline that at the bottom of the language-game there is “an ungrounded way of acting” (*OC* §§ 110, 204), whilst Ortega does not address the epistemological problem of how certainties can be grounded: instead, he was mainly interested in considering beliefs and ideas as vital phenomena, or rather, in revealing their role in our existence in order to show as clearly as possible that the spontaneous and authentic life is not the intellectual life characteristic of dealing with ideas (cf. *IC*, p. 30). Regarding the problem of ineffability, Wittgenstein (*OC* § 36) contemplates certainties as unsayable because propositions like “I have a body” constitute presuppositions so assumed and unquestionable that they have no use in our current language-games; therefore, they are nonsense too. Meanwhile, Ortega (cf. *IC*, pp. 29–30) holds that beliefs are ineffable because they cease to be reality for us as soon as we begin to think about them. Moreover, Ortega said that genuine doubt arises when a belief is lost, and it is just then when people begin to think (cf. *IC*, p. 37). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein regards the loss of a certainty as “madness” (*OC* § 281), resulting in the impossibility of being certain of any judgment (cf. *OC* § 490) because the background against which we distinguish between true and false would disappear (*OC* §§ 94, 514).

Having said this, I am going to analyze the possibility of sharing the certainty – henceforth, I will use the term “certainty” to refer to “objective certainty” – that one will die only in a very distant future, so that in his daily life he would not count on the possibility of dying in the short or medium term. To begin with, there is a peculiar feature of our language-games which seems to be closely related to the certainty of dying far in the future. Indeed, when someone suddenly says that he is frightened of dying soon, the most common reaction is to ask him why he fears such a thing: put another way, he will be asked to give a reason for this fear or doubt. As Wittgenstein (*OC* §§ 4, 122–123, 458) pointed out, we need “grounds for doubt.” Naturally, it would not be a valid and sufficient ground if the subject in question retorted that his doubt or fear is justified because it is certain we will die at some time. For although it is sure that every one of us will die, dying soon is a mere possibility that cannot be considered as justified doubt. Therefore, the suspicion that one will die soon is only justified if there are good reasons, like evidence that someone is trying to kill him, or a diagnosis that predicts a fatal outcome in a few days’ time, etc. While reasons like these cannot be adduced, fear of death should, at least in theory, be deferred. Of course, that does not exclude the possibility of dying at any moment; but keeping in mind that doubt will be fully consistent only when it is duly reasoned and justified, the only reason that can be discerned in the distance is to die of old age.

Nevertheless, the certainty of dying in a distant future but not in the short or medium term presents a clear problem. It is well known that every mentally sane person instinctively tends, to the extent of his possibilities, to avoid damage and, above all, his own death. Therefore, if someone were really certain that he will not die in the short to medium term, this certainty should be reflected spontaneously in his way of acting and speaking one day after another. In such a case, he would not need to worry about a fatal outcome if he crossed a street with heavy traffic, just as it should not be expected either that he would show the survival instinct we would have by attempting to protect ourselves in any manner whatsoever if our car were tossed over to the shoulder of the road and began to flip over. In view of this, it seems unquestionable that every mentally sane person is certain that he can die at any moment. Nevertheless, I would like to add an amendment to my approach by bringing up two certainties which might alternate with each other. On the one hand, it could be said that in ordinary circumstances some people do not even note the possibility of dying, for they live immersed in a world-picture in which there is only room for seriously considering such possibility if they have compelling grounds. With this background, they are willing to admit publicly the possibility of dying at any time but without assuming it as certain. On the other hand, as soon as people foresee the possibility of dying – for example, when they realize they may be about to suffer an accident – they may suddenly begin to take into account the certainty that they can die at any time. It is true I have made reference to two extreme cases – that is, to take into account the possibility of dying or not to take it into account at all – but in this way it is easier to illustrate the radically different world-pictures in which people are immersed in each of these cases. In what could be called the usual world-picture, one's own death seems to be something that dissipates into a very distant future, to the extent that daily life seems to extend endlessly, with no limits (cf. *T* 6.4311). Conversely, in the other world-picture the possibility of dying soon appears in the foreground, which leads to perceive life, above all, as something limited.

According to this approach, someone may alternately share the certainties “I will die in a very distant future” and “I will die very soon,” to the extent that the change from one to the other might take place suddenly and even repeatedly within a short period of time. For just as someone immersed in the certainty that he will die in a very distant future may suddenly be certain that he will die very soon, he might shortly afterwards share again his initial certainty if he convinced himself that the danger had passed or that it was a false alarm. As said above, this approach has the advantage of helping to explain some important issues like the radically different world-pictures resulting from the certainties of dying soon and of not taking this possibility into account. Furthermore, this approach allows us to explain experiences

typically associated with each world-picture: when someone starts to take into account the possibility of dying soon, he often realizes with amazement how unaware he had been of such possibility until then, while the impending danger of death is often forgotten as soon as one loses the certainty that he will die soon. Nevertheless, our approach still seems to be faulty in some respects. To begin with, the question arises of how someone might perceive or sense danger of an imminent death when he is certain that he will die in a distant future. But it should be borne in mind that the individual in question would count on the possibility of dying even though in the long term. It is precisely because of this that in such cases there arise thoughts and expressions like “Has my hour *already* come?,” “How can this be?,” “I *still* was not counting on it,” etc.

A more fundamental objection I mentioned above is how to discern whether someone’s conviction of not dying in the short to medium term is a subjective or an objective certainty. The way I see it, it is possible to assess such a thing, yet this assessment should be, above all, *indirect*. Regarding the certainty about one’s own death in the short to medium term, a direct assessment could be carried out by asking, for example: “Will you die in the short to medium term?” Yet, in this case, a negative answer will not make it possible to distinguish if the individual merely hopes so or has assimilated it as objectively certain. Instead, it should rather be assessed if this certainty is in some case *forgotten* or if it is continually shown by the individual in his way of acting and speaking; it could also be assessed what he would consider as the discovery of a mistake about such certainty, etc.

In addition, one can wonder how people with different certainties, and by extension different world-pictures, might understand each other. Once again, it should be noted that the certainties of dying soon and of dying in a distant future converge in a common point, for in both cases it is assumed that one will die. It is of even bigger importance to emphasize that it is possible to understand someone when his certainties have been shared more than once and sometimes for a long time, although they are now not shared. In this vein, it even appears feasible to understand the child who, by being unfamiliar with the idea of death, conceives himself not as immortal but as eternal, which led Unamuno to state about adults that “only by preserving an eternal childhood (...) can one reach true freedom and look at the mystery of life face to face” (1982, p. 129).

#### 4. Conclusion

In this paper I do not confine myself to a clearly defined line of argument or a specific conclusion, but oscillate among diverse variations of the certainty of one’s own death. Not for nothing was my aim to show that this certainty

is far from being a simple matter – or rather, a certainty as evident, common and unquestionable as the certainties that we are alive, have a body, or that people to whom we are speaking exist.

First of all, I have used Ortega's terminology to show that one can believe in his own finitude with living or dead faith, with the particularity that, in my opinion, dead faith takes place when someone seemingly goes on sharing the belief in question although he really no longer believes in it. Machado, for his part, regards death as an object of belief, but he warns it is a belief so bitter that people often tend to take it as an idea, so that it becomes an object of thought. Since ideas are consciously managed through thoughts, we can try to control or manipulate them in such a manner as to render them as painless as possible, either by singing them, by stating them in plain verse or by making them the subject of philosophical reflection. However, I claimed it is much more bearable to believe in one's own death than to think of it, for the belief entails that we are accustomed to it to the point that we take it into account even without noticing how it continually influences our life, while thinking about death is something people do, among other reasons, because as Machado himself suggested, it is difficult to assume such a belief. As regards Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, I have focused on issues which were not explicitly tackled in this work, rather than in problems he directly dealt with in it. Thus, I held it is possible to understand someone who has different certainties, when these certainties not only coincide in a basic aspect with ours, but also have been shared in the past. Furthermore, I have shown that the conception of "world-picture" outlined in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* is maybe too static to account for some phenomena like the ease with which a different world-picture may arise regarding the certainty of dying in the short to medium term. By this I want to stress that among the great contributions of Wittgenstein to the theory of knowledge – not in vain Stroll (2005, p. 33) regarded *On Certainty* as "the most important contribution to the theory of knowledge since *The Critique of Pure Reason*" – I find the treatment of problems to be missing. Far from revolving around George E. Moore's reflections, these problems may focus on questions like discerning between what certainties people might oscillate regarding some issues. For it is often difficult to distinguish not only if a given certainty is objective or subjective, but also what objective certainty someone has at a given moment. Of course, the procedure suggested above for distinguishing subjective and objective certainties is far from safe, for it leaves much room for error and ambiguity. But instead of considering this as a shortcoming, in this work I take it as an added indicator of the difficulties of discerning what certainties someone may share regarding issues as important as one's own death.

## NOTE

1. Quotations from Machado's, Ortega's and Unamuno's work have been translated into English by José María Ariso.

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## EMPLOYEE MOTIVATION AND JOB PERFORMANCE

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**ABSTRACT.** The mainstay of the paper is formed by an analysis of motivational determinants in the workplace, job performance of employees, and the motivational factors of conduct in work organizations. My paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the causal link between different need satisfactions and employee job performance, the impact of need contentment on work behavior, and the components of employee job performance conducts.

**Keywords:** work behavior; employee motivation; job performance

### 1. Introduction

Managers must carry out their objectives and operate via the activity of others, cultivating the required capacities and dedication in their workers. The former tackles challenges that demand a lot more endeavor, ingenious problem-solving, and disposition to change. Level-one management employs conventional top-down, command-and-control approaches to organize, routinize, and regulate the work. Level-two planned environment involves an inventive, managerial method on the part of the entity. To be a successful manager signifies leading the way by advancing and embracing new management procedures (Drumea, 2011) that bring about the types of operations required for tactical success. Established command-and-control administration does not bring about the kinds of performances (Ionescu, 2014a) we require to the highest extent from our workers. The current business setting necessitates a swift pace of transformation and constant innovations on the part of workers and their entities. The latter must act in ground-breaking manners, pursuing chances, solving problems, and adopting new trends. Managers should bring about a sound impetus by impelling workers to innovate and change. The latter must adapt to changes at work, encompassing periodic retrenchment and shake-up, new technologies and systems, and new goods and consumers. (Hiam, 2003)

## **2. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs**

According to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, workers are interested in fulfilling external necessities such as physiological ones (i.e., the demand for air, water, and food) and safety and security ones (a house in a safe neighborhood, job security, a retirement scheme, and health/medical insurance); these incentives should be undertaken by employers (e.g. by supplying employees with a satisfactory benefits package). Within the workplace, workers look for a sense of community and acceptance (Drumea, 2012a), pursuing the consent and recognition of their fellows and overseers, whereas managers, by assisting staff in feeling associated with the organization and its assignment (Nica and Potcovaru, 2014), can supply it. External esteem is fulfilled by attaining the recognition of others (Popescu, 2015), social and professional standing, gratitude, and appreciation. Internal esteem entails the demand for self-respect, a sentiment of trust, accomplishment, and self-determination. Cautious employment of approval and of positive response to staff is a significant way of impelling employees. Managers should supply workers with chances to prove their competence: staff involvement in advancing education and providing opportunities for thought-provoking and relevant work are strong incentives. Managers should identify the demands of each worker, separately. (Borkowski, 2011)

Maslow employs the notions of deprivation and satisfaction to furnish the active forces that connect demands to behavior. The physiological requirements, when unmet, dominate the body, advancing all strengths into their service and arranging them so that they may be successful to the highest degree. Deprivation or frustration of a need of high prepotency causes its control over the body's character. Comparative satisfaction of a particular need overwhelms it and initiates the subsequent higher need in the hierarchy. In a growth-motivated, self-actualizing person, satisfaction of the self-actualization demands generates a growth in its relevance. The most unsatisfactory need should be the most prevailing or significant need. (Wahba and Bridwell, 1976)

## **3. Adams' Equity Theory**

Adams holds that equity is the craft of one person being honest and neutral in social interplays (Uhrig, 2015) with another individual. The difficulties with inequity can result in employees diminishing the work to clear up an inequity. There are four posits when inequity occurs: (i) when the perceived inequity causes stress in a person, (ii) when the quantity of tension is correspondent to the dimension of the inequity, (iii) when the inequity drives the person to diminish it, and (iv) when the intensity of the motivation to moderate the

inequity is correspondent to the perceived inequity. (Schniederjans et al., 2012) Adams insists that a sentiment of equity is the consequence of (i) balancing the inputs and upshots for the self and for the referent other, and (ii) contrasting both intra-individual relationships between persons. When the arrangements diverge, inequity is perceived, generating a dispute situation that causes stress. The larger the inequity, the larger the strain is, and with higher tension, the person undergoes a powerful demand to diminish it by removing the perceived inequity. (Hofmans, 2012) As Adams put it, de-motivation takes place if workers experience their workplace inputs (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014a) as more significant than the outputs obtained for their work endeavors. Impressions of external pay inequity enhance job discontent and may not attract or retain the better employee. Awards should not entail better work plans (this could generate inequity matters). Inequity generally leads to a strong negative motivational effect in the workplace. (Tudor, 2011) Adams's equity theory can be employed by managers to be in touch with their subalterns to grasp that equity and impartiality occur among workers. When individuals feel discomfort from inequity (i) they may limit their inputs to a degree they think is compatible with the results they obtain; (ii) they may contact their superintendents to orally arrange a better deal (they will strive to identify an equilibrium between work and gain); and (iii) the discomfort of sentiments of inequity may compel some workers to leave the organization. The "equity norm" is a social presupposition that a worker will require a reasonable compensation for the contribution to the task they perform. The "social comparison" is the decision workers will make as to whether or not their result is fair correlated to other individuals' inputs and outcomes. (Bell and Martin, 2012)

On Adams' reading, the existence of inequity stimulates the person to alter the state of affairs via behavioral or cognitive instruments to come back to a condition of equity. The individual will seek to optimize valent outcomes and reduce progressively demanding inputs in re-establishing equity (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014b), and will avoid changing the object of correlation and misrepresenting inputs that are viewed as central to the self-concept. Separate requirements about equity or "fair" correspondences between inputs and results are discovered throughout the process of socialization and via analogy with the inputs and results of others. (Mowday, 1983) Adams argues that people perceive their connections with other individuals and organizations in terms of a deal, and an inequity in the latter can generate a diversity of results: when an inequity in inputs and results is observed (Petcu, 2014), a person may seek to institute equality by bringing up less endeavor, aiming to obtain more output or by altering their understandings concerning the inequality (persons evaluate the ratio of outputs to inputs employing a comparative criterion). (Weathington and Reddock, 2011)

#### 4. Alderfer's ERG Theory

Existence, resistance, and growth (ERG) is a motivational concept dealing with grasping the aspects that are instrumental in individual human conduct. ERG may be employed to interpret and/or anticipate workplace matters, connection patterns, and private development choices (ERG can be employed as a construct to comprehend what inner views drive individuals to particular behaviors). (Caulton, 2012) Alderfer's ERG theory enables a person to pursue fulfillment of higher level demands before lower level demands are satisfied: it does not necessitate a person to fulfill a lower level demand for a higher level demand to be transformed into the determinant of the individual's conduct. The ERG theory justifies dissimilarities in need choices between cultures (the disposition of needs can be distinctive for diverse individuals). The frustration-regression principle clarifies that when a hurdle obstructs a person from getting a higher level demand, the latter may return to a lower level one (or vice versa) to attain contentment. Managers must admit that a worker may have various needs to fulfill at the same time. If growth chances are not supplied to workers, they may return to connectedness needs and socialize more with colleagues. If the work atmosphere does not fulfill a worker's demand for social interplay (Popescu, 2014), an enhanced craving for a better salary or better working conditions may appear. (Borkowski, 2011)

Alderfer maintains that concentrating solely on one demand at a time does not successfully drive modifications in human conduct. His frustration-regression principle claims that when more significant order requirements are not carried out, persons may regress to raise the contentment of lower-order requirements which seems like easy to fulfill. It impacts workplace motivation: if workers are bereaved of growth chances, they are inclined to regress to lower order requirements such as existence or relatedness demands. (Chen-namaneni and Teng, 2012) The maximization of a business firm's profit on investment by moderating production or service distribution expenditures (Nica, 2015) and the competitive character of international business have enhanced the significance of cost decrease and the delivery of prime products and services. Organizational strength is considerably reliant on the productive use of the materials, devices, funds and individuals' capacity (Mircică, 2014) in the production and distribution processes of companies. The latter require effective and productive workers whose job performance is at an unsurpassed level to be able to attain their organizational objectives. Need theory indicates that workers are stimulated to enhance their job performance by their separate endeavors to fulfill particular demands, evaluating the impact of demand satisfaction on job performance of top managers and frontline workers. The existence needs incorporate the human fundamental needs required for existence, which are the physiological and security needs, the connectedness

needs stand for individuals' inclination to preserve significant interpersonal links (Olssen, 2014), and the growth needs constitute people's craving for individual development, self-realization and self-actualization. Alderfer concentrates on pay fringe benefits, connectedness needs from colleagues and managers, and growth need satisfaction at work. (Arnolds and Boshoff, 2002)

## 5. Conclusions

Workers' positions and their degree of motivation are a growing responsibility for managers. The concern for creating new, more adjustable, and flexible corporate policies falls to separate workers (Drumea, 2012b) taking a more discretionary and variable procedure to their work. Nearly all managers demand employees who are *intrinsically* driven (Ionescu, 2014b) to do their tasks finely (intrinsic motivation brings about the type of conducts managers seek in their ideal worker). Handling individuals based on extrinsic motivation is an unrewarding enterprise (external constraints are needed). Motivational management aims the constitution of a positive, dynamic emotional environment as a background to particular objectives and duties. Management undertakings should be directed by a coherent grasp of the new performance prerequisites and the necessity to employ motivational processes suitable to them. Workers frequently *walk around with negative sentiments* by reason of their interplays with their supervisors. (Hiam, 2003)

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## **CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BUSINESS ETHICAL VALUES**

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**ABSTRACT.** Over the past decade, there has been increasing evidence describing the relational consequences of ordinary business decisions, the demand for moral values in business decision making, and the corporation as the vital participant in establishing socially preferable conduct on the part of business. Our analysis complements the growing literature on the intricate and active international business ethics context, business ethics as a phenomenon of organizational culture, and business-driven forms of CSR. The objective of this paper is to emphasize firms' adherences to ethical business behavior and probity, business ethics's emphasis on business entities as ethical factors in and of themselves, and ethics as a customary segment of business practice. The findings of this study have implications for the link between business priorities and ethical concerns within a business entity, business ethics as a self-conscious manner of considering business, and grounds for motivating ethical business practices.

**Keywords:** corporate governance; business ethics; organizational culture

### **1. Introduction**

As a practical issue, business ethics is restricted by a somewhat stiffly outlined and organized series of organizational practices. An investment in business ethics is a requirement for an entity's persistent involvement (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014a) in formal business interconnections. Business ethics and corporate governance are established aspects in both tertiary programs and corporate training funds. When ethics operates as an indispensable portion of business practice (Drumea, 2011a), it characterizes persons' understandings of events from the beginning and has a significant role in fashioning their feedbacks.

Endeavors to articulate clear prescriptive guidelines for the handling of business may influence us to disregard the features of human conduct that both legality and morality aim to defend. Ethics in business covers the strength to react befittingly to the competing demands and presuppositions that push and pull persons throughout their ordinary involvement in intricate organizational and business interconnections. (Painter-Morland, 2008)

## **2. The Demand for Moral Values in Business Decision Making**

A set of notions indicates society's requirements as to the function and duties of business. Relying upon on the stakeholders' concerns, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is established either in a business- or society-oriented manner. If CSR seeks to specify *what* duties business ought to perform, the stakeholder notion approaches the matter of *whom* business is or should be responsible to. Business does not undertake only short-run profits, but instead a multitude of objectives which associate to secure business's viability and success in an ever-changing setting. The notion of a license to function entails that society authorizes business to perform presuming that it will operate honestly and display responsibility for its undertakings beyond legal demands. A social contract (Lăzăroiu, 2014) specifies society's requirements of business and vice versa. Business is granted its capacity and impact under some particular stipulations established by society. (Kakabadse et al., 2005) Shareholders must maintain stocks for the long-run and ignore corporations involves in less sustainable patterns of business. CSR at the company level must be perceived within the broader dynamics of business and trade organizations, social networks (Nica and Potcovaru, 2014) and state regulation. From an institutional view, CSR, as an intentional, improvised and nonmandatory set of practices, is a fragment of corporate undertakings at the boundary of business and society. (Brammer et al., 2012)

Business ethics is primarily about human conduct. Work organizations function within a wide and intricate global business environment. Numerous executives realize the positive long-run advantage a standing for ethics can produce to business transactions: they are concerned about ethics in their own entities and about business's perception in society. In today's extremely interlinked, international, and transparent society, companies are observing that social responsibility is crucial to basic business strategy (numerous corporate social responsibility matters are generated by the global character of business). Business ethics is important because society is concerned. Business understands that it must employ its capacity responsibly or stand a chance losing it. Even without criminal accountability, businesses that do not operate in a responsible manner endanger their reputations. Societies and cultures' collective values are a significant component of the business setting (Drumea,

2011b) and requirements of business and businesspeople. Numerous businesses are assigning important funds to formal ethics and legal compliance policies. Responsible entities have identified countless manners of making ethics and values essential to how they do business. (Klebe Treviño and Nelson, 2011) The predisposition to disjoint ethics from specific established practices frequently weakens the meaningfulness of business ethics interferences. Pre-packaged business ethics schemes generally depend on the institutionalization of standardized principles (Popescu, 2015) and conformity procedures. The institution of stricter legislation and other types of regulation have established new criteria on business undertakings and have reinforced the case for ethics involvements in organizations. The objective of corporate business ethics interferences should be to bring about a significant blending of ethics with essential business interests. Stakeholders should be on board if ethics are to be a portion of ordinary business practices within an administrative system. The separation of ethics from business practice is noticeable in the manner that the value prime concerns that permeate the prescriptive susceptibilities of those who take part in an organizational system are articulated in ethics policies. (Painter-Morland, 2008)

### **3. Business Ethics as a Phenomenon of Organizational Culture**

Business cannot avoid having an ethics than it can escape having a structure or standing. The variety of regulatory agencies indicates how nations and organizations attempt to process concepts of business misbehavior. Corporate governance is the routine of general management and supervision of a company, business or corporate body. Codes of practice and of ethics, and their performance and command are formulated by or are taken in the name of the guidance or boards of directors of influential organizations and businesses. (Donaldson and Fafaliou, 2003) The disclosures of corporate malpractice do not mean that considering ethics in business circumstances is superfluous. The issue of business ethics mainly occurs for the purpose of supplying us with some responses as to *why* particular resolutions should be assessed as ethical or unethical. Customers and pressure groups seem to be progressively requesting companies to identify more ethical and ecologically more robust manners of doing business. Ethical matters challenge organizations whatever type of business they may be in. Business malpractices may impose massive damage on persons, on communities and on the environment. The requests being placed on business to be responsible by its diverse stakeholders have become intricate and challenging. (Crane and Matten, 2007)

Important businesses that are confined to ethics tend to have formal ethics management systems. If managers cannot handle the basics skillfully, it will be tremendously demanding to motivate individuals to satisfy business objec-

tives or live organizational values. Conceiving business decisions in ethical conditions (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014b) has considerable effect on enhancing moral cognizance, reporting one's criteria, and highlighting the significance of ethical conduct. Business must employ its strength responsibly in community or take the risk of losing it. Social responsibility is as essential to the business as is economic carrying out. The economic accountabilities of a business entail its main purpose of providing goods and services that customers demand and desire, while making a satisfactory profit (accomplishing it successfully is a significant ethical aim of business). (Klebe Treviño and Nelson, 2011) Ethics persists on the borders of the business community's interests, and numerous business ethics patterns prove unsuccessful in making ethics a component of ordinary business practice. The reinterpretation of business ethics as practice has to demonstrate its value in the ordinary business of business. Within the business context, decision makers may be contingent on an institutional and rigid straightjacket that weakens particular consideration and open-mindedness. Specific values appear in the operation of improving business's most fundamental objectives, being those prime concerns that allow business to strengthen life. Within the setting of a business entity, workers grasp what is acknowledged and suitable via both planned training and implicit socialization. For those who earn their living in business, profit may be the standard of private and organizational favorable outcomes, being a requisite component of how sustainable businesses and effective careers are established. (Painter-Morland, 2008)

#### **4. Grounds for Motivating Ethical Business Practices**

Business ethics can supply us with the capacity to evaluate the advantages and troubles related to various manners of handling ethics in organizations. As business is less established territorially, so companies progressively participate in international markets, unexpectedly finding themselves tackled with unprecedented and mixed ethical requirements. Deterritorialization boosts the need for business ethics as deterritorialized economic undertakings are beyond the supervision of state (territorial) governments. (Crane and Matten, 2007) We function in a networked community necessitating a distributed, information-oriented business ethics. Business is an ethically fine strength to the extent that it incorporates human tension (Petcu, 2014) between being in support of systemic growth and welfare, and in opposition to wastefulness. Business agents, their positions and schemes, are established as morally good or evil in a secondary sense, i.e., accompanying the evaluation of their performances and the correlative results. The function of a liberal state in a modern democracy concentrates on what business representatives should not do and on stimulants to further particular conducts which are morally advan-

tageous to the entire system or community. Profit is neither a component of the *definition*, nor the *role*, of business, but an *objective* that supplies no ethical stimulant by itself. Without profit, business can much less smoothly develop in dimension, grow in quality, and thrive as a gratifying and effective initiative for the individuals involved. Profit is ethically unreasoning, recompensing any business that undertakes it swimmingly. (Floridi, 2009)

Business should accomplish its undertaking in conformity with the present law and government regulations. The law can further be regarded as constituting the minimum criteria and principles of business behavior (Popescu, 2014) approved within a society. To be thriving, corporations must have both outstanding business schemes and socially responsible business practices. First-rate business does fine financially by producing goods that satisfy consumers' demands and by being accountable to workers and the wider community. Companies doing business overseas have a duty to improve guidelines and procedures to regulate their employees' ethical behavior. The value of a business to community is the prosperity and hiring it brings about (Uhrig, 2015) and the marketable goods and services it supplies to customers at a fair price compatible with quality. (Klebe Treviño and Nelson, 2011) Business prime concerns are considerably permeated by societal dynamics and acknowledge its values. Business's link with other stakeholders has an important effect on the manner in which the end of a goal-oriented process of business is imagined. Business necessitates rules and practical skills to operate as practice. Business practice is also about skillfully and thoughtfully reacting to confrontations and chances as they appear. The conduct and undertakings of business practitioners are considerably typified by the organizational contexts in which they perform. Efforts to impact organizational cultures (Olssen, 2014) are an indispensable constituent of numerous business ethics interventions. (Painter-Morland, 2008)

## 5. Conclusions

The connectedness of an entity secures its internal consistency (Nica, 2015) in a continuously ever-changing business context. A great deal of the value of an organization is brought about in and via shared business connections. A business practitioner or entity does not function in the lack of any moral presuppositions. The types of moral limitations that arise in the circumstances of particular business links (Drumea, 2012) are frequently of a more challenging character than more prevailing legalistic ones. Life improvement should be the final objective of business undertaking. Ordinary business interactions may impact the normative compatibility that arises in the organization. Schemes bring about clear guidelines and make it simpler to handle the uncertainties of ordinary business life. (Painter-Morland, 2008)

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## **INTERPERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORKAHOLISM**

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**ABSTRACT.** I am specifically interested in how previous research investigated the conceptualization and assessment of workaholism, negative consequences that can arise from workaholism, and the affective experiences of workaholics. The results of the current study converge with prior research on the function of external and contextual pressures on workaholism, the affective character of workaholism, and workaholic conduct patterns and their effect on individual and organizational outcomes.

**Keywords:** workaholism; affective nature; behavior pattern; organization

### **1. Introduction**

Workaholism is a dependence to work, and entails a concern and obsession concerning one's work (workaholics are impelled to work by nonfinancial requirements). Workaholics do not undertake immoderate work because of external determinants such as financial troubles, unsatisfactory marriage, or coercion by their organization (Nica and Molnar, 2014) or supervisor. Almost every formulation of workaholism encompasses the notion that workaholics work longer and more strenuously than others. Thus, they may frequently miss family happenings, work evenings or weekends, and routinely bring work home with them. Workaholism is a dependence to work that entails feeling coerced or impelled to work by reason of inner constraints (Drumea, 2011a), having constant beliefs about work when not working, and toiling notwithstanding possible negative repercussions. (Clark et al., 2015)

### **2. The Conceptualization and Assessment of Workaholism**

Employees who are intrepid and achievement striving (Bacalu, 2014) tend to undertake workaholic conducts such as working long hours and persistently

thinking about work. Workaholics may be impelled to work relying on inner “shoulds” (a type of introjected motivation) and not intrinsic motivation. If workaholics are determined to work by sentiments of remorse and concern and an inner constraint or motivation to work (Drumea, 2011b), they also tend to undergo a lot of job stress. They are likely to experience more significant degrees of job stress (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014) because of the constraints they put on themselves, and will be usually dynamic and undergo career success at their jobs. If workaholics are having interpersonal troubles with other fellow employees, this may reverberate negatively on functioning assessments. Workaholics are frequently exhausted with feelings of guilt and anxiety when they are not toiling, perceiving less contentment with their activities outside of work. (Clark et al., 2015) Workaholism tends to be a main notion in comprehending the association of workplace experiences and a diversity of private and organizational results. The enthusiastic workaholic’s grounds for toil is ascribed to the tremendous fulfillment and satisfaction stemming from work, whereas nonenthusiastic workaholics become involved in excessive work because of an unmanageable impulse or demand to work. Workaholism is considerable involvement in work that encompasses a private unwillingness to detach from work and an inclination to think about work continually. Enthusiastic workaholism is embedded in intrinsic motivation and is positively associated with private and organizational results (Nica and Potcovaru, 2014), while nonenthusiastic workaholism is established on extrinsic motivation and is negatively connected with private and organizational results. Workaholism is a persistency that can bring about diverse degrees or levels of positive human health (Popescu, 2015) and psychological and spiritual welfare. (Fry et al., 2006)

Workaholism is typified by considerable involvements of laborers in their work (Drumea, 2012), e.g., concerning time and endeavor (it generates unwell-being and should be avoided). Workaholics are driven by a compulsive internal urge they are addicted to. (Shimazu et al., 2015) Workaholism is not a positive feature signifying a sound craving and motivation for one’s work, but a detrimental aspect that can have pernicious repercussions for an employee’s psychological, social, and physical welfare. (Stoeber and Damian, 2015) Workaholism is associated with individual dissimilarities in perfectionism and work motivation. Laborers whose work motivation is typified by significant levels of compatibility and cognizance of grounds and objectives being in integration with the self (identified regulation) and/or by significant levels of self-control and ego-involvement and being stimulated by inner recompenses and sanctions (introjected regulation) tend to display dignified degrees of workaholism compared to laborers whose work motivation shows these features to lower levels. Identified and introjected regulation may justify why laborers significant in self-oriented perfectionism tend to display

more relevant degrees of workaholism than laborers inferior in self-oriented perfectionism. (Stoeber et al., 2013)

### **3. The Function of External and Contextual Pressures on Workaholism**

When employees are immoderately engaged in work and allow themselves almost no breaks, they tend to undergo burnout as they do not allow themselves enough time to recuperate from their toil. Workaholics are impelled to work not on account of financial or family demands, but because of some inner urge to work, and tend to be extremely attainment-oriented and compete to perfectionist levels, granted the powerful positive connections between perfectionism, Type A personality, and nondelegation with workaholism. As workaholics spend much time at work, they may have more time and chance to elucidate their work goals, tasks, and responsibilities. (Clark et al., 2015) Enthusiastic workaholics' urge to work constantly may be established on intrinsic motivation that generates a perception of self-worth and leads to positive private and organizational results: they strive for accomplishment and favorable outcome, are impelled by competition (Mircică, 2014), can put off satisfaction and can concentrate on remote goals. Enthusiastic workaholics spend much discretionary time on work undertakings, persistently think about tasks, toil beyond employer and economic demands, and characterize their activity as gratifying, enjoyable, imaginative and thought-provoking. Essentially stimulated enthusiastic workaholics undergo self-determination, proficiency and connectedness: they can be intrinsically motivated at work via aim identification. Significant work and life contentment for the enthusiastic workaholic may be reliant on the degree to which they can satisfy their work objectives. (Fry et al., 2006)

Workaholics tend to undergo some motivational uncertainty as they concurrently see grounds to alter and not to modify their immoderate work conducts. They frequently lack the problem cognizance that is required if they are to revise their conduct. Workaholism comprises both a cognitive (working compulsively) and a behavioral (working excessively) constituent. (van Wijhe et al., 2010) Workaholics are more interested in professional and managerial positions that are intrinsically thought-provoking and require significant time investment. The substantial monetary rewards related to them may function as a supplementary reason for workaholics to occupy them. (Harpaz and Snir, 2003) Individual dissimilarities in intrinsic-extrinsic work incentive have a main function for comprehending the perfectionism–workaholism connection. Workaholism in self-oriented perfectionists is impelled by those kinds of extrinsic motivation positioned halfway on the autonomous-controlled motivation persistency (Burke and Crozier, 2014) in which self and ego are incorporated. Inner recompenses and sanction, which are specific for introjected

regulation, have a function for self-oriented perfectionists' predilections towards workaholism. The latter is chiefly impelled by private features of perfectionism and not social characteristics. (Stoeber et al., 2013)

#### **4. Workaholic Conduct Patterns and Their Effect on Individual and Organizational Outcomes**

A positive link between workaholism and sensed supervisor support may indicate that supervisors may back or further a workaholic's immoderate engagement with work. Workaholism is related to spending more time at work, and may not generate positive results in the short term, based on the considerably negative or nonsignificant links between workaholism and signs of welfare and organizational functioning. If organizations aim to raise productivity and reduce employee burnout, they should endeavor to support workers' involvement instead of motivating and praising workaholic conduct. In an endeavor to cushion the detrimental consequences of workaholism on employee welfare (Popescu, 2014), firms could stimulate all workers to get more involved in sports and exercise outside of work. (Clark et al., 2015) The nonenthusiastic workaholic's urge to toil may be established on extrinsic motivation, which brings about a feeling of negative self-worth and detrimental private and organizational results. Nonenthusiastic workaholics may undergo significant degrees of pessimism, unsound judgment, anxiety and burnout and have more personality collapses and health-associated problems. The priority on extrinsic recompenses by the nonenthusiastic workaholic hampers them from fulfilling their basic spiritual necessities for calling and enrolment on account of an ego-driven, obsessive-compulsive demand for self-gratification. Enthusiastic workaholics aim intrinsic rewards and can comply with the higher-order requirements, which is needed for spiritual and psychological welfare and positive health. Nonenthusiastic workaholics are stimulated by extrinsic rewards that apply to the secondary necessities of persons, and have a significant demand for external confirmation and acceptance from others. (Fry et al., 2006)

The self-employed (entrepreneurs) will score more significantly than laborers on both work involvement and workaholism. There may be dispositional individual dissimilarities between both types that are accountable for the intended dissimilarities in engagement and workaholism. Numerous particular features of self-employed persons' job content are extremely motivational and can generate higher workaholism and involvement, the self-employed being a risk-group for workaholism. Toiling may pay off less for workaholic employees than for engaged persons. (Gorgievski et al., 2010) The length of hours per employee may be a reason of workaholism. The latter becomes questionable when long hours surpass an enthusiastic work integrity or sig-

naling of engagement, and become a dependence or drive. (Golden, 2015) Workaholics toil beyond their job descriptions and it is hard for them to attain a point where they think they may have done sufficiently. Workaholic trends may be stimulated by high private criteria and self-imposed objectives. Workaholics may be incapable to disconnect from work, irrespective of the degree of self-determination. Workaholism is associated with lasting until the employee thinks that (s)he put adequate effort into work. (van Wijhe et al., 2011)

## 5. Conclusions

Workaholism is an inner obsession to work, which originates in an internal compulsion or feeling that one “ought” to be toiling, and not by reason of external determinants such as organizational or financial demands. Workaholics tend to be attracted to organizations that enhance and rate their workaholic conducts, and may self-report that they are considerably concerned with work as they have a lot of external requirements (Macfarlane and Macfarlane, 2015), but it is perfectly feasible that they may have preferred that profession/job for that specific grounds. Workaholism is positively associated with concepts indicating obsessive or compulsive conduct (Petcu, 2014), and is generally connected with negative consequences for the person, both at work and home: it may be more intimately linked to the maladaptive features of perfectionism than the adaptive ones. (Clark et al., 2015)

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## **HUSSERL, HABERMAS, AND THE LIFEWORLD AS THE OVERALL HORIZON WITHIN WHICH INDIVIDUALS ACT**

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**ABSTRACT.** The objective of this paper is to emphasize Husserl's notion of the lifeworld, the connection between the transcendental ego and the lifeworld, and lifeworld as exemplified by a culturally conveyed and linguistically constructed stock of explanatory models. The analysis presented in this paper contributes to research on Husserl's accounts of the lifeworld, communicative rationalizations of the lifeworld, and the interaction between lifeworld, history and reason. This study is grounded in the considerable body of scholarship examining social configurations of the lifeworld, structural constituents of the lifeworld, and the link between science and the lifeworld.

**Keywords:** Husserl; Habermas; lifeworld; communicative rationalization; science

### **1. Introduction**

Husserl's phenomenology entails an account of the world as phenomenon or world-as-it-presents-itself-to-us. The lifeworld entirely necessitates its own ontology, and is the sphere of what is pre-given to consciousness, evoking its own theory of organization. The notion of the lifeworld is a notable new improvement in Husserl's phenomenological theory. The issue of the lifeworld must be disconnected from its link with the theory of science and perceived as a philosophical issue in its own right. From the new ontology of the lifeworld we must advance via a phenomenological reduction to the conscious intentionality in which it is composed. (Carr, 1987) Habermas holds that the posttraditional perception of norms (Drumea, 2011; 2012a; 2012b) is blended with a notion of communicative rationality that can become real (Mircică, 2014) only to the level that arrangements of the lifeworld are distinguished and members advance conflicting individual concerns. Actors in symbolically mediated interplay (Nica and Potcovaru, 2014) can reconstruct themselves

from exemplars of an animal breed with an innate, species-specific setting into fellows of a collective with a lifeworld only to the level that an unspecified other has taken form. In the symbolic duplication of the lifeworld, speech acts can at the same time take on the purposes of cultural dissemination (Petcu, 2014), social incorporation (Olssen, 2014), and the socialization of persons only if the propositional, illocutionary, and meaningful elements are assimilated into a *grammatical entity* in each and every speech act, such that semantic content does not separate into parts but can be straightforwardly transformed from constituent to constituent. The rationality intrinsic in speech can become, through empirical observation, operative insofar as communicative acts are dominant in the guidance of social interplays and accomplish roles of social reproduction, of preserving social lifeworlds. (Habermas, 1987)

## 2. Structural Constituents of the Lifeworld

Husserl's view on the world marks an important turning-point in the history of the appearance-reality differentiation, being a perspective of ontological impartiality beyond realism and idealism. He discerns in natural consciousness the strong belief that it is in immediate and close connection with the real. Husserl's "phenomenological" attitude is to allow common knowledge speak for itself. His intentionalist approach prevents the realistic postulate of a world in itself to which consciousness positions in a real or cognitive link. Husserl depicts the world as it emerges, as it successfully demands the duty of consciousness and purposes in the realization of goals (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014a) and the validation of claims about reality. Perception "pretends" or presupposes to position us in immediate contact with reality, whereas the perceptual world is there for us before the clear attraction to the categories of objectivity and intersubjective agreement. (Carr, 1987) As Husserl puts it, lifeworld encompasses both the pre-scientific and the diverse sedimentary levels of the senses of consciousness and its objects. To establish the lifeworld as the *manner* objects count is to set it up in a similar way to the lived body. The transcendental ego establishes the lifeworld as the dynamic, developing, and enlarging *manner* in which the objects of experience can set off to and interweave with the ego, can drive the ego into a disposition, and can function as the ego's memorial cells. (Costello, 2006)

Habermas insists that the link between religion and morality can be observed in the fact that morality receives no explicit standing (Popescu, 2015) in the fabrication of a structurally differentiated lifeworld. In the flow of the process of individualization, the human being has to sketch his/her personality behind the contours of the actual lifeworld and of his/her nature as connected with this framework. The concrete duplication of society is blended out of the image of community perceived as a communicatively organized lifeworld.

The rationalization of the lifeworld needs to be placed in a *systematic* history available only to operational investigation. The rationality's capacity in action adjusted to reciprocal understanding can be released and transposed into the rationalization of the lifeworlds of social organizations insofar as language accomplishes tasks of attaining understanding, organizing undertakings, and socializing persons; it thus becomes a setting via which cultural duplication, social assimilation, and socialization occur. (Habermas, 1987)

### 3. Social Configurations of the Lifeworld

The important issues for phenomenology are put forward by Husserl's manner of reaching the theory of the lifeworld. We should differentiate between the lifeworld and the scientifically construed world which is set up upon the lifeworld and composes a perfect concept from it. The only manner to completely comprehend science is to identify its origins in the lifeworld, the world in which in reality we exist. The outcomes of the scientific enterprise of idealization return into the lifeworld, establishing the fashion the world displays itself to us. The lifeworld is handled in an explicit manner as an intersubjective world and characterized as being presumed in any and all specific experiences. The concreteness of the lifeworld spreads farther than the simple objects given in corporeal perception, as it also incorporates other individuals. "Lifeworld" is intimately associated with the concept of intentionality and to the philosophical approach of epoché. Everything in the lifeworld can be scientifically objectified. Actors in communicative interplay approach each other with the framework beliefs which constitute their lifeworld. (Carr, 1987) Habermas posits that the notion of the lifeworld that arises from the notional view of communicative action has restricted analytical and empirical scope. A *situation* is a portion of *lifeworld circumstances of appropriateness* that is thrown into relief by topics and expressed via objectives and schemes of action. The lifeworld to which actors in communication belong is existent in such a manner that it shapes the framework for an actual setting. Only the restricted portions of the lifeworld put into the horizon of a case establish a thematizable background of action settled to reciprocal understanding. Every new case emerges in a lifeworld comprised of a cultural supply of knowledge that is "always already" well-known. (Habermas, 1987) Habermas expands the notions of colonization and uncoupling to depict the link between system and lifeworld. Complications occur when the system, designed to satisfy our technical concerns, permeates the practical sphere of the lifeworld, and interferes in the processes of meaning-making (Nica and Molnar, 2014) among persons and groups (Popescu Ljungholm, 2014b) in ordinary life. The symbolic reproduction process (Lăzăroiu, 2013) of the lifeworld includes a dis-course of practicality and individuals, and communities progressively charac-

terize themselves and their aims in system terms and perceive themselves as customers and clients. The lifeworld is settled by the operational imperatives of the state and the economy (Popescu, 2014), typified by the fashion of efficiency and the unsuitable use of technology. Metamorphosis of the lifeworld entails alteration in its cultural, social or personality facets. Opposition to colonization has undertaken new forms and class disputes have been substituted by discord at the seams or confines between system and lifeworld. New social advances cover overwhelming the consequences of the colonization of the lifeworld. The commitments of the economic and political-legal system eliminate the inner communicative action that grounds the constitution and duplication of lifeworlds. (Fleming, 2002)

#### **4. The Interaction between Lifeworld, History and Reason**

Husserl's inner history is the essential notion for his two leading goals of the crisis topic: to examine the lifeworld as the sense-foundation of the sciences for the purpose of grasping them in the sense of their objective soundness by reason of sense-genetic clarification, and to clarify phenomenologically the lifeworld itself due to the authentic sense-bestowals of transcendental subjectivity. (Ströker, 1993) On Husserl's reading, the lifeworld must occur as existent so that the transcendental ego might establish itself as active. The lifeworld emerges as historical, as the capacity of objects to preserve their references to life and historicity. Any happening "in the world" hearkens back to the lifeworld, whereas any event of the latter is that of organicity. For the transcendental ego to establish or perceive the lifeworld is to admit that the latter is pre-given as the basis of all objective meaning. The lifeworld is something that signifies to us a sort of operation. The lifeworld's organic agency and its capacity to both base our undertakings and comprehend them enable us to be existent *qua* objectified or *qua* human subject. (Costello, 2006)

Habermas emphasizes that in the flow of history the lifeworld must be "rationalized." The theory of the lifeworld is matching the one of communicative action. Rationalization does not indicate necessarily that the lifeworld loses its strength. The latter loses it to the detriment of effective forces ("system"). The lifeworld lasts, but is *colonized* by system. The lifeworld, once reasoned out by communicative action, can back *normative* operation that is rather self-regulating, uncomplicated, from second nature, established on collective values and confidence (Uhrig, 2015), without favoring religious tenet or political absolutism. The separation of lifeworld and system is somewhat because of the intervention of "media" between participants. The function of the lifeworld as a derivation of social capital in operation, as normative action has potential in determining social capital and the organizations that enable it to thrive. (Bolton, 2005) Habermas tackles unswervingly the con-

frontation with rationality caused in Husserl's late work by the notion of lifeworld, and repudiates the confirmation of reason with the mathematizing knowledge of the laws of physical reality. The lifeworld is the reality we consider as real in the deepest false beliefs which herald our scientific mathematization of nature. Just as communication necessitates putting forward private or personal perspectives to public debate, so any peculiar and limited strong beliefs must be to a greater extent established in an ever-widening sphere of rational discourse (a picture of reason is feasible only as communicative reason). Our rationality shifts us toward each other in the process of communication. Habermas aims to preserve the universality of reason in contrast with an image of the world which, as lifeworld, is specific and restricted, regardless of how widely imagined. (Carr, 1987)

## 5. Conclusions

Husserl stresses that the lifeworld is the frame that sustains the other undertakings of our embodied subjectivity that we store there temporarily. To set up the lifeworld is to establish the ensemble of ourselves-with-things. The lifeworld is directly perceived as the very indispensability, the sphere and reference of subjectivity, prevails as the very maintenance of our reciprocal permeation, and is active to the extent that it makes us cognizant that what we sense is already grasped by others. We become cognizant of the lifeworld as having an inner drive (Nica, 2015), as being itself active, via the manner in which it impels us to perceive our own inner drives, our own augmentations into the existences of one another. The link between my understandings of objective time and of my own private experienced time denotes the link between my own experienced time and that of the lifeworld. (Costello, 2006) Habermas affirms that communicative participants are continually migrating *within* the horizon of their lifeworld. As performers, they themselves are associated with the lifeworld, in conjunction with their speech acts, but they cannot indicate "something in the lifeworld" in the same manner as they can as regards to events, standards, or experiences. The configurations of the lifeworld specify the types of the intersubjectivity of potential understanding. The lifeworld is the transcendental setting where speaker and hearer encounter, where they can mutually put forward contentions that their utterances conform to the world, and where they can pick apart and substantiate those validity contentions, resolve their discords, and reach agreements. The chief goal of the phenomenological analysis of lifeworld arrangements is to clarify the spatiotemporal and social construction of the lifeworld. (Habermas, 1987)

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### Language and Imaginability

Horst Ruthrof (Murdoch University)

Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, 272 pp.

ISBN 978-1-4438-5545-7

Ruthrof asserts that the regulated, motivated signified is stimulated by *imaginability* by the reorganization of what a speaker is talking about (*aboutness*), directly altered by the restoration of speech intention, *implied deixis* carried by *voice*. Imaginability furthers *aboutness* altered by the rebuilding of speech modalities, reconciling the gulf between the linguistic system and its non-verbal outside. A *semantics of imaginability* should call for the theorization of the *signified* as *motivated*. The semantics of *imaginability* uses a transcendental speculative critical procedure for the purpose of identifying the requirements without which we could not perceive language the manner we do. The event of meaning necessitates imaginative *awareness* of what is being discussed, as an indispensable *imaginability condition* of language.

The step-down of natural language to semantics without preserving at least a minimum of pragmatic *imaginability* is deceptive. An important result of considering natural language as if it were formal, or as complying with formalization without harm, is the inevitable removal of *imaginability* as one of its basic components. Natural language meaning is implied in hyperintensional semantics, and with it *imaginability*. Without *imaginability*, perceived both as a human capacity and an aspect of motivated signifieds, we cannot represent the arbitrary sounds of linguistic expressions as meaningful. *Imaginability* is the foundation of language, in both the sense of the human capacity for the mental projection of mental situations and what can be envisaged in and by means of language. The uneven arrangement between perceptual input and neurally determined internal monitoring neurons backs the stress on the *primacy of imaginability*.

On Ruthrof's reading, pragmatics should include the bridging process of *imaginability*, perceived as "mental iconic transformations of perception" (*imaginability* unveils itself as irreducible basis). The seeking of the pragmatic prerequisites of natural language draws us to the base requirements of human rationality, of which *imaginability* is an essential ingredient. *Imaginability* establishes the manner word sounds are given iconic content in the

mental acts of native speakers which are *indirectly public* as an outcome of pedagogy. Sentences in the mind constitute a small portion of the sphere of the mental processes epitomized under the notion of *imaginability*. The latter, as transfiguration of perception into mental iconic projections, experiences an important advantage.

*Language and Imaginability* is a stimulating, sharp and keenly argued book. I find it to be tremendously interesting and thought-provoking.

**Social Efficiency and Instrumentalism in Education:  
Critical Essays in Ontology, Phenomenology,  
and Philosophical Hermeneutics**

James M. Magrini (College of Dupage)

New York-London: Routledge, 2014, 190 pp.

ISBN 978-0-415-74400-3

Magrini aims to clarify what it might mean to have a better life via *authentic learning*, and contribute to envisioning a pattern of curriculum and education that is ontological in character. Magrini investigates the ontological premises of the human being in its most authentic strength to learn via construing its world. The process of writing and re-writing positions us at an ontological interval from the characteristics of lived experience. Transcendence may be interpreted in connection with the human going past itself, being transformed into something *other* than it is currently, in and via understanding. Understanding via elucidative acts arises through the “mediation” of the *other*. Hermeneutics is not merely a theoretical or methodological implementation of rules for comprehending and handling practical activity.

Phenomenology, established in *inquiry* as opposed to *investigation*, deals with *how* something is in the world, or the way in which its existence or Being develops. A phenomenological question aims in examining to maintain and protect the fundamental *question-worthy* progress of the phenomenon under examination. The practice of phenomenology indicates possible manners for “education” to display itself in its own dissimilar and mode(s) of “self-showing” as it displays in and via elucidative acts of human understanding. A phenomenological image of the human and world incorporates a diverseness of views and situations. “Phenomenology is the philosophical method-practice of observing, recording, and interpreting lived experience by drawing out *ontologico-existential* ‘themes’ for analysis from vivid and detailed descriptions. Phenomenology seeks to uncover or reveal (universal) transcendental elements of human existence that are instantiated within practical (particular) empirical situations.” (p. 2)

As Magrini puts it, praxis, the genuine realm of education’s evolvment, is a *seeing-interpreting-understanding*. Knowledge has become consumable

merchandise in education. Educators in universities are ineffectual in voluntarily picking and arranging curriculum content and pedagogy, as they have been absolved of the duty of composing and enforcing the curriculum. Education manifests a frenetic sense of being out-of-control without knowledge that supplies cornerstones or steady epistemological premises. Original learning is conjoined with human transcendence as a requirement of phenomenological self-hood. Learning is established in existential *nothingness*: *original learning* considers the finitude bound up with language and all ways of comprehending our Being, being a practice of investigation where we are accustomed and sympathetic to being dragged into the depths of things that accurately and fundamentally demand our reasoning. The language of “learning” in *social efficiency* is one immersed in the history of behavioral and cognitive psychology. The language of *social efficiency* is incapable of engaging the most unconventional and existential features of our lives.

*Social efficiency* defines the ‘effective’ and ‘expert’ teacher and student ‘achievement’ in advance of the processes of education by consulting pre-determined competencies established outside of the realm and purview of education, which are then imposed bureaucratically on our schools. [...] In this age, teachers are becoming ever more *alienated* from the curriculum with dire effects on their students, who are as well *alienated* from anything that might resemble an authentic sense of learning. There is a crisis in contemporary education: radical achievement gaps in public schools, a shortage of highly trained and effective teachers, and the continued bureaucratization of American education where marketplace values dominate. (pp. 22–23)

Magrini holds that the most fundamental manner in which we are in the world resists being encapsulated and conveyed via theoretical accounts. The *world* we dwell in is an intricate system of meanings and structures organized by our dynamic heuristic endeavors to comprehend our existence. Language conveys our notions and articulates them as linguistic representations, arranging them in manners that further the communication of our notions and is instrumental in their development. The budding improvement of life’s intricacy, ambiguity, and mystery emerges as a phenomenon of language. Language can be employed to influence, indoctrinate, and trick. It can also motivate, regulate, and redeem. Language is not the correspondent of conveying or articulating knowledge via propositions.

*Social Efficiency and Instrumentalism in Education* is a bold and engaging book, opening up much fertile ground for future work. I find it to be both insightful and admirable, and a masterly success.

Reviewed by George Lăzăroiu, PhD  
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