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PRESENTED DISCOURSE IN POPULAR SCIENCE NARRATIVES OF DISCOVERY: COMMUNICATIVE SIDE OF THOUGHT PRESENTATION

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ABSTRACT. Thought presentation is considered the means of revealing an actant's inner world. However, a close look at popular science narratives of discovery suggests that presentation of thought serves to introduce scientific hypotheses and to announce discoveries – discourse acts that are outwardly oriented. The communicative nature of thought presentation in the narratives manifests through verb patterns observed in reporting clauses. Such an approach is seen as a mitigating strategy by means of which the authors renounce access to the inner worlds of scientists they describe. This observation points to a greater distinction between the functions of thought presentation in fiction and in non-fiction than is common to assume. The study compares data from popular science narratives of discovery with presented discourse in fiction and non-fiction examined by the Semino and Short (2004) corpus analysis.

Keywords: presented discourse; presented thought; popular science; narrative; discovery; non-fiction

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1. Introduction

This study is part of a larger research project that investigates portrayal of scientists in popular science bestsellers. It is also, and perhaps more importantly, an attempt to draw attention to the differences in functions of presented discourse in fiction and non-fiction and to demonstrate that the functions observed in fiction do not always constitute the norms.

My analysis focuses primarily on the narratives of discovery within popular science books since a narrative has been proven a potent vehicle for transferring scientific knowledge (see, for example, Blanchard et al., 2015; Hermwille, 2016; Pilkington, 2017; Reitsma, 2010). The present article looks at presented discourse of scientists and its role in the narratives of discovery.

Fu and Hyland (2014: 127, 141) assert that authors of popular science rely heavily on outside voices to make their arguments. Popular science, they argue, delivers its message through presented discourse of the scientific community. Since presented discourse is a primary means of information delivery in popular science texts, it is important to understand how popular science authors employ this mechanism and whether or not presented voices and thoughts of scientists function in the same way as presented voices and thoughts of characters in novels, for example.

Current studies in presented discourse will suggest that its functions in fiction and non-fiction while slightly different are, in general terms, similar. This is especially true when thought presentation in concerned. I explain this by the fact that while extensive research on the forms and functions of discourse presentation in non-fiction has been completed throughout the years (some of it is referenced in this work), the standard for functional distinctions of the categories remains centered on the norms for fiction. My findings, on the other hand, demonstrate that presented discourse, especially presented thought, do not perform the same functions in fiction and non-fiction. For example, the overarching function of inner world presentation assigned to presented thought in both genres is almost entirely absent in popular science.

As a result of my findings, I argue that it is necessary to systematically consider presented discourse functions in non-fiction as stand-alone phenomena rather than as extensions of the uses observed in fiction.

In a way, my look at presented discourse of scientists in the narratives of discovery is a comparison with discourse presentation types and functions identified by Semino and Short (2004) in their seminal *Corpus Stylistics: Speech, Writing, and Thought Presentation in a Corpus of English Writing*. The reason for this comparison is that the Semino and Short (2004) study is the most comprehensive corpus analysis of presented discourse in non-fiction to date even though it does not deal with non-fiction exclusively. The size of their corpus (258,348 words and 16,533 occurrences of presented discourse) allows for their findings and conclusions to be representative of the genres they examined. At the same time, I remain mindful that Semino and Short (2004) included only certain genres to represent fiction and non-fiction. For instance, the fiction section was represented by novels and non-fiction section by newspapers, biographies, and autobiographies. While it is possible that the newspaper reports analyzed contained scientific news and thus represented the genre of popular science, there is no clear indication of that in Semino and Short (2004). Therefore it is unclear if their findings can be generalized to include the genres beyond those examined. In investigating another non-fiction genre, I am testing their observations and conclude that for the most part their findings are more generalizable than Semino and Short (2004) themselves were able to argue based on the limitations of their corpus.

By contrast with the vast Semino and Short (2004) corpus, my sample is rather small. I analyzed a total of approximately 30,000 words and 193 occurrences of presented discourse. At the same time, my smaller corpus is much more specialized, dealing not only with one non-fiction genre but also focusing on a very specific subset of texts within it – narratives of discovery. At the same time, my data correlates with the general findings about the distribution of presented discourse observed by Semino and Short (2004). For example, Semino and Short (2004: 59) demonstrate that the speech and writing presentation occur more often than the presentation of thought.

As a result of this comparison with Semino and Short's findings (2004) and the observations of other researchers in the field of discourse presentation, I conclude that in the popular science narratives of discovery presentation of thought has a markedly different function from that assigned to this category of discourse presentation in either non-fiction or fiction. I argue that though presentation in the narratives is used to introduce not the intimate inner worlds of the scientists but to present to the reader scientific information in the form of hypotheses and announcements of discoveries.

1.1. Popular Science Narratives of Discovery

Popular science narratives of discovery are segments of text devoted to telling stories of important and famous scientific breakthroughs and the scientists who achieved them. They represent a type of narrative that can be positioned alongside the narrative types proposed by Myers (1990). Myers (1990: 141–142) identifies two kinds of scientific narratives: narratives of science and narratives of nature. A narrative of science is a story that focuses on "the conceptual structure of the discipline" that produced it (Myers, 1990: 142). A narrative of science mimics the research steps undertaken to produce a discovery. A narrative of nature, on the other hand, emphasizes the "object of study" at the expense of the "disciplinary procedures" (Myers, 1990: 141).

At a first glance, it appears that the narratives of discovery fall under the category of the narratives of nature. However, the investigation of presented discourse suggests another possible classification: the narratives of people. Similarly to a narrative of science or a narrative of nature, a narrative of people chooses to highlight one aspect of a discovery. In the case of the narratives I analyzed, the scientists, not the disciplinary procedure or the object of discovery, become the foci. In a sense, speech and thought presentation are only possible because the narratives are about people. At the same time, the functions of thought presentation, to which this article is devoted primarily, suggest a closer connection with the scientific issues rather than with the personal aspects of the scientists' lives.

1.2. Presented Discourse: A Brief Overview and Proposed Changed to Existing Models

Before I delve into detailed exploration of presented discourse found in the narratives of discovery, I would like to introduce my analytical framework since it differs slightly from the classical approach of Leech and Short (1981/2007) and from the updated and very detailed model proposed by Semino and Short (2004).

Leech and Short's (1981) model included five basic categories of discourse presentation with each category of speech presentation having a counterpart in the presentation of thought. The five categories are as follows:

- **Direct Speech/Thought [DS/DT]** – The original utterance/thought presented as if it were verbatim and introduced by a reporting clause.
- **Free Direct Speech/Thought [FDS/FDT]** – Original discourse presented as if it were verbatim but without the reporting clause and often without the quotation marks.
- **Indirect Speech/Thought [IS/IT]** – Reformulation of an original utterance/thought that contains a reporting clause.
- **Free Indirect Speech/Thought [FIS/FIT]** – IS/IT that is presented without a reporting clause.
- **Narrative Report of Speech Acts/Thought Acts [NRSA/NRTA]** – Summaries of utterances/thoughts.

All subsequent studies of discourse presentation (including Semino and Short's) draw on the Leech and Short (1981) model. Semino and Short (2004) choose to update the framework based on the findings of their study. Thus their model includes seven categories, with the addition of several new types of presented discourse which indicate even greater authorial control that the traditional NRSA/NRTA. Semino and Short (2004) also propose a new form of presented discourse – Presented Writing.

I am not including the whole Semino and Short (2004) model in detail because my nomenclature is closer to the classical framework of Leech and Short (1981) with some updates from Short (2012) even though the functional comparison is done with the Semino and Short (2004) study. The reason for the combined approach is the superior usability of the Leech and Short (1981) nomenclature and the detailed approach to function of the Semino and Short (2004) work.

I use the same categories introduced in the Leech and Short (1981) model but change the names slightly to reflect Short's more recent observations. I will use the term "Presentation" (P) rather than "Representation" (R) in the names of the categories. The model I will use therefore is as follows:

Speech(Writing) Presentation Scale

(F)DS(W)—FIS(W)—IS(W)—NPSA(W)

Thought Presentation Scale

(F)DT—FIT—IT—NPTA

The major alteration to the Semino and Short (2004) model that I propose is the combination of Writing Presentation category with Speech Presentation category and labeling the joint category Public Discourse. The idea behind the creation of writing presentation was accuracy – Semino and Short (2004: 48) note, for example, that Direct Writing may create a more "accurate word-by-word representation" than Direct Speech. However, Semino and Short (2004: 50) point out that "writing presentation…is very like the speech presentation…in relation to the effects associated with particular categories." Short (2007: 230, and 2012) endorses this view.

While I see the potential usefulness of the distinction, in my popular science corpus, it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between the two categories, as the authors may present writing in the form of speech by using the scientists' diaries, papers, or even secondary publications as sources for presented discourse, not to mention that often no specific source for a particular instance of discourse is identified. To me, the very presence of the ambiguity suggests the lack of importance of the distinction in the narratives. For these reasons, I will use the label Public Discourse to cover both speech and writing presentation. In contrast to this category, I will refer to thought presentation as Private Discourse. In distinguishing between speech and writing on the one hand and thought on the other, I am in accord with Short (2012: 22); however, he does not give a specific name to the combined category and refers to it as "speech and writing."

2. Methods and Materials

The present study involves popular science bestsellers published between 1988 and 2012. The reason to explore written popular science by focusing on books is dictated by the lack of research is this area. The majority of presented discourse studies concerned with popular science choose to analyze newspaper or magazine articles and texts written for online media. A study that contributes to the so far rather small pool of research on popular science books is covering an area that appears somewhat neglected. From the practical point of view, a lot of aspiring writers aim to produce books. While starting with an article or a blog might be a more realistic endeavor (as the writing manuals point out; see, for example, Barton, 2010), the demand for advice about strategies used in successful books remains strong.

For this study, I analyzed a corpus of 100 narratives of discovery with 50 narratives being taken from books written by scientists and 50 from books written by science journalists. I initially separated the corpus into the two subgroups anticipating differences in the numbers, types, and treatment of discourse presentation. This hypothesis was based on de Oliveira and Pagano's (2006: 642, 643) findings that show discrepancies in the treatment of presented discourse by professional scientists and science journalists. However, upon closer analysis, my corpus did not supply the evidence to support their observations. The reason might be the difference in the texts examined. While de Olivera and Pagano (2006) looked at articles – professional research articles and popular scientific articles – my corpus is based on popular science books. Therefore, the final version of my analysis does not distinguish discourse presentation based on the qualifications of the author.

There are 10 books used to construct the corpus. They are listed below alphabetized by the author's last name:

- Bill Bryson 2003, *A Short History of Nearly Everything*
- William Bynum 2012, *A Little History of Science*
- Sean Carrol 2012, *The Particle At the End of the Universe*
- Enrico Coen 2012, *Cells to Civilization*
- Marcus du Sautoy 2011, *The Number Mysteries*
- Timothy Ferris 1988, *Coming of Age in the Milky Way*
- Brian Greene 2011, *The Hidden Reality*
- Michio Kaku 2011, *Physics of the Future*
- Sam Kean 2012, *The Violinist's Thumb*
- Carl Zimmer 2011, *A Planet of Viruses*

These texts represent the following scientific disciplines: astronomy, chemistry, genetics, mathematics, medicine, physics, and virology. All of them are originally written in English.

Overall, even though I do supply the frequency counts for the types of the discourse presentation observed, this is largely a qualitative study with a sample of 193 occurrences of discourse presentation of scientists. These occurrences are short stretches of discourse that are on average about 35 words long. However, the narratives themselves are not very long either, ranging from between 200 to 500 words. These narratives of discovery are not themselves the end products but rather brief excursions into history on a larger journey to uncovering the potentials of the modern-day science. They often provide the reader with the much-necessary background of the fundamental laws and scientific principles.

Although I haven't analyzed every instance of discourse presentation in the books, having examined the texts beyond the narratives as well, I conclude that the categories of discourse presentation used for the analysis of the narratives of discovery are exhaustive and reflect the forms of discourse presentation found outside of the narratives.

In order to collect the sample of the discourse presentation occurrences that was representative of each author but at the same time still manageable for manual analysis, I first limited the number of narratives analyzed from each text. I looked at 10 narratives of discovery from each author. To collect the 10 narratives from each text, I first went through each book and identified all the narratives of discovery. Narratives of discovery possess a certain structural makeup: they start out with a hypothesis, develop/prove/disprove it, and then supply an evaluation, which examines the discovery's relevance. Such narratives often function as explanatory vehicles for the scientific concepts discussed in the books. From the books that included 15 or fewer narratives of discovery, I took the first 10. From the books that included more than 15 narratives of discovery, I used three narratives from the beginning of the text, three from the middle, and four from the concluding sections.

Having selected the narratives, I then analyzed each one for evidence of presented discourse of scientists. After that I proceeded to identify all occurrences of Public and Private Discourses, labeling them according to the categories introduced in 1.2. My analysis yielded 193 total occurrences of speech and thought presentation in 100 narratives of discovery. See Table 1 for the frequency information of Public and Private Discourses. While the number of occurrences is not very large, I believe the sample to be sufficient for a qualitative study that focuses on the effects created by the presentation of discourse.

Table 1 Frequency of Private and Public Discourse Presentation in the Narratives of Discovery

Total number of discourse presentation occurrences	
193	
Public Discourse # of occurrences/Percentage	Private Discourse # of occurrences/Percentage
140/72%	53/28%

3. Results

The two major outcomes of my analysis concern both quantitative and qualitative differences of Private Discourse in popular science narratives of discovery as compared with Semino and Short's (2004) observations. I will discuss each of the findings separately, beginning with the quantitative comparison.

3.1. Comparison of Corpus Data with That of Semino and Short (2004)

Since the focus of the present study is primarily on Private Discourse, the quantitative data introduced in the main portion of the article will reflect Private Discourse frequency information and examples. The appendix will supply frequency data and examples of Public Discourse.

Private Discourse presentation in the narratives of discovery does not follow the overall pattern established by Semino and Short (2004) very closely. See Table 2. However, as Table 3 demonstrates the distribution of Private Discourse in the narratives of discovery resembles the pattern for non-fiction observed by Semino and Short (2004). In my analysis, I eliminated the category of Internal Narration (NI) from the frequency counts since other studies (see, for example, Toolan, 2001, and Short, 2007, 2012) suggest that it belongs inside the category of Narration and should not be part of the discourse presentation scale. I adjusted the total number of occurrences in each section of the Semino and Short (2004) corpus accordingly. Thus the data in Tables 2 and 3 reflects the numbers and percentages that do not take NI into account. Tables 2 and 3 show the comparison of my data with that of Semino and Short (2004). Table 4 shows my data with examples from my corpus.

Table 2 Comparison of Private Discourse Frequencies in the Narratives of Discovery with Thought Presentation Frequencies in the Semino and Short (2004) Whole Corpus (Source: Semino and Short (2004: 115))

Ty		Narratives of Discovery # of occurrences followed by percentage	Semino and Short (2004) # of occurrences followed by percentage
Type	(F)DT	3 (5.6%)	107 (15%)
	IT	24 (≈47%)	201 (29%)
	FIT	0	275 (40%)
	NPTA	26 (≈47%)	114 (16%)

Table 3 Comparison of Private Discourse Frequencies in the Narratives of Discovery with Thought Presentation Frequencies in the Semino and Short (2004) Non-fiction Section (Source: Semino and Short (2004: 115))

Ty		Narratives of Discovery # of occurrences followed by percentage	Semino and Short (2004) # of occurrences followed by percentage
Type	(F)DT	3 (5.6%)	30 (13%)
	IT	24 (≈47%)	106 (46%)
	FIT	0	45 (19%)
	NPTA	26 (≈47%)	52 (22%)

Table 4 Types and Frequency of Private Discourse Presentation in the Narratives of Discovery

		Example	# of occurrences out of 53 total
Type	(F)DT	The healthy plants, Mayer discovered, turned sick as well. *Some microscopic pathogen must be multiplying inside the plants*. Mayer took sap from sick plants and incubated it in his laboratory. (Zimmer, 2011: 3–4)	3 (5.6%)
	IT	It occurred to Bradley that the earth is like a boat adrift in winds of starlight – that, as the earth moves through the starlight, its motion alters the apparent positions of the stars. (Ferris, 1988: 138)	24 (≈47%)
	FIT		0
	NPTA	Hubel and Wiesel decided to look at what would happen if animals were deprived of sight in one or both eyes as they grew up. (Coen, 2012: 324)	26 (≈47%)

Semino and Short's (2004) frequency counts for thought presentation in non-fiction and in the whole corpus suggest two different categories as the norm: Free Indirect Thought for the corpus and as a whole (and for fiction) and Indirect Thought as the norm for non-fiction. FIT as the norm for thought presentation (especially in fiction) contradicts the earlier assumptions of Leech and Short (1981), who suggested that in fiction (and by their extension, overall) IT should be the norm for the presentation of thought. Ironically, the findings from the Semino and Short (2004) non-fiction section and from my non-fiction corpus of the narratives of discovery are the ones that provide support for Leech and Short's (1981) suggestion. In my corpus, however, IT occurs just as often as Narrator's Presentation of Thought Acts (both at ≈47%), which is not the case with the Semino and Short (2004) non-fiction data. At the same time, in their corpus, NRTA in non-fiction is the second most numerous category after IT, with 22% of total occurrences.

FIT, the norm for Semino and Short's (2004) whole corpus, is not represented at all in the narratives of discovery. This might appear as a striking difference between the two corpora. However, when my data is compared with the non-fiction section of the Semino and Short (2004) corpus, the difference is less pronounced. Especially if the non-fiction section is analyzed not as a combination of press and (auto)biography but as its component parts. According to Semino and Short (2004: 115), there are no occurrences of FIT in the press section. The 45 occurrences reflected in Table 3 are all from (auto)biographies. This helps reconcile my data with the figures from Semino and Short (2004) since, as they show, not every non-fiction genre includes FIT. However, FIT in the Semino and Short (2004) non-fiction section is not the least frequent category. In the whole corpus and in the non-fiction section of Semino and Short (2004), it is (Free)Direct Thought that occupies this position. If FIT is excluded from the consideration in my corpus, then the frequency count for (F)DT falls in line with what Semino and Short (2004) observed.

Overall, Private Discourse in the narratives of discovery follows the pattern established for the presentation of thought in non-fiction by Semino and Short (2004), but it does not correspond closely with the data on thought presentation in their whole corpus. For instance, the norm for Private Discourse presentation suggested by the frequency counts corresponds to that for non-fiction in the Semino and Short (2004) study.

3.2. Functions of Private Discourse in Popular Science

Those who study speech/writing and thought presentation often note the functional distinctions. For instance, Semino and Short (2004: 118) confirm that "the effects that result from their [thought presentation] types are quite different from those we have noted for speech and writing." The difference, as Leech and Short (2007: 270) point out, lies in the inaccessibility of thought, "We cannot see inside the minds of other people." Short's later works (see, for example, Short, 2007, 2012) further this point by stressing that thought presentation does not possess those communicative properties that are common for speech/writing presentation.

It is generally assumed that since thought is not directly accessible in everyday life and is not used for communicative purposes, presentation of thought centers on the inner worlds of actants (see, for example, Leech and Short, 2007; Semino and

Short, 2004; Short, 2007, 2012; Toolan, 2001). As a result, thought presentation is usually discussed in close connection with dramatization. While my corpus follows the observations of Semino and Short (2004) regarding the frequencies of Direct Thought, Free Direct Thought, and Free Indirect Thought (see Tables 2 and 3), I interpret the functions associated with Private Discourse as radically different from those assigned to thought presentation by the previous studies, which dealt with non-fiction genres other than popular science. By using Private Discourse to introduce scientific hypotheses and discoveries, the authors of the popular science narratives take thought presentation out of the realm of the intimate. Private Discourse introduces the reader to common knowledge or cutting edge scientific advancements rather than to the intimate thoughts of the scientists. In other words, the messages delivered through Private Discourse are very much public and, for the most part, do not contribute to characterization of the scientists, something that would be expected of thought presentation based on the previous analyses.

Below I introduce a prototypical example of thought presentation used to reveal inner worlds of characters. Since my corpus does not contain such functional instances of Private Discourse, the example comes from a scientifically-themed novel *Intuition* by Allegra Goodman (2006). The novel belongs to the genre of Laboratory Literature or lab lit. Rohn (2005, 2010) defines lab lit as realistic fiction about scientists set in a world identifiable as cognate with our own, as opposed to the speculative settings found within science fiction (For a comparison of popular science and lab lit see Pilkington, 2016). Goodman's (2006) work deals with a group of scientists working in a cancer research laboratory who come to experience the exaltation of discovery and the consequences of fraud. In the process, they reexamine the nature of their personal and professional relationships.

Example 1. uses the presentation of thought of two scientists to transmit their experiences in the laboratory to the reader:

> 1. Marion and Feng looked at each other. After repeated failure, could one of Cliff's viral variations actually have some effect? What had changed here? What had Cliff done? The variation of the virus was R-7, Cliff had scrawled a note on the blue index card labeling this cage of mice. But he's never gotten R-7 to work effectively in live animals before. Were these three mice significant? Or were they outliers of some kind – tainted by some other condition? This was the difficulty with animal research: so many different things could go wrong. (Goodman, 2006: 27)

This passage contains Free Indirect Thought of scientists (The use of the past tense suggests Indirect rather than Direct thought.). The author uses FIT to express the emotions of puzzlement and hesitation. Goodman (2006: 27) never indicates that these questions are voiced, and the reader is to presume that he/she is given access to the inner worlds of the characters. The choice of FIT in this extract is very likely not accidental since, as Semino and Short (2004: 123–124) show, this is the most frequently used form of thought presentation in fiction. FIT is considered to present thoughts in a "dramatic and immediate way" that allows the reader access to "the consciousness of characters" and creates "closeness and empathy towards characters" (Semino and Short, 2004: 123–124). The reader is allowed to share in these unspoken emotions which reflect the subjective experience of the scientists.

At the same time, the data from my corpus suggests a different relationship between Private Discourse and subjective, intimate experiences of the actants in the narratives of discovery. Thought presentation in the narratives of discovery is rarely used in the way demonstrated by example 1., and the category of FIT – the most dramatic and immediate of all the forms of thought presentation – is entirely absent from the narratives in my corpus. The reader of popular science is much more likely to encounter thought presentation similar to the instance in example 2.

> 2. Alvarez, a brilliant physicist with a penchant for puzzles, hit on an idea: Use muons coming from the skies in the form of cosmic rays to peek inside the rock of Khafre's pyramid. (Carroll, 2012: 106)

This is Direct Thought expressing a scientific hypothesis. The choice of the form is not accidental but aligns closely with the purpose of the narrative. Semino and Short (2004: 118) note in contrasting DT with FIT that the former presents "highly conscious, deliberate thought" while the latter is more emotional. Deliberate and well-articulated thought expressed in example 2. is fit to present a scientific hypothesis that is expected to be tested. The reporting clause, "Alvarez…hit on an idea" contains an element of surprise, yet it also establishes the DT that follows as a product of previous deliberation on the subject.

Example 2. shows that in the narratives of discovery thought presentation is used for very different purposes than it is in fiction. Even though the author shares with the reader the thoughts of the scientist, they are not intended to evoke in the reader the emotional experience of coming up with a hypothesis and thus reveal an inner world. In fact, the author gives no indications of how Alvarez felt about his idea, whether, for example, he was excited or concerned that it might not work.

Private Discourse in the narratives of discovery is closely associated with the experimental and the empirical (and thus the more physical rather than the mental) sides of science. The decision to focus on the empirical side of science through the presentation of mental processes might be an attempt at establishing a kind of closeness between the reader and the scientific issues discussed.

In the narratives of discovery overall, experimental procedures are not foregrounded, and the discoveries are often described as being the products of intellectual rather than experimental processes, so it appears that overall scientific discovery is presented as a result of thinking rather than doing. Presented discourse, however, brings the experimental procedures to the forefront even if they are introduced through Private Discourse, and therefore internal modes of discourse presentation.

Private Discourse in the narratives of discovery is dedicated not so much to the unveiling of the inner worlds of scientists but rather to tracing the mental processes and reactions to empirical work which result in discoveries. Narrator's Presentation on Thought Acts and Indirect Thought aid the most in accomplishing this goal. These two types of Private Discourse are responsible for introductions of scientific hypotheses and discoveries in the narratives.

IT and NPTA are the least dramatic means of Private Discourse. For instance, Toolan (2001: 139) writes, "…recourse to more direct thought-presentation than IT [FIT, DT, FDT] may…invite the inference of … 'entering' of the character's intimate mental space." Like Toolan (2001), Semino and Short (2004: 128, 131) observe that IT and NPTA are "less dramatic" means of accessing the inner world of a character. Semino and Short (2004: 115) note the relative lack of NPTA across their corpus and in the non-fiction section in particular. It is IT that is more prominent in their frequency counts (Semino and Short, 2004: 115). In my corpus, however, both IT and NPTA have nearly the same number of occurrences, accounting for almost all of the instances of Private Discourse.

The preference for the most non-dramatizing categories of Private Discourse falls in line with the purpose of IT and NPTA in the narratives of discovery, where Private Discourse focuses on science rather than on the scientists. Out of 53 occurrences of Private Discourse, 44 focus on the scientific issues rather than present more personal thoughts.

The introductions of scientific hypotheses and discoveries reveal several important points about Private Discourse. Firstly, they demonstrate a strong connection between Private Discourse and Narration that describes experimental procedures, thus supplying evidence for Private Discourse being concerned more with the empirical than with the intimate. Secondly, presentations of discoveries and hypotheses follow specific verb patterns that, I suggest, generalize Private Discourse and, again, provide support for my argument that Private Discourse does not focus on expressions of individual inner worlds.

In fact, I suggest that verb choices identified during the analysis of hypotheses and discoveries presentations function as what Mildorf (2008: 288) calls "a mitigating strategy which helps the speaker disclaim any ultimate knowledge or access to…other people's minds." Mildorf's (2008) study is of oral narratives, and consequently the mitigating strategies for thought presentation she observed are different. In general the idea that a discourse is linguistically marked based on its pragmatic goal has been addressed in multiple studies (see, for example, Dilmon 2009, who suggests that discourse of truth differs from discourse that is designed to mislead). Such explorations are, however, almost always limited to the investigations of speech. The limitation is understandable given the traditional properties of thought presentation. My examples, on the other hand, show that Private Discourse may function in a very public way, and the presence of verb patterns associated with certain instances of thought presentation suggest a similarity with Public Discourse.

To borrow terminology employed by van Krieken and Sanders (2016: 49), thought presentation of scientists in the narratives of discovery appears to represent Narrative-Internal Space – that is thoughts that the scientists are thinking as they come up with hypotheses or realize they've made a discovery. However, upon closer analysis, it becomes evident that it is Narrative-External Space that is being presented to the reader. Unlike Narrative-Internal Space, Narrative-External Space is dedicated to non-dramatizing discourse that is connected with facts and their legitimizing properties.

3.2.1. Scientific Hypotheses: Narrator's Presentation of Thought Acts and Indirect Thought

Scientific hypotheses are an important part of the narratives of discovery. They are signposts that guide the readers' expectations of what is to be discussed in a narrative. Even though only about 20% of the narratives use presented discourse to introduce hypotheses, these narratives rely overwhelmingly on Private Discourse to do so. Out of all the occurrences of Private Discourse, 43.3% is used to present hypotheses, with only 13.5% of Public Discourse (mostly IS) serving the same role. Example 3. shows a hypothesis presented via IT:

> 3. Many scientists at the time were skeptical, but Shope wondered if rabbit "horns" were also tumors, somehow triggered by an unknown virus. (Zimmer, 2011: 24)

This is a typical hypothesis expressed using Private Discourse. It contains a verb of mental action ("wondered") and a hedge ("if") to indicate uncertainty that is to be eliminated once the proof is obtained. Using Private Discourse to introduce a hypothesis inevitably personalizes the discovery process.

There are two major ways to introduce scientific hypotheses using NPTA and IT. The first one involves interaction of Private and Public Discourses and Narration and involves mostly NPTA. The second one is to use single occurrences of IT, as in example 3.

NPTA that appear in combinations with Public Discourse and Narration do not themselves introduce hypotheses and are more likely to resemble prototypical NPTA observed by Semino and Short (2004: 130) and described as "occurrences of a specific individual thought in the mind of a participant in the story, which do not include any indication of the propositional content or the 'wording' of the thought." Such NPTA, as Semino and Short (2004: 131) suggest, most often introduce the character's motivations that help explain his/her speech or actions that precede or follow. This is also true for this category of NPTA in my corpus. However, the thoughts and motivations that they present are connected with scientific hypotheses and never uncover personal feelings of the scientists. Consider example 4. (NPTA is bolded followed by the italicized Public Discourse):

> 4. While delving microscopically through the pus in surgical bandages, Miescher found a substance he didn't recognize and called it nuclein (because it resided in the nuclei of cells). At the time, Miescher did little more than note its existence, but **nuclein clearly remained on his mind**, for *twenty three years later in a letter to his uncle he raised the possibility that such molecules could be the agents behind heredity.* (Bryson, 2003: 400)

As Semino and Short (2004: 131) note, NPTA of this kind often appear as interjections within characters' conversations. While this is not the case in my corpus, NPTA that do not themselves express hypotheses are much more likely to be followed by Public Discourse than the other types of Private Discourse. For instance there are 17 prototypical NPTA and 5 of them are followed by Public Discourse. As with example 4., Public Discourse in such combinations is motivated by NPTA and contains the hypothesis. In a way, NPTA of this kind, while not introducing the hypotheses themselves, trace the mental path the scientists take to arrive at a hypothesis.

There is also a connection of Private and Public Discourses with Narration that such NPTAs highlight. Note that in example 4., the narrated segment describes the experimental procedure. Example 5. (NPTA bolded, IS italicized, Narration unmarked) also demonstrates the interaction of Private Discourse with the experimental procedure presented via Narration. The IS that follows the NPTA contains the hypothesis, to which the Narration and the NPTA lead. The rest of the narrative discusses and confirms this hypothesis.

> 5. Thompson and his colleagues at the Cavendish Laboratories began to measure the electrical charge and the weight of some of these radiations. **They tried to decide how these two measurements were related to each other**. In 1987 *Thompson proposed that these rays were streams of charged subatomic particles: bits of atoms.* (Bynum, 2012: 183)

The different types of discourse presentation introduce the different chronological stages of the discovery process.

Hypothesis-introducing NPTA may also manifest as single occurrences (there are 9 such cases) that themselves carry the hypotheses. Consider example 6.

> 6. This set Bunsen to wondering whether they might be able to detect chemical elements in the spectrum of the sun as well. (Ferris, 1988: 164)

Single occurrences of hypotheses presentation are, however, much more commonly expressed via IT (see example 3). In fact, there are only 4 interactions between Private and Public Discourses that include IT. Single-occurrence hypotheses presentations reveal clear verb choices associated with hypotheses expressed through NPTA and IT. Consider example 7.

> 7. He wondered if something other than bacteria was responsible for tobacco mosaic disease, something far smaller. (Zimmer, 2011: 4)

The hypothesis is introduced via IT. The verb "wondered," is part of a pattern for hypotheses presentation via Private Discourse. There are four verbs/verbal phrases that occur most often with hypotheses in Private Discourse: "wonder," "come up with an idea," 'think," and "assume." The first two most often indicate what I call "positive hypotheses" – hypotheses that are proven correct as the narrative progresses. The last two are associated with "negative hypotheses" – hypotheses that are later refuted. Accordingly, example 7. introduces a positive hypothesis, while example 8. illustrates a negative hypothesis:

> 8. Perhaps, he thought, the plants were suffering from an invisible infection. (Zimmer, 2012: 3)

Other than the verb used to present it, it is impossible to distinguish a negative hypothesis from a positive one without the context of the narrative. The verb choice, however, creates a distinction between the two hypotheses and can help predict the narrative's resolution when hypotheses are analyzed in isolation. Examples 7. and 8. are taken from the same narrative on the discovery of viruses and show that other than the verb used in the reporting clause of IT, there is nothing to separate a negative hypothesis from a positive one. For instance, both contain hedges ("if" and "perhaps") that point to the tentativeness of the statements. This demonstrates the key role reporting verbs play in Private Discourse introducing hypotheses.

While Private Discourse dominates introduction of hypotheses over Public Discourse, Indirect Speech also contributes to the presentation of hypotheses. The numbers are, however, lower: only 14 hypotheses presented via IS compared to 26 introduced with the aid of Private Discourse. There are certain verbs ("argue" and "propose," for example) which are frequently used in IS that expresses hypotheses, but the verb choices pointing to positive and negative hypotheses are less pronounced. While the verbs "propose" and 'suggest" are associated with positive hypotheses, there is no discernible verb pattern for negative hypotheses. Both positive and negative hypotheses could be expressed using the verbs "argue" and "ask."

The lower number of hypotheses introduced via IS and the less rigorous verb choices point to the dominance of Private Discourse when this particular function is concerned. The preference for Private Discourse suggests the focus on the personal observations and the empirical work in the road to discovery rather than on publications, for example, which would manifest as instances of Public Discourse.

In both the hypotheses introduced via Private Discourse and via IS, positive hypotheses outnumber the negative. The emphasis on the positive hypotheses also confirms the general focus of the narratives on the positive outcomes of science.

3.2.2. Introduction of Discoveries: Indirect Thought

After hypotheses presentation, the introduction of discoveries forms the second most numerous functional category of Private Discourse. There are 12 occurrences of Private Discourse that introduce discoveries, and all of them use IT. IT appears to be the only mechanism of Private Discourse for signaling these important points in the narratives. (Other options include Narration and non-dramatizing Narrator's Presentation of Speech Acts.) Consider example 9.

> 9. An atom, Rutherford realized, was mostly empty space, with a very dense nucleus at the center. (Bryson, 2003: 140)

This example demonstrates the most popular way of incorporating statements of discoveries into the narratives: the use of what I label "pragmatic" as opposed to figurative language. Such descriptions use generic terms of the disciplines to present the discoveries. This method of discovery presentation reveals the connection of IT with Public Discourse and Narration and also uncovers a popular verb choice associated with discovery presentation. In other words, IT that presents discoveries acts similarly to hypotheses-presenting NPTA.

Almost all of the discoveries introduced via IT use the verb "realize" – 10 out of 12 total occurrences. The remaining two instances of IT that introduce discoveries use the verbs "occur" (see example 12. below) and "assume." Except for the instance that uses "assume" ("she assumed…that the change involved hydrogens shifting around" (Kean, 2012: 100)), all of the discoveries introduced through IT contain an element of sudden enlightenment, which the verbs "realize" and "occur" express. At a first glance this observation suggests that some scientific discoveries are being presented as serendipitous insight not necessarily dependent on consistent empirical work. However, when the instances of discoveries introduced via IT are examined in the context of the narratives, the connection between Private Discourse and descriptions of experiments provided via Narration show that just the opposite is true.

Out of the 12 occurrences of discovery introductions via IT, 8 are preceded and/or followed by descriptions of experimental procedures, presenting the Eureka moment as a reaction to a specific experimental result. Consider example 10., which supplies the rest of the narrative introduced in the previous example:

> 10. <u>In 1910, Rutherford…fired ionized helium atoms, or alpha particles, at a sheet of gold foil. To Rutherford's astonishment some of the particles bounced back.</u> *It was as if he said, he had fired a fifteen-inch shell at a sheet of paper and it rebounded into his lap. This was just not supposed to happen.* **After considerable reflection he realized there could be only one possible explanation: the particles that bounced back were striking something small and dense at the heart of the atom, while the other**

> **particles sailed through unimpeded. An atom, Rutherford realized, was mostly empty space, with a very dense nucleus at the center.** <u>This was a most gratifying discovery, but it presented one immediate problem. By all the laws of conventional physics, atoms shouldn't therefore exist</u>. (Bryson, 2003: 139–140)

With such an introduction, the discovery presented as IT does not seem as sudden or as unfounded as it might when IT is analyzed in isolation as in example 9. Note also the interaction of Narration (underlined), Public Discourse: Indirect Speech and Free Indirect Speech (italicized), and Private Discourse: Indirect Thought (bolded). The narrated segment supplies the details of the experiment (and later the evaluation of the discovery); IS and FIS show Rutherford's reaction to the experiment, and the second sentence of IT presents the discovery itself as a culmination of all the previous activities provided via Narration and Public Discourse. The combination of presented discourse (Public and Private) and Narration works to create a chronological account of the discovery and to position it as the outcome of the experiment. Rutherford's thoughts are presented as focused on the observation, from which he deduces the structure of the atom – his discovery.

When IT is not connected with an experimental procedure, the discovery process appears underdeveloped and the discovery announcement comes somewhat suddenly. However, this mode of introducing discoveries appears to be a deliberate choice on the part of the authors. A discovery presented through IT which is not connected to an experiment is usually not the main discovery of a narrative (see example 11.), or it mimics the actual events where a discovery was indeed a sudden realization (see example 12.).

> 11. Despite the evidence mounting against him, Bekenstein had one tantalizing result on his side. **In 1971, Stephen Hawking realized that black holes obey a curious law**. (Greene, 2011: 247)

In this case, Hawking's discovery helps Bekenstein strengthen his own theory and provides evidence for the main discovery of the narrative – the multiverse. There is no need to take up room with the descriptions of Hawking's discovery process; the mention of the discovery is sufficient. The remainder of the narrative provides a brief explanation of Hawking's findings and connects them to Bekenstein's ideas.

> 12. As often happens, the answer came to him not while he was at work in his observatory but while he was relaxing. While on a boat in the Thames, Bradley found himself gazing at a wind vane mounted atop the mast. It pointed into the wind and therefore seemed to change direction whenever the boat turned. What was changing, of course, was the orientation, not of the wind, but of the boat.

> **It occurred to Bradley that the earth is like a boat adrift in winds of starlight – that, as the earth moves through the starlight, its motion alters the apparent positions of the stars**. (Ferris, 1988: 138)

Example 12. presents a different reason for not including a description of the experiment – it did not happen – and illustrates the use of figurative language in the description of the discovery. Ferris (1988: 137–138) tells a discovery story different from those found in the majority of the narratives but one that nonetheless is not uncommon when it comes to discoveries, as he himself suggests.

With IT, the content rather than the wording is in the forefront; however, analogies and metaphors shift the focus back to wording, producing IT that is more suitable for fiction, where the narrator has unlimited access to the thoughts of his/her characters. Incidentally, example 12. does not employ the verb “realize” commonly associated with the introduction of discoveries via IT and which I consider a mitigating mechanism which signals the generalized and non-intimate nature of Private Discourse. By using the verb “occur” Ferris (1988: 138), in a way, breaks with the tradition and thus signals an instance of Private Discourse similar to thought presentation usually associated with fiction.

The scarcity of Direct Thought, Free Direct Thought and Free Indirect Thought in Private Discourse observed in the narratives of discovery supports the claim that Private Discourse’s functions lie beyond dramatization and characterization – functions commonly associated with thought presentation in fiction. Example 12. is the only instance of Private Discourse that uses figurative language. The overwhelming majority of occurrences express the thoughts of scientists in more pragmatic language. I suggest that the lack of elaborate descriptions in Private Discourse and the preference for reporting verb patterns (certain verbs associated with positive and negative hypotheses and almost universal use of the verb “realize” for the presentations of discoveries) constitute the mitigating strategies for Private Discourse that point to the overall lack of inner world access for thought presentation in the narratives.

4. Conclusion

A look at discourse presentation in popular science narratives of discovery provides several important insights into presentation of discourse in non-fiction. Firstly, my observations do not support the need for a third category of discourse presentation – Presented Writing. The adjustment proposed for the Semino and Short (2004) model suggests looking at presented discourse in broader terms: using the categories of Public and Private Discourse rather than analyzing speech and writing as separate categories. While I recognize the category of presented writing as a form presented discourse takes, I have not observed that in the popular science narratives of discovery it is employed to create effects significantly different from those produced by the presentation of speech. It is my assumption that other forms of narrative besides the narratives of discovery might use presented discourse in a similar way. For those analysts whose material might not emphasize presented writing, the separation into Public and Private Discourses might afford more flexibility.

Secondly, my findings suggest that Private Discourse in the popular science narratives of discovery performs functions that are different from those of prototypical instances of thought presentation in either non-fiction or fiction. According to my data, Private Discourse in the narratives of discovery is not employed for dramatization or for revelation of the inner worlds of actants. For the most part, it is used to present scientific hypotheses and to announce discoveries – both outwardly oriented actions traditionally associated with Public Discourse.

Thirdly, the article highlights the need to consider presented discourse functions in non-fiction not as projections of those from fiction but as stand-alone phenomena. While studies of presented discourse in non-fiction abound, and some functional differences are articulately presented (see, for example, Calsamiglia and Ferrero, 2003; de Oliveira and Pagano, 2006; Livnat, 2012; Semino and Short, 2004; Smirnova, 2009), functions of presented discourse observed in fiction remain prototypical starting points, and the examples found in non-fiction are seen as deviations.

The small sample analyzed for the present study prohibits any generalization of the findings; however, even an exploration of this scale points to possibilities and warrants further investigation of presented discourse functions in popular science specifically and non-fiction in general.

Appendix

Table 5 Comparison of Public Discourse Frequencies in the Narratives of Discovery with the Speech/Writing Frequencies in the Semino and Short (2004) Whole Corpus [Source: Semino and Short, 2004: 67, 101]

Ty		Narratives of Discovery # of occurrences followed by percentage	Semino and Short (2004) # of occurrences followed by percentage
Type	(F)DS/(F)DW	47 (33%)	3155 (47%)
	IS/IW	34 (25%)	1188 (18%)
	FIS/FIW	4 (3%)	188 (2.8%)
	NPSA (NV/NW + NRSA/NRWA)	47 (33%)	2045 (31%)

Table 6 Types and Frequency of Public Discourse Presentation in the Narratives of Discovery

		Example	# of occurrences out of 140 total
Type	(F)DS	"What a field of novelty is here opened to our conceptions!" he exclaimed, more delighted by the variety of the sky than bothered at having been wrong. (Ferris, 1988: 157)	47 (33%)
	IS	Moreover, they claim that this process is universal, that, any visual thought or even dream should be able to be detected by the fMRI scan. (Kaku, 2011: 57)	34 (25%)
	FIS	Far from rejoicing, the older scientist screwed up his brow…. Miescher had made a mistake, surely. (Kean, 2012: 20)	4 (3%)
	NPSA	Penzias and Wilson phoned Dicke at Princeton and described their problem to him. (Bryson, 2003: 12)	47 (33%)
Mixed Categories	<u>NPSA</u>+*DS*	A colleague later described him as *"driven by a demon."* (Kean, 2012: 20)	5 (4%)
	<u>NPSA</u>+**IT**	<u>Newton is said to have recalled</u>, near the end of his life, that **this inspiration came to him when he saw an apple fall from the tree in front of his mother's house**. (Ferris, 1988:107)	1 (.7%)
	IS+*DS*	But Cirelli insists that **he obtained permission from the PAMELA physicists who were at the conference***: "We asked the PAMELA people [there], and they said it was not a problem."* (Carroll, 2012: 200)	2 (1.3%)

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SYMBOLIC FORM AND PURE INTUITION: CASSIRER AND CROCE ON THE NATURE OF ART

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ABSTRACT. The issue of art in the philosophical speculation occupies an important place but, obviously, it received many solutions or definitions and some of them are diametrically opposed, as in the case of the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer and of the Italian philosopher and historian Benedetto Croce. Even though there is only one critical monograph on this topic, it is interesting to compare these two opposite visions on the nature of art, just because both Cassirer and Croce tried to collocate art in the life of Spirit. In this essay I will focus my attention on how Cassirer and Croce tried to deal the topic of art from a philosophical point of view and at the end of it, by comparing Croce's and Cassirer's views on art, I will explain why Croce misunderstood completely the symbolic nature of art in Cassirer's reflection, because it is not true, as Croce upheld, that Cassirer privileged only scientific knowledge; at the opposite, Cassirer, after his critique of abstraction-theory as exposed in his *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* of 1910, extended his structural analysis of symbolic forms to all the human spheres of spiritual production (myth, religion, arts, and so on).

Keywords: abstraction; art; concretization; conventionalism; dialectics of distinct; idealization; intuition; symbolic form

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Introduction

Generally speaking, art is often considered as a subjective and relativistic form of knowledge and in this respect very far away from the precise and stable scientific method of Galilean memory, but this way of facing the problem it is quite trivial. There is no doubt that art is a form of knowledge but it is very important to specify why and how and in this case the reflections of the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer and of the Italian philosopher and historian Benedetto Croce can be very useful in order to solve this problematic intersection, just because they aimed to collocate art into a general vision of spiritual activity.

The issue of art in the philosophical speculation occupies an important place but, obviously, it received many solutions or definitions and some of them are diametrically opposed, as in the case of Ernst Cassirer and Benedetto Croce. Unfortunately, there is only one critical monograph on this topic,[1] so it would be very interesting to devote one more study to this topic in order to compare the opposite visions of Cassirer and Croce on the nature of art, just because both of them tried to collocate, as I previously said, the role of art into the life of Spirit. In this essay I will focus my attention on how Cassirer and Croce tried to solve the problem of art from a philosophical point of view and at the end of it I will explain why Croce misunderstood completely the symbolic nature of art in Cassirer's reflection, because it is not true, as Croce upheld, that Cassirer privileged only scientific knowledge; at the opposite, Cassirer, after his critique of abstraction-theory as exposed in his *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* of 1910, extended his structural analysis of symbolic forms to all the human spheres of spiritual production (myth, religion, art, and so on). While Cassirer tried to unify all the human spiritual activities as language, myth, art, science, and so on through the concept of symbolic form, Croce, at the opposite, used to distinguish social sciences from the natural ones, just because according to the Italian neo-idealist, science is not a form of genuine knowledge since it uses abstract and pseudo-concepts like mass-points, triangles, and so on. This is the first difference that one can catch between Cassirer and Croce, that is to say the hidden unity (Cassirer) or divorce (Croce) between social sciences and natural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften*). The consequence of this difference leads us to the second one, which consists of the opposite way of conceiving art: in fact, while according to Cassirer art, analogously to myth, religion and science, is a symbolic form (man=*animal symbolicum*), according to Benedetto Croce art is intuition of the particular and that's why the Italian philosopher linked art to the concreteness of history but not to the abstract nature of science.

In the first part of this essay I will critically expose Croce's reflections on art, while in the second one I will expose Cassirer's concept of art in the light of his philosophy of symbolic form. In the third and last part of this essay I will compare these two conceptions on art in order to highlight the differences between them but, most importantly, I will show that Cassirer's conception of symbolic form is not a kind of scientist reduction and that it doesn't imply a separation between natural sciences and social sciences, as Benedetto Croce used to uphold about Cassirer's neo-Kantianism.

1. The *Dialectic of Distinct* and the *Nature of Art*

In order to understand Croce's conception of art it becomes necessary to enucleate the main aspects of the so-called *dialectic of distinct*, which constitutes the bonestructure of Croce's philosophical system. As it is well known, Benedetto Croce conceived *Logic*[2] and *Aesthetic*,[3] respectively, as intuition of universal and intuition of particular and these two fields connote the theoretical sphere, while the practical sphere is characterized by *Ethics* and *Economy*,[4] that is to say volition of the universal and volition of the particular:

> Philosophy, in consequence of the new relation in which it has been placed, cannot of necessity be anything but the *methodological moment of historiography*: a dilucidation of the categories constitutive of historical judgments, or of the concepts that direct historical interpretation. And since historiography has for content the concrete life of the spirit, and this life is life of imagination and of thought, of action and of morality (or of something else, if anything else can be thought of), and in this variety of its form remains always one, the dilucidation moves in distinguishing between aesthetic and logic, between economic and ethic, uniting and dissolving them all in the philosophy of the spirit.[5]

These are, in extreme synthesis, the main aspects of the dialectic of distinct, but in this *circularity of spirit* what is the place for art? Croce faced this problem in his first philosophical writing, that is to say *La storia ridotta sotto il concetto generale dell'arte* (*History reduced under the General Concept of Art*) of 1893,[6] where he tried, under the influence of Francesco De Sanctis, to trace back history to its concreteness by reducing history itself to the intuition of the particular *par excellence*: that is to say art. In this respect Croce writes: "we make science or we make art. If we assume the particular under the general, we make science; if we represent the particular as such, we make art. So, we have seen that historiography doesn't elaborate concepts, but reproduce the particular in its concreteness; and therefore we denied to her the characters of science. This is a simple consequence […]: if history is not science it must be art."[7] As Jacques Revel stated, according to Croce "history, like art, is a kind of knowledge attained by imagination and intuition, which alone permit the apprehension of individual facts."[8] Croce, in this respect, refused to connect the philosophical concepts to the scientific ones, that is to say to conceptual fictions, because according to the Italian neo-idealist the scientific abstractions or fictions have nothing to say about the real world and therefore, in a negative way, they should be considered as *abstract* and *conventional*; in fact, in Croce's view, scientific concepts are not true but rather useful.[9] That way Croce could elevate philosophy to a concrete knowledge while scientific abstractions were reduced to mere pseudo-concepts. The Italian philosopher, in order to justify his own asserts, used to uphold conventionalist theories taken from the epistemology of Ernst Mach and, as a consequence, he became the main Italian supporter of an instrumentalist conception of science; let's see this Croce's quotation taken from his *Lineamenti* of 1905:

> The assertion that art, philosophy and history constitute the totality of knowledge, seems to exclude from the field of knowledge the positive or natural sciences, that is to say those order of studies that, in our times, was conceived as the type of real, solid and unique science. But it is our

> assertion exclude them, or rather they exclude themselves through the cognitive theories, that emerged recently, and that well reflect their character: theories that insist on the conventional […] practical and economical character of the constructions used by natural sciences?[10]

It is obvious that his hermeneutic "move," that aimed to justify the conventional character of scientific constructions, doesn't mirror the real and concrete cognitive value of science that provided humanity many more than simple conventional theories. For instance Croce, by considering science as a *corpus* of merely conventional and utilitarian knowledge, used to conceive technique as a further extension of the utilitarian and conventional character of science; let's see, in this respect, a Croce's definition of "technique" that he exposed in a review to the volume *Tecnica del romanzo novecentesco* (1948) of J. W. Beach (1880–1957): "The word 'technique' has a meaning only in the production of objects and practical goals, in the manipulation […] of the natural things for our utilitarian goals."[11]

In this case, Croce forgot the Galilean *Discorsi,* where we can find the Galilean exhortation to conceive "technique" as culture and not only a mere practical expedient cut off from any cognitive element. Let's see this extraordinary Galilean quotation:

> The constant employments (Gentlemen) in your famous *Arsenal of Venice*, and especially those relating to what we call Mechanics, seem to me afford, to a speculative *Genius*, a large Field of Philosophize in, there being a great Number of Artificers constantly employ'd in forming Engines and Machines of all Sorts; amongst whom, as well on account of the Observations made by their Predecessors, as of those which their own Care and Industry helps them to, there must certainly be some very skilful, and such as are able to give the just Reasons of Things.[12]

In this respect let's see some passages taken from Croce's *Logica come scienza del concetto puro,* which contains his main ideas concerning the various science's articulations (logic, epistemology, natural sciences, mathematics, and so on):

> A geometrical triangle can never be found in reality, because in reality there is no straight line, no right angle or sum of right angles and sum of angles equal to two right angles. A free movement can never be found in reality, because every real movement can be actuated in determined conditions and necessarily between obstacles. So, a thought that has as an object something unreal is not a thought; for this reasons these concepts are not concepts, but conceptual fictions.[13]

Croce, by being not satisfied of geometry or mathematics, extends his critique also to empirical sciences: "Natural sciences are only constructions of pseudo-concepts and properly of that of concepts that we called *empirical* or *representative*."[14] What is the root of Croce's diffidence towards abstractions? In this case Croce's attack jumps on the *modus operandi* of natural sciences, that is to say against the application of abstract schemes to the variable reality, since Croce used to privilege the individualizing method of history and art. The distinctive aspect of art, according to Croce, is the feeling and that's why he defined art as a lyrical intuition, as we can see in his *Breviary of Aesthetic*: "the intuition is really such because it represents a feeling, and can only appear from and upon that, not the idea, but the feeling, is what confers upon art the airy lightness of the symbol: an aspiration enclosed in the circle of a representation that is art; and in it the aspiration alone stands for the representation, and the representation alone for the aspiration. Epic and lyric, or drama and lyric, are scholastic divisions of the indivisible: art is always lyrical that is, epic and dramatic in feeling. What we admire in genuine works of art is the perfect fanciful form which a state of the soul assumes; and we call this life, unity, solidity of the work of art."[15] Very important here is the often disputed distinction between content and form, but in his *Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic* of 1902 Croce stated that *the aesthetic act is nothing but form*: "We must […] reject both the thesis that makes the aesthetic fact to consist of the content alone (that is the simple impressions), and the thesis which makes it to consist of a junction between form and content, that is, of impressions plus expressions. In the aesthetic fact, expressive activity is not added to the fact of the impressions, but these latter are formed and elaborated by it. The impressions reappear as it were in expression, like water put into a filter, which reappears the same and yet different on the other side. The aesthetic fact, therefore, is form, and nothing but form."[16] The main category that art is connected to is the "Beauty," which must be conceived as distinct and independent from the other categories of Spirit, that is to say the "Good" and the "Truth." From that point of view, Croce conceives art as independent and autonomous from ethics and from logics, and as a consequence art is an end in itself (*art pout l'art*). Another important aspect of Croce's aesthetic is the unity between expression and intuition, just because according to the Italian philosopher what is intuited is at the same time expressed. When the coincidence between intuition and expression is perfect we have what Croce calls "pure intuition," which is the intuition of a particular feeling and that's why according to Croce all art is lyrical. The consequence is that between aesthetic and linguistic there is a perfect unity and in this respect they don't represent two distinct spheres of philosophy but at the opposite, the same thing: "whoever study general Linguistic, that is to say, philosophical Linguistic, studies aesthetic problems, and *vice versa. Philosophy of language and philosophy of art are the same thing*."[17]

About the thesis concerning the unity between expression and intuition as it was showed in an essay of 1908 entitled *L'intuizione e il carattere lirico dell'arte*, we have to say that it doesn't represent a denial of what Croce upheld in his *Aesthetic* of 1902, but rather a supplementary reflection on the nature of art. In fact, in his work of 1902 Croce stated that art is intuition of the particular and from that point of view it was equalized to history, but in the essay of 1908 Croce extends this conception by stating that art is intuition of the particular thanks to the mediation of feeling and that explains why according to Croce art is lyrical intuition. In fact, Croce says that "art is not an abstract knowledge but a concrete one. Art is intuition

[…] and one must say pure intuition."[18] The concreteness of art should not be confused with the empirical generalization as exemplified by the procedure of Aristotelian abstraction, even though Croce used to consider the empirical generalizations as useful for classificatory purposes.[19] In an essay on Edgar Allan Poe's poetry, Croce stated that empirical concepts like quantity, accent, tonic syllables, atonics syllables, and so on, are not aesthetical but practical and "so extraneous to poetry that, as is known, a verse can be entirely impeccable metrically, but equally ugly."[20] The consequence of this conception of empirical concepts consists of Croce's refusal of the so-called genres in literature, since Croce conceives them as pseudo-concepts with no cognitive value. According to Croce art is not only an intellectual intuition but also an individual act and as such it is linked only to the single work of the artist: "Pure intuition, given the fact that it doesn't produce concepts, represents the will in its manifestations; that is to say, it represents moods. And moods are the passion, the feelings, and personalities, that we can find in every art and that determine the lyrical character of it. Where the lyrical character misses, it misses the art, just because the pure intuition is missing."[21] As it has been rightly underlined, Benedetto Croce "rejects 'genres' both as principles of composition and as critical categories. Each poem is *sui-generis*, a unique expression of its author. Hence no attempt should be made to compare one poem with another, still less to categorize it as 'lyric,' 'epic' or 'dramatic.' Croce holds that the concepts of genres and all other such classifications (conventions, etc.) arise out of empirical generalizations and practical advice to poets; they are abstractions formed from single works and have no value for the judgment and for the history of poetry. Genre distinctions are merely useful, as aids to the recollection and identification of single works or as shorthand designations for group works."[22] But one must say that the refusal of the genres in literature upheld by Croce is quite problematical, because in this case the relationship between the single work of art and its literary tradition becomes impossible in Croce's aesthetic.

If we turn back our gaze to Croce's concept of "pure intuition" we can also explain, in the light of it, the famous Croce's distinction between poetry and non-poetry, which received many critiques especially because of Croce's bad comments on Giacomo Leopardi's poems. According to Croce, a real poet *is his poetry*, but when the perfect coincidence between intuition and expression is not reached it means that *poetry is absent*. This perfect coincidence, Croce holds, cannot be reached when a poet mixes-up lyrical elements with philosophical, allegorical or satirical ones and from that point of view, according to the Italian neo-idealist, the most part of Leopardi's poems is non-poetry, given the fact that the Italian poet, through his poems, used to express also philosophical ideas, a pessimistic conception of life, and so on; all these elements or factors cannot be part of poetry because they are by Benedetto Croce considered as extrinsic: "For Croce, the 'externalization' of intuition-expression was a practical affair, not an aesthetic one."[23] In fact, Croce stated that Leopardi's life was "a strangled life"[24] and this bad comment on Leopardi's personal life seems to be strongly linked to Croce's ideas on Leopardi's poetry, that is to say a *strangled poetry*. Croce expressed the same judgment about a Leopardi's poem entitled *A sè stesso*, by the Italian philosopher defined as the "actuation of an internal suicidal,"[25] just because this poem was the expression of his pessimistic conception of life well exemplified by anguish and desolation.

The distinction between poetry and non-poetry is the consequence of Croce's ideas on the two forms of knowledge that he exposed at the beginning of his *Aesthetic* of 1902, where he wrote that knowledge has two forms: "it is either *intuitive* or *logical* knowledge; knowledge obtained through the *imagination* or knowledge obtained through *intellect*; knowledge of the *individual* or knowledge of the *universal*; of *individual things* or of the *relations* between them: it is, in fact, productive either of *images* or of *concepts*."[26] At the beginning of the second chapter of the same work he wrote that "We frankly identified intuitive knowledge with the aesthetic or artistic fact, taking works of art as examples of intuitive knowledge and attributing to them the characteristics of intuition, and *vice versa*."[27] This is another problematic aspect of Croce's reflection of the nature of art; in fact, even though Croce addressed his thought to an idealist philosophical conception, he paradoxically falls under an empiricist vision of art, just because he considers the artistic facts as something extrinsic to concepts while, as Giovanni Gentile rightly underlined, the problem of art must be solved through philosophy.[28]

As we have seen, the main aspects of Croce's reflections on art are quite problematic and even though his great work of 1902 obtained a great success in the first half of the twentieth-century, it cannot be said the same about the period that followed Croce's death (1952). The distinction between poetry and non-poetry, the unity between aesthetic and linguistic, the refusal of the genres in literature, and so on, were suddenly abandoned by the most part of Italian philosophers, which preferred to link their reflections on art to new philosophical perspectives provided by symbolism (Cassirer), existentialism (Heidegger), phenomenology (Husserl) and so on. One of those philosophers who provided a new philosophical perspective on art is the German Ernst Cassirer who, through his *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, showed that art is not simply the expression of the feeling but rather of the power of symbolic form. Croce did not understand the symbolic nature of art by Cassirer exposed in his work on philosophy of symbolic forms just because, in the light of a reductionist interpretation of the neo-Kantian Marburg School, the Italian philosopher conceived Cassirer's theory of symbol as the expression of scientific knowledge only. In the following section I will enucleate the main aspects of Cassirer's reflection on art by taking into account all the works where the German thinker faced this topic.

2. *Art* and *Symbol* in Cassirer

Before taking into account Cassirer's philosophy of art we have to specify that this topic is not easy to show, since Cassirer never wrote a treatise or a critical monograph on art, even though his intention was to work on it. Many philosophers and scholars were waiting for a Cassirer's critical study on art, but for many reasons it never appeared, as we can see from a letter that Cassirer wrote on may the 13th of 1942 to Paul Arthur Schilpp: "Inhaltlich würde sie insofern neu sein, als ich hier zum ersten Mal eine eingehende Darstellung meiner aesthetischen Theorie geben würde. Schon im ersten Entwurf der Phil. d. s. F. war ein besonderer Band über Kunst vorgesehen – die Ungust der Zeiten hat aber seine Ausarbeitung immer wieder hinausgeschoben."[29]

The only way to enucleate the main themes of Cassirer's philosophy of art is to make a selection, from all his writings, of his specific reflections on art, and from this point of view the material is quite extended. The main sources for this purpose can be found in *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen,* which is composed by three volumes devoted, respectively, to the analysis of language, myth and scientific knowledge, even though many pages of his *Hauptwerk* are devoted to art, *Eidos und eidolon*, the essays in *Symbol, Myth, Culture*, the chapter on art taken from *An essay on Man*, *Language and Myth*, and so on.

As in the case of Croce, we have to extrapolate the main aspects of Cassirer's thought in order to understand the place of art in the frame of the philosophy of symbolic forms, because art, just like the main human productive activities as myth, language, religion and science, is conceived as a symbolic form. Cassirer, rightly defined as "the pioneer in the philosophy of symbolism,"[30] extended the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant to all the human activities just because, according to Cassirer, it was necessary to move from a *critique of reason* to a *critique of culture*. At the beginning of his academic career, Cassirer devoted his major efforts to the analysis of scientific knowledge, especially in his great work of 1910 *Substanz-begriff und Funktionsbegriff*. Cassirer's concept of function finds its source both in philosophy and science: from the philosophical side Kant is the primary source, in fact according to Kant the function is "the unity of the act of arranging various presentations under one common presentation,"[31] hence the concepts are *functions*. From the scientific one the main source is the mathematical and scientific concept of function that Cassirer took from Leibniz and from the Galilean procedure of idealization, where the function is conceived as a mathematical relation that to every value *x* (that is to say, the independent variable) it makes it correspond to one and only one *y* (that is to say, the dependent variable).

The innovative aspect of this work consisted of the passage from the concept of substance to the concept of function, which was well exemplified by the revolution of modern science that started with Galileo's revolutionary scientific method. First of all Cassirer, in the light of the history of scientific-philosophical thought, puts his emphasis on the sterility of Aristotelian abstraction, which exerted a massive influence on scientific thought (especially during the medieval season). In fact, abstraction is a theoretical procedure applied by the human intellect to obtain universal concepts from the knowledge of particular objects (by the generalization of empirical facts), while Galileo used to apply what modern philosophers of science call *idealization*, which proceeds "enclosing in parenthesis" some aspects of phenomenal reality that we consider secondary, to take into consideration the essential factors of the phenomena under investigation.[32] Cassirer, in his work of 1910, catches in a very clear way the difference between abstraction and idealization,[33] by considering the latter as the building block of the concept-formation process of natural sciences. Here is the difference between abstraction and idealization in Cassirer's methodological reflection:

> 'Abstraction,' as it has hitherto been understood, does not change the constitution of consciousness and of objective reality, but merely institutes certain limits and divisions in it; it merely divides the parts of the sense impression but adds to it no new datum. In the definitions of pure mathematics […] the world of sensible things and presentations is not so much reproduced as transformed and supplanted by an order of another sort. If we trace the method of this transformation, certain forms of relation, or rather an ordered system of strictly differentiated intellectual functions, are revealed, such as cannot even be characterized, much less justified, by the simple schema of 'abstraction.' And this result is also confirmed if we turn from the purely mathematical concepts to those of theoretical physics. For in their origin the same process is shown, and can be followed in detail, of the transformation of the concrete sensuous reality, a process which the traditional doctrine cannot justify.[34]

Obviously, Cassirer transplanted this distinction within the frame of Kant's transcendental philosophy, in fact according to Kant a scientific object is a phenomenon qualified as object, in the sense that it is modeled by the subject on the base of his a priori mental structures. This topic, obviously, is related to the well-known Kantian problem of the term "transcendental," that Kant defined that way: "I call *transcendental* all cognition that deals not so much with objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing is to be possible a priori. A *system* of such concepts would be called *transcendental philosophy*."[35]

It means that the "transcendental" deals not with objects (because they are noumena), but rather with the modality thanks to which we know them; that way, the objectivity that Kant talks about doesn't refer to the dogmatic objectivity linked to the absolute knowledge, but rather to the phenomenal sphere, where the phenomenon is configured as objective knowledge, in the sense that the scientific object is a phenomenon qualified as object. This is the deeper meaning of the so-called *Copernican revolution* made by Kant and it is clear that through this *gestaltic re-positioning* the thinker of Königsberg maintains the objectivity even though he unties it from the absolute. The way Kant conceived the relationship *subject-object* is the opposite of the correspondence theory well exemplified by the scholastic axiom *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, which used to conceive this relationship in a passive way. This Kantian refusal of the correspondence theory leads Cassirer to state that "what we call 'reality' of things, is not simply the static expression of 'perceptions' existing in our spirit, or even the pure translation of the sensorial content given in another sphere of reality, but it can only be obtained and elaborated only through a *gradual process of idealization*."[36]

According to Cassirer, scientific knowledge is not the only form of symbolization of reality and, as a consequence, it cannot explain completely the richness of the world we live in, so other forms of symbolization are necessary and art is one of them. In fact, as Verene wrote in 1966, "Cassirer regards the ability to symbolize as the distinguishing feature of human thought and considers all knowing as symbolic."[37]

It would be a mistake, as I previously said, to conceive Cassirer's interpretation of Kantian critical philosophy as the mere expression of scientific knowledge, in fact the philosophy of symbolic forms, as Cassirer says, "is not concerned exclusively or even primarily with the purely scientific, exact conceiving of the world; it is concerned with all the forms assumed by man's understanding of the world. It seeks to apprehend these forms in their diversity, in their totality, and in the inner distinctiveness of their several expressions."[38] What does, in Cassirer's philosophy, *symbolic form* mean? A very good explanation can be found in his essay entitled *Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften*, where he wrote that "By 'symbolic form' I mean that energy of the spirit through which a mental meaning-content is attached to a sensual sign and inwardly dedicated to this sign. In this sense language, the mythical-religious world, and the arts each present us with a particular symbolic form. For in them all we see the mark of the basic phenomenon, that our consciousness is not satisfied to simply receive impressions from the outside, but rather that it permeates each impression with a free activity of expression. In what we call the objective reality of things we are thus confronted with a world of self-created signs and images."[39] Cassirer never wrote a critical study on art, even though his letter to Schilpp shows that his aim was to work on it, but nonetheless the concept of symbolic form has, ironically, an aesthetic origin. In fact, Cassirer took inspiration from Goethe's interest on the concept of symbol (*Symbolbegriff*), even though Goethe never used the expression "symbolic form" but *Urphänomenon* (primal phenomenon).[40] But the main source for Cassirer's concept of symbol is the aesthetic work of Theodor Vischer, as Cassirer himself confessed in his *Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften*;[41] furthermore Cassirer largely used Vischer's work for his essay entitled *Das Symbolproblem und seine Stellung im System der Philosophie*.[42] All these information prove that Cassirer's interest in art was quite profound and not only a marginal aspect of his philosophy of symbolic forms.

The root of art, in Cassirer's view, is imagination, which gives us "the intuition of the form of things. But this too is by no means a mere repetition of something we had before. It is a true and genuine discovery."[43] As we can see, according to Cassirer both art and science refuse the theory of correspondence and from that point of view they are subjected to the same "productive synthesis:"

> An artist that produces through his fantasy the image of an object, never perceived before, doesn't limit himself to connect outwardly given representations, but he intersects and models them in an overall and unitary intuition, totally new. This productive synthesis, that overpass

> every 'attenuated imitation,' is what we have to recognize everywhere also in science. Science manifests itself especially in geometry: the exactness of geometrical figures is an extension of the poetical force […]. In the same way, also the fundamental laws of motion, usually conceived as mere empirical generalizations, show themselves, at a deeper analysis, as *ideal products*.[44]

There is another affinity between artists and scientists; in fact, they share the same way of approaching reality, which consists of the search of essential factors and forms: "the artist is just as much a discoverer of the forms of nature as the scientist is a discoverer of facts or natural laws."[45] Obviously, the artistic or aesthetic experience, as Cassirer holds, is richer than the ordinary one, hence artistic activity reveals us some aspects of phenomenal reality through a process of gradual concretization, while scientific abstractions or fictions, even though very important for the explanation of reality, are too poor from that point of view. What is important and innovative, in Cassirer's reflections on art, is the cognitive value that the German philosopher addressed to it, hence there is no conflict between science and art since they share the same way of approaching reality. Art is not a mere reproduction of things but rather a symbolic construction and that is why according to Cassirer it is not true, as Edmund Husserl used to uphold, that there are sensible data free of any *symbolic pregnancy*. The notion of *symbolic pregnancy* (*symbolische Prägnanz*) is by Cassirer explained in the third volume of his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, where the German philosopher wrote that by symbolic pregnancy he means "the way in which a perception as a sensory experience contains at the same time a certain non-intuitive meaning which it immediately and concretely represents."[46]

In this regard Cassirer makes the famous example of a plotted line (*Linienzug*), which can be explained from different perspectives: from the purely expressive sense, from the mathematical one, from the mythic one and finally from the aesthetical one. From a purely expressive sense point of view, *Der Linienzug* represents a specific mood determined by the way a subject follows the movements or evolutions of the line. But if we conceive the line as a geometrical figure, hence from a mathematical point of view, the previous perspective changes and it becomes a way to represent a general geometrical law. We can also conceive the line as a mythical sign and in this case it can represent a separation between two fields, that is to say the "sacred" and the "profane;" finally there is also the aesthetical one, where the line can be seen as an ornament.[47] Cassirer makes this efficacious example in order to demonstrate that every experience of perception has a *symbolic pregnancy* so, in this sense, "the phenomena are situated in a symbolic horizon."[48] *Der Linienzug* example, obviously, should not be confused with a substantial concept, just because the symbolic process of formation that constitutes the object is rather a functional-form.[49] Very important here is also the way the process of symbolization takes place and in this respect Cassirer makes a triple distinction that shows the way reality is interpreted and explained by human mind. This distinction can be found in the third volume of *Philosophie der symbolischen*

Formen, which is devoted mainly to the issue of phenomenology of knowledge, where Cassirer affirms that the linguistic unity of reality can be reached thanks to these three stages: the mimic expression, the analogical expression and the symbolic expression of thought. In the first stage the sign is strictly connected to a sensible element, in the second one the relationship between the sign and what is designated is mediated by the intervention of human subjectivity, so a little margin of freedom is introduced; finally, in the third stage, there is the process of signification exemplified by modern logic or scientific idealizations. In this case art is a form concretization just because it allows us to regain what has been lost in the idealizational process of natural sciences.

We previously said that art, according to Cassirer, reveals us certain aspects of phenomenal reality through a process of gradual concretization, but what does it exactly mean? Modern science reached its greater development thanks to the Galilean idealizations, which allowed scientists to overcome the hindrances of matter in order to catch the essential aspects of phenomena, and in this respect the role of mathematical abstractions was immense and crucial. The symbols of arithmetic, geometry or the symbols that can be found in chemical formulas largely contributed to the process of objectification, as Cassirer holds in his *Language and Art I*,[50] but the price to pay was too high. In fact, scientific abstract schemes distances us from the everyday experience and in order to conquest it once gain, according to Cassirer, we need a new activity and a new effort: that is to say, art. Cassirer puts his emphasis on the active role of art and as a consequence it cannot be conceived as a mere reproduction of things; in the opposite case, Plato would be right when he says that art is only a mere copy of the perfect ideas and in this sense with no cognitive value.[51] According to Cassirer, the "philosophers tried to avoid this conclusion by assigning to art a higher aim. They explained to us that art doesn't reproduce the phenomenal, empirical world, but rather the supersensory one."[52] So it is no wonder if idealist philosophers as Plotinus, Hegel, Schelling, and so on, stated that the beauty is a predicate of the supersensory in order to avoid the Platonist theory of art as a *mimesis*. But from one side this divinization of art distanced it from its concreteness and from the other, by virtue of the postulated superiority of philosophy, art lost its cognitive value to simply become a limited or partial form of knowledge. For instance, this is quite evident in Hegel's *Aesthetik*. Spirit, in Hegel's view, is reason that manifests itself in history, and during this ideal development reason passes through many phases represented, respectively, by three forms: art, religion and philosophy. The object of all three forms is Absolute Spirit or (in religious terms) God, but while in art it is presented in an immediate way, in religion the Absolute is conceived as an intellectual representation, that is to say in a rational way. According to Hegel, however, this is not sufficient: it is philosophy that thinks the Absolute through the concept of reason. That way Absolute Spirit, through human self-consciousness, can think itself and at the same time be aware of itself. According to Hegel, philosophy must aim at Totality because "the Truth is the Whole," and in this respect the different aspects of reality should be understood not in their abstract separation, but rather in their articulation and becoming. Truth, in this way, is not conceived as a substance, as something already given, but as a process, as Spirit. This is, in a very brief sketch, the way the Absolute Spirit manifests itself in history, that is to say the *phenomenology of Spirit.*

According to the thinker of Stuttgart, differently from what has been maintained by Alexander Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant, aesthetics is not the science of perception but rather "philosophy of art" and its main domain is the realm of beautiful. As Hegel states at the beginning of his *Introduction* to the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Art*, "The topic we are considering is defined as the realm of beautiful, more precisely as the domain of art."[53] Hegel, in opposition to Baumgarten and Kant, prefers the term *callistics* instead of *aesthetics*, in order to indicate the real issue of his reflections: "The term "aesthetics" is also used here. So this is actually an inappropriate term, although the issue here is not what is beautiful as such; instead the issue is artistic beauty."[54] Hegel prefers to connect his ideas on aesthetics to artistic beauty just because beauty expresses itself in artistic production, and artistic production is primarily a spiritual activity. All that is spiritual, in Hegel's view, is higher than what is natural, which is why according to Hegel art has a philosophical status. According to Hegel, the beautiful is the Idea that expresses itself in a sensible form. But in this respect, art also falls under the triadic scheme of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. In fact, not all sensible intuitions are able to express the Idea, so it becomes clear that in the phenomenon of art there is a triadic development, a process thanks to which we can attain a larger awareness of the infinite essence. Obviously, this triadic scheme finds its practical expression in the historical process, so it is no wonder that Hegel talks about three historical modes of art: symbolic, classical and romantic. The first mode of art finds its expression in Oriental art (especially in Egyptian symbols and architecture), but if, from one side, its sensible forms try to express the Absolute, on the other they are not able to do that because the universality they pursue is only something abstract, "symbolic." Classical art finds its highest expression in Greek sculpture, where there is an almost perfect balance between the sensible form and the spiritual content that this second mode wants to show. The third and last mode is designated by Hegel as romantic art or Christian art where there is not, as in the case of the first mode, a perfect balance between form and content, but for different reasons. While in the first mode the knowledge was not adequate to its concept, in the third mode we have the opposite situation: romantic-Christian art is aware that the infinity of the Spirit cannot be expressed by (and in) the finiteness of the sensible form. According to Hegel, this is the reason why romantic-Christian art disregards all those artistic forms in which the sensible element is decisive – sculpture, architecture, and so on – in order to focus its attention on those arts where the sensible element is almost irrelevant, such as music, poetry, and painting. After these reflections on art Hegel formulates his well-known thesis about the death of art. Hegel never wanted to claim that, after romantic-Christian art, it is no longer possible to make art. What Hegel is telling us is that at this point Spirit is aware that it is not possible to express adequately the Absolute through art. It is therefore necessary to overcome art with other forms of knowledge, namely religion and philosophy. This is why Hegel says at the end of his *Philosophy of Art*: “For us, art in its seriousness is something bygone. We need other forms to make the divine into an object for us. We require thinking.”[55]

I intentionally exposed, even though very briefly, the main themes of Hegel’s view on aesthetic because they are the bridge the links together Cassirer and Croce, since the philosopher of symbolic forms criticizes Croce’s identity between language and art right after the discussion of the Hegelian theory of the death of art. In the following, and last, part of this work I will discuss Cassirer’s critique of Croce and *vice versa*.

3. *Symbolic Form* or *Pure Intuition*?

While Cassirer quoted Benedetto Croce’s *Estetica* and *Breviary* in many occasions (for instance, in *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, in *Symbol, Myth and Culture*, and so on[56]), Croce’s very first encounter with Cassirer is only a quite long review of *Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften*, appeared in the Italian journal *La Critica* in 1943. Cassirer highlights the fact that, even though Croce was a neo-Hegelian philosopher, nonetheless he refused Hegel’s aesthetic in many respects, especially the already mentioned theory of the death of art. We have seen that in Hegel’s system the absolute form of knowledge is *Philosophy*, while Croce attributed to art an autonomous and distinct form of cognitive value, as one can deduct from the dialectic of distinct. By virtue of this tetrad of *Spirit* (Art, Logic, Economy and Ethics), Croce postulated the identity between language and expression, which was by Cassirer considered as quite paradoxical. In fact, in Croce’s aesthetic it becomes impossible to make a distinction between language and art, because according to the Italian philosopher they are not two separated branches of philosophy but rather the same branch, since they are both “expression” which is an indivisible process; that’s why Cassirer stated that for Croce art “must be expression of the feeling.”[57] According to Cassirer this aspect of Croce’s aesthetic suffers of two specific deficiencies: on one hand, “the mere fact of the expression cannot be considered as an artistic fact. If I write a letter in order to provide or to ask information about empirical facts, or in order to serve a practical end, I’m not, by virtue of the only fact of writing, an artist;”[58] on the other hand, the function of art is not only the exhibition of our feelings, because when our emotions dominate us, “this is sentimentalism, not art.”[59] For Croce, Cassirer says, “language and art are identical because he locates in them the same distinguishing feature: the character that in his terminology is called lyricism.”[60] It would be a mistake, according to the philosopher of symbolic forms, conceiving the language as a particular aspect or case of aesthetics, as Croce and Vossler, for instance, used to do. For Cassirer language and art cooperate, and from that point of view there is a systematic connection between the problem of aesthetics and the problem of philosophy of language. Cassirer confesses that Croce faced this issue, but the mistake made by the Italian neo-idealist consisted of deducing both aesthetics and philosophy of language from a common root, in this case the *function of expression*. According to Cassirer, aesthetics and philosophy of language should be grounded on the *function of representation*. In this respect Cassirer agrees with Konrad Fiedler's view on art, in fact Fiedler thought that the world of artistic forms doesn't reproduce in a passive way what is real. This view is by Fielder can be also found for what concerns the issue of language, which is by him conceived as a form of being itself and not the expression for a being.[61] The language stays between the theoretical form and the aesthetic one, while in Croce's view they are like two parallel lines, but the way philosophy of art tries to reach the "object" is not the same of the scientific judgments, because the "object" is conceived as something of "purely visible." But, Cassirer states, "visibility" "is neither a predicate, we must recognize, is neither a predicate attributed to things as such, as absolute things, nor does it consist in the simple passive possession of certain sense-data, certain optical sensations or perception. 'Things' attain at 'look' because Spirit lends it to them through a particular kind or direction of activity. This activity is none other than that of artistic production. It doesn't imitate what has been seen; rather, its basic significance and true achievement consist in transforming the merely sensed or dully felt into something seen."[62] Croce, at the opposite, disagrees with this conception, as we can see by the reading of his essay entitled *La teoria della pura visibilità* of 1911, where he wrote that the physiological process of vision is a naturalistic concept and because of that it allows "no passage to the philosophical concept of art, which is spiritual activity."[63] What really matters for Croce is the power of feeling but even though it is very important in poetry, nonetheless the mere richness and profusion "of feelings is only one between the elements and moments of poetry, and it doesn't constitute its essence. This richness must be governed and dominated by a different power, by the power of form."[64] From that point of view art is an active expressive modality and not a passive one, it is also a productive imagination and not a reproductive one. As Cassirer says, the artistic emotion, which is a creative one, is "that emotion that we feel when we experience the life of form. The form – every form – has not only a static being, but also a dynamic force and a dynamic life [...]. Light, color, mass and weight are not experienced in a work of art in the same way as in our ordinary experience."[65] In fact, in art the horizon of our sensible experience becomes wider, and even our perspective of reality changes, and, from that point of view, "we look at reality under a new light, by means of living forms."[66]

For what concerns Croce's critique of the genres in literature, Cassirer highlights the fact that this critique in Croce's aesthetic was the consequence of his thesis about the "expression" conceived as the fundamental moment of aesthetic. If we hold that art must be the expression both of feeling and of an individual mood, the consequence is the priority addressed to the subjective element in spite of the objective one. Moreover, Cassirer specifies that the power of form implies also the negation of Croce's theory of expression, just because in art the mean of expression used by an artist is not an accessory but rather an essential element. In fact, we have to bear in mind that "art is not only expression in general, that is to say in a non-specified manner, but also expression through a specific mean. A great artist doesn't choose his mean as he would choose a purely extern, indifferent material. For him, words, colors, forms and spatial figures, musical sounds are not mere technical means of reproduction, but rather the very one conditions, as well as essential moments of the same productive process of art."[67] As we can see, according to Cassirer the means of expression used by an artist are simply not mere external or accidental factors, but rather an essential ones and in the light of this critique Cassirer asks a question: "is aesthetics, as Vossler assumes with Croce, really *the* science of expression, or is it not rather *one* of the sciences of expression, a "symbolic form," beside others of equal stature?"[68] It is easy to guess Cassirer's answer to this question.

Let's turn now our gaze to Croce's brief interpretation of Cassirer, which can be found in the already mentioned review of *Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften* published in *La Critica* in 1943.[69] According to Croce, the philosopher of the symbolic forms provided a very good contribute to the history of the Renaissance thought and of the eighteenth century as well, but his way of philosophizing was not able to overcome the fallacies of both positivism and naturalism; the consequence was, in Croce's view, the parallelization of natural sciences and human sciences, just because according to the Italian neo-idealist, in Cassirer's thought there is not a logic of philosophy but only the abstract logic of mathematics.[70] Croce, obviously, disagrees with Cassirer's critique of the identification between language and poetry, which is the cornerstone of Croce's aesthetic, and in this respect the Italian philosopher replies that "the language, in its original and genuine nature, is an intuitive, musical and poetical form of the spirit, and that the poetry is the form of the spiritual expression, hence these two forms coincide completely. […] The language cannot ever be thought as separated from intuition or fantasy […] and poetry vanishes if one disregards its expressive force."[71] Croce states that Cassirer's critiques of his main aesthetical theses were the result of Cassirer's insufficient knowledge of poetry and art, in fact the Italian philosopher wrote that: "I have reason to believe that Cassirer never rested for long on poetry and on art and that he never examined in depth its problems; after all, the volume of his work, that was supposed to deal with art, as far as I know, was never published."[72]

We can sum up Croce's critical comments on Cassirer in the following way: scientific reductionist conception, insufficient knowledge of art and poetry and parallelization of both natural and social sciences. Let's see now if Croce's critique of Cassirer is right or not. First of all, as Cassirer himself stated in his *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, he tried to extend Kantian critical philosophy to all the human spiritual activities as myth, language, religion, art, science and so on, through the passage from a critique of reason to a critique of culture; that way Cassirer avoided the explanation of the phenomenology of spirit by taking into account scientific knowledge only. Secondly, Cassirer was very deep into art, as his many pages devoted to this topic show and even though Croce could not read the most part of Cassirer's papers on art because they remained unpublished for a long time, nonetheless in *An Essay on Man* of 1944 there is an entire chapter devoted to art (but we have reason to believe that Croce never studied this volume). Finally, in Cassirer there is not a parallelization of natural and human sciences, because through the concept of symbolic form he gave to each form of spiritual and productive activity its autonomy so it would be more correct to say that there is a hidden unity between natural and social sciences just because man is an *animal symbolicum* and in this respect, all the spiritual activity as myth, language, art, religion and science are the result of symbolic forms. From that point of view the distance between Croce and Cassirer is unbridgeable: in fact according to the neo-idealist philosopher the scientific abstractions or fictions are conceived as mere pseudo-concepts and in this respect they are useful only for practical reason; Cassirer, at the opposite, realizes that all the scientific concepts or theories are idealizations of reality, as Galilei showed through his scientific method, but the procedure of idealization is also active in art, in economy, in linguistics, in other words in human sciences and not only in the natural ones. It is no wonder if Cassirer totally rejects Croce's theory of pseudo-concepts, according to which these concepts cannot help us to understand reality but rather make only empirical classification.[73]

But there is another important issue that should be taken into account, that is to say the pedagogical or educational value of art. Croce and Cassirer disagree on this topic; in fact, according to the former, art cannot have an educational value, just because this pedagogical function would be something extrinsic to art, an extrinsic aim. At the opposite, Cassirer used to conceive art not an end in itself (*art pour l'art*), but rather directed to the elevation of human spirit. Cassirer, in his essay "The Educational Value of Art," takes into account Plato's and Tolstoy's reflections on art and their critiques are both directed to the hedonistic conception of art. According to this conception, the aim of art is nothing but pleasure but, Cassirer holds, if this thesis was true, it would be impossible to attribute to art "any proper *educational* value."[74] In fact education needs a stronger structure than the one coming from the simple pleasure and from that point of view art is not something different from other symbolic forms such as myth, religion, science, and so on. What is important, in art, is the *moment of form*, thanks to which we can give form to passions and emotions, and in this sense they become part of our *active* live and not of the passive one. That way, art is a *way to freedom* since it is "part of the process of the liberation of the human mind," which is, according to Cassirer, the last and authentic aim of every education.[75]

In conclusion, while Cassirer studied and quoted many important Croce's volumes as the *Aesthetic*, the *Logic*, the *Breviary* and so on, Croce, at the opposite, had a very lousy knowledge of Cassirer's works and his review of *Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften* is a good proof of that, but what matters is the fact that Croce's totally misunderstood Cassirer's thought in every respect.

NOTES

1. See Dessì Schmid (2005).
2. See Croce (1971).
3. See the first Italian edition: Croce (1902). For this essay I use the English translation of 1965.
4. See Croce (1909). See also Croce (2001), that is to say the fourth volume of the so-called Philosophy of Spirit, entitled *Teoria e storia della storiografia*. For this essay I use the English translation of 1921.
5. Croce (1921), p. 151.
6. See Croce (1919), pp. 3–41.
7. Ibid., pp. 23–24.
8. Revel (2003), p. 393.
9. See Peters (2013).
10. Croce (1905b), p. 62.
11. Croce (1948), p. 101.
12. Galilei (1730), p. 1.
13. Croce (1971), p. 18.
14. Ibid., p. 196.
15. Croce (1961), p. 26.
16. Croce (1965), pp. 15–16.
17. Croce (1965), p. 142.
18. Croce (1910), pp. 14–15.
19. See Croce (1969).
20. Croce (1950), p. 215.
21. Croce (1910), p. 23.
22. Moller (2008), p. 339.
23. Anderson (2009), p. 221.
24. Croce (1946), p. 102.
25. Croce (1941), p. 379.
26. Croce (1965), p. 1.
27. Croce (1965), p. 12.
28. See Gentile (1937), p. 49.
29. Cassirer (1942a), p. 2. This three pages letter can be consulted at the Yale University, Department of Philosophy, but it is also available in pdf file at the website of the University of Hamburg.
30. Langer (1954), p. 8.
31. Kant (1996), p. 43.
32. On the difference between abstraction and idealization, see Nowak (1980), Coniglione (2010), Borbone (2011a), and Borbone (2011b).
33. On Cassirer's concept of idealization, see Borbone (2016), pp. 88–109.
34. Cassirer (1910), p. 18.
35. Kant (1996), p. 24.
36. Cassirer (1964), p. 422.
37. Verene (1966), p. 553.
38. Cassirer (2016), p. 18.
39. Cassirer (1983), p. 175.
40. On this topic, see Cassirer (1995), pp. 113–198.

41. Ibidem.
42. See Cassirer (1927), pp. 295–312.
43. Cassirer (1944), p. 184.
44. Cassirer (1964), pp. 619–620.
45. Cassirer (1944), p. 184.
46. Cassirer (2016), p. 270.
47. See ibidem, pp. 268–270.
48. Perniola (2013), p. 69.
49. See Hinsch (2001), p. 137.
50. See Cassirer (1942b), p. 158.
51. See ibidem.
52. Ibidem.
53. Hegel (2014), p. 182.
54. Ibid., p. 194.
55. Ibid., p. 439.
56. Croce, in fact, was well known in Germany and some of his major works were also translated into German thanks to the interest of Karl Vossler, maybe the main German supporter of Croce's theory of aesthetic. On this topic, see Ferrari (2003), p. 69.
57. Cassirer (1980), p. 121.
58. Cassirer (1942b), p. 160.
59. Ibidem.
60. Ibid., p. 162.
61. See Fiedler (1991).
62. Cassirer (2003), p. 103.
63. Croce (1911), p. 224.
64. Cassirer (1942b), p. 162.
65. Ibidem.
66. Ibidem.
67. Ibid., p. 164.
68. Cassirer (2016), pp. 142–143.
69. I use the version included in Croce (1945), pp. 251–256.
70. See Croce (1945), p. 252.
71. Ibid., p. 254.
72. Ibidem.
73. See Cassirer (1913), p. 43.
74. Cassirer (1943), p. 205.
75. Ibid., p. 219. On Cassirer's reflections on art see Bayer (2006) and Carter (2015).

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EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION: AN INTEREST AND BELIEF-BASED MODEL

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ABSTRACT. The paper presents an inferential model of explicit communication based on the speaker's interests and the addressee's beliefs. After the introduction, the paper sets out some notions concerning explicit communication within the frameworks of truth-conditional pragmatics and relevance theory. The third section describes the phenomenon of semantic underdeterminacy, and the fourth section introduces non-demonstrative inferences in communication. The fifth section presents the model. The main notions involved are the speaker's intended meaning and the addressee's intended meaning. The former notion is centered on the speaker's interest in situation: a speaker intends the meaning of an utterance on the basis of a partial order of preference with respect to a set of contextually plausible meanings. The latter notion is centered on the addressee's communicative inference, which is based on the addressee's belief about the speaker's interest. The paper takes the notion of interest from cognitive social theory, the notion of meaning from semantics, and the notion of explicit meaning from pragmatics; and it uses the notion of communicative inference for explicit meaning in partial accordance with relevance theory. In the sixth section, the paper argues in favor of the inferential approach compared with the associative approach in determination of "what is said." The paper's method is conceptual analysis of declarative utterances used in communicative situations. The main finding of the paper has been to show that, in contextual underdeterminacy cases, speaker's interest is a determining factor in communicative processes.

Keywords: states of affairs; truth-conditions; semantic underdeterminacy; contextual underdeterminacy; speaker's interest; goal-conditions; speaker's intended meaning; addressee's belief; communicative inference; addressee's intended meaning; shared intended meaning; explicit communication.

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1. Introduction[1]

Communication is a phenomenon which pervades all human activity. It is studied by various disciplines from different theoretical perspectives. Whatever the perspective taken, however, studying communication involves investigation of a complex phenomenon which by its nature requires dialogue among disciplines. Some important theories in philosophy, linguistics and cognitive science share the idea that full understanding of verbal communication requires understanding the role of the non-linguistic knowledge tied to the situation in which a linguistic expression is uttered (Travis, 1975; Searle, 1980; Grice, 1989; Levinson, 2000; Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2010; Bach, 2010; Wilson and Sperber, 2012).

Although in recent years these approaches to the study of language have gained increasing consensus, still firmly established in the philosophy of language is the "code model" (e.g. literalism). In other words, it is still widely believed that syntactic and semantic rules suffice to decode the meaning of a natural language expression (see the indexicalism of Stanley, 2000, and the minimalism of Cappelen and Lepore, 2005).

In the literalist framework, the explicit level of communication, "what is said," is strictly related to the conventional meaning of the expressions appearing in a sentence. It differs in only two respects: if there are indexical and demonstrative expressions, they must be saturated; if there are structural ambiguities and homonymous expressions, it is necessary to establish what meaning or syntactic structure is relevant in the context of utterance. Once the explicit level has been identified, it is possible to determine a possible implicit level at which the speaker's communicative intentions have a role. On this view, the sentences of a language have fixed truth conditions entirely determined by the syntax and semantics. Only the decodification process makes it possible to assign the semantic content (truth conditions), and it does so in a manner completely independent of the speaker's intentions. Literalism thus draws a distinction between, on the one hand, the obligatory or semantic processes (saturation) which allow determination of the level of the proposition literally expressed by an utterance, and on the other, the optional or pragmatic processes (enrichment, transfer and implicatures) which make it possible to determine an additional and implicit level of sense.

This paper contends that the speaker's intentions and contextual assumptions also contribute to determination of "what is said:" that is, it argues in favor of the contribution of the speaker's intentions and the pragmatic context to the truth-conditional content of the utterance (a contribution made before the semantic composition). In particular, the paper argues for the context-dependence of meaning, and it proposes a model of explicit communication in which the process of determining "what is said" is guided by the addressee's recognition of the speaker's non-linguistic goals, which trigger information relative to the speaker's non-linguistic interests.

In summary, this research is relevant because it shows that in the explicit (and not only implicit) communication processes the determination of the intended meaning of an expression does not depend exclusively on the decoding of linguistic items, that is, syntax and semantics, but also on non-linguistic items related to the context of utterance (semantic underdeterminacy). Moreover, it is more relevant to the paper's goals that, in some cases, it is not possible to determine the intended meaning even on the basis of non-linguistic information about the context of utterance (contextual underdeterminacy). In the latter cases, we need to recourse to specific information about the speaker, that is, his/her interest in situation. Another relevant question faced by the paper is that, in cases of contextual underdeterminacy, the associative approach seems to be less effective compared with the inferential approach.

The scope of the model presented here relates to communicative situations in which contextual underdetermination is present and the addressee has specific information about the speaker's interests, from which he/she obtains an order of preference between contextually plausible meanings.

2. What Is Said

In recent years, studies by pragmatists and semanticists have given rise to diverse standpoints about different aspects related to the context-dependence of meaning (e.g. indexicality, reference assignment, literal meaning, semantic underdeterminacy, context-sensitivity, pragmatic intrusion, unarticulated constituents, semantics/ pragmatics distinction, "what is said"/"what is implicated" distinction, etc.) (Perry, 2000; Stanley, 2000; Recanati, 2002a, 2004a, 2010; Bianchi, 2004; Bach, 2004, 2012; Szabó, 2005; Cappelen and Lepore, 2005; Cappelen, 2007; Carston, 2008; Gaucker, 2012; Borg, 2012; Corazza and Dokic, 2012; Stojnic and Lepore, 2013; Belleri, 2014; Stalnaker, 2014). There is also lively debate within pragmatics which treats and extends the previous issues: for instance, "what is said" vs. explicature, associative vs. inferential method, primary and secondary pragmatic processes, top-down vs. bottom-up processes, explicature vs. impliciture, *ad hoc* concepts construction, mutual adjustment, backward/forward inference, meta-representations in communication, radical vs. moderate contextualism, etc. (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 2002; Levinson, 2000; Bezuidenhout, 2002; Recanati, 2007, 2010, 2012; Carston, 2002, 2007, 2009; Wilson and Carston, 2007; Bach, 2010; Mazzone, 2011; Mazzarella 2011; Wilson and Sperber, 2012; Carston and Hall, 2012; Belleri, 2013; Hall, 2014).

This article will pay especial attention to the truth-conditional pragmatics of Recanati (2010) and the inferential approach to communication of Sperber and Wilson's (2012) relevance theory. These two solid approaches are based on similar frameworks but propose explanatory models which differ in various respects. There follows a brief description of some of the concepts used by the two approaches of relevance to the paper and some of their main differences.

In particular, of relevance to the purpose of the paper is the debate concerning the nature of the "primary" pragmatic processes, i.e. the processes that contribute to determination of the explicit meaning of an utterance ("what is said" in Recanati's terms and "explicature" in Sperber and Wilson's[2]). Relevance theory has developed a unified inferential account of primary (i.e. explicatures) and secondary (i.e. implicatures) pragmatic processes. Instead, Recanati conceives two different processing systems: for primary processes, there is an associative system, which guides the determination of "what is said;" and for secondary processes, there is an inferential system, which recovers "what is implicated."

According to truth-conditional pragmatics, primary pragmatic processes are ruled by accessibility and constrained by semantic associations and world knowledge structures (i.e. schemata). On Recanati's view, "what is said" is a proposition determined by decoding and semantic associations, and it is used as a premise for inferring "what is implicated" (Recanati, 2010).[3] Of great importance in Recanati's framework is the notion of accessibility. When an utterance is interpreted, the possible candidates for the meaning of a word are activated in parallel, and they compete with each other. The winner is the one most accessible to the addressee. A meaning can be more accessible and immediate to the addressee because, for example, it relates to his/her activities and knowledge, and is therefore activated more than the other competing meanings. However, during the interpretation process it may happen that the meaning most accessible to the addressee is not consistent with the communicative situation. At this point, an accessibility shift is triggered on the basis of the conceptual coherence of another of the candidate meanings with the schemata activated by the elements of the communication situation (e.g. words, contextual factors). The interpretative process is thus realigned with the communication (content sharing). In Recanati's view, the composition of the utterance's meaning may occur after the lexical modulation (e.g., free enrichment). In this case, the modulation has an effect on the truth-conditional content of the sentence uttered. When the pragmatic processes of lexical modulation intervene before the semantic composition, we have a pragmatic intrusion which delivers intuitive truth-conditions (put otherwise, we have a form of contextualism). Finally, the process of determining "what is said" is characterized as sub-personal: only the output from the process (i.e., "what is said") is available to the participants in the communicative exchange (see Recanati, 2004b).

According to relevance theory, an utterance (like every ostensive-inferential communicative act) communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance (communicative principle of relevance), which guides the derivation of explicatures, contextual assumptions and implicatures. On Wilson and Sperber's view, an explicature is a proposition determined by decoding and inference, and it is connected to implicature by a process of mutual parallel adjustment (Wilson and Sperber, 2012).[4] In relevance theory's framework, the inputs to the interpretative process are identified and processed by the addressee according to their cognitive relevance. An input is relevant to an addressee when its processing in a context yields a positive cognitive effect: that is, a worthwhile difference to the addressee's representation of the world. An input is optimally relevant if and only if it justifies the processing effort of the addressee, and it is the one most compatible with the capacities and preferences of the speaker. When the level of relevance is optimal, the comprehension procedure is triggered. The comprehension procedure is based on a path of least effort in testing possible interpretations (e.g., ambiguity resolution, reference assignment) in order of accessibility, and it stops when the addressee's expectations of relevance are satisfied (Wilson and Sperber, 2012; Wilson, 2014). The comprehension procedure is a heuristic and automatic procedure for achieving an interpretation of an utterance that confirms the presumption of optimal relevance, and it is conceived as a specialized comprehension module which is part of a broader mind-reading module dedicated to attributing mental states in order to explain and predict behavior (see Wilson, 2014; Wilson and Sperber, 2012).

In pragmatics, the most typical and pervasive primary process affecting the truth-conditions of an utterance is free enrichment: that is, a kind of lexical modulation that affects "what is said" (Recanati, 2010). It gives an interpretation more specific than the literal one; that is, the process of free enrichment outputs a denotation of an expression that is a subset of the initial denotation (Carston, 1997). In relevance theory, this kind of lexical modulation is called "narrowing," and it contributes to explicatures.[5] It is driven by the search for relevance, as are all pragmatic tasks and processes (e.g., ambiguity resolution, implicatures). On Recanati's view, free enrichment is a top-down process; that is, a contextually-driven and optional one. In contrast, a bottom-up process is a signal-driven process which is mandatory to obtain a truth-evaluable utterance. Typically, a bottom-up process consists in the saturation of indexical expressions, where the information used is triggered by variables in the form of a sentence (e.g., "I", "here").[6] Instead, the process of free enrichment is not triggered by variables in the form of sentence; rather, it is triggered for purely pragmatic reasons, that is, in order to understand what the speaker is saying.

In short, the current debate is animated by numerous questions. For example: What is the contribution of context to the determination of propositional content? How is the relevant non-linguistic information triggered? And how is it used? Is it the premise of a non-demonstrative inference, or does it activate a frame that associates concepts? Etc.

The following sections briefly present the phenomenon of semantic underdeterminacy; the communicative inferences for explicit meaning; the interest and belief-based model of explicit communication, and explanation of how it works. The final section argues in favor of the role of the speaker's interest and the addressee's beliefs in explicit communication.

3. Semantic Underdeterminacy, Non-linguistic Information and Contextual Underdeterminacy

This section briefly illustrates the phenomenon of semantic underdeterminacy, and outlines some differences between semantic perspective and pragmatic perspectives concerning the role of non-linguistic information in meaning determination.

Semantic underdeterminacy occurs when the conventional meaning of a sentence uttered by a speaker underdetermines the proposition explicitly expressed by the utterance (Travis, 1975; Searle, 1980). The question is whether conventional meaning, obtained by semantic conventions and linguistic rules, is sufficient to provide truth-conditions or whether other items are required as well. In other words, is it sufficient to know semantic conventions and linguistic rules or is it necessary to know elements of the specific situation of utterance?

On a semantic view, conventional meaning and a small number of contextual variables are sufficient to determine the truth-conditions of a sentence (see Stanley, 2000; Cappelen and Lepore, 2005). In this view, few types of expressions are considered context-dependent: for example, indexical expressions (e.g. "I", "she", "here", "today"), demonstrative pronouns (e.g. "this", "that", "there"), pronouns used anaphorically, verb tenses, etc. In these cases, information about the objective context of the utterance[7] is triggered solely by variables positioned in the logical and linguistic form of the sentence. In fact, the context-dependence of meaning is addressed by semantics without contributions from pragmatics: more precisely, without recourse to communicative intentions and the contribution of the context (in the broad sense). From this perspective, the primary pragmatic processes (i.e., lexical modulation) are not necessary for the assignment of reference; they do not intervene before the semantic composition, and hence have no impact on the truth-conditions of the sentence.

On a pragmatic view, conventional meaning is not sufficient to determine a unique set of truth-conditions (Recanati, 2010; Sperber and Wilson, 2012). In this view, semantic underdeterminacy is considered pervasive of almost all natural language sentences; or, to put it differently, most natural language sentences are context-sensitive. Hence, we need information about the context of use to complete the conventional meaning and to determine the truth-conditions. More precisely, the current debate in pragmatics centers on the contextual dependence of the meanings of individual words, and how the contextual factors intervening in the assignment of reference contribute to the truth-conditions of the sentence uttered. In short, according to this account, the primary pragmatic processes intervene before the semantic composition, thus contributing to determination of the utterance's (intuitive) truth-conditions.

By "context" – in communication – I mean the information mentally represented (cf. Wilson, 2014) in order to understand linguistic expressions. This information concerns various aspects of the situation in which communication takes place. Some types of contextual information are the following: linguistic information (e.g. the sentence in which a word appears, the text/discourse in which a sentence appears); "local" information concerning specific events and the individuals involved in the interaction (e.g., the town's best-known bookshop is holding a sale; "yesterday it rained all along the River Adige;" "the speaker is an angler;" "it is the speaker's birthday"); "general" (encyclopaedic) information relative to shared practices and facts about the world (e.g. "writing books is difficult;" "it is usually very damp on the banks of rivers;" "the capital of Italy is Rome"); information gathered directly from the surrounding environment (e.g. "it's raining;" "the speaker is holding a fishing rod;" "there's a large book in the bag").

Specifically, this paper deals with the problem of explicit meaning when a number of interpretations are all plausible in the same combination of contexts, and not with the problem of whether there is a need for non-linguistic information to fix a unique set of truth-conditions. We might call this kind of phenomenon "contextual underdeterminacy."

An example can clarify this point. The issue is as follows: the conventional meaning of a sentence, even without indexical expressions and structural and lexical ambiguity, actually underdetermines the proposition expressed by the sentence. And even with the additional pragmatic contribution of relevant non-linguistic information, it is not always possible to fix a unique proposition. Consider the following sentence:

(1) "There is water on Mars."

I do not know whether there is water on Mars, but I understand the sentence because I am able to imagine the ways in which there might be water on Mars: for example, in the form of ice on the planet's surface or in the form of gas in its atmosphere. Consequently, sentence (1) can have at least two interpretations (two different sets of truth-conditions); that is, it can be true both if there is water in the form of ice on the surface and if there is water in the form of gas in the atmosphere.[8] The two sets of truth-conditions correspond to different states of affairs:

a. "There is ice on the surface of Mars."
b. "There is water vapour in the atmosphere of Mars."

Hence, (1) can refer to both states of affairs. This is the case if we consider semantic conventions, but also if we consider the text of the sentence in which the word "water" appears and we use encyclopaedic knowledge (e.g. physical states of water).

In these cases of contextual underdeterminacy, how is it possible to establish which of the two enrichments is the most appropriate in the specific situation? Put otherwise: in communication processes what is it that drives enrichment in the interpretative process in one direction rather than another? This paper argues that if non-linguistic information is not sufficient to determine a unique set of truth-conditions (proposition), then, in order to determine the explicit content of communication, we can take into account the speaker's preferences for the states of affairs which make a sentence true.

Before discussion begins on how preferences for states of affairs contribute to retrieval of the non-linguistic information necessary to determine the explicit meaning, we shall briefly consider the kinds of inferences considered in the model.

4. Inference of Explicit Meaning

This section presents communication inferences for explicit communication, i.e., non-demonstrative inferences. Communicative inferences are non-demonstrative because they have a logical structure that does not guarantee the truth of the conclusions, in contrast to deduction. Deduction is a type of inference whereby what is inferred is necessarily true if the premises are true; that is, the truth of the premises logically guarantees the truth of the conclusions. Even if new premises are added, the conclusions remain valid.

The communicative inferences considered here have the structure of abduction. An abduction is an inference where the truth of the premises does not logically guarantee the truth of the conclusion, but guarantees it with respect to the current information and until proof to the contrary is forthcoming. It is possible that new information added to the premises modifies the conclusions. In these terms, abduction violates the property of monotonicity, and the conclusion is defeasible. It is a type of reasoning aimed at obtaining the best explanation given the information available.

In particular, in explicit communication/language understanding, the concern is to infer the meaning that best fits with the contextual assumptions; that is, the best explanation of why the speaker says "what s/he says" in the situation in which the sentence is uttered.

The type of communicative inferences considered here are the following:

P_1: Form and semantic conventions.
P_2: Contextual information.

C: Explicit meaning.

Consider the following sentence:

(2) "The bank is wet."

In (2) the meaning of the word "bank" is not determined, and it can mean a financial institute or land alongside a river. In cases of this kind, the context may provide information with which to select a plausible interpretation. For example, on the one hand, if (2) is uttered by a speaker close to an angler who is about to fish, then "bank" plausibly refers to the land alongside a river and (2) plausibly means that alongside the river there is high humidity; on the other hand, if the speaker is near to the doors of a financial institute, then the word "bank" plausibly refers to the institute and (2) plausibly means that the floor of the financial institute has just been washed. In both cases the non-linguistic information is directly perceived from physical surroundings (i.e., the angler and the financial institute). Hence, the meaning of (2) is obtained through an inference composed of two premises: sentence (2) (semantic conventions applied to the linguistic form) and information about the context in which (2) is uttered; the conclusion consists of a unique proposition. The two possible inferences are as follows:

P_1: "The bank is wet."
P_2: Direct perception of the financial institute.

C: "The floor of the financial institute has just been washed".

P_1: "The bank is wet."
P_2: Direct perception of the angler.

C: "There is high humidity alongside the river."

Consider (2) uttered by a speaker close to an angler about to fish: the word "wet" can refer to both high humidity and water on grass, rocks, etc. Here the form or the way in which water is on the bank is not determined. We need further information: for instance, yesterday it rained alongside the river (local knowledge); or generally there is high humidity alongside rivers (encyclopaedic knowledge), to determine the ways in which there is water on the bank. The two possible inferences are the following:

P_1: "The bank is wet."
P_2: Yesterday it rained alongside the river.

C: "There is water on grass, etc. alongside the river."

P_1: "The bank is wet."
P_2: Generally there is high humidity alongside rivers.

C: "There is high humidity alongside the river."

The inferential processes involved in determination of the meaning of (2) are those of resolution of ambiguity and enrichment of truth-conditions. We can infer an interpretation of the word "bank" on the basis of contextual information directly perceived from the physical surroundings, and consequently we can infer an interpretation of the word "wet" on the basis of local or encyclopaedic knowledge.

Note that, in this study, the resolution of ambiguity is treated in inferential terms like any pragmatic task (see Wilson and Carston, 2007), regardless of the type of contextual dependence that it exhibits and the status assigned to it in semantics.[9]

Finally, I would stress that it is not necessary for communication that the non-linguistic information used in the second premise be made available by, or constrained to, the linguistic form of the sentence. It is triggered for pragmatic reasons – that is, to understand what the speaker is saying – and contributes to the utterance's truth-conditions.

5. The Model

This section presents a model of explicit communication where the notion of shared intended meaning is based on the speaker's preference for a state of affairs to which a sentence refers, and on the addressee's communicative inference, which involves the addressee's belief about the interest of the speaker in the specific communicative situation.

The two basic theses are the following: 1) given a set of contextually plausible interpretations of an utterance, the speaker's intended meaning is determined by the speaker's situational interests; and 2) the addressee's intended meaning[10] is inferred by the addressee on the basis of his/her belief about the speaker's interest. Communication is successful when the intended speaker's meaning and the addressee's speaker meaning are shared: that is, when the addressee's inference is based on a true belief about the speaker's interest in situation.

The model takes the notion of interest from cognitive social theory. It thus views an interest as a state of affairs preferred by a speaker because it implies the conditions of possibility of his/her goal (goal-conditions) − this is a modified notion originally proposed by Conte and Castelfranchi (1995). The model also takes the notion of meaning from semantics: that is, a sentence's meaning identifies with the truth-conditions of that sentence; and the meaning of an expression identifies with its contribution to the truth-conditions of the sentence in which it appears.

Speaker's intended meaning.[11] The notion of speaker's intended meaning of declarative sentences is founded on the relation between the states of affairs in which a sentence is true and the speaker's preferences ordering in regard to the states of affairs in which the sentence is true. A sentence can be true with respect to different sets of truth-conditions, which correspond to different states of affairs. The state of affairs preferred by a speaker because it implies his/her goal provides the truth-conditions which determine the speaker's intended meaning in the specific situation of use. From this perspective, the determination of the speaker's intended meaning is viewed as a selection of a state of affairs which makes a sentence true (via truth-conditions) and satisfies the speaker's interest in situation (via goal-conditions). Hence, the process of determining the speaker's intended meaning can be explained in terms of preferences ordering.

The schema in Figure 1 illustrates the notion of speaker's intended meaning as it is conceived here.[12] At the bottom of the schema is a sentence which, given a context of use, has some plausible interpretations. Each interpretation refers to a state of affairs which makes the sentence true: that is, it refers to specific truth-conditions. The correspondence between the state of affairs preferred by the speaker and one of the states of affairs which make the sentence true determines the speaker's intended meaning. In other words, when the goal-conditions match the truth-conditions, we have speaker's intended meaning.



Figure 1 The schema illustrates the notion of speaker's intended meaning as it is conceived here

Addressee's intended meaning. The addressee's intended meaning is obtained via a communicative inference (Figure 2). The premise P_1 consists of a sentence, the semantic conventions associated with its linguistic form, and contextual information (that is, some plausible meanings). The premise P_2 consists of the addressee's belief about the speaker's interest, more specifically about a partial ordering of the speaker's preferences, and contributes to the intuitive truth-conditions.

P_1 = Sentence (linguistic form, semantic conventions, context).

C = Addressee's intended meaning (truth-cond. level).

P_2 = Addressee's belief (speaker's interest).

Figure 2 The schema illustrates the notion of addressee's intended meaning as it is conceived here.

Before how the model works is described, the following section introduces some notions of the logic of preferences that will be used to account for the speaker's order of preferences and to express the contents of the addressee's belief.

5.1. Preferences and state of affairs

In philosophy and the logic of preference, the items of preference are generally states of affairs which are represented as sentences (see von Wright, 1963). This section introduces the notion of preference for states of affairs based on the comparative notions: "better than" (>), i.e. the strict preference relation, "equal in value to" (≡), i.e. the indifference relation, and "at least good as" (≥), i.e. the weak preference relation. Using this language, it is possible to express the preferences of agents for states of affairs.[13] For instance, on writing: $[(sa_1)>(sa_2)]_{Ag}$, we assert that an agent prefers the state of affairs 1 rather than the state of affairs 2 (see Fig. 1).

Decisions theorists assume that an agent can rationally choose an option if the set of options satisfies the properties of completeness and transitivity. These properties are now defined.

Completeness for strict preference (>) is defined as follows:[14]

the relation > is complete if and only if for any elements *a* and *b* of its domain, either *a* > *b* or *b* > *a.*

Transitivity for strict preference is defined as follows:

the relation > is transitive if and only if it holds for all elements *a*, *b* and *c* of its domain, so that if *a* > *b* and *b* > *c*, then *a* > *c*.

These properties ensure that an agent is able to compare all options coherently with his/her own preferences. However, it may be that an agent is not always able to compare all options clearly, but this does not prevent him/her from choosing coherently with his/her own interest. Hence, in order to consider an agent's choice coherent with his/her interest, it is sufficient that s/he is able to determine the best state of affairs among others without necessarily ordering the other states of affairs: that is, a partial ordering of preference is sufficient.[15] In substance, considering the notion of partial order, it is not necessary for the set of states of affairs to be completely ordered; it is sufficient for the highest preference to be recognized, regardless of the relations among the other options.

The next subsection shows the role of the speaker's preferences in the interpretative process.

5.2. How the model works

Consider the following sentence:

3) "I lost the book yesterday."

Situation: (3) is uttered by a writer who is completing his latest book. Yesterday he went to the library to borrow a book on Wittgenstein and had with him the draft of his new book with annotations on changes to its content. He proudly showed the draft to an employee of the library, whom he has known for a long time. Again yesterday, he bought at the town's best-known bookshop a new item for his bookshelf at home. When he went to the library he was carrying the bookshop bag with a heavy volume inside it. Today the writer has met the library employee strolling in the town centre and has uttered (3).

In this situation, (3) has at least three plausible meanings:

Meaning$_1$: [I lost the book on Wittgenstein yesterday.]
Meaning$_2$: [I lost the draft of my new book yesterday.]
Meaning$_3$: [I lost the book bought yesterday.]

What is the speaker's intended meaning? Is it the same as the addressee's?

Before showing how the addressee's communicative inference functions, we specify the speaker's potential goals and the preference relation for the states of affairs that make the various meanings of (3) plausible:

Goal$_1$: Find the book on Wittgenstein (so as to save face).
Goal$_2$: Find his book (so as not to lose the annotations).
Goal$_3$: Find the book bought for his collection at home (so as not to lose the money paid for it).

Given the speaker's goals, we specify the preferences for the states of affairs that make the meanings of (3) plausible. In this example, we assume that the addressee gives most value to the work done on the draft (e.g., because it is irreplaceable) rather than the possible loss of face or the small amount of money spent on the book. Hence, the addressee's belief about the speaker's interest can be expressed in terms of order of preference for the states of affairs that make (3) true as follows:

(sa_2): /I lost the draft of my new book yesterday/ > (sa_1): /I lost the book on Wittgenstein yesterday/

(sa_2): /I lost the draft of my new book yesterday/ > (sa_3): /I lost the book bought yesterday/

(sa_1): /I lost the book on Wittgenstein yesterday/ ≡ (sa_3): /I lost the book bought yesterday/

In short: (sa_2) > (sa_1) ≡ (sa_3).

Hence the communicative inference is as follows:

$\mathbf{P_1}$ = “I lost the book yesterday.” $[M_1; M_2; M_3]_{\mathrm{ctx}}$

C = [I lost the draft of my new book yesterday]
(addressee’s intended meaning – truth-conditional level).

$\mathbf{P_2}$ = Addressee’s belief $((sa_2) > (sa_1) \equiv (sa_3)) \rightarrow (\textit{goal-conditions} \leftrightarrow \textit{truth-conditions}_2)$.

When the addressee’s inference is based on a true belief about the speaker’s interest, we have an effective communication, that is, a content sharing.

In what follows, the paper argues in favor of the inferential approach and of the role of the speaker’s interest and the addressee’s beliefs in explicit communication within the debate in pragmatics.

6. Interest and Belief in Communication

This section discusses the process of determining the shared intended meaning of an utterance within the debate in pragmatics. It argues in favor of the role of the speaker’s interests and the addressee’s belief concerning the speaker’s interests in explicit communication.

As said, the conclusion of the inference in question consists of a unique proposition, the one explicitly expressed by the speaker with the utterance. Or, as in the case that follows, it consists of a part of the proposition that contributes, as the premise of another inference, to determination of the utterance’s overall meaning. Consider the following sentence taken from the pragmatics literature (Carston, 2007).

4) “I’m going to the bank now to get some cash.”

At first glance, here the interpretative problem consists in identifying a referent for the word “bank” (“financial institute” or “riverside”). Let us base our interpretation on the approach of Recanati’s truth-conditional pragmatics. In this case it would be plausible to assume that the referent “financial institute” is assigned to the word “bank” because it is associated with the concept “cash” triggered by the word “cash,” or because it is associated with the stereotypical representation “getting money from a bank” (or with both). This association is made possible by the discourse (or linguistic) context, i.e., the part of the sentence in which the expression “to get some cash” appears, and by the shared encyclopaedic knowledge that, in general, money is withdrawn from banks/financial institutes.

Following the same interpretation procedure, if at the beginning of utterance (4) the word “bank” is understood by the addressee in the sense of “riverside,” because for some reason the latter concept is more activated and available to the addressee than “financial institute,” it is likely that the word “cash” in the continuation of the sentence will trigger the concept “cash,” which is associated with the concept of “financial institute,” thus aligning the communication with the speaker’s intentions (accessibility shift) (see Carston, 2007).

But this is not necessarily the intended interpretation, even though it is the most immediate one. Consider the case in which (4) is uttered by an angler who is going fishing and who intends to sell the fish that he catches. In this case, the encyclopaedic knowledge that money is withdrawn from banks is not relevant. But nor is the local knowledge that the speaker is a “professional” fisherman able to disambiguate the word “bank” (because also fishermen go to banks/financial institutes). Instead, if we know the speaker’s interests – for example, that he intends to sell the fish that he catches in order to earn money, or that he intends to withdraw money in order to go shopping – then we are able to identify the intended referent in both the former and the latter case. We are able to do so on the basis of the knowledge shared between speaker and addressee about the speaker’s interest, and not on the basis of conceptual associations produced by the addressee. If this is how matters stand, then it is plausible that the speaker’s interests/goals and the addressee’s beliefs render the communicative models more suitable for explicit communication (i.e. for truth-conditional content sharing) than to “mechanistic” models – or at least to more rigid ones based on conceptual frames and schemata activated by the addressee and presumed shared assumptions.

Presented below is the scheme of the inferential process whereby the addressee determines the meaning of (4):

“I’m going to the bank$_{1,2}$ now *to get some cash.*”

I’m going to the bank$_{1,2}$ now to get some cash [fishing and selling fish]$_{\text{enrichment}}$

Addressee’s belief
about speaker’s interest:
“fishing and selling fish.”

I’m going to the riverside now to get
some cash by fishing and selling fish.

Linguistic context: “to get some cash [fishing and selling fish].”

Figure 3 Inferential steps in determination of the meaning of (4).

In interpretation of (4), the shared knowledge of the speaker's interest enables determination of the meaning of the expression "to get some cash" ("fishing and selling fish") which then makes it possible to assign the reference for the word "bank" ("riverside"). Hence, the interest (via enrichment) has determined (i) the contribution of the expression "to get some cash" to the truth-conditions of the sentence, and accordingly (ii) the relevant linguistic context for disambiguation of "bank" in the specific situation.

Finally, an important characterization of the communication model is as follows. If we believe that knowledge of the speaker's interests is used in the premise of the addressee's inference, then we admit that the meta-representational capacities have a role in explicit communication. We therefore assume that, although this process is often automatic, in principle, the addressee can at any time justify, with respect to (4), the assignment of reference to the word "bank" or determination of modes in which "to get some cash."

7. Conclusion

The paper has presented a model of explicit communication for declarative sentences. The scope of the model relates to communicative situations in which contextual underdetermination is present and the addressee has specific information about the speaker's interests. The model's components have been: meaning as truth-conditions, inferential process, the speaker's interest as a state of affairs preferred by the speaker because it implies his/her goal; the partial ordering of states of affairs; and the addressee's belief about the speaker's interest. Its arguments have been: the communicative intentions that trigger the information of the pragmatic context are often not sufficient to select the speaker's intended meaning among some contextually plausible meanings (*pars destruens*), and thus it is necessary to take into account the partial order of preferences to determine the speaker's intended meaning (*pars construens*). Its related notions have been "what is said" and explicature. "What is said" refers to the explicit level of communication and is based on truth-theoretic machinery which delivers truth-conditions (Recanati, 2010). Nevertheless, the model differs from the truth-conditional pragmatics because it comprises the communicative inferences also for explicit meaning, and it considers as very relevant the active role of addressee in communication, as in the case of explicature in relevant theory (Wilson and Sperber, 2012).

As we have seen, the model is able to account for cases of the assignment of the reference of words and expressions through lexical modulation processes and disambiguation. The cases discussed have been resolved through the recognition of non-linguistic goals which have made it possible to order, according to the speaker's situational preferences, the states of affairs that make an utterance true with respect to a context or a combination of contexts. Shown in particular has been the assignment of reference for the word "book" in (3) and for the expression "to get some cash" and the word "bank" in (4) through free enrichment and disambiguation.

Moreover, it has been shown how, through enrichment of the expression “to get some cash” in (4) and the subsequent assignment of reference, it has been possible to determine the linguistic context appropriate for resolving the ambiguity of the word “bank” in (4).

A further consideration is that the model discussed comprises two components of the shared intended meaning – i.e. the speaker’s intended meaning and the addressee’s intended meaning – which are obtained by different processes. With the notion of shared intended meaning thus conceived, it may be possible to explain in analogous manner both cases of communication and cases of miscommunication (based on the addressee’s false beliefs).

Finally, now briefly outlined there are some answers to the questions posed in the introduction of the article. What is the contribution of context to the determination of propositional content? The context provides non-linguistic information essential for determination of the propositional content. As we have seen in (1), for example, the linguistic information triggered by the logical and linguistic form of a sentence is not sufficient to determine the meaning of that sentence. This is due to semantic underdeterminacy; and even with the aid of non-linguistic information available in the context is it not always possible to determine the intended meaning of an utterance because not all the contextual information is relevant or appropriate.

How is the relevant non-linguistic information triggered? The non-linguistic information that comes into play in interpretation of an utterance is mainly triggered by recognition of the speaker’s goals and interests, which give access to information relevant to the situation of the utterance. As we have seen in (4), for example, the relevant knowledge is triggered on the basis of recognition of the speaker’s activities in the situation.

And how is it used? Is it the premise of a non-demonstrative inference, or does it activate a frame that associates concepts? It is used as a premise in a non-demonstrative inference. Recourse to communicative inference presupposes a more (inter)active role by the addressee with respect to the association of concepts identified on the basis of presumed conceptual schemata shared by speaker and addressee. In other words, inference makes it possible to model the interaction on the basis of the relation between speaker and addressee which affords access to shared information, and not vice versa. In (4) for example, knowledge of the speaker’s goals enables retrieval of information pertinent to the modulation of “to get some cash [‘selling fish’]” and consequently pertinent to disambiguation of the word “bank.”

In summary, the speaker intends the meaning that maximizes his/her interest in situation, and the addressee infers the meaning on the basis of his/her belief about the speaker’s partial order of preferences. We have shared intended meaning, that is, effective communication, when the addressee’s inference is based on a true belief about the speakers’ interest.

Disclosure statement

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NOTES

1. This article is an extended and revisited version of Cruciani, M. (2015). "An Interest and Belief-based Model of Explicit Communication," *Proceedings of EuroAsianPacific* joint conference on Cognitive Science, http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1419/paper0036.pdf

2. On the notion of explicature, see Carston (2002); on "what is said," see Recanati (2001). More precisely, the expression "what is said" was originally proposed by Grice (1989).

3. More precisely, Recanati (2004a, 2010) distinguishes two levels of "what is said:" 'what is saidmin' that is obtained by bottom-up processes, and "what is saidint" that is obtained by top-down processes, where "int" stands for intuitive (truth-conditions) and "min" stands for minimal (role of pragmatics in content determination).

4. On inferential vs. associative methods, see Carston (2007); Recanati (2002b, 2004a, 2007); Wilson and Carston (2007). Moreover, for an argument in favor of relevance and the role of preferences in the communication process (*contra* the associative method), see Mazzarella (2011). For an argument in favor of the associative method and the role of schemata see Mazzone (2011).

5. Other kinds of lexical modulation are approximation or loosening/broadening (e.g., in "this piazza is round," "round" is used to mean "relatively round") and metaphorical extension (e.g. "tank" used to mean "forceful person"). In relevance theory, they are considered different outcomes of a single process which produces *ad hoc* concepts as result of an interaction among conventional meanings, contextual factors and pragmatic expectations (Wilson and Carston, 2007).

6. When Recanati uses the expression "free enrichment," by "free" he means non-mandatory, that is, optional (Recanati, 2010, 2012).

7. That is, objective features of the context of the utterance such as speaker, addressee, place, etc.

8. In this simple example, whose purpose is solely illustrative, not considered are the cases in which there is no water on Mars, in which there is water simultaneously in both gaseous and solid form, or in liquid form.

9. For example, Recanati (2010) does not consider the resolution of ambiguity to be a good counter-example to the fact that semantics and pragmatics do not mix, because semanticists do not consider disambiguation to be part of the semantic interpretation process. Perry (2000) treats it as a pre-semantic question to satisfy before a semantic evaluation can be made. Again, Belleri (2014) relates ambiguity to a case of underspecification (vs. semantic underdeterminacy): see also Travis (1997) and Bezuidenhout (2002). Bach (2012) does not consider ambiguity to be a true case of the context-dependence of meaning. However, the basic idea here is that in the communication process the addressee draws inferences to understand what the speaker is saying no matter what the source of underdeterminacy may be, and s/he does so by using any information available in the context that s/he considers more appropriate/manageable.

10. This notion will be introduced in the following of this section.

11. Note that here “Speaker’s intended meaning” stands for “Speaker’s *explicit* intended meaning.”

12. The level of the interest in Figure 1 represents an order of preference, where “>” stands for the preference relation: “better than,” and “≡” stands for the preference relation: “equal in value to,” as specified in the following part of the paper.

13. For an overview on the logic of preference in philosophy see Hansson and Grüne-Yanoff (2012).

14. Analogously we can define completeness and transitivity for the relations “≥” and “≡”.

15. More precisely, a partial order requires satisfaction of the reflexive, transitive and asymmetric properties; and a strict partial order requires satisfaction of the irreflexive and transitive properties (see Hansson and Grüne-Yanoff, 2012). Reflexivity is considered a property that guarantees a pre-order, and asymmetry is derived from transitivity.

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THE *QUA*-PROBLEM AND MEANING SCEPTICISM

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ABSTRACT: When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the *qua*-problem. I consider Kusch's criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the *qua*-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke's scepticism is removed.

Keywords: philosophy of language; causal theory; Kripke; meaning skepticism; meaning; reference

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1. Introduction

Kripke (1982), inspired by his reading of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, argued that words do not have meanings. Such a conclusion could be considered paradoxical – his argument cannot be sound if the words therein have no meaning. Rejecting this sceptical conclusion without specifying where his argument is in error simply reinforces the paradox; if words do have meaning, and the argument is sound, there must be no such thing as meaning! This scepticism presents a challenge for those wanting to defend accounts of language where words are determinately attached to meanings, or refer to particular individuals or kinds, as well as undermining non-theoretic conceptions of language and communication. Kripke maintained that this challenge could not be directly refuted via "straight" solutions that overcome the sceptical position. Rather, he put forward a "sceptical solution," grounded in the conditions under which speakers can make certain assertions, in an effort to make sense of our talk of meaning, without committing to its existence. Reaction against the sceptical conclusion has been widespread and ongoing, with recent debate focussing on its implications for the normativity of meaning (Green, 2015; Whiting, 2016), and Kripke's own solution has been criticized for implying that sentences cannot have truth-conditions (Boghossian, 1989; Millikan, 1990).

While Kripke (1982) considers a range of solutions to the sceptical paradox, a causal or causal-hybrid type of solution is not among them. Kusch (2006) has defended this via his own criticism of a causal solution, concluding that Kripke was correct to not consider such an approach. The core of Kusch's criticism is that attempting to overcome the *qua*-problem leaves the causal theory of reference vulnerable to sceptical attack. On this basis, he concludes that neither Maddy (1984), nor McGinn (1984) have refuted Kripke's argument. However, there might be a way to overcome this difficulty that Kusch did not consider. Making use of the notion of assertability conditions, I will argue that the *qua*-problem can be overcome in a way that resists sceptical attack. If successful, this would remove one important barrier to using causal-hybrid theories of reference, such as those put forward by Devitt (1981, 1997) or Evans (1973), as solutions to Kripke's meaning scepticism. I will argue that if a few key premises are acceptable, the *qua*-problem cannot be used a reason to rule out a causal approach to solving Kripke's puzzle.

2. Kripke's Meaning Scepticism

Kripke's (1982) development of his argument against the existence of meaning is reasonably well-known, so this exegesis will be brief. Kripke asks the reader to consider an example of an arithmetic calculation: 68 + 57. It is the case that he or she has not completed this calculation before, and that he or she has never added two numbers larger than 57 together. With some degree of confidence, Kripke arrives at "125." The answer is correct in both the arithmetic sense, and the metalinguistic sense, that '"plus' as I intended to use the word in the past, denoted a function which, when applied to the numbers I called '68' and '57,' yields the value 125" (Kripke, 1982: 8).

Kripke (1982), via his interlocutor, the bizarre sceptic, puts forward an argument to undermine certainty that 125 is the correct answer, suggesting instead that "5" is the response Kripke should have given. The problem is not with Kripke's arithmetic skills. The sceptic disputes that Kripke is correct in the metalinguistic sense. The answer, 125, could not have been attained through explicit instructions, as Kripke had never completed that addition before. The answer was attained by applying a rule or function that had been applied in the past. But what was this function? The sceptic suggests that Kripke, rather than meaning "plus" by the "+" symbol, actually meant "quus," symbolized here by "⊕." Quus is defined by Kripke as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} x \oplus y &= x + y, \text{ if } x, y < 57 \\ &= 5 \text{ otherwise.} \end{aligned}$$

The sceptic claims that Kripke is misinterpreting his previous use of "plus" and "+," and that he always meant "quus," making a linguistic rather than arithmetic mistake (1982: 9).

The core question that the sceptic advances is this: What fact makes it the case that a speaker means, or refers to, one thing rather than another? Kripke (1982) considers a range of potential solutions: rule-following, dispositions, simplicity, appeals to qualia, meaning as a primitive phenomenon, and platonism. All of them are judged by him as being unable to refute the sceptic's claim – that Kripke always meant quus by "+" – and concludes that the same facts that justify meaning plus apply just as well to meaning quus. Since the sceptic's supposition that a speaker means quus and not plus cannot be answered, there is no fact that differentiates between a speaker meaning a definite function such as plus and them meaning nothing at all (Kripke, 1982: 21). There is, as Kripke would say, no fact in virtue of which we mean anything by any word.

While Kripke (1982) considered a number of potential arguments that would refute this position, he did not consider a causal theory of reference. Despite this, and despite Kusch's (2006) criticism, I would argue that it is an account worth examining. Kripke argued that the sceptical position was so unassailable that the only way to make sense of language was with an account of language that relied on assertion of meaning, rather than meaning itself – his "sceptical solution" (1982: 69). Careful examination of a causal approach shows that this may not necessarily be the case.

3. Causal Theory of Reference

Devitt and Sterelny (1987) give an account of a causal theory of reference. An individual is ostensively dubbed "N." This can be formal or informal and the dubbing is in the presence of the individual or object in question. The event of dubbing is perceived by the person undertaking it and the event is causal in the sense that to perceive an event or object is to be causally affected by it. A speaker witnessing this event gains the ability to use that word to designate or refer to that individual. When a speaker uses "N" to designate that individual, they do so in virtue of the causal link to that individual. Those present at the dubbing acquire a semantic ability that is causally grounded in that object or individual (Devitt & Sterelny, 1987).

After the reference fixing, the name is passed on to other speakers via communication. This occurs when speakers not present at the dubbing hear the name in conversation with those who were; such interaction can be characterised as causal in nature (Devitt & Sterelny, 1987). Speakers successfully refer when they use its name because of the causal chain that goes back to the initial dubbing. For example, we can use the name "Einstein" to designate Einstein because we are causally linked to that individual by a chain that runs from us back through our linguistic community to someone present at his dubbing.

Thus, this could be a potential route to overcoming Kripke's scepticism – this is the approach described briefly by McGinn (1984) and defended by Maddy (1984). For referring terms, the causal chain leading from a word to the world is the kind of fact that should satisfy the sceptic. As McGinn points out, there are no *aardvarks* in the causal chain that leads to his present use of the word "tigers." Likewise, when Devitt (1997) discusses the justification of "cat" referring to a certain kind of mammal and "Nana" referring a particular cat, there are no dogs in the relevant causal chain.

4. The Qua-Problem

Kusch (2006), however, points out that the *qua*-problem could render such solutions unacceptable. The *qua*-problem is a difficulty relating to the fixing of reference by grounding. Devitt and Sterelny describe it as "the problem of discovering in virtue of what a term is grounded in the cause of a perceptual experience *qua*-one-kind and not *qua*-another" (1987: 254). Consider the example of a cat named "Nana." The use of that name was grounded in virtue of perceptual contact with that individual cat. That is, the name refers to that individual in virtue of a baptiser having had perceptual contact with them. However, the contact is not with that entire particular cat, either spatially or across time. In time, the contact with Nana is finite for any one grounding – a "time-slice" of the referent individual. Similarly, some contact with Nana is with an un-detached part of her, perhaps as she peers around a corner. The question that the *qua*-problem poses in this case is why "Nana" refers to the whole individual and not an individual time-slice or un-detached part (Devitt & Sterelny, 1987: 64).

The solution that Devitt (1997) proposes to the *qua*-problem is to introduce a descriptive element into the act of baptising. In other words, speakers would need to have some idea – some mental content – about of what kind of thing they are dubbing or "baptising." Sauchelli (2013) characterises this as the speaker referring to the individual as if they were members of a class. (Exactly what this mental content consists of is left unspecified in this theory, though the question is certainly worth exploring). Other approaches, such as those of Sterelny (1983) and Miller (1992), which focus on a more purely causal relationship, are worth considering but are outside of the scope of this article.

The *qua*-problem presents a difficulty in using a causal response to Kripke's sceptical challenge, because the requirement that the baptiser have some idea of what it is that they are naming introduces an intentional element that the sceptic can potentially exploit. The example used by Kusch (2006) with regard to McGinn's (1984) causal solution illustrates this point. In this example, the sceptic questions the meaning of words involved in the act of baptising the individual "Kripke." The sceptic suggests that "Kripke" refers to *Kripnam*, where Kripnam is Kripke before 2006, or Putnam after 2006. Kusch indicates that McGinn would argue Putnam is causally isolated from the baptism of Kripke and hence that "Kripke" cannot mean (nor refer to) *Kripnam* (2006: 134). The obvious retort, according to Kusch, is that the words or thoughts of the baptiser used in the process of baptism are open to sceptical interpretation. Thus, if the baptiser thinks "I baptise you Kripke" the sceptic could suggest an interpretation of those words that is compatible with "Kripke" referring to *Kripnam*. Any effort to explain why the conventional interpretation is preferable will encounter similar difficulties. If we were to say that names refer to individuals in a particular way, the sceptic could suggest that by "individual" we mean *quindividual*, where that word applies to an entity spread over the time-slices of two people. The defence of a causal theory of reference would appear to be stuck at this point. If the descriptions the baptiser uses are taken out, there will be no way of answering the *qua*-problem. If they are included, the sceptic can exploit them to render reference indeterminate.

A range of solutions to this problem have been suggested. Kusch (2006) cites Maddy (1984) as suggesting that there is a way to solve this type of problem without appealing to descriptions or intentional states, but also argues that this solution fails to specify the nature of the relation between these brain events and mental states.

5. Solving the Qua-Problem

However, there is another answer to the *qua*-problem, one that requires accepting two key premises. The first is that, regardless of how Kripke's (1982) arguments are judged, there are conditions under which some assertions made by speakers will accepted by their linguistic peers, and others will not, and that these conditions constrain the behaviour of speakers. The second is that these assertability conditions in fact supervene upon the same causal chain of events that ground reference under Devitt's (1997) account.

According to Kripke's (1982) sceptical solution, the reason why there is little in the minds of speakers over how these words are to be used or what they refer to is simply due to their assertability conditions:

> All that is needed to legitimise assertions that someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives. (Kripke, 1982: 78)

In order to demonstrate the validity of an assertion that a speaker means "plus" by "+," there must be approximately specifiable conditions under which such an assertion will be accepted and the practice of using "+" under these conditions plays a role in the lives of the speaker and the rest of the linguistic community.

This is not to defend Kripke's (1982) solution. On the contrary, its shortcomings are extensive enough to deserve attention in their own right. Rather it is to highlight the notion of assertability conditions – or as Kusch (2006) characterised them "acceptability conditions" – and how they might be of use in solving the *qua*-

problem. One does not have to accept either Kripke's arguments against meaning, or his solution, to admit that there are conditions under which the assertions of a speaker will be accepted by others in their linguistic community.

Importantly, such conditions and the expectations they create, place substantive restrictions on speakers' behaviour (Kripke, 1982: 93). This is, broadly, a difficult idea to argue against. If assertability conditions do not influence speakers' actions, then the whole notion of language as an interactive behaviour breaks down. I do not think the idea that speakers are not heavily influenced by each other's linguistic behaviour can be seriously entertained.

The second premise that this argument relies upon is that these assertability conditions supervene upon the causal chain of use that Devitt and Sterelny (1987) describe. The reference of a term supervenes upon the causal chain of events that connects our use of that term with its referent (this is the whole point of a causal theory of reference). At any given time, assertability conditions *must* supervene upon that very same causal chain of events. Consider a hypothetical situation where an individual the linguistic community knows as Sam was baptised with a different name – Bob – and the causal chain of events proceeded from there as previously described. If this were the case, the assertability conditions would necessarily be different to those we experience now. If the chain starts with "Bob," and no alternative grounding events occur to change which name refers to that individual, then the assertability conditions are always going to push speakers towards saying "Bob" and not "Sam," because only Bob features in the causal history of that individual in the relevant sense.

This idea should apply just as well to non-referring terms. The causal chain of a non-referring term will go back to the very first uses of that word. What is important is that this chain of events that produces current use, and is propagated into the future by current use is of the same form as for referring terms. This is essentially the point made by Lycan (2006). He argues that even though the first "link" in the causal chain that refers to a fictional character is the naming of the character, rather than the properties of the bearer of that name, it then spreads into the future as if it had been bestowed on a real individual. Further, he notes that this could be applied to other similar situations, including abstract objects such as numbers.

If the past use of a word has no influence on the present use of a word, or its influence is indeterminate in nature, trying to make sense of language becomes fraught with difficulty. On one hand, we would be asked to accept that language was essentially chaotic and that its seeming consistency was an extended coincidence. On the other, that some other agency or force keeps our use consistent. Neither option seems like a particularly good choice when compared to the idea that there is a link between the causal chain of use and conditions of assertability of a word.

Finally, this principle needs to be applied to solving the *qua*-problem. This solution lies in the fact that all the words a baptiser might think in the process of baptising, are themselves constrained by their causal history and the resulting conditions under which certain meanings of them can be asserted. For example, the assertability conditions for names of individuals do not allow for Kusch's (2006) Kripke-to-Putnam transfer, any more than the assertability conditions for "+" allow us to use it to denote *quus*, or the assertability conditions of "tiger" allow us to use it to denote aardvarks. Not only are there specific assertability conditions that entail specific names attach to particular individuals, there are conditions on how we use anything that is acting as a name.

Likewise, the word "individual" can be used in certain ways under the assertability conditions; Kusch's (2006) assertion that we mean "*quindividual*" and its peculiar spread over the time-slices of two people will not be accepted. This is not to say that the assertability conditions entail that "individual" *means* a certain thing, just that the conditions under which a word can be used a certain way are a result of the causal history of that word. What is important is that these assertability conditions constrain and guide the behaviour of speakers, including any words used in the act of baptising an individual. Thus, the sceptic's challenges regarding what we might mean are to no avail. Even if forced, temporarily, to accept that there is no such thing as meaning anything by "individual" we can still point to clear conditions under which the word will be accepted by the linguistic community. These conditions will rule out the bizarre uses that the sceptic puts forward. If assertability conditions result from determinate causal relations, the *qua*-problem evaporates because the descriptive element Devitt (1997) introduces into the act of baptism is no longer vulnerable to sceptical attack. Our present use of a word is based on assertability conditions, and our assertability conditions are based on our past uses of that word.

6. Conclusion

Kripke (1982) purports to show that there is no such thing as meaning anything by any word. While he considered several potential solutions to this problem, a causal theory of reference was notably absent. Kusch (2006) argues that this absence was justified as attempting to solve *qua*-problem leaves the causal response vulnerable to sceptical challenge. If, however, it is the case that the actions and metal content of baptisers are constrained by assertability conditions to the extent that the sceptic cannot call their descriptions into question, then it cannot be the *qua*-problem that rules out something like a causal theory of reference as a possible solution. There might be other problems for a causal theory of reference as a solution to Kripke's meaning scepticism, but the *qua*-problem need not be one of them.

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LINGUISTIC DISARMAMENT: ON HOW HATE SPEECH FUNCTIONS, THE WAY HATE WORDS CAN BE RECLAIMED, AND WHY WE MUST PURSUE THEIR RECLAMATION

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ABSTRACT. This paper explores the nature and linguistic mechanics of hate speech and, using both traditional analytic approaches from the philosophy of language – primarily the Austinian theory of speech acts and the Gricean framework for speaker meaning – as well as contemporary contributions to the literature, it examines the possibility of reclaiming words of hate in order to disarm them of their power to inflict harm – this possibility of linguistic disarmament is one that we take to be self-evidently desirable, especially from the perspective of those who might otherwise be vulnerable to the effects of hate speech. After establishing what constitutes hate speech, the paper moves on to consider how it operates and how it might come to change. We determine from our analysis that words of hate can only effectively be disarmed, as it were, through the process of reclamation. Thus, we then look at some case studies to elucidate the shifting nature of the meaning of hate words. Finally, operating on the basis of our normative goal of disarming this particular class of harmful words, we tie the preceding analysis together and advance our strategy for how to disarm hate words, as well as considering some objections that might be levied against our position.

Keywords: language; hate speech; speech acts; reclamation; philosophy; meaning

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"The question is," said Alice, "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master – that's all."

– Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*[1]

1. Introduction

"Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me" – or so the old adage goes, so often told to the child who has just experienced the sting of another's words. But the fact is that, as Rae Langton observed: "Names *do* hurt."[2] One would be hard-pressed to find someone who has not experienced the cutting feeling of words employed in the service of another's cruelty. Yet, beyond mere insults and names, there lies a distinct class of words whose power to cause damage is so great that they deserve special consideration. The study of hate speech inspires questions that are both interesting and troublesome: what hate speech is, what hate speech does and how it does it, and how those affected by its pernicious character are to respond to words of hate are all major concerns. At the outset, it is easiest for us to identify certain obvious examples of hate speech by looking to words such as "nigger" or "faggot"; however developing a more complete definition of hate speech – one that takes into account the nuances and peculiar characteristics of words of hate – can only be formulated in light of the more in depth investigation that follows.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of hate speech through the lens of the theories offered by philosophers of language, to identify what hate speech is and to explain how it operates, and to offer a framework through which minority and target groups can reclaim hate speech, rendering it either neutral or positive. I do this through an analysis of speech act theories in conjunction with pragmatics in the tradition of J. L. Austin ("Austinian") and H. Paul Grice ("Gricean") in addition to various other authors contributing to this general area of study within philosophy. From the works discussed in what follows, and based on how hate speech behaves and how verbal communication between speakers in the linguistic community takes place, I ultimately argue that hate speech is subject to change beginning at the level of the groups it targets and extending to the larger society in a way that makes it possible to reclaim hate speech and transform the meaning of hate words to convey something either neutral or perhaps even something positive. Speaking generally, while much of the scholarship on the subject of hate speech might be characterized as having a gloomy outlook, I intend to offer arguments that give us compelling reasons to remain optimistic about what future developments may have in store.

To put things quite simply: With this paper, I offer a thorough examination of hate speech as well as the relevant theories from the philosophy of language and the study of linguistics that undergird our understanding of speech in general and hate speech in particular. Further, I document how hate words can be changed – that is, how they can be disarmed of their capacity to inflict certain kinds of harm – and why affecting such a linguistic shift through a process of reclamation (as opposed to approaches such as the prohibition of hate words – an approach that I take to be generally ineffective and untenable), is the most feasible option before us and so also constitutes a normatively desirable aim that ought to be pursued.

The overall structure of this paper is as follows: In section 2, I build on the existing literature to offer a fuller understanding of what we mean by "hate speech" in addition to providing some good reasons for thinking that mine is a topic worthy of philosophical inquiry, and that the account of hate speech and reclamation that I offer in what follows constitutes a positive contribution to the scholarly work that preceded this analysis.[3] In section 3, I explain speech acts generally before applying speech act theory to hate speech in particular and examining some unique features of hate speech so understood in sections 3.1–3.3. In sections 4–4.2, I develop our understanding of how hate speech means what it means and does what it does, the role of convention, and how what words mean and do can come to change. In section 5, I apply the Austinian and Gricean theories discussed in the preceding sections to hate speech specifically; in sections 5.1–5.3, I explore possible goals of reclamation efforts as well as two case-studies of hate speech changing; and in section 5.4, I offer a framework for reclamation. In section 6, I address some objections that might be levied against my arguments from section 5. Finally, in section 7, I conclude by reiterating the analysis that has taken place and by giving some good reasons for remaining optimistic about the troublesome issue of hate speech.

No matter what we call it – hate speech, slurs, epithets, etc. – that words of hate possess the power to hurt in a unique way seems clear to anyone who understands their nature. Yet, if words can, as I show, be used to derogate and hurt, then surely they can be used to uplift and heal. Certainly, hate speech is powerful, but, I think, the very mechanisms by which words of hate come to have that power also hold the keys to undoing some of the damage caused by hate speech. Where hate speech finds its force, so too can be found its defeat.

2. Defining Hate Speech and Motivating Our Analysis

Here I offer an exposition of what hate speech is and why it is an interesting and important issue worthy of our careful attention. I give some of the ways that we might want to think about hate speech, offering a variety of different conceptualizations and definitions of what constitutes hate speech. In addition to discussing hate speech and how to define it, I also offer some insights into the kind of harm that hate speech causes and some reasons we might have for thinking it to be a problem.

What, then, do we mean when we say that some speech is "hate speech"? While perhaps intuitive, offering a firm definition of hate speech can prove a rather cumbersome task. According to Langton, it is "speech that promotes racial or sexual [or perhaps some other sort of] hatred."[4] For Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore, "slurs, *as a matter of convention,* carry negative attitudes towards targeted groups."[5] They are "expressions that target groups on the basis of race ('nigger'), nationality ('kraut'), religion ('kike'), gender ('bitch'), sexual orientation ('fag'), immigrant status ('wetback') and sundry other demographics."[6] Jennifer Hornsby stipulates: "By *derogatory* words, I need to mean something quite narrow"[7]; she argues that, to count as hate speech, words must meet two conditions:

> First, they apply to people and are commonly understood to convey hatred or contempt. Secondly, for each such word, there is, or at least perfectly well could be, another that applies to the same people but whose use does not convey these things – there is, that is, a neutral counterpart.[8]

In other words, according to Hornsby, hate speech is understood by members of the linguistic community as expressing hate for the group it targets, and there exists an alternative way of referring to the target group without expressing hate.[9]

Finally, Caroline West describes hate speech as speech that "expresses derogatory feelings about, or attitudes towards, people on the basis of their race [or gender or sexual orientation, etc.]"; furthermore, it does so as a way to "1) directly inflict psychological injury on them (in the case of face-to-face encounters) or 2) to incite third parties hostility towards or hatred for them, or both."[10] As such, "hate speech differs from merely racially discriminatory speech (speech that advocates a negative view of a particular racial group) in that its primary function or purpose is to cause psychological injury to its targets and/or to arouse hostility or hatred for the group targeted."[11] Drawing on these descriptions, we might offer the following definition for hate speech:

> (HS1): Hate speech is derogatory speech (based on race, sexual orientation, gender, religion, or some other arbitrary categorization) that conveys hatred towards and negative attitudes about the target group and its members so as to belittle, dehumanize, demean, injure, or subjugate.[12]

When an utterer says, "Larry is a Nigger," s/he conveys hatred toward and negative attitudes about Larry and all black people so as to belittle, dehumanize, demean, or injure them. In doing so, hate speech has not only the potential to offend, but to injure psychologically (or even physically, in cases where such speech incites violence as was the case in Nazi Germany,[13] among others). Being a form of speech that can be harmful, hate speech is thus an important phenomenon for us to examine. Furthermore, we will come to see that hate speech is a peculiar kind of speech that is not easily understood through traditional approaches found in the philosophy of language.

3. Understanding Speech Acts

In this section, I develop our understanding of what hate speech does through an analysis of the theory of speech acts first introduced by J. L. Austin in *How to Do Things with Words*. Put most simply: "To say something *is* to do something."[14] Austin distinguished between three kinds of speech acts: (1) the "locutionary act," (2) the "perlocutionary act," and (3) the "illocutionary act." He wrote, "we perform a *locutionary act*, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense." Perlocutionary acts are "what we bring about or achieve *by* saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading." Austin offered that illocutionary acts, "such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc." are understood as "utterances which have a certain (conventional) force."[15]

In other words, the locutionary act is the action of saying something with a particular content or meaning, the perlocutionary act is the effect that the utterance brings about, and the illocutionary act is the *action* that the utterance *is* (McGowan 2003: 158). Furthermore, such acts may have a particular force, which is to be understood as the specific perlocutionary or illocutionary acts (e.g. a perlocutionary act may have the force of demeaning or of uplifting or any number of other possibilities). To illustrate these differences, let's turn to an example offered by Austin and elaborated by Langton. She writes,

> Two men stand beside a woman. The first man turns to the second, and says "Shoot her." The second man looks shocked, then raises a gun and shoots the woman.[16]

The locutionary act (the action of saying something) of the first man's saying "shoot her" was meaning to shoot (with a gun) her (the woman). As we saw, the second man looked "shocked" before shooting the woman – in other words, the second man was first *shocked* and then *persuaded* to shoot the woman. These *effects* of the speech act (shock and persuasion) are the examples of the perlocutionary force of the perlocutionary act (saying something that has certain effects). Lastly, the utterance "shoot her" itself constituted the first man "*urging*" the second to shoot the woman; urging, the action constituted by "shoot her," is the illocutionary act.[17] Austin worried that there was "a constant tendency in philosophy to elide [illocutionary acts] in favour of one or other of the other two [locutionary or perlocutionary acts]." However, he maintained that the distinction was substantial and should be observed.[18]

Having teased-out the differences between Austin's three kinds of speech acts, let us now turn to examine three features of speech act theory that will aid us in the coming analysis: Felicity Conditions, Misfires, and Exercitives. First, in order for an illocutionary speech act to be successfully performed, it must meet certain "felicity conditions," which are normally "set by conventions, written or unwritten, and typically require that the speaker is intending to do something with his words."[19] So understood, if the conditions for performing the illocutionary act (the felicity conditions) are not met, the speech act fails to carry any illocutionary force. An example of this would be if a couple who otherwise fulfilled all the relevant felicity conditions required for entrance into the marriage covenant were to complete their marriage ceremony only to find out that the man officiating the nuptials was not ordained. They are not, then, married. While there are many conditions that must be satisfied (e.g. both people attempting to get married must be of appropriate age), one such condition is that the person officiating the ceremony be qualified to perform the ceremony. Since the man who performed the ceremony was not ordained, and was thus unqualified, all the felicity conditions for marriage were not met. When the would-be spouses said "I do" and when the would-be priest pronounced them married, none of these speech acts carried illocutionary force. They failed. They misfired.

Second, according to Austin, a "misfire" causes "the act purported to be done null and void, so that it does not take effect."[20] In the case of an illocutionary act, failure to meet the felicity conditions will produce a misfire. Additionally, perlocutionary acts may also misfire if the intended effects of the speech act do not obtain (e.g. if I insult someone intending for them to become offended or hurt and they are not offended or hurt by what I have said).

Third, an exercitive is something that "confers or takes away rights and privileges."[21] As McGowan writes, "[*e*]*xercitive* speech acts fix what is permissible in a certain realm." According to her, they do this in three ways: first, they set "institutional" facts; second, utterers of exercitives must have the appropriate authority – thus, exercitives are "*authoritative speech acts*"; and third, exercitives are used in instances of ceremony (e.g. the marriage example above).[22] With the basics of Austin's speech act theory laid out, we can now move forward to apply the framework of speech act theory to hate speech in particular.

3.1. Hate Speech Acts

At the outset, we can apply Austin's speech act theory to instances of hate speech without incurring much difficulty. The locutionary act of hate speech is to refer to an individual (and the group to which they belong, as well – more on this later) in a derogatory manner and to mean that s/he is inferior (among other negative ideas). The perlocutionary act(s) of hate speech is a bit more complex. Understood most simply, the target(s) of the speech (if present or aware of it) may be offended and the speech may result in a confrontation (though, as mentioned earlier, hate speech *can* have the perlocutionary effect of violence).[23] Furthermore, the target(s) of hate speech may come to develop low self-esteem and other psychological issues.[24] Additionally, we might suppose that utterers of hate speech experience a perlocutionary effect of feeling superior to their targets. Finally, hate speech, I argue, may have the illocutionary force of subordinating and silencing – a claim I address in subsequent sections. All this being said, such a description of hate speech fails to capture all that it is. Hate speech, as we are beginning to see, operates strangely and uniquely. Let us then turn our attention to some of the unique aspects of hate speech.

3.2. Hate Speech: A Unique Case

One need not conduct a full examination of hate speech to realize that it operates in a rather strange fashion; one need only experience hate speech in use. Here I wish to draw out some of the odd, and perhaps unexpected, features of hate speech. Doing so will help us to understand, in greater detail, what hate speech *does* and thus will later assist in offering a framework for how it might be reclaimed.

3.2.1. Referents and Reminders

First, hate speech has the characteristic of what I term "multiple referents." By this, I mean to say that hate words simultaneously refer to the group they target and to the individual members of the target group. Going in the opposite direction, hate speech cannot *merely* be used against individuals; in any instance where they are used against an individual, they, at the same time, refer to the whole of the target group as well. In this way, hate speech is distinct from pejoratives and other insults. Whereas the referent(s) of mere insults can be constrained so as to target as few as one individual, hate speech automatically includes the entire target group.

Understanding this feature of hate speech also helps us to understand how offense can be – and often is – taken simply by overhearing or observing the use of hate speech. Because of this, Anderson and Lepore go so far as to recommend that – even in an academic setting such as this – one always consider that offense might be taken if such speech is overheard.[25] We find in later sections that this feature of hate speech becomes a particularly difficult obstacle for reclamation efforts to overcome.

Second, hate speech seems to have the characteristic of alluding to troublesome historical facts – at least in some instances. Hate speech might become so damaging in part "because of a tainted history of associations; perhaps it conjures up past pernicious or injurious events."[26] It seems that hate speech seeks to assert a particular, subjective world-view as an objective fact; a world-view that holds members of the target group as being inferior (at the very least). Since minorities tend also to comprise many of the target groups and since minorities have historically faced numerous instances of oppression, I argue that hate speech has a tendency to reference the times in history when the target group was openly and officially oppressed. In doing so, and at least for some cases, utterers of hate speech might be said to endorse those points in history as a model for how s/he thinks the world ought to be now. In other words, hate speech has the capacity to reach back through history and bring some of the worst cruelties into the present and endorse them. Then to assert, "Larry is a Nigger" may be to derogate or belittle Larry as we saw from HS1, but it may also be to make the claim that Larry *should* be oppressed. Furthermore, and particularly for individuals who have had hate words used against them, hate speech can open the healing wounds of past uses.[27]

These reminders of past injustice and injury and potential endorsement of past oppression only add to the already complex nature of hate speech. Additionally, the above two characteristics of hate speech raise interesting questions regarding how hate speech is able to offend; however, I save discussion of this for section 6.

3.2.2. Subordination and Silencing

An understanding of hate speech would be incomplete if it were to neglect an analysis of what hate speech *does*. Here, I explore two things that hate speech does by turning to analyses of pornography; admittedly, it may initially be unclear how hate speech and pornography are connected. In fact, I do not believe that the two are directly connected; however, that is not my concern here. Instead, I utilize these arguments as a lens through which we can view hate speech. In doing so, I show that hate speech can both subordinate and silence.

What do I mean by subordinating? Langton writes, "to subordinate someone is to put them in a position of inferiority or loss of power, or to demean or denigrate them."[28] Going further, Ishani Maitra claims that, "some speech can subordinate by causing physical and psychological harms to its targets that (unfairly) deprive them of significant rights, powers, and abilities."[29] Even with this early understanding of subordination, we can see that hate speech might be said to subordinate since it places members of the target group in a position of inferiority and may convey that the speaker seeks to demean and denigrate the target. Instances of racist speech such as "Blacks are not permitted to vote" can, according to Langton, serve to,

> [*R*]*ank* blacks as having inferior worth. They *legitimate* discriminatory behavior on the part of whites. And finally, they *deprive* blacks of some important powers: for example, the power to go to certain areas and the power to vote.[30]

Speech, then, can subordinate when it ranks, legitimates, and/or deprives. However, as Langton notes, subordination is not always the case when speech ranks, legitimates, and/or deprives. Indeed, there are instances when ranking and the like might be appropriate – Langton uses the example of ranking an athlete.[31] So this conceptualization needs something more for us to distinguish between cases and determine if the speech in question is subordinating. Reformulated, speech acts such as the racist speech of apartheid can be considered, "acts of subordination: [because] they *unfairly* rank blacks as having inferior worth; they legitimate *discriminatory* behavior on the part of whites; and they *unjustly* deprive them of some important powers."[32] To place this within our previous discussions of Austin, speech acts that rank, value, and place are what Austin called "*verdictives*."[33] Additionally, if speech acts deprive (or grant) powers, they can be examples of exercitives, as discussed in section 3.

In order to clarify this thought, let's take a moment to apply it directly to instances of hate speech. We already know that hate speech *can* derogate, demean, dehumanize, belittle, or injure – among other things. Does hate speech "unfairly rank" its target? Yes, one component of hate speech is that it may convey the belief that the target is inferior (or at least it may represent that the speaker intends to convey such a belief even in cases where the belief is not held by the speaker) and, when it does, asserts that the target is inferior. Does hate speech "legitimate discriminatory behavior" towards its target? Yes: as we saw earlier, hate speech may sometimes convey that the speaker intends to endorse discriminatory practices (perhaps a particular world-view that – at least in some cases – endorses oppression as witnessed throughout history); in this way, hate speech says that discrimination against the target is acceptable or even encouraged. Moreover, Maitra argues that being the target of hate speech, "may cause targets to treat all members of the hate speakers' group with suspicion," which only serves to further divide the groups.[34]

Finally, does hate speech "unjustly deprive [the target] of some powers"? This last question is more difficult to answer. It would seem that there are certainly cases[35] where an utterance clearly deprives the target of some powers, but some such cases might end up relying on the utterer being in a position of authority. This seems troublesome for ordinary instances of hate speech. It should be noted, as Langton observed, "Austin placed his theory of speech and action firmly in the arena of social activity, and there is a political dimension to this arena."[36] Considering this, then, it might be argued that hate speech deprives its target(s) of their powers to conduct themselves as equals within the realm of social or political activity. For instance, when hate speech convinces hearers that members of the target group are not to be taken seriously or are not to be trusted, this can limit the ability of members of the target group to access and utilize political power when dealing with others in society. Additionally, depending upon the circumstances of the utterance, hate speech might serve to deprive rights (as exercitives can) even when no official authority is established.

Thus, we can say that ranking as inferior, legitimating discrimination, and depriving of important powers are examples of hate speech's perlocutionary force at the very least. Furthermore, we can say that hate speech has the illocutionary force of ranking as inferior and legitimating discrimination in most (if not all) cases of its use against a target; and, at least in some cases (e.g. the racist legislator), it has the illocutionary force of depriving its target of powers.

How then, might hate speech be thought to silence those it targets? When speaking about pornography, Langton lists three ways in which people may be silenced: (1) people do not speak "because they are intimidated, or because they believe that no one will listen"; (2) people speak but fail to achieve the perlocutionary effects they intend – "one invites, but no one attends the party"; and (3) one speaks and not only does not achieve the perlocutionary effects they intended, but they also fail to perform the illocutionary action they intended.[37]

First, and particularly in cases where hate speech incites violence, sometimes resulting in death – as in Rwanda or the Holocaust[38] – hate speech silences those it targets. Certainly those who are killed because of hate speech are silenced to an irreparable degree. Even those who do not suffer such an extreme fate are intimidated. Surely when Randall Kennedy's mother urged him as a child to "pay no heed to racial taunts," she did so out of a fear for what might happen to young Kennedy were he to respond.[39] Simply put, intimidation motivates silence and when hate speech intimidates, it silences.

Second, where hate speech seeks to persuade audiences of the target group's inferiority and where it succeeds in having such perlocutionary effects, hate speech also has the perlocutionary effect that those whom it persuades will not take seriously the utterances of members of the target group. In this way, hate speech silences those it targets because it convinces others that those targeted are unworthy.

Third, we know that part of what hate speech aims to do is to belittle and demean those it targets. This can cause those it targets to misfire when speaking by enraging them; that is, hate speech may cause its target to become so overwhelmed with anger and hurt that s/he temporarily loses his or her rational capacity – that s/he is put in a position such that reasoned responses are inaccessible and s/he is rendered incapable of forming a rational response.[40] As many of us have probably observed, when the wrong thing is said at the wrong time – particularly if it is hate speech – tension mounts, feelings can get hurt, and anger can erupt. It may be argued that when hate speech incites such responses, it has the perlocutionary effect of silencing those it targets by eliciting uncontrolled reactions.

From the above considerations, I have argued and, I think, shown that hate speech can (though perhaps not always) subordinate and silence those it targets. The analyses of pornography considered illuminate these strange and dangerous features of hate speech.

3.3.3. Context

The final potentially surprising feature of hate speech that I address here is that of context. Taking into account that hate speech is so pernicious and so potentially harmful, it might at first strike some as odd that the effects of hate speech are context sensitive. Jennifer Saul reminds us, "[i]mportantly, the speech act is that of uttering the sentence (or series of words), not the sentence (or series of words) itself."[41] Saul uses the example of the words "I do" being used to *do* very different speech acts in very different contexts. She contends that the illocutionary act performed by certain words is dependent upon the context in which they are uttered.[42] Likewise, Robin Brontsema notes at least six different uses of the word "nigga" that would not qualify as hate speech. Such cases, it seems, find salvation from offense within their specific contexts – in this case, the relevant context seems to be in-group status.[43]

This shows us that context is important because hate speech is, at least in part, enabled or empowered according to the context in which it is used. Understanding that context partly determines the nature of the locutionary, perlocutionary, and illocutionary elements of a speech act will be crucial for understanding how hate speech might be reclaimed.

Having examined the relationship between hate speech and speech act theory, let us take what we have learned and apply it to our definition (HS1) offered in section 2 so as to offer an updated definition of hate speech. Thus, hate speech is:

> (HS2): Hate speech is context-sensitive, derogatory speech (based on some arbitrary category) that conveys hatred towards and negative attitudes about the target group and its members so as to dehumanize, demean, injure, silence, or subjugate; it refers simultaneously to individuals and groups; and it may remind of historical injustices. Furthermore, hate speech ranks its targets as inferior, legitimates discrimination against its targets, and may deprive its targets of powers.[44]

With a reformulated and expanded understanding of hate speech, the following section, I explore the nature of meaning, and how it can change.

4. The Mechanics of "How": Meaning and Change

Up until now, I have focused on developing our understanding of what hate speech *is* and what hate speech *does*. In the present section, however, I turn to an analysis of *how* hate speech does what it does and the role of convention. Moreover, I explore how conventions and what words mean can come to change. This analysis will prove useful both in developing our understanding of hate speech and in formulating the framework for reclamation which I present in detail in section 5.

4.1 Meaning and Convention

We saw from the analyses in sections 2 and 3 that hate speech can, in effect, mean and do quite a lot, but we have not yet explored just *how* this happens. One might initially turn to the definition of a particular hate word offered by a dictionary ("official definitions"), however, while *in effect* instances of hate speech both say and do a lot, their official definitions are often surprisingly sparse. Thus, we find such an explanation to be inadequate.

Take, for example, the word "Nigger," which has been described as the "filthiest, dirtiest, nastiest word in the English language."[45] A search for this slur in the *Merriam-Webster* dictionary only tells us that the word is "*usually offensive*," that it means "a black person," and that it is "expressive of racial hatred and bigotry" ("Nigger"). Yet, we know from our analysis of hate speech – and, most likely, also from our experiences with it – that to utter the word "Nigger" is to *do* much more and *mean* much more than "a black person." Similarly, searching for the word "faggot" yields even thinner results; in this case, we are told that the word's use is "*usually disparaging*" and that it means "a male homosexual" ("Faggot"). Again, as in the case of "Nigger," we know that utterances of "faggot" often *do* much more and *mean* much more than "a male homosexual."

Utterances of these words have the potential effects of (as we remember from HS2) dehumanizing, demeaning, derogating, injuring, silencing, or subjugating.

Simply put, descriptions of what these and other hate words (officially) mean often exhibit a dearth of understanding with regard to their power, their effect, and their potential to harm. What, then, is responsible for those aspects of hate speech which extend beyond their official definitions?

This, I argue, is explained by convention. That is, hate words and their uses operate according to particular social conventions. Convention dictates that when someone intends to convey these negative attitudes or produce these negative effects, they use hate speech. Furthermore, when someone uses hate speech, convention tells us that we (the audience) are to take such hate words to mean, convey, and do some of things discussed previously beyond the official definition (e.g. "a black person"). Put more simply, hate speech means what it means and does what it does because that is how it is conventionally used.

Convention may also operate at different levels or in different contexts, and hate speech conventions may operate alongside other conventions. There may be one convention governing the official meaning of a word that operates simultaneously with another convention that governs the extended meanings of that word as it is used by speakers. When Phil says, "Alex is a Nigger," there may be one convention which determines that Phil means that Alex is a black person and other conventions determining what else is conveyed when he says, "Alex is a Nigger" – indeed, one need look no further than Kennedy's history of the word to see that there may be multiple (and potentially contradictory) conventions in place when such a phrase is uttered.

It is important to note that while convention is, to some degree, prescriptive, it also serves to map usage. That is, convention follows the way we use words to mean and do different things. If speakers in a linguistic community use a particular word in a particular way, then eventually, if said speakers use the word in this particular way often enough and for long enough, the convention governing the use of the word in question will adapt to the new meaning. Convention will come to map the normal usage of the word and will then prescribe that particular usage. However, in the sense that convention is prescriptive, it is not yet clear how speakers can go about developing a new convention while an old convention is still stipulating how to use a certain word.

4.2 How a Word's Conventional Meaning Can Change

Thus far, we have established what hate speech is and what hate speech does, and we have explored the role of social conventions in governing how words mean and do what they do. Additionally, we have shown that conventions are dynamic and not static, that they both prescribe usage and follow it. But how can a word be used so as to defy convention while still conveying a certain meaning? In order to answer this question, I turn now to the theories of H. Paul Grice regarding speaker meaning and intention.

Grice considers the possibility of a speaker prefacing an utterance with the "explicit formulation of intention" or "plan" whereby the speaker states for their audience how they intend to use a given word or phrase. Admittedly, Grice thinks that such "[e]xplicitly formulated linguistic (or quasilinguistic) intentions" are quite uncommon; however, he also says, "[t]he presence of such an explicit 'plan' obviously counts fairly heavily in favor of the utterer's intention (meaning) being as 'planned.'"[46] In this way, an utterer can employ a particular word in an uncommon way and make her use of the word clear and accessible to her audience by explaining how she is using the word. Over time, and if enough speakers in the linguistic community utilize this technique in *redefining* a word or phrase – or so I argue – then the conventional constraints in effect for that word will begin to model the new usage (or they will at least change so as to make the new usage of the word as acceptable as the old usage).

Of course, this method is not without its difficulties. As Grice points out, "a speaker who has declared an intention to use a familiar expression in an unfamiliar way may slip into the familiar use."[47] Also, where the speaker did not make her use of the word clear, then the audience would look for the meaning of the word as it was in previous uses. If such were the case, then the speaker's attempt to redefine the word would fail – though it seems to me that the failure there would be on the part of the speaker, not the method.[48]

Simply put, conventions governing usage beyond the official definition of a word may be thought to operate as a sort of default way of conveying meaning and understanding utterances. And a speaker may set that default aside when she explicitly stipulates or plans how she uses her words. Since, as we saw earlier, convention must – to some extent – map usage, if speakers in a linguistic community *plan* their uses of a particular word often enough and for a long enough amount of time, then convention will begin to follow the new use of the word in question and may, over time, come to prescribe the new use as the standard use (or one equally possible standard use among several).

As I elucidate in the sections to come, this should be seen as good news because if convention dictates the dangerous meaning of a hate word, then when convention changes, so too must the broader meaning. In the section that follows, I elaborate on ways of understanding meaning in relation to hate words in addition to applying my proposal for reclamation to hate speech and looking at examples of reclamation.

5. Hate Speech and Reclamation

Having unpacked what we understand hate speech to be, and having offered readings both of Austin's speech act theory and Grice's theory of speaker meaning, we can now turn our attention to efforts to reclaim hate speech and the practical application of what we have examined so far. This section focuses more deeply on reclamation, sometimes called "reappropriation." According to Brontsema, reclamation "refers to the appropriation of a pejorative epithet by its target(s)."[49] I first explore some additional ways of understanding the relationship between hate speech and meaning. Then, I consider two case studies of reclamation. Finally, I proffer a framework for reclaiming hate speech.

5.1. Potential Goals of Reclamation

In section 4, we looked at the nature of meaning and how it is conveyed when a speaker utters a particular word or phrase. What we did not explore directly is the notion of separability as it concerns hate speech – separability being where the meaning (in the broader sense of our understanding) of an epithet can be separated from the word. Though our analysis from the previous section might suggest that words *are* separable from their meanings to some degree, it might be countered that hate words are a special case where the normal rules of meaning do not obtain. Therefore, it is beneficial to explore this notion further. Here, I look at three different approaches for understanding meaning's relationship to hate speech and the possible goals for any attempted reclamation. Following that, I offer a rearticulated view based on Brontsema's analysis.

Brontsema rejects the traditional view of reclamation that views such efforts in a binary manner such that reclamation is either supported or opposed.[50] Instead, she offers a reformulation of the topic and gives three "perspectives" for thinking about hate speech reclamation: (1) "Pejoration Inseparable: Reclamation Opposed"; (2) "Pejoration Separable: Reclamation Supported"; and (3) "Pejoration Inseparable: Reclamation Supported."[51]

The first view, "Pejoration Inseparable: Reclamation Opposed," holds that a hate word is, "inseparable from its pejoration and therefore should *not* be used."[52] On this view, it is not simply the case that a slur happens to be used in a pejorative way – rather, hate words themselves *are* pejorative; that is, the definition of hate words cannot be expressed in a non-offensive way and to do so is not to succeed at expressing said meaning. In other words, an epithet's relationship to its negative meaning is comparable to the relationship between the word "bachelor" and "unmarried man"; that is, they are one in the same. Thusly, according to the first view, any use of hate speech on the part of members of the target group "can only be self-degrading and disrespectful, a repetition of the intolerance and hate that the word somehow encapsulates and carries with it."[53]

This view is grounded in the idea that hate speech derives its pejorative nature and capacity to harm from external sources. Words of hate are not invented and employed *against* members of a particular group *by* members of that same group. Rather, hate speech comes to have its negative meaning because of how out-group members use it. Brontsema calls this concept "linguistic ownership," which holds that hate speech "is and always will be an outsider's weapon that forcefully establishes bounds of legitimacy"; furthermore, because linguistic ownership is seen as "fixed" or "permanent," any reclamation efforts prove "not only futile but self-defeating."[54]

Second, "Pejoration Separable: Reclamation Supported," contends that pejoration *can* be separated from hate speech and, thus, the word in question *should* be used.

Brontsema writes, "[t]he goal is for [the hate word] to lose its stigma so that it can no longer offend or injure."[55] On this view of hate speech, reclamation efforts can have two distinct goals in mind: (1) "neutralization" or (2) "value reversal." According to Brontsema, neutralization seeks "to render [hate speech] ineffective, to nullify its force, to remove its biting sting"; she says, "[a] word neutralized is a word deadened, incapable of inspiring shame, or pride."[56] Conversely, she states, "value reversal is the transformation of a negative value into a positive one"; here the plan is "to steal [the word] from its injurious trajectory to send it on the opposite path."[57] Value reversal aims to utilize what gives hate speech some of its power and use it to change the value of the word to something positive.[58]

Additionally, where the first view held that linguistic ownership is fixed, the second view treats ownership of words to be "transferable"; this view accepts the notion of "taking-back in order to make [the word] one's own."[59] As Brontsema says, "[i]f a word could be kidnapped, it could also be taken back;" by taking back words of hate, it is possible to change what those words have the power to do.[60]

Finally, the third view, "Pejoration Inseparable: Reclamation Supported", argues – as did the first view – that hate speech is inseparable from its pejoration, however, proponents of this approach see that very inseparability as a reason *for* using the word. On this view, the goal of reclamation is "stigma exploitation" in order to use said stigma as "a confrontational, revolutionary call."[61] Essentially, for members of the target group to use hate speech that targets them "is to question the social construction and regulation" which apply to their group.[62] It is important to note that while in-group usage and out-group usage of hate speech both employ the pejorative nature of such words, their purpose in doing so differs greatly. Brontsema writes, "in-group usage radically differs from out-group usage by questioning the very assumptions of normality upon which its pejoration is based."[63] In other words, this form of reclamation challenges the legitimacy of the distinction between the groups in question; in a way, it might be said to resist the notion of "the other" in the first place. Note that for the third view to obtain, the word in question cannot undergo either neutralization or value reversal as with the second view. For the third view, if hate speech loses its pejorative nature, it also loses its power to be used in questioning the status quo.

As Brontsema points out, each view is not without its share of difficulties. In the case of the first view, not only are there cases of hate speech being detached from its pejoration (as in the case of "Nigger"), but she argues – and I think rightly so – that the first view "freezes meaning in time" when the fact of the matter is that the meanings of words do change.[64] The second view, according to Brontsema, faces the paradox that "[a] reclaimed word partly depends on the pejoration that drove its reclamation."[65] In this way, even if a word is successfully reclaimed, it can never be entirely detached from its pejoration since its neutralized or value-reversed meaning must exist in relation to (or perhaps in spite of) the original pejoration. Furthermore, reclamation of this second kind does not end racism, sexism, homophobia and the like; rather, it merely removes a weapon from the bigot's linguistic arsenal – if one word is reclaimed, then another word will be created to express the hate that the reclaimed word no longer conveys.[66]

The third view, she says, "puts too much faith in will and intent: they alone cannot control the fate of a word."[67] Initially, this may not seem like a problem for the third view, but consider that this approach seeks to use the pejorative nature of hate speech as a criticism of the status quo. This becomes problematic because it seeks to fix the meaning of the word; yet, if part of the meaning – whether the word will be used to derogate its targets and reinforce social construction or to criticize it – can change with intent, then the meaning cannot be entirely fixed. As Brontsema writes, "[c]onsciously choosing [a word's] stigma does not guarantee its permanence; the future of a reclaimed word cannot be determined in advance."[68] Furthermore, to successfully reclaim hate speech according to the third view is to show that linguistic ownership is transferable (and thus could be transferred again at a later point in time).[69]

At this point, I must introduce a distinction that is intended to build upon Brontsema's analysis and assist us in subsequent discussions of reclamation. While Brontsema differentiates between neutralization and value reversal, a further distinction needs to be made with regard to the idea of neutralization. Namely, neutralization can manifest in one of two ways: (1) neutralization of meaning or effect, or (2) neutralization of applicability. In the first case, the case of neutralizing the meaning or effect, the case which I believe Brontsema to be describing, hate speech is reclaimed and rendered "dead." That is, it loses its power to cause harm – it loses its pejorative value. In the case of neutralizing a word's applicability (perhaps more aptly termed as universalizing the word's applicability), the goal is not to strip it of its ability to cause offense; rather, the goal is to strip the word of its association to any particular group. On this second interpretation of neutralization, once a word is reclaimed, it can still be used to insult, but can be levied against anyone (not just members of a target group) just like any other insult. And just like any other insult, and because the word no longer targeted a group, using it as an insult would be to use it only against a particular individual. I argue that either reading of neutralization could be successful in a reclamation effort; however, I suspect that the second form is more plausible.

Speaking generally, I dismiss the first view in light of considerable evidence that hate speech may be, at least in some cases, separable from its pejoration. As stated above, what a word means can change; Brontsema writes, "[c]hange is the only constant."[70] With regard to the second and third views, whether the meaning of a slur is separable from its pejoration is difficult to determine; I suspect that pejorative meaning may be partially fixed – existing in a state such that while it cannot be completely eradicated, it also can change to some degree. Even if pejoration cannot be neutralized or reversed, it does not follow that alternate meanings cannot coexist. In the same way that when the word "gay" came to mean "homosexual," it did not cease to also mean "happy"; the original definition did not disappear and it can even still be used to mean "happy," but it is no longer the meaning assumed when "gay" is uttered. Moreover, I concur with the second view in asserting that linguistic ownership is not fixed as evidenced by the nature of words. Indeed, were linguistic ownership fixed, the outlook of my entire project would be bleak, to say the least.

In the present section, I have examined Brontsema's analysis of the goals of various efforts to reclaim hate speech. In evaluating these views, I offered an additional distinction that Brontsema did not address. Furthermore, I argued that the pejorative nature of hate speech might be partially fixed such that, while pejorative meanings might not be erased, they can be overtaken. In the next two sections, I consider two case studies of reclaimed words.

5.2. Case Study One: Reclaiming "Queer"

In order that we may get a better grasp of what reclamation efforts look like, let's turn now and explore the case of the word "queer." To do this, we must consider *queer* both in terms of its "non-sexual" and "sexual senses."[71] Then, we look at the historical progression of the word as its meaning changed.

According to Brontsema, *queer*, in its original form, coming from, "the Middle High German *twer,* signifying 'cross' or 'oblique' […] could refer to strange objects, places, experiences, persons, etc. without sexual connotations."[72] However, over time the word began to take on a sexual sense and by the beginning of the 20th century, *queer* came to mean, "non-normative sexuality […] restricted almost exclusively to male homosexual practices."[73]

At this point, *queer* was being used along with the word "fairy" to mean homosexual men; whereas *fairy* denoted homosexual men who acted more in accordance with feminine gender norms, *queer* was used to refer to masculine homosexual men. This distinction, however, was only observed on an in-group basis. Since *fairies*, being effeminate, were more obvious in their non-normative sexuality, *all* gay men were associated with femininity and were then classified together by society at large. This caused the "*fairy–queer* distinction" to collapse.[74] Originally used as an in-group code word, after the collapse of the "*fairy–queer* distinction" and by the time of World War II, the word "gay" had replaced *queer* in referencing homosexual men irrespective of the gender norms they lived by. Also, by this point, *queer* had developed its derogating, pejorative meaning; *queer* came to view "homosexual interest as deviant, abnormal, and perverse."[75]

These characteristics – or conventional meanings – of *queer*, *fairy*, and *gay* remained fixed until the beginning of the 1990s. At this point, a series of elements came to light that constituted a turning point for the meaning of *queer*. These were: (1) "the limitations of *gay* and *lesbian* as universal categories and homosexuality itself as their foundation"; (2) "the AIDS crisis and its behavior-based prevention education and identity-transcendent activism"; and (3) "Queer Nation's coalitional politics of difference and its impact on the reconceptualization of sexual identity."[76] The group Queer Nation – which originally formed in 1990 from "the AIDS activist group AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP)" – was the first to use *queer* in an act of reclamation when their strategy became one of "confrontational, direct, and action-oriented activism."[77] This emerging use of *queer* rejected the notion of defining sexual identity based merely on "sexual object choice" and instead "allowed – and welcomed – a multiplicity of sexualities and genders."[78] In a sense, *queer* offered fluidity in its application where then-conventional terms such as *gay* and *lesbian* did not. Furthermore, the word *queer*, which had long been used only in the pejorative, became "associated with a radical, confrontational challenge to the status quo."[79]

In its contemporary application, *queer* has various meanings. In one sense, *queer* is used to self-identify; the inclusive nature of the word makes defining who fits into it as a category difficult – instead, it is self-selected as a category. And that is just the point. Most regularly, *queer* is used to mean "gay men and lesbians, disregarding bisexuals and transgendered;" however, as Brontsema notes, the word *can* be used to mean "men, women, and transgendered; male homosexuals, female homosexuals, and bisexuals." In the media, *queer* has been employed in a variety of non-pejorative ways resulting in more widespread acceptance of the term.[80] Unfortunately, these efforts to reclaim *queer* may have both failed to erase the pejorative meaning and may have actually revitalized the pejorative meaning. Brontsema writes, "[i]ronically, the very movement to reclaim *queer* could actually have restored its injurious power for some, bringing back to life what was dead and forgotten."[81] This is because to "revive" a word that has fallen out of use is to make it relevant in the linguistic community. For example, once *queer* is brought back, it can be used either to target those who do not identify with it or to remind those who remember (or perhaps simply be aware of) its older pejorative meaning of painful memories in which it was used in a negative way.

Moreover, the case of *queer* shows us that slurs *can* be reclaimed – at least to some limited degree. *Queer* might still be used to wound, but now it can also be used to empower. Before its reclamation, that was not possible. Yet, someone might criticize the case of *queer* on the grounds that, since it began its career of referencing a particular group of people *within* that group, only later to be taken over by the out-group and then reclaimed by the in-group, it is an odd case. Perhaps reclamation was only possible here (to the extent that it has succeeded) because it did not come from without. This concern is not without merit, and to answer it, the next section examines a second case study – this time of a word with a longer and more troublesome history.

5.3. Case Study Two: Reimagining "Nigger"

If the history of a word can make it more or less difficult to reclaim, then "Nigger" might well be one of the most – if not *the* most – challenging candidate for reclamation. It is, after all, a word so reviled that it has its own euphemism: "the N-word." Kennedy observes: "Over the years, *nigger* has become the best known of the American language's many racial insults, evolving into the paradigmatic slur."[82] He continues,

> It is the epithet that generates epithets. That is why Arabs are called "sand niggers," Irish "the niggers of Europe," and Palestinians "the niggers of the Middle East"; why black bowling balls have been called "nigger eggs," games of craps "nigger golf," watermelons "nigger hams," rolls of one-dollar bills "nigger rolls," bad luck "nigger luck," gossip "nigger news," and heavy boots "nigger stompers."[83]

Kennedy recalls his first experience of being the target of *nigger*; he tells us of how his father instructed him to "go to war" with anyone who used the word.[84] On countless occasions, *nigger* has been used to intimidate and injure even in a public or quasi-public setting.[85] Moreover, of the myriad slurs available, *nigger* is so pernicious – when used in a pejorative sense – that it may be characterized as "the *most* socially destructive racial epithet in the American language."[86]

Nigger serves as a painful reminder of the horrific injustices of slavery, of life under Jim Crow, and of fire-bombings and assassinations. Yet, for a word so destructive and so soaked in blood, its meaning and use are still evolving. Kennedy writes that,

> The use of *nigger* by black rappers and comedians has given the term a new currency and enhanced cachet such that many young whites yearn to use the term like the blacks whom they see as heroes or trendsetters.[87]

According to Kennedy, it is not uncommon for blacks to use the word freely in conversations between in-group members. Alternately, many blacks use *nigger* against those who attempt to target them with the word – bouncing the epithet "right back in their oppressors' faces."[88]

While many other speakers – perhaps even most – would meet the use of *nigger* in a conversational setting with outrage and disgust, Kennedy argues in the opposite direction. He says,

> There is nothing necessarily wrong with a white person saying "nigger," just as there is nothing necessarily wrong with a black person saying it. What should matter is the context in which the word is spoken – the speaker's aims, effects, alternatives. To condemn whites who use the N-word without regard to context is simply to make a fetish of *nigger*.[89]

Additionally, according to Kennedy, *nigger* can even be used between blacks and whites without causing offense or harm in some settings (such as that of a close relationship where usage has been discussed and agreed upon).[90]

Generally, according to Kennedy's analysis, "blacks differ sharply over the use of *nigger*"[91]; there are currently efforts among speakers both in the in-group and the out-groups to end the constraining notion that *nigger* can only be an insult. On Kennedy's view, the singular-meaning view of *nigger* (being an insult) is based on "boring conventions" which dictate, "despite massive evidence to the contrary, that *nigger* can mean only one thing."[92] Brontsema observed that, in addition to an insult, *nigga* – a derivative of *nigger* – can and is used by in-group members to mean the following: (1) “close friend, backup”; (2) “someone who is culturally Black”; (3) a “synonym for Blacks or African-Americans”; (4) “African American women’s term for the Black man as lover/partner/significant other”; (5) “rebellious, fearless, unconventional, in-yo-face Black man”; (6) “derogatory, similar to pejorative use by out-group”; and (7) “*any* cool, down person who is deeply rooted in hip hop culture.”[93]

As Kennedy says, “*nigger* is being renovated.” While it still maintains its pejorative meaning, more speakers are using it and in more ways. For example, he says, “[w]hites are increasingly referring to other whites as niggers, and indeed, the term both as an insult and as a sign of affection is being affixed to people of all sorts.”[94] The use of *nigger* between whites is an example of the word being neutralized in the second sense where it comes to be applicable to individuals regardless of group membership. These diverse and ever-evolving uses and meanings of *nigger*, the king of slurs, show us not only that reclamation is possible even when the word in question carries with it a tragic and shameful history, but in fact reclamation is already taking place as the speakers in the linguistic community use *nigger* in a continually increasing array of contexts and circumstances. Surely, then, if there is hope for *this* word, there must be hope for other words of hate. In the next section, I take all that has been discussed up to this point and apply it directly to hate speech to proffer a framework for reclamation.

5.4. Changing Hate Speech

Hate speech is, as we have seen throughout the analyses in the preceding sections, a complex linguistic phenomenon. Slurs of this nature have the devastating potential to harm and injure their targets psychologically, socially, politically, and even physically. Simply put, words of hate are words that have been, in practice, weaponized. Thus, can hate speech be, as it were, disarmed? And, if so, then how can this be done? These are the questions to which this paper seeks to offer answers. In this section, I apply what we have learned about hate speech, speech acts, speaker meaning, and convention so far and propose a framework for how hate speech can be reclaimed. Furthermore, I elucidate some of the effects of any successful reclamation.

Let me begin, then, by reiterating what we are to understand hate speech to be. I concluded section 3 by offering the following definition of hate speech, reformulated in light of our analysis of Austin’s theory of speech acts:

> (HS2): Hate speech is context-sensitive, derogatory speech (based on some arbitrary category) that conveys hatred towards and negative attitudes about the target group and its members so as to dehumanize, demean, injure, silence, or subjugate; it refers simultaneously to individuals and groups; and it may remind of historical injustices. Furthermore, hate speech ranks its targets as inferior, legitimates discrimination against its targets, and may deprive its targets of powers.[95]

To this understanding, we can also say that the particular (official) definitions of at least some words of hate fail to capture all that is meant when such words are used by speakers; instead, convention facilitates what hate words mean and do beyond their official definitions. Also, we see that convention is only one part of meaning; an utterer's intent is also in need of consideration; however, in order for an utter to be successful in what they intend to do and mean, s/he must either observe conventions or be explicit when diverging from them.

Brontsema's analysis of reclamation gives us a more complete idea of what reclamation might seek to do. Specifically, reclamation allows us to use hate speech in an act of rebellion against the status quo, to change the application of hate speech, to strip it of its meaning and power altogether, or even to change its meaning from something bad to something good. Our case studies went further in showing us that not only are these approaches of reclamation plausible from a theoretical point of view, but also that they *are* currently taking place.

Where speakers do not *intend* to use hate speech to convey pejorative, injurious, and harmful ideas, they can explicitly establish the parameters of their usage for a given instance.[96] In so doing, speakers can slowly effect a change on what a given word means. I suspect that this will begin between members of a target group, who are friends, such that trust has been established and where it will be easier for the audience to understand or believe that a given utterance of hate speech is not meant negatively (this is because in-group members will be less inclined to assume that utterers intend to derogate themselves). From there, and as non-conventional usage increases and diversifies, the conventions governing the meaning of hate speech will become saturated to the point where the meaning of a particular utterance of hate words is not immediately clear. Additionally, once convention no longer clearly and rigidly specifies meaning, hate speakers will experience difficulty in using hate speech as they might now.

I argue that, as saturation continues to expand, pejorative understandings of hate speech will be forced into a position of secondary meaning and new conventions will form that specify the assumption of these new or reclaimed meanings. Of course, the reclaimed word will not shed its pejoration entirely, but when the pejorative meaning is a secondary meaning, convention will not permit harm to be easily inflicted with reclaimed words. As Grice says with regard to instances where the intended meaning is unclear,

> [W]e tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternatives would be relevant to other things he is saying or doing, or which intention in a particular situation would fit in with some purpose he obviously has (e.g. a man who calls for a "pump" at a fire would not want a bicycle pump).[97]

Presumably, part of the allure of hate speech is the efficiency and simplicity with which it is used. If convention cannot determine meaning, and hate speakers have to clarify and explain what they mean with their slurs, then those words of hate lose their efficiency – they lose their allure. That is, part of what hate speech offers hate speakers is efficiency, and complicating convention would make it so that hate speakers would need to specify *how* they meant a hate word – this would not be efficient and would make the use of (current) hate words less appealing to hate speakers. This also seems to be the case with correlations. According to Grice, "correlations seem to grow rather than to be created."[98] Understood in this way, correlations cannot be controlled by any one individual, rather they form over time as many speakers make many utterances; however, it may be possible – or so I argue – for correlations to be created through purposive, collective action. That is, as a group, speakers in a linguistic community can *create* correlations together. Thus, as correlations between hate words and positive (or neutral) meanings are created (through collective action), and correlations between hate words and negative meanings become weaker, such words become harder to use.

Understood through the lens of Austinian speech act theory, when meaning changes, utterers who attempt to perform locutionary, perlocutionary, and illocutionary acts with words of hate will find their attempts resulting in misfires. Admittedly, even if this proposal is successful, it cannot go so far as to eradicate hate itself; "so long as [bigoted] sentiments exist, they will find linguistic means of expression, even if some avenues are blocked."[99] Bigots will find new words to kidnap and corrupt to express their hate, but they will be carrying the heavy end of the workload when they do.

While I contend that this proposal for reclamation is viable, it will not pass unscathed by criticism. It may ultimately be the case that the biggest obstacle to the reclamation of hate speech is not that it cannot be done, but rather that speakers (both in-group and out-group) do not desire it to be reclaimed. In the following section, I address some potential criticisms of the framework offered above.

6. Objections

Although my theory for reclaiming hate speech is, so I think, both philosophically plausible and supported by evidence in the world, there are points that might be raised in opposition. In this section, I address three potential criticisms against my reclamation framework.[100] They are as follows: (1) The Problem of Offense; (2) The Problem of Silencing; and (3) The Problem of Oppression and the Burdens of Resistance.

6.1. The Problem of Offense

For Anderson and Lepore, hate words are offensive because they are "prohibited words."[101] They argue that offense results "not because of any content [a slur] or its uses communicate, or because of surrounding beliefs and intents, but because of a responsibility we all have in ensuring certain violations are prevented."[102] On this view, we cannot avoid offending with slurs because any use violates this prohibition and this – it might be said – leaves the reclamation framework that I have proposed in this paper in a position of weakness, subject to an unfortunate contradiction. That is, if a goal of reclamation is to render a slur inoffensive, but any use of a slur is offensive due to its prohibition, then reclamation seems like a non-starter. I argue, however, that this understanding of offense is flawed and that offense is actually a result of the meaning, purpose, and historical background of hate words.

First, their analysis fails to accurately account for how prohibition comes about in the first place. They suggest that a word might become prohibited due to what it means, its "tainted history of associations," who introduced the word, or because relevant figures have rejected it.[103] On this understanding, it looks as though hate speech offends because it is prohibited – as though hate speech might not offend were it not prohibited – and in fact, Anderson and Lepore seem to contend just this. But this seems to get the story backwards. What's more is that it cannot account for the offense caused by hate speech that is not prohibited.

Second, throughout their analysis, prohibition is characterized as being binary where a word either is prohibited or it is not, but there seems to be another way to understand prohibition. It appears plausible to say that a prohibited word is conventionally inappropriate to use in any circumstance. In other words, "prohibited words" are unacceptable to use in any context. But a context-sensitive understanding characterizes prohibition as existing on a spectrum where prohibition varies by degrees. In this way, most if not all words are "prohibited" in certain circumstances and it just so happens that hate speech is prohibited in all circumstances. For example, the title "Professor" is (usually) conventionally prohibited when referring to someone who is not a Professor. Of all possible circumstances, this word is prohibited in the vast majority, but is appropriate to use when actually referring to a Professor in some way.

If we understand prohibition in this way – and I don't think it inappropriate to do so – then it becomes unclear why using hate speech in a prohibited circumstance (any circumstance) produces offense while using non-hate speech in a prohibited circumstance does not. In order to draw this point out a bit more, we may imagine a scenario in which a student, Tom, walks to the front of the classroom after the first lecture intending to ask a question and addresses his instructor with "Professor So-and-so." The instructor turns to Tom and says, "Just call me 'Doctor', I'm not actually a professor yet." It is obvious that since Tom used the title "Professor" when referring to someone who was not a professor that he used the title in a circumstance for which its use was prohibited, yet it would also seem quite strange to suppose that Tom's use of "Professor" in violation of the prohibition was offensive. This seems to suggest that offense is not a result of prohibition, but something else. Moreover, Anderson and Lepore's argument for slurs as prohibited words fails to account for the ability to mitigate offense in some (although not all) circumstances – particularly through the use of explicit clarifications of meaning.

A more plausible account might be that slurs are prohibited *because* they offend – in Austinian terms that offense is, as it were, a perlocutionary effect of hate speech. If this is the case, then offense is prior to prohibition. Offense, on this view, is due to a number of characteristics of hate speech – none of which can individually account for the offense caused, but which in aggregate go a long way to explaining what happens. On this view, to say that content or tone or mere implicatures solely cause offense is wrong – as Anderson and Lepore argue; but the right content with the right tone, with the right presuppositions, implicating the right things culminate in offending. If we can identify and change some of those elements that contribute to offense as my proposal seeks to do, then offense would not pose a problem for my framework for reclamation. Unfortunately, the constraints of this project prevent a full analysis of offense here; however, from this brief exploration of the issue, it seems that more work is needed in order for offense and prohibition to pose a threat to the philosophical viability of my proposal.

6.2. The Problem of Silencing: A Double-edged Sword

Another concern about reclamation might be that since reclamation requires the use of hate speech (though in unconventional ways so as to change it), and since hate speech silences those it targets, uses of hate speech as part of reclamation that take place before the word has been successfully reclaimed will continue to silence and will only serve to perpetuate and increase the very damage that reclamation itself seeks to solve. At the outset, given what we understand hate speech to be, it should be a major concern of any reclamation effort to try to avoid further injury when possible. Considering the pernicious nature of silencing, perhaps the benefits of reclamation might ultimately prove inadequate for justification of such a cost.

I argue, however, that silencing is a double-edged sword. Certainly, it may be the case that throughout a reclamation effort some instances of a word's use will result in silencing. At the same time, though (and particularly when reclamation is being advanced by members of the target group), calling for abstinence in this regard is itself a form of silencing as it pressures already silenced members to refrain from doing certain things with their speech – namely the act of resisting the oppressive nature of such speech. Admittedly, this may seem like we are left with a bleak outlook: hate speech silences if used against target groups, it (sometimes) silences if target groups try to reclaim it, and refraining from reclaiming it silences those who are in favor of reclamation. The issue of silencing means that we aren't left with any particularly appealing option. Silencing is, as it were, unavoidable and no course of action can avoid it entirely. Yet it is important to note that my project in this paper is *not* to advance a strategy of reclamation for its own sake; rather, my aim is to linguistically disarm certain hate words and it is part of my position that reclamation is the most effective means for achieving this end – that is, I do not advocate reclamation because reclamation is inherently preferable, rather I advocate reclamation because it is best suited to realize my central goal of disarming hate words of their power to harm. We can say, then, that the salient difference between the available options is that with reclamation (seen as a means to the end of linguistic disarmament), it is possible to reach a stage where no normal use of the reclaimed word silences. Therefore, I argue that reclamation is still the preferable option.

6.3. The Problem of Oppression and the Burdens of Resistance

If we are to follow the framework for reclamation that I have proposed in this paper, it seems that many people will end up being offended and some will end up being further silenced and injured before positive results are seen. That those who are already oppressed by hate speech are also saddled with the burden of resistance is a problem for reclamation, indeed. Any reclamation undertaken will prove difficult and messy, in addition (I suspect) to sometimes being hurtful – and the costs of reclamation will not fall on some activist group (though such groups may encourage or initiate reclamation), rather they will fall on individual members of the target group. As Jean Harvey writes of resistance, "[t]he onus comes down to individuals."[104] In this way, asking that members of targeted groups endure the costs of reclamation may be, "going beyond what is usually thought of as reasonable to ask of victims of oppression."[105]

It is all too easy to offer a path to reclamation or talk about why such an effort should be undertaken without considering the human element. What seems clear is that the decision to engage in reclamation must be left with the individual and should they decline to participate in reclaiming a hate word, that decision must be respected. Similarly, it seems that members of a target group should not decry and pressure those for whom reclamation is the right path. That being said, those affected most must confront the brute facts of hate speech no matter how unpleasant and must ask if the result of reclamation is worth the costs. The reclamation of hate speech, though painful and unpleasant, can be likened to the case of the injured athlete in need of physical therapy, where such treatment – though both unpleasant and difficult – is still a necessity if that athlete wants to heal and recover.

Of course, this analogy of the injured athlete is not without its pitfalls since, with this analogy, our injured athlete ought not be understood as desiring to be healed merely for the sake of being healed. Rather, she would want to no longer have an injury, for instance, because of what having a healthy and functioning body will mean for her in a broader sense: she will not incur the suffering of an injury and with once healed she will be able to do other things that she could not otherwise do while injured. Likewise, a member of a target group need not be imagined to merely want to reclaim a particular form of hate speech for the sheer fun of reclaiming it. Instead, they may be expected to want to reclaim a hate word because doing so will make them less vulnerable to the harms that can result from the use of that hate word. Further, they can be understood as desiring the capacity to do the things that are made more difficult in the presence of hate speech (e.g. living as a co-equal member of a diverse society, free from the kind of subjugation perpetuated by hate speech). In this sense, one might be inclined to think that my position is merely a consequentialist one. But that would be a shallow reading of my project. To recognize that hate speech exists and has the capacity to harm naturally entails the conclusion that neutralizing or disarming hate speech so that it becomes less harmful or less capable of inflicting harm is a good and desirable normative end. On my view, this much is both obvious and inescapable. The question, then, is what can be done to combat hate speech. Accordingly, I contend that prohibition cannot produce the effect of neutralizing the capacity of hate words to cause harm and I posit that we ought to have as our aim the more ambitious goal of disarming hate speech, and further that the best hope we have for success in reaching this goal is reclamation of hate speech. If I am correct in arguing that (a) hate speech is bad, (b) linguistic disarmament should be our ultimate goal if possible, (c) that attempts at mere prohibition of hate words are incapable of separating such words from their power to harm, and (d) that disarmament *is* possible through reclamation, then my pro-reclamation position necessarily follows from what I take hate speech to be throughout the preceding analysis.[106]

7. Conclusion[107]

Throughout this paper, I have developed an understanding of what hate speech is, what it does, and how it does it by viewing it through the lens of Austinian and Gricean theories found in the philosophy of language. Furthermore, I elucidated some of the potential goals of reclamation and examined past and emerging efforts to reclaim words of hate. Additionally, I proffered what I believe to be a philosophically viable framework for reclaiming hate speech before considering several possible objections to reclamation.

Moreover, I have sought to develop an understanding of this complex issue that gives us good reasons to remain optimistic about the future of words of hate. I have argued that while reclamation is not easy, it is possible and successful; reclamation can serve to significantly lessen the capacity of these words to inflict pain and harm upon those whom they target. As we saw in this paper, words *can* and *do* change. We cannot say with certainty what the future of certain words of hate may have in store since the usage of such words continues to develop and evolve. But this, I argue, is reason to remain optimistic because with each new meaning that hate words take on, the ability of hate speakers to rely on such words to cause harm and spread hate diminishes. Hate speech should not be taken lightly, but if we are careful in how we approach it, we can begin to change its direction. Words are tools at the disposal of speakers and, as such, will change if it is asked of them. As Lewis Carroll taught us:

> "When *I* use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less."
>
> – Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*.[108]

NOTES

1. Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*, 186.
2. Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," 302, emphasis added.
3. At the same time, it should be noted that one of my aims in this paper is to write it in an manner such that the analyses and arguments contained within it are accessible to non-

specialist/professional/philosophical audiences, and even non-academic readers or those who may be new to academic inquiry such as inexperienced undergraduate students.

4. Langton, “Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography,” 72.

5. Anderson and Lepore, “Slurring Words,” 2.

6. Ibid., 1.

7. Hornsby, “Meaning and Uselessness: How to Think about Derogatory Words,” 128.

8. Ibid., 128.

9. Cf. Anderson and Lepore, “Slurring Words.”

10. West, “Words that Silence? Freedom of Expression and Racist Hate Speech,” 232.

11. Ibid., 232.

12. Note that while the speaker is not required to have these negative attitudes, on my understanding, s/he is required to intend to convey such attitudes. Furthermore, it may be the goal of hate speakers to have these effects and, I take it, the goal itself produces these effects.

13. See Langton: “Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography.”

14. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 94.

15. Ibid., 109.

16. Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 295, cf. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*.

17. Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 295–296.

18. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words*, 103.

19. Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 301.

20. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words*, 25.

21. Ibid., qtd. in McGowan, “Conversational Exercitives and the Force of Pornography,” 159, fn. 11.

22. McGowan, “Conversational Exercitives and the Force of Pornography,” 159.

23. Though offense is not strictly limited to members of the target group; as we know, even those who are not members of the target group may (and frequently do) become offended by the use of hate speech. However, an analysis of the possible differences in the kind of offense taken is beyond the scope of this paper.

24. West, “Words that Silence? Freedom of Expression and Racist Hate Speech,” 232.

25. Anderson and Lepore, “Slurring Words,” 7.

26. Ibid., 16.

27. Ibid., 16.

28. Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 303; cf. MacKinnon, “Francis Biddle’s Sister,” 176.

29. Maitra, “Subordinating Speech,” 96–98.

30. Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 302–303.

31. Ibid., 303–304.

32. Ibid., 304; cf. McGowan, “Conversational Exercitives and the Force of Pornography,” 161.

33. Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 304.

34. Maitra, “Subordinating Speech,” 97.

35. Such as the racist legislator; see Maitra, “Subordinating Speech,” 94–99.

36. Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 302.

37. Ibid., 315.

38. See Langton, “Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography,” 73–77.

39. Kennedy, *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*, xii.

40. Of course, this is not to suggest that the agent targeted by a hate speech act is thought to lose *all* of his/her rational capacity. As has been rightly pointed out to the author, "rationality is not a light switch that slips from on to off." Rather, the point of discussing the (partial) loss of rationality was to flag up the way in which being the target of hate speech may have the effect of sufficiently diminishing one's rationality so as to stymie the formulation of a rational or reasoned response. Such a prospect is, I suspect, potentially frightening to philosophers in particular as they tend to pride themselves on their rationality.

41. Saul, "Pornography, Speech Acts and Context," 235.

42. Ibid., 235–236.

43. Brontsema, "A Queer Revolution: Reconceptualizing the Debate Over Linguistic Reclamation," 7; cf. Kennedy, *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*, 47.

44. Again, keeping in mind the role of intention.

45. Kennedy, *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*, 23.

46. Grice, "Meaning (1948/1957)," 222.

47. Ibid., 222.

48. Ibid., 222.

49. Brontsema, "A Queer Revolution: Reconceptualizing the Debate Over Linguistic Reclamation," 1.

50. Ibid., 5.

51. Ibid., 6–10.

52. Ibid., 6.

53. Ibid., 6.

54. Ibid., 6.

55. Ibid., 8.

56. Ibid., 8.

57. Ibid., 8.

58. Ibid., 9; cf. Grice, "Meaning Revisited (1976/1980)," 298 for a discussion of value.

59. Ibid., 9.

60. Ibid., 9.

61. Ibid., 10.

62. Ibid., 10.

63. Ibid., 10.

64. Ibid., 7.

65. Ibid., 9.

66. Ibid., 9.

67. Ibid., 11.

68. Ibid., 11.

69. Ibid., 12.

70. Ibid., 7.

71. Ibid., 2.

72. Ibid., 2.

73. Ibid., 2.

74. Ibid., 2–3.

75. Ibid., 3.

76. Ibid., 4.

77. Ibid., 4.

78. Ibid., 4.

79. Ibid., 4.

80. Ibid., 11–12.

81. Ibid., 13–14.

82. Kennedy, *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*, 22.

83. Ibid., 22.

84. Ibid., xii.

85. For examples, see Langton, "Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography," 77.

86. Kennedy, *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*, 24.

87. Ibid., 36.

88. Ibid., 37–38.

89. Ibid., 41.

90. Ibid., 42.

91. Ibid., 125–126.

92. Ibid., 135.

93. Brontsema, "A Queer Revolution: Reconceptualizing the Debate Over Linguistic Reclamation," 7.

94. Kennedy, *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*, 137.

95. Noting again that the speaker is not required to have these negative attitudes, on my understanding, but is only required to intend to convey such attitudes.

96. Grice, "Meaning (1948/1957)," 222.

97. Ibid., 222.

98. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," 135.

99. Kennedy, *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word*, 108.

100. One interesting potential fourth challenge to my overall position was offered during peer-review and is as follows: "[W]hat about the habituated and overly casual use of slur-words on the part of members of oppressor groups? If you've ever been around some white heteronormative guys who are part of families and groups that refer to black people and gay people with slurs, they don't feel intentions of hatred every time. Slurs become habituated in oppressive contexts. Do they only count as slurring when expressed TO the member of the target group, and not when some pals are just sitting around bonding with each other by saying bad words? Is it an implication of this paper that it's not at all slurring to casually talk with fellow non-group members about derided group members using these words?"

In response to this line of inquiry, first recall that, on my final view, hate speech is: "context-sensitive, derogatory speech (based on some arbitrary category) that conveys hatred towards and negative attitudes about the target group and its members so as to dehumanize, demean, injure, silence, or subjugate; it refers simultaneously to individuals and groups; and it may remind of historical injustices. Furthermore, hate speech ranks its targets as inferior, legitimates discrimination against its targets, and may deprive its targets of powers." And that while "the speaker is not required to have these negative attitudes, on my understanding, s/he is required to intend to convey such attitudes. Furthermore, it may be the goal of hate speakers to have these effects and, I take it, the goal itself produces these effects."

So, in the case of the "overly casual use of slur-words," whether the casual use of such slurs constituted hate speech would still depend on whether the aforementioned felicity conditions were satisfied for the casual use of slurs. Nevertheless, I have five initial responses:

a). The use of hate speech is not confined to "oppressor groups" or their members. Part of what makes words of hate so pernicious is that they are (or can be) effective no matter the identity of the speaker, provided that the relevant conditions are satisfied.

b). We might imagine cases where slurs could be used without them constituting hate speech. For instance, if the speaker who used the slur was so ignorant as to not know either (a) the hateful aspect of the language they were using or (b) an alternate non-hateful word to use when referring to members of the target group. Similarly, if it were the case that the speakers in question did not intend their slurs in the senses relevant to hate speech (perhaps they are using the slurs ironically, or as part of a reclamation effort, or in the context of having appropriately clarified their meaning), and their use of slurs did not produce any of the effects of hate speech, then we might have good reason to think their utterances *not* hate speech.

c). Further, even when such slurs are expressed to a member of the relevant target group, it is not *necessarily* the case that hate speech has occurred as speakers can intend and stipulate meanings not in line with the prevailing convention – indeed, the possibility of this kind of scenario is essential for the success of reclamation as I envision it.

d). It may also be the case that some uses of slurs count as hate speech while others do not, all while being uttered by the same speaker.

e). While it's not the aim of the paper to endorse the casual use of slurs with in-group members as permissible, a full exploration of the rules that would govern such a scenario are too complex and too context dependent to fairly, fully, or adequately explore in these pages. That is, partly because of the extent to which I rely on intent and speaker meaning, I have elected not to direct my attention to this line of critique in the main body of my paper as I believe that seeking to account for such hypotheticals would be unduly complicated and distract from my central aim in conducting this extended analysis of hate speech.

101. Anderson and Lepore, "Slurring Words," 15.

102. Ibid., 16.

103. Ibid., 16.

104. Harvey, "Victims, Resistance, and Civilized Oppression," 23.

105. Ibid., 26.

106. By this juncture, one might also have noticed that I did not consider some legally-oriented questions, such as the following: "Does suppressing hate speech undermine the legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws by depriving people of the opportunity to oppose them?" Or, "Do hate speech laws represent a collective commitment to uphold the fundamentals of people's reputation as ordinary citizens or members of society in good standing?"

My omission of such questions is simply because a proper exploration of questions about hate speech and the law would go far beyond the scope of this paper. This is especially so given that, speaking more broadly, I am philosophically committed to a rather radical view free speech and so any discussion of laws limiting speech would require extensive subsequent analysis of the notion of free speech as well as consideration of counterarguments and a defense of my own position (which I have deliberately not detailed here). Instead, the analysis of hate speech that I have conducted is rooted in the linguistic mechanics of hate speech and reclamation and is focused at the level of the individual.

107. I wish to acknowledge the insightful comments of the three anonymous referees who reviewed earlier drafts of this article, providing helpful and challenging feedback. As well, I am grateful to Jenny Saul, who supervised this project from its most nascent form when I was her graduate student.

108. Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*, 186.

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THE PHILOSOPHY-LADENNESS OF PERCEPTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION IN HUSSERL AND SARTRE

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ABSTRACT. The basic entity in phenomenology is the phenomenon. Knowing the phenomenon is another issue. The phenomenon has been described as the real natural object or the appearance directly perceived in phenomenology and analytic philosophy of perception. Within both traditions, philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and Wittgenstein have considered that perceptual experience demonstrates what a phenomenon is on the line between the mind and the external world. Therefore, conceptualizing the phenomenon is based on the perceptual evidence. However, if the belief that perception is "theory-laden" is true, then perception can also be "philosophy-laden." These philosophers have not noticed whether perceptual knowledge is independent of philosophies. If perceptual knowledge is not independent of philosophies, a philosopher's background philosophy can influence what he or she claims to know about the phenomenon. For Husserl, experience is direct evidence of what exists. The textual evidence shows that Sartre rejects the distinction between appearance and reality based on the assumption of the phenomenon. By examining Husserl's *Ideas* and Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* I conclude that these philosophers' philosophical languages influence their perceptual knowledge. Philosophical traditions affect the thoughts of perception.

Keywords: philosophical language; phenomenon; perception; philosophical tradition; analytic philosophy; continental philosophy; discourse analysis

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1. Introduction

In the philosophy of science, perceptions are said to be "theory-laden" when they are affected by the theoretical presuppositions held by the scientist. Hanson (1958) and Kuhn (1962) credibly argued that theory does influence observation. More recently Churchland (1988) and Fodor (1988) have debated about the issue (Brewer and Lambert 2001: 176). Theory-ladenness of perception, however, does not necessarily imply the influence of theoretical presuppositions on perception but on what judgments are derived from perception. Everyday experience proves the existence of such a phenomenon. Moreover, there is much new evidence regarding the effects of language on thought in psycholinguistics. For example, cross-linguistic differences have been found in many of the most fundamental domains of thought including color perception, object categories, conceptions of shape, substance, events and people's representations of motion, space, causality, time and number (Boroditsky, 2009, 2012). As a consequence, if perception is theory-laden, then perception may also be philosophy-laden. A philosopher's background philosophy can influence what she or he claim to know about the perceived phenomenon, or about the perceived object. On the one hand, the universalist school of thought opposes linguistic relativity arguing that thought is independent of language (Pinker, 2007; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 2015). On the other hand, philosophical theories and traditions seem to influence philosophers' thoughts of what they perceive because their thoughts are different. Perception does not justify conflicting thoughts of philosophers. Using Husserl's *Ideas* and Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* I will ask whether perceptual knowledge is independent of background philosophies, which is the question these philosophers have not asked themselves: do philosophical traditions influence what is said to know through perception? The cognitive acts known as "believing" and "perceiving" have been said to directly inform the observer about real things in the external world. The problem is, however, if the perceptual evidence available to us is sufficient to justify our claims of perception. Philosophical analysis shows the opposite. I will argue that philosophies influence *what* Husserl and Sartre claimed of the phenomenon of perceptual experience. In addition, there is not much research about how Sartre conceptualizes perceptual experience.

Many analytic and continental philosophers who have identified appearance with reality, including Berkeley, Heidegger and Russell, have denied that there is a veil of perception between a subject and the external world or the world-as-phenomenon. In the same way, in *Being and Nothingness*, Jean-Paul Sartre reduces an external existent to a particular appearance and claims to gain reliable evidence from it. He claims to know by immediacy that something directly experienced that appears to him is *a real being*, not merely a phenomenon that is deceiving him. This is how Sartre claims to know phenomena. This article will provide an argument for the claim that philosophies can influence what one claims to know through perception. The notion of a "perceptual object" has been defined in many different ways in the Western philosophical tradition. With this in mind, it seems justified to suppose that philosophical traditions have influenced philosophers' intuitions. That is to say, perception as such cannot reveal the nature of an object of perception when distinct conceptual frameworks explain the same perceptual object in different terms.

First, I will briefly outline the problem whether traditions, beliefs or prejudices color claims derived from perceptions and then review what Husserl argues about the reduction that a phenomenologist must undertake in order for an inquiry to be phenomenological. This shows that Sartre uses "Husserlian reduction" in his own way. After this, Sartre's argument against a distinction between appearance and reality, or dualism of outer entity and inner phenomenon, will be analyzed. According to Sartre, although empirical knowledge is fallible, this immediacy of reality involves indubitable knowledge. Finally, Sartre seems to use certain metaphysical language in his claims to know what he perceives. I will conclude in the final section that philosophies influenced what Husserl and Sartre claimed of the phenomenon of perceptual experience. The philosophical analysis of the use of philosophical concepts in the context of philosophical traditions reveals their effect on the conceptualization of the perception.

2. The Conceptualization of Perception as Independent of the Conceptual Framework

In this section, I will briefly outline the problem with traditions, beliefs or prejudices color the conceptualization of perceptions or claims derived from perception before examining Husserl's phenomenological reduction in detail. Although there is evidence of this effect, it seems that for example Husserl and Heidegger saw perceptual experience as free from background influences. But first I introduce more specifically what the "theory-ladenness" means.

Theory-ladenness of perception does not necessarily imply the influence of theoretical presuppositions on perception but on what judgments are derived from perception, even though there are cases where theory influences perception (Kordig, 1971: 449; Brewer and Lambert, 2001: 178–180). For example, Priestley and Lavoisier – contrary to Kuhn – both saw oxygen, but they interpreted their observations differently; Aristotle and Galileo both saw pendulums, but they differed in their interpretations of what they both had seen. In contrast, for Hanson and Kuhn, different "paradigms" transform observation and experience: transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed and in the meanings of the terms employed (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962; Kordig, 1971: 448–449). Paul M. Churchland's example may clarify the meaning of theory-ladenness of perception. There is a person who suffers mental illness who is "engaged in incoherent, paranoid, or even murderous behavior," describes Churchland (1984: 44). A person suffering from psychosis was seen by ancient and medieval people as a witch and a case of demonic possession. The existence of witches was not a controversial belief for them. A modern human person claims to know that they have perceived something else: a person who has psychiatric problems. A modern person simply perceives the phenomenon in a distinct conceptual framework that affects interpretation when observing something (Churchland, 1984: 44, 47–8). It is plausible to say that different observers see the same objects but make different judgments about them influenced by theoretical presuppositions. Why then would philosophies not affect interpretations derived from the perception? The philosophical language is full of abstract terms in which the interpretation of the perception takes place.

Something is seen, heard and felt from the first-person point of view, and the theories of perception have different conclusions about the object given to the senses. *Direct realists* assure that the object that is directly perceived is an external body outside of the perceiver. We see the world as we see the garden through a window. There is not an extra thing between the act of seeing and the external object (Austin, 1962; Martin, 2002; Searle, 2015). Phenomenology, as Husserl describes it in *Ideas*, resembles a direct realist theory of perception. Husserl is known to have been critical against some forms of representationalism (Hickerson, 2005; Naberhaus, 2006). *Representative realists* say that the object that is directly perceived is a mental appearance that represents a presupposed mind-independent thing. For example, in visual perception, one is directly conscious of an image of a house. This image is a tiny representation of the house that is located in the external world (Ayer, 1973; Grice, 1961; Jackson, 1977; Russell, 1912). Phenomenology is the study of phenomena. According to Smith (2008: 1), it is a study of "things as they appear in our experience." He continues that "our experience is directed toward – represents of 'intends' – things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc." (Smith, 2008: 2). To my mind, in classical phenomenology, this content of experience or appearance is distinct from the real things. In other words, in classical phenomenology, the object that is *directly* perceived is a mind-dependent phenomenon in oneself. These philosophical traditions do not include the idea that beliefs, theories or prejudices have an influence on perception. However, these traditions may have an effect on *claims* made on objects given to the senses.

Phenomenology seems not to share such a theory-laden view of perception: not even Husserl's arguments. Although phenomenology studies things as one experiences them in consciousness, and sees these things as directly experienced entities, a phenomenological viewpoint would state that a background theory does not influence the ways by which one describes things. Husserl's examples give evidence of this interpretation. For example, by "perception," Husserl meant that "To have something real primordially given, and to 'become aware' of it and 'perceive' it in simple intuition, are one and the same thing" (Husserl, 1913/1931: 51). And also "'*Perception*' in the normal sense of the word does not only indicate generally that this or that thing *appears* to the Ego *in embodied presence*, but that the Ego is *aware* of the appearing thing, grasps it as really being, and posits it" (Husserl, 1913/1931: 315). The following passage shows that Husserl sees perception, rather than being theory-laden, as free from background presuppositions:

> But if, in *this* way, we try to separate the actual Object (in the case of perception of something external, the perceived physical thing pertaining to Nature) and the intentional Object, including the latter <as> really inherently in the mental process as 'immanent' to the perception, we fall into the difficulty that now *two* realities ought to stand over against one another while only *one* <reality> is found to be present and even possible. I perceive the physical thing, the Object belonging to Nature, the tree there in the garden; that and nothing else is the actual Object of the perceptual 'intention' (Husserl, 1913/1982: 219).

Martin Heidegger's example presents a similar tone in his "The Origin of the Work of Art":

> We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g. tones and noises, in the appearances of things – as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e. listen abstractly (Heidegger, 1935/1993: 95).

For Husserl and Heidegger, it seems that background philosophies do not influence the ways in which one experiences things. Transitions from one philosophical tradition to another would not force radical changes in what is observed and in the meanings of the terms employed. All this leads us to ask whether perception is independent of philosophies. Or does "world-view" influence perception? The hypothesis is justified to be such that philosophers' philosophies influence what they *claim* to perceive.

In his ground-breaking work *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, Alexander Wendt, says "The belief that all observation is 'theory-laden' is a rare point of agreement among positivists and interpretivists, and post-structuralists might go even further, arguing that perception is theory-determined" (Wendt, 2015: 224). However, according to Wendt, it seems that both sides implicitly share a classical Newtonian world view, even though quantum effects in human vision are possible (Wendt, 2015: 224–226). In any case, perception is based on the sensory data of sensation and is possibly "theory-laden." The classic theory of cognitive scientist Ulric Neisser states that a person's background belief system influences his or her perception, although perception starts from sensation (Neisser, 1976: 13–14, 20–24, 40–43). It begins as a bottom-up process, and the conceptual framework comes in afterwards. Paul M. Churchland (1984: 44, 47–8) also thinks that perception always occurs within a conceptual framework. Therefore, at least, claims derived from perception are not free from theories, ideologies or beliefs. Animals also experience something, but a linguistic subject is able to perceive something *as* a black bicycle. This interpretation of "perception" underlines the role of theories in perception. In fact, it seems to be a fact that cognition influences perception-based claims that intend to a real thing by way of *noematic* sense. For example, language, beliefs and emotions color people's perceptions of the world, and there is considerable evidence of this effect (Stefanucci, Gagnon, & Lessard, 2011: 296–308; Boroditsky, 2012). Claims concerning everyday life are said to be reliable because they are based on experience. A claim is justified because it is the product of perceptual experience. However, is the perceptual evidence available to me sufficient to interpret things correctly? According to critical theory, experience is not sufficient neutral warrant for knowing because a background ideological framework with a desire for domination might influence what *it is said to be known* in a given situation (Alcoff, 1992: 77–80). Judgment formation occurs in an ideological context. That is why we make distinct claims about the nature of an object that we perceive although contemporary philosophy of perception assures that a background theory does not influence the ways by which one explains the object. Different claims about the same particular fact cannot *all* be true. In the next section, I will review what Husserl argues about the reduction that a phenomenologist must undertake. It is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that the philosophical tradition affects the interpretation given to the perception.

3. The Meaning of Husserl's "Phenomenological Reduction"

I will examine here what Husserl meant by "transcendental-phenomenological reduction" in order to show later that Sartre used it in a different way. All this indicates that their philosophies influenced what they *said* to know through perception.

The written sources show that, for Husserl, the world is the world of perception. Experience is direct evidence of what exists (Husserl, 1913/1931: 52). Although doubting that the empirical scene is itself the world and bracketing the world as "the world" (Schmitt, 1967: 59), Husserl seems to accept the existence of the world and the real bodies that we perceive (Husserl, 1913/1931: 110–111). Nonetheless, the result of bracketing the objective world is that reality that is experienced, which we had previously taken for granted, "now becomes 'mere phenomenon'" (Schmitt, 1967: 59–60). The change of attitude from dogmatism to philosophy, or from "the natural standpoint to the phenomenological one," occurs when questioning or wondering about *that* which one had earlier considered a truism, such as whether what is sensed is the real external world: Husserl called this phenomenological reduction or doubting (Husserl, 1913/1931: 108–110; Schmitt, 1967: 59–60). The open question is whether Husserl's *motive* to question the natural standpoint and the natural world was because it is not a way to obtain *certain* and *infallible* knowledge.

It seems that, according to Husserl, "transcendent" means "absolute" and "mind-independent," which should reduce to "consciousness." Absolute entities are "transcendent" because they are not to be found in pure consciousness. Transcendental-phenomenological reduction means reducing transcendents to consciousness: for instance, reducing the natural world. On the other hand, "reduction" seems to identify with "suspension" in Husserl's theory. For Husserl, "reducing transcendents to phenomena" means "suspending or excluding transcendental real beings" as immediate objects of phenomenological inquiry. He described, for example, how phenomenological reduction as suspension involves the absolute being of pure consciousness and its absolute experiences, which are the basic data and field of phenomenology:

> Thus, instead of living naively in experience (*Erfahrung*), and subjecting what we experience, transcendent nature, to theoretical inquiries, we perform the 'phenomenological reduction.' In other words, instead of naively carrying out the acts proper to the nature-constituting consciousness with its transcendent theses and allowing ourselves to be led by motives that operate therein to still other transcendent theses, and so forth, we set all these theses 'out of action,' we take no part of them; we direct the glance of apprehension and theoretical inquiry to pure consciousness in its own absolute Being. It is this which remains over as the 'phenomenological residuum' we were in quest of: remains over, we say, although we have 'Suspended' the whole world with all things, living creatures, men, ourselves included. We have literally lost nothing, but have won the whole of Absolute Being, which, properly understood, conceals in itself all transcendences, 'constituting' them within itself (Husserl, 1913/1931: 154–5).

By "performing the phenomenological reduction," Husserl clearly meant "suspending the whole world," including rocks, flowers, and butterflies. However, this does not exclude our consciousness, in which we introspectively reflect. He did not "bracket" his mental life. I interpret that "suspending" in Husserl's view does not mean that there is no natural world with its natural entities.

Within "natural" and "the suspension of the natural world," Husserl included individual objectivities that are constituted through the functional activities of consciousness in valuation and in practice. "Natural" things exist as varieties of cultural expression, works of both technical and fine arts, of the sciences, ideas of state, moral custom, laws, and religion (Husserl, 1913/1931: 171, 177–8). The only things that survive after carrying out this reduction are experiences and "the pure Ego" within "one single stream of experience" and "the flux of manifold experiences" (Husserl, 1913/1931: 172, 177–8). They do not "transcend" pure consciousness but can be found within it (Husserl, 1913/1931: 175). According to Husserl, this reduction is the disconnection of the natural world from experienced consciousness (Husserl, 1913/1931: 189). In other words, this reduction disconnects the extramental mind-independent world from the mind-dependent realm of experience.

Nevertheless, when Husserl stated that "If we wish to construct a phenomenology as a *pure descriptive theory of the essential nature of the immanent formations of Consciousness*, of the events which under the limitations of the phenomenological suspension can be grasped within the stream of experiences, we must exclude from this limited field everything that is transcendently individual…," we can wonder what his reasoning or arguments are behind this (Husserl, 1913/1931: 178). Why must we participate in transcendental-phenomenological reduction? For example, Luft does not say much about *why* Husserl asked us to use this phenomenological method of reduction or suspension. He paraphrases Husserl's method of reduction without providing an explanation of Husserl's sentences or technical terms (Luft, 2004: 203–208). Pietersma, too, engages in a similar description, but does not say much about the motive for the use of the phenomenological reduction in Husserl's phenomenology (Pietersma, 1979: 38–39, 41–42). On the other hand, Overgaard assures his readers that Husserl does not exclude the natural world by reducing it to the status of "mere phenomena." While the reduction means that the attitude changes from the natural standpoint to a phenomenological one, for Overgaard this change does not exclude the transcendental natural world (Overgaard, 2008: 294–299). However, the meaning of "reduction" remains unclear if phenomenology does not examine phenomena through experiencing them, but instead the natural world and its entities of cups, rocks, and butterflies. If the natural things are as they appear in consciousness, then why should we reduce anything? The concept of reduction remains unclear. Could an explanation of Husserl's motives be as follows? Transcendental-phenomenological reduction is necessary because 1) we are immediately in connection with entities within the stream of experiences, 2) we directly know mental entities of conscious experiences rather than natural entities of the external world, although we believe otherwise, and 3) reduction is the way to obtain absolute certain knowledge about reality. The last suggestion indicates that our knowledge of our conscious entities is infallible, although it is contingent knowledge, which could possibly be fallible. For example, a thought that a sound heard is the internal *mental* entity is not justified because the introspective process is not reliable. Knowledge cannot be both infallible and fallible as this would be self-contradictory.

According to Husserl, phenomenology can begin only after the transcendental-phenomenological reduction (Schmitt, 1967: 238). However, this reduction cannot be what analytic philosophers have previously meant by a term "reduction." This kind of a reduction can be defined as follows: questioning a thing A in such a way that A is reduced or changed to a simpler form B. For example, mathematics has tried to reduce to logic and mental states and their phenomenal properties to brain processes. Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological reduction does not mean this, but instead means excluding the natural world and obtaining knowledge about intentional objects in consciousness. According to Husserl, this means understanding that *what* one experiences is not the natural world and its real objects, but the experienced world and its particulars as they appear in one's conscious experience. This reduction means to study our inner phenomena from the I-perspective rather than seeming to study outer objective things themselves. Did phenomenological reduction influence Husserl's claims about the phenomena of experience?

The transcendental-phenomenological turn is turning away from an external world beyond phenomena. We then focus our attention on the entities that are experienced within our consciousness (Smith, 2008: 11). In *Ideas*, Husserl admitted a dualist world-view: a realm of consciousness and the external natural world. However, his "bracketing the world as 'the world'" and "the change of attitude from ‘the natural standpoint to the phenomenological one’” may influence how he described, interpreted and understood the sensible phenomena. Conceptualizing perception in Husserl’s way is influenced by philosophical ideas because without these ideas conceptualizing in such a way is impossible. Indeed, Husserl’s philosophical discourse is so abstract that it is in a philosophical tradition context.

4. Sartre’s Identification of Absolute Reality with Relative Appearance

To my knowledge, there are no studies of how Sartre conceptualizes perception from the traditional epistemological point of view. Instead, his affection for direct realism has been emphasized (McCulloch, 1992: 456–457). At the beginning of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre tries to disprove the dualist appearance/reality distinction that occurs when phenomenology is understood as purely a study of phenomena. The distinction means that the phenomena that are bare inner appearances differ from external reality. For example, I can directly know a rustle sound that I hear now, but I cannot be aware of the real things that cause it to enter my consciousness. Nevertheless, if the phenomenon is the real thing, then we cannot mistake what appears to us. Therefore, Sartre says that if we know what appears to us, we know real things themselves, not things-as-they-appear in one’s subjective experience and experienced from a first person point of view. For example I could discover nothing but that a black shape experience is a black bicycle. According to Sartre, we can obtain infallible knowledge of an external world. Personal perception is directed toward a real existence without supposed sensory content or a separate level of appearance. On the other hand, what are Sartre’s reasons for arguing that there is no separate level of appearance between a subject-in-itself and an object-in-itself? He did not form this argument that there is no distinction between appearance and reality simply *through guesswork*, and even without this distinction he would still experience something before he knows what it is.

Sartre claims that the appearance itself is the real being because there is nothing behind the appearance that is present to us. That is why, according to him, the dualism of the appearance/reality distinction must be negated. For example, Sartre would argue that the appearance of something being black and the appearance of it being a certain shape are united with each other, and these appearances are the thing itself. He states that they do not hide from sight the true nature of the bicycle (Sartre, 1943/2003: 1). He claims that the appearance indicates only itself. His belief that phenomena are the real thing is based on perceptual experience and its reliability. He also states that:

> The appearances which manifest the existent are neither interior nor exterior; they are all equal, they all refer to other appearances, and none of them is privileged (Sartre, 1943/2003: 1).

He uses the example of force, which is not an *unknown* thing that is located behind its effects, but rather “the totality of these effects” (Sartre, 1943/2003: 1). In the same way, it is possible to say that perception is nothing but a brain process in a sensory nerve and a certain part of the cortex, and table an aggregate of atoms. Nevertheless, this analogy is refuted in the case of an appearance if the real existent *causes* a specific appearance in the observer to whom the inner phenomenon appears. If the appearance of a bicycle is located in the brain, then a real bicycle is absolutely distinct from the appearance. But Sartre argues that the real thing is not within the consciousness (Sartre, 1943/2003: 7).

He presents an argument for a claim that the appearance of a phenomenon does not refer to any being other than it is. His words may be put as follows. There are no two distinct entities but the appearance is the real thing because: 1) there is nothing behind the appearance, and 2) it indicates only itself (Sartre, 1943/2003: 4). Sartre claims that we can describe what appears before our minds because we can speak of it. Nevertheless, a question arises: is our description true? That is similar to another question about whether we discover the nature of a being that appears to us. For example, do we know the true nature of this color of experience that appears black, and how do we know it? It, the blackness, is focused upon by our consciousness because we are aware of its presence. According to Sartre, being aware of something yields to knowing it: one knows something is present.

Sartre eliminates the dualism of the appearance and the absolute being. It is hard to recognize reasons for this conclusion in *Being and Nothingness*. He insists that there is nothing behind appearance. He infers *from what it appears to himself that it is an appearance.* According to him, this means that the appearance is a real entity; the real entity is a phenomenon; and then the appearance is a phenomenon. This argument, for him, replaces the dualism of being and its appearance (Sartre, 1943/2003: 1–4, 6). He writes:

> But if we once get away from what Nietzsche called ‘the illusion of worlds-behind-the-scene,’ and if we no longer believe in the being-behind-the-appearance, then the appearance becomes full positivity; its essence is an ‘appearing’ which is no longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure of it. For the being of an existent is exactly what it *appears*. Thus we arrive at the idea of the *phenomenon* such as we can find, for example in the ‘phenomenology’ of Husserl or of Heidegger – the phenomenon or the relative-absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for ‘to appear’ supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear (Sartre, 1943/2003: 2).

What *causes* something to appear to a subject? Sartre’s conception of appearance seems to be uncaused. It is not under causality. According to Sartre, an appearance does not have causes that realize it, since he equates it with the real being. I would say, however, that the appearance has an event-like nature that entails causes. That is, if “to appear” means “something appears to somebody,” then why would this “appearing” *not* mean “something occurs to somebody when a phenomenon comes into existence or arises in experience”?

For Sartre when an absolute being, such as a butterfly, is an appearance, and thus what it appears to be to somebody is identical with the phenomenon and the appearance, i.e. the butterfly is an appearance, the appearance simply exists. Nothing external to the appearance of a butterfly causes it to exist for "somebody to whom to appear." It exists by itself. Sartre does not mention in *Being and Nothingness* why something starts to appear or appears to someone. To my mind, Sartre's meaning of "appearance" is insufficient. But how then does Sartre discover what an appearance is?

Because Sartre rejects the idea of a distinction between appearance and an external object, he says that he discovers what appears to him. A real bicycle, not a visual phenomenon, appears to him. He knows this because a bicycle appears, and therefore the idea of a real x behind the appearance of a bicycle is a fallacy. He directly knows a sight that appears to him and a sound that is heard, and he knows that sight is a bicycle and that sound is a bell ringing. For Sartre, these sights and sounds are beings of knowledge, not knowledge as such (Sartre, 1943/2003: 6–7). According to him, they are the same as our knowledge of them because our consciousnesses are directed towards them: "…all knowing consciousness can be knowledge only of its object" (Sartre 1943/2003: 8).

Sartre's argument for knowledge about appearance may be put as follows (Sartre, 1943/2003: 8).

1) If I am conscious of being conscious of the x-appearance, then I know the nature of the x-appearance.
2) I am conscious of being conscious of the light-appearance.
3) Therefore, I know the nature of the light-appearance.
4) Therefore, I know that the light-appearance is artificial light of a lamp, not natural light.

For Sartre, consciousness is the foundation of knowledge: consciousness is a thing to which all other appearances appear, "the absolute in relation to which every phenomenon is relative" (Sartre, 1943/2003: 13). However, a thing's appearance as an object is not within consciousness. For example, according to Sartre, a table that reflects light waves is in space, beside the window (Sartre, 1943/2003: 7). In fact his definition of "knowledge" seems really to be "consciousness of being consciousness of something," of the phenomenon behind which a real thing does not hide (Sartre, 1943/2003: 8–10). The object, a bicycle in consciousness, determines knowledge of what is perceived to exist in the world. For Sartre (1943/2003: 9), the property of black shape appears to my consciousness as a property that exists in the world. But can *consciousness* be evidence for knowledge of reality? Sartre argues that this is the case.

He uses Husserl's idea of "the phenomenological reduction" in his own way: the existent reduces to the appearance (Sartre, 1943/2003: 2, 4). If, by "reduction," Husserl means "suspension," Sartre uses "reduction" to mean "identification," "if we no longer believe in the being-behind-the-appearance" (Sartre, 1943/2003: 2). Sartre's view is unconvincing: if there is no appearance of a butterfly, there is no a butterfly. This is Sartre's inference, which follows from the reduction of real existence to appearance. The question "Is an appearance experienced by a subject located in the external material world?" is fundamental because it has been always thought that appearance is in the mind and is not in itself real (compare space-location, for example, with the views of Sextus Empiricus, Berkeley, and Kant). Sensible qualities of experience, sounds, colors and shapes, appear to a subject. The planets Mars and Venus exist in space without a subject. However, these sensible light points of experience in the black background do not *appear* without a subject where their appearances arise in the night sky. Furthermore, the subject will not perceive Mars and Venus from the group of lights points of experience if she has no background knowledge in order to look in the right direction. In sum, despite Sartre's claims, existence is not always reduced to appearance.

According to Sartre, however, one perceives these appearances as existing, and nothing absolute exists behind them:

> It seems that we have arrived at the goal of our inquiry. We have reduced things to the united totality of their appearances, and we have established that these appearances lay claim to a being which is no longer itself appearance. The '*percipi*' referred us to a *percipiens*, the being of which has been revealed to us as consciousness. Thus we have attained the ontological foundation of knowledge, the first being to whom all other appearances appear, the absolute in relation to which every phenomenon is relative (Sartre, 1943/2003: 13).

This means that *consciousness* has become the absolute that perceives appearances. Sartre bases this "knowledge" on imagination. It is impossible to hold a reliable belief that *consciousness perceives* by means of external perception or introspection.

One essential argument of phenomenology seems to be:
1. One is conscious of something, x.
2. Therefore, one knows something, x.

However, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. The argument is invalid. That is, it is possible that the two statements "One is conscious of something, x, and one knows something, x" are untrue when occurring together, as the former could be true while the latter is untrue. For example, although Sartre would be conscious of a *sensible quality of redness*, it is certain that he does not know what *sensible redness* is. He does not know *its nature* because the colors may be physical events themselves. He knows the red color sensation, the existence of which is the object of his conscious experience. The general reason for the claim that one can decide to know the colors is *perception*. The argument is as follows: "Because I perceive them, I know that colors are the qualities of real things." Nevertheless, the argument seems slightly circular, since one has to assume that the immediate objects of perception are real when giving a reason "I perceive them." "Them" in the proof means real things that are neither simply apparent nor false.

Although perception does not reveal how it occurs in itself, it is, after all, ready to non-verbally vindicate that the objects are directly and immediately disclosed in the world and that the immediate objects of perception are located in the world. For Sartre, the brain and the sense organs are not necessary in the meaning of "perception," but in truth they are necessary.

Sartre's *knowledge-claim* is a belief in the real bicycle, which is not a false or apparent picture in the visual field. That belief is a contingent knowledge: his description can be true or it can be untrue. Sartre's *justification* of knowledge relates to being conscious of something. For example, he says that "consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and transphenomenal being" (Sartre, 1943/2003: 18). This objective phenomenon "gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it" (Sartre, 1943/2003: 18). In the same way, consciousness implies "a being other than itself" (Sartre, 1943/2003: 18). So Sartre claims that he knows what kind of beings his consciousness discloses: "It is the being of this table, of this package of tobacco, of the lamp, more generally the being of the world which is implied by consciousness" (Sartre, 1943/2003: 18). He continues that these things are "immediately disclosed to consciousness" (Sartre, 1943/2003: 19).

Sartre's *criterion* for knowing what is perceived is the denial of the distinction between appearance and reality. According to Sartre, we do not perceive an apparent sensory entity behind which the real bicycle exists. Sartre argues that, because the distinction between appearance and reality is false, something of which one is conscious must be a real being in space next to the perceiver. This evidence available to Sartre is not sufficient to justify the beliefs that he holds. His belief "Something of which one is conscious must be a real being" is based on the denial of the being-behind-the-appearance. Background metaphysical beliefs influence Sartre's perceptual belief, although this belief is grounded in being conscious of something and the denial of the distinction between appearance and reality.

Many phenomenologists and existential philosophers have described a human person as having some kind of a basic holistic state during his or her lifetime that embodies or illustrates his or her existence in the world. Such a general mental feeling, or a way of being in life, has been exemplified with "nausea" by Sartre, "care" by Heidegger and "anguish" by Kierkegaard. For example, "I have far-reaching nausea about my future existence" would mean living my life in a continuing mental state that lasts. Nausea has possessed my mind and disturbs me all the time. According to Sartre, I know that I suffer nausea because I am conscious of my state, not another person's state. If such a mental state occurs and remains over time, it must have causes that realize it. Otherwise, mental pain or *anguish* exists only when one is conscious of it, and thus it is produced by one's consciousness. More generally, this would mean that phenomena exist at random somewhere in a human person's unconscious, and that he or she becomes conscious of them. In Sartre's argument, nothing has caused these phenomena. But this argument does not reflect general truth: mental pains do not simply exist externally of causality. An experience of mental feelings may be caused by the brain state *and* certain social conditions.

In the same way, perception does not exist because of the presentation of the real bodies. It requires energy that causes changes in the qualities of *a human person* or *an animal*. We do know *the change* of things in sense experiences. I am justified in believing that things of the sense experience change because its presence on the visual field causes my belief. However, the presence of objects of experience does not cause the true belief that an object *must* be real. Metaphysical presuppositions influence this belief formation. I conclude that Sartre's perception-based claims are influenced by the philosophy because otherwise he would not have been able to make arguments like above from perception phenomena. Sartre's discourse is not unbiased.

5. Perceptual Knowledge Influenced by Background Philosophies

I will finally discuss in this paper whether the examination of Husserl's and Sartre's views would justify the idea that their philosophies affect what they think of the experience of the objects. My point is that the object of experience should be distinguished by what belongs to the experience and what the perceiver thinks about the experience. Husserl seems to distinguish things as they appear in experience from things as they are independent of the observer, whereas Sartre equates the two. That is, Sartre reduces things as they are to things as they appear to the observer. How do people then discover *what* they experience? The idea of experience naming *perception* cannot be a sufficient answer because, according to Sartre, people form their knowledge claims by perception. The following two judgments are contradictory and cannot both be true: 1) experienced things are not the real things; and 2) experienced things are nothing but the real things. Perceptual experience itself does not show which judgment is true. Is it then possible that a theory or a philosophy can influence how a person interprets what she is perceiving? If the scientific background presuppositions influence knowledge based on perception and perceptual beliefs, then underlying philosophical ideas and beliefs also influence them. Therefore, the perceived phenomena do not cause the correct observation belief. In philosophy of perception, in the 20th century, there has been a transition from one philosophical framework to another, meaning from the sense datum view of perception to the object view. Following Kuhn's words, why would these different philosophies not transform perception and philosophers' interpretations of what they are perceiving?

Everyday life shows that people's claims about the objects of perception do not always correspond with the perceivable world. People's talk is full of value judgments, political and abstract concepts. Philosophers do not make an exception. The observation reports are influenced by both background beliefs and traditions, not just a perception. Let me put it this way. After starting to experience a thing, person 1 may recognize it as p, whereas person 2 recognizes it as q. The first person's recognition, p, occurs within a certain system of concepts, A, and the second person's recognition, q, occurs within a different system of concepts, B. This would mean as follows.

i) One examines x from point of view Y; therefore, one perceives x as p.

ii) Therefore, the examination from the point of view Y influences how one perceives x.

Now let us consider a few examples of this.

First, something happens in a country. The average Finn recognizes the happening in experience as being civil unrest. The human rights activist recognizes it as a justified democratic rising. The Machiavellian political analyst recognizes it as a clear coup d'état. The authoritarian president recognizes it as a terrorist act against the people. In sum, the same thing of experience appears to these four persons but they lead to different conclusions from the perception.

Second, as I mentioned earlier, Paul M. Churchland's example may clarify the meaning of perception-in-a-conceptual-framework. There is a person who suffers mental illness who is "engaged in incoherent, paranoid, or even murderous behavior," describes Churchland (1984: 44). This is an observable phenomenon that may be called by the name "psychosis." A person suffering from psychosis was seen by ancient and medieval people as a witch and a case of demonic possession. The existence of witches was not a controversial belief for them. A belief-system involving witches and demons made them think that they were simply seeing with their own eyes that a person was a witch. A modern human person claims to know that they have perceived something else: a person who has psychiatric problems. A modern person simply perceives the phenomenon in a distinct conceptual framework that affects interpretation when observing something (Churchland, 1984: 44, 47–8).

Third, why would philosophical theories *not* influence what philosophers "know" when they are perceiving? Imagine an entity visually appears in front of a philosopher. For Berkeley, a set of propositions and assumptions of Idealism stored in the memory would enable him to see perceived objects as visual ideas existing in mind. These ideas include, for example, the color yellow, a round contour, and an aspect of a building. Berkeley would argue that these ideas did not include sensation, perception and belief, which are mental acts produced by a subject. For Kant, however, a set of propositions and assumptions of Transcendental Idealist thought would enable him to see perceived objects as copies of archetypes called "things in themselves." These "things in themselves" cause mental representations, which then appear to the subject. For Husserl, a set of propositions and assumptions of Phenomenology would make him see conscious objects in his world of experience, relative to him. His philosophical attitude towards the objects of the world is based on personal experience. Finally, Sartre's refutation of the distinction between appearance and reality would lead him to decide that he "knows" that the perceptual appearances are "what they really are": they are real existents, not mental items in his mind. Sartre claims that he sees the real nature of beings that visually appear to him.

In every case above, the same sensible object would be used to justify these philosophers' claims about what they perceive. That is to say, they believe that they know the nature of a particular perceptual object. Their cognitive criterion for deciding that they know something seems to be "whatever appears to us in experience make our claim p evident to us about that object." However, what they claim to know when something appears to them in experience leads to distinct claims that they make. Their experiences do not make their beliefs true. Therefore, the perceived phenomena do not cause the correct belief because the same phenomenon that p causes distinct beliefs about the phenomenon. What they claim to experience is not part of the experience. What is in the experience and what these philosophers think about the experience differ from each other.

Finally, perception does not give justified thoughts about language if a perceiver does not know the language he or she interprets. For example, using perception to seek knowledge from the Internet depends on the background information of the observers. A person who has a loose definition of "knowledge" and no criteria for "a thing" constituting knowledge *perceives* raw digital data of experience on an Internet site as "knowledge" without hesitation. He does not recognize the difference between reliable knowledge and poor opinion. He finds much "knowledge" if he knows the language. Perception in a conceptual framework affects how much information one receives when searching for evidence for the existence of the reality. For example, I can accurately state regarding language perception that if one does not know French, one will not gain much information from the French sites on the World Wide Web *by means of experience*. Recognition of the content of the Internet as knowledge requires a general understanding of this thing called "knowledge." But people seem to refer to any content that they share and use on the Internet as knowledge. A person's experience is of the Internet and language. However, the essential concern is with how the Internet and language are meant by experiencing them. What concepts he uses affects how he interprets the meanings phenomena have for him in a cultural context. How he conceptualizes the Internet sites and their content defines their *meaning* in his current experience. The given language in perception does not mean much if the perceiver is not part of the language community.

As an objection, it can be argued that empirical words and propositions are derived directly from perceptual experience without the influence of theories, philosophies or background assumptions. The words "blueness," "green," "bluebird," "bird," "wings," and "head" as examples can be derived from the male bluebird. My reply is that perceptual experience does not justify conflicting thoughts of philosophers: the empirical object is the same, but philosophers use different words. Moreover, one's language can influence how one thinks and perceives the world, which is the Whorfian hypothesis (Whorf, 1956). There is much new evidence regarding the effects of language on thought in psycholinguistics. For example, cross-linguistic differences have been found in many of the most fundamental domains of *thought* including color perception, object categories, conceptions of shape, substance, events, and people's representations of motion, space, causality, time, and number (Boroditsky, 2012: 618). Some languages do not have a color word for blue: some distinguish only between dark and light; some have a color word that includes both blue and green, and others would require one to specify necessarily whether the house was dark blue or light blue (Boroditsky, 2012: 615, 620–621). Can language play a role in even such low-level perceptual decisions as judging whether two squares of color are exactly the same? Boroditsky answers the question that at least sometimes the language plays a role:

> To test whether differences in color language lead to differences in color perception, cognitive scientists compared Russian and English speakers' ability to discriminate shades of blue. In Russian there is no single word that covers all the colors that English speakers call 'blue.' Russian makes an obligatory distinction between light blue (goluboy) and dark blue (siniy). Does this distinction mean that siniy blues look more different from goluboy blues to Russian speakers? Indeed, the data say yes. Russian speakers are quicker to distinguish two shades of blue that are called by the different names in Russian (i.e., one being siniy and the other being goluboy) than if the two fall into the same category. For English speakers, all these shades are still designated by the same word, 'blue,' and there are no comparable differences in reaction time. Further, the Russian advantage disappears when subjects are asked to perform a verbal interference task (reciting a string of digits) while making color judgments but not when they are asked to perform an equally difficult spatial interference task (keeping a novel visual pattern in memory). The disappearance of the advantage when performing a verbal task shows that language is normally involved in even surprisingly basic perceptual judgments – and that it is language per se that creates this difference in perception between Russian and English speakers. When Russian speakers are blocked from their normal access to language by a verbal interference task, the differences between Russian and English speakers disappear (Boroditsky, 2009).

These results demonstrate that language is involved in even basic perceptual judgments (Boroditsky, 2009; Boroditsky, 2012: 620–621; Winawer et al., 2007). It seems then that language affects at least what the perceiver thinks of her perceptions. The members of universalist school of thought, like Pinker, Fodor and Pylyshyn, oppose this type of linguistic relativity, the claim that language affects thinking. Thought would be independent of language. Fodor and Pylyshyn, for example, argue that forms of speech inherit their semantic contents from the concepts and thoughts that they express; not vice versa. For example, you can speak about cats because "cat" refers to cats. Moreover, another argument against "language before learning" is that language learning takes a lot of thinking on the part of the learner. So, if you have to be able to talk before one is able to think, it follows that one cannot learn a first language. However, many children do so. Therefore, conclude Fodor and Pylyshyn, thought comes first and language follows after. In contrary to Boroditsky, one cannot learn or speak a language, including a first language unless one can already think (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 2015). They also argue against the Empiricists that early stages of perceptual processing provide canonical representations of sensory properties of things-in-the-world. A process of conceptualization then pairs such canonical sensory representations with perceptual beliefs: causal interactions with things in the world give rise to sensory representations, and sensory representations give rise to perceptual beliefs (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 2015). Firstly, I consider that Boroditsky's studies provide more empirical evidence than that of Fodor and Pylyshyn. Fodor and Pylyshyn's work is theoretical and philosophical of how external objects cause mental representations in mind and of how a reference relation occurs between mental representations and the things-in-the-world. This does not, however, undo a possibility that different languages affect beliefs based on mental representations. In fact, I believe that Boroditsky agrees with Fodor and Pylyshyn in a sense that though comes first in language learning. Secondly, and this is more important, even if causal interactions with things in the world give rise to sensory representations, sensory representations may give rise to many conflicting perceptual beliefs, which can be verified every day by listening to people. For example, Husserl and Sartre certainly perceived the same objects, but their perceptual beliefs were conflicting. Husserl and Sartre expressed their perceptual beliefs under different philosophies, like Fodor and Pylyshyn express their claims under a theory. In this way perceptual beliefs and thoughts can be philosophy-laden, although early stages of perceptual processing are not philosophical. Observers can use what words they want, and yet those words do not have empirical content. In conclusion, my argument is as follows: if perception does not justify philosophers' conflicting thoughts of the object of perception, then philosophers' philosophies influence these thoughts; perception does not justify philosophers' conflicting thoughts of the object of perception; therefore, philosophers' philosophies influence these thoughts. In fact, background theories and philosophies explain the difference of thoughts. However, perception seems to be independent of thought. To sum up, philosophers' philosophies have influenced how they have conceptualized perceptions. This is a reason why Husserl's and Sartre's claims of the object of perception are contradictory.

The examples above justify the claim that philosophies and world views about the nature of reality influence perception-based reports. In sum, the philosophy-ladenness of perception is as likely a phenomenon as the theory-ladenness of perception, even though the philosophy-ladenness of perception would not imply the influence of philosophies on perception. Philosophical discourse is not based on perceptions.

6. Conclusion

This paper has argued that perceptual knowledge is not free from a conceptual framework under which a human perceiver claims to know the nature of a sensible object of experience. Philosophies can influence philosophers' belief-formation in perceiving because what they say that they perceive changes so much from one philosopher to another. One thing is certain. Sartre does not start knowing the world of perception in general and an object that is being perceived in particular simply by refuting a metaphysical principle. Rather, there is too much divergence in different people's claims about what a sense experience presents to them for this to be the case. This thesis clearly contradicts Sartre's view of phenomenology and the notion of direct realism about what is claimed to be perceived.

Western philosophers' different sayings about one and the same phenomenon cannot be all true. I do not understand how continental and analytic philosophers' different claims about knowing the perceptual phenomenon can be explained if not through their different philosophies. They can be said to perceive the same phenomenon. Husserl and Sartre perceive the same phenomenon or object but their claims differ from each other. Therefore, they cannot both know the phenomenon. Now we know that their different conceptual perspectives *explain* why they have different claims about the same perceptual phenomenon. Husserl says to know that the phenomenon directly perceived is a conscious object and Sartre that it is a real thing. Thus, we can see that they must have different metaphysical presuppositions. This conclusion means that perception does not justify claims of what is a perceptual phenomenon, but claims derived from perception are philosophy-laden. Transitions from philosophical traditions to others affect the philosophical claims about the perceptual phenomenon. This conclusion also questions the objectivity of a philosophical language about perception. The philosophical language of perception is not neutral, but is determined by the abstract language of philosophies. To avoid mistakes, we should not follow one of the philosophical traditions.

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FEAR OF MISSING OUT, IMPROPER BEHAVIOR, AND DISTRESSING PATTERNS OF USE. AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

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ABSTRACT. This paper takes a unique approach to fear of missing out research by focusing on improper behavior and distressing patterns of use. Employing data from Deloitte, The Economist, Gallup, Mashable, Pew Research Center, Statista, The Wall Street Journal, etc., I performed analyses regarding % of internet users watching online videos every day, the number of times individuals estimate they look at their phones in a day (U.S., by age group, years), % of U.S. smartphone owners who check their phones at least several times an hour, share of respondents who cannot imagine life without the Internet, hours per day spent online via a mobile device, per user, time U.S. teens could go without using certain devices, average time U.S. consumers spend with digital media per day, % of cell owners who did particular activities using their cellphone during their most recent social gathering, top online activities individuals engage in at least once a day, % of teens who count certain platforms as one of the three most common ways they talk with their closest friend, how often U.S. Internet users unplug, and the impact of technology on relationships, by cell phone, social media, and online dating status.

Keywords: fear of missing out; improper behavior; distressing pattern of use

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1. Introduction

The gratifying character of online social networking may result in the rise of uncontrollable checking behaviors and immoderate participation (Donnelly, 2017; Letang, 2017; Peters, 2016; Tulloch, 2016) in social media, and consequently to adverse psychological effects. Even though the fear of missing out (FoMO) is not significantly a phenomenon confined to social media users, persons with high FoMO may feel driven to inspect their social media more frequently with the purpose of keep acquainted with their peers' intentions and events. (Oberst et al., 2017)

2. Literature Review

Individuals high in FoMO tend to overuse their smartphones to gratify their compulsion to remain connected. FoMO does not by its own nature differentiate between significant versus irrelevant utilization (Alican, 2017; Ebert, 2016; Locke et al., 2017; Peters, 2017; Upadhyay, 2017) of the smartphone, but contrasts problematic from non-problematic utilization: higher FoMO is associated with unsatisfactory degrees of contentment with expertise (Alpopi and Silvestru (Bere), 2016; Fox, 2017; Machan, 2016; Pilkington, 2017), self-government (Arvidson, 2017; Freeman-Moir, 2017; Machan, 2017; Reimann, 2017; Van Heerden and van Rensburg, 2017; Zogning, 2017) and empathy. (Elhai et al., 2016) Even though Facebook users frequently undergo adverse emotions, they feel anxious to access the site at short intervals as a consequence of FoMO and to maintain relationship continuance pressures. As Facebook provides steady availability and updating, users are apprehensive (Borbone, 2016; García-Encinas, 2017; Michailidou, 2017; Sharp, 2016) that they may pass by social information (Benedikter, Siepmann, and Reymann, 2017; Furey, 2017; Meçe, 2017; Scott and Stevens, 2016) without inspecting the site routinely, generating more social activity for users. (Fox and Moreland, 2015)

3. Methodology

Using data from CivicScience, Deloitte, The Economist, EY Straits Times Graphics, Gallup, GfK, IAB, Ipsos, Mashable, Pew Research Center, Statista, TNS, The Wall Street Journal, and YouGov, I performed analyses regarding % of internet users watching online videos every day, the number of times individuals estimate they look at their phones in a day (U.S., by age group, years), % of American smartphone owners who check their phones at least several times an hour, share of respondents who cannot imagine life without the Internet, hours per day spent online via a mobile device, per user, time U.S. teens could go without using certain devices, average time U.S. consumers spend with digital media per day, % of cell owners who did particular activities using their cellphone during their most recent social gathering, top online activities individuals engage in at least once a day, % of teens who count certain platforms as one of the three most common ways they talk with their closest friend, how often U.S. Internet users unplug, and the impact of technology on relationships, by cell phone, social media, and online dating status.

4. Results and Discussion

Significant degree of FoMO has adverse psychological and physiological effects. FoMO indirectly causes social media exhaustion through compulsive social media utilization. (Dhir et al., 2018) Social media utilization is a notably captivating choice to stay informed concerning social activities (Collins, 2017; Hedger, 2016; Panova and Buber-Ennser, 2016; Strielkowski, Gryshova, and Kalyugina, 2017) for users with significant degrees of FoMO that should be positively associated with the incidence of online interaction and checking behavior (Chapman, 2017; Green, 2016; Monzó and McLaren, 2016; Moser, 2017; Spahn, 2017), causing higher levels of exchanging information load. Social pressure and FoMO make Internet users more predisposed to computer-mediated communication behavior that, fundamentally, raises their risk of apprehensiveness and psychological health deficiencies. (Reinecke et al., 2016) A situation when an individual is not connected to Facebook and as a result not able to stay in touch with all the activities may generate stress. (Błachnio and Przepiórka, 2018) (Figures 1–12)

Figure 1 How often U.S. Internet users unplug



Sources: CivicScience; The Wall Street Journal; Statista; and AJMR survey among 2,700 individuals (ages 13+) conducted June–July 2017

Figure 2 Time U.S. teens (ages 13 to 17) could go without using the following devices



Sources: YouGov; Statista; and AJMR survey conducted between June and July 2017.

Note: Missing percentages to 100%: I do not have/use this device.

Figure 3 Impact of technology on relationships, by cell phone, social media, and online dating status (%)



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 3,500 individuals conducted July–August 2017.

Figure 4 How many times would you estimate you look at your phone in a day? (U.S., by age group, years)



Sources: Deloitte; The Economist; and AJMR estimates.

Figure 5 Average time U.S. consumers spent with digital media per day (hours:minutes)



Sources: GfK; IAB; Mashable; Statista; and AJMR survey among 3,500 individuals conducted July–August 2017.

Figure 6 % of teens who count the following platforms as one of the three most common ways they talk with their closest friend



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey (among 2,400 teens ages 13 to 17 who have a close friend) conducted June–August 2017.

Figure 7 % of cell owners who did the following using their cellphone during their most recent social gathering



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 3,200 individuals conducted July–September 2017.

Figure 8 Top online activities individuals engage in at least once a day



Sources: EY Straits Times Graphics; and AJMR survey among 2,700 individuals conducted August–September 2017.

Figure 9 Smartphone addiction (hours per day spent online via a mobile device, per user)



Sources: Statista Digital Market Outlook (based on internet users aged 16 and over); and AJMR estimates.

Figure 10 Share of respondents who cannot imagine life without the Internet



Sources: Ipsos; Statista; and AJMR survey among 3,500 individuals (ages 13+) conducted August–October 2017.

Figure 11 % of American smartphone owners who check their phones at least several times an hour



Sources: Gallup; Statista; and AJMR survey among 6,200 smartphone owners conducted July–August 2017.

Figure 12 % of internet users watching online videos every day



Sources: TNS; Statista; and AJMR survey among 2,700 individuals conducted May–June 2017.

5. Conclusions

FoMO may be instrumental in the presentation of self-perceptions on social media contingent on reasons to bring about and engage in interplays with other individuals (Cohen, 2016; Hayes and Jeffries, 2016; Nica, Comănescu, and Manole, 2017; Sternadori, 2017) and to depict oneself as more linked. The social media behaviors related to FoMO may appear out of lack of confidence or a compulsion for self-improvement (Brown, 2016; Grčić Fabić, Zekić, and Samaržija, 2016; Moghtader, 2017; Shin, 2017) via connections to other persons. (Barry et al., 2017)

Author Contributions
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and approved it for publication.

Conflict of Interest Statement
The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE USE AND DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS: DOES FACEBOOK ACTIVITY LEAD TO ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH?

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ABSTRACT. We inspect the relevant literature on Facebook addiction (e.g. Abbasi and Alghamdi, 2017; Błachnio et al., 2017; Brailovskaia and Margraf, 2017; Carbonell and Panova, 2017; Casale and Fioravanti, 2018; Delaney, Stein, and Gruber, 2018; Frison et al., 2018; Gul et al., 2018, Marker, Gnambs, and Appel, 2017; Monacis et al., 2017; O'Sullivan and Hussain, 2017; Schou Andreassen, Pallesen, and Griffiths, 2017; Turel, Brevers, and Bechara, 2018; Vanman, Baker, and Tobin, 2018; Young et al., 2017) and provide both quantitative evidence on trends and various in-depth empirical examples. Using data from Business Insider, Edison Research, Facebook, GlobalWebIndex, Hootsuite, Internet World Stats, KPCB, Pew Research Center, Piper Jaffray, Priceonomics, Retrevo, Statista, Techcrunch, Triton Digital, and We Are Social, we performed analyses and made estimates regarding social media usage among U.S. youth, teens' most important social network, the fastest growing social and messaging apps worldwide, % of users of each social media site who use another social media site, % of global population using Facebook by region, % of social networking websites's users who ever gets news on the site, % of online adults who use certain social media websites, monthly active users of selected social media networks and messaging services, % of Facebook news consumers who regularly see news on Facebook, among the users of selected sites, Facebook's daily active users as % of monthly active users, % who use each respective site with certain frequencies, % of teen social

media users/online adults who use the most relevant sites most often, and leading countries based on number of Facebook users.

Keywords: Facebook addiction; depressive symptom; adverse psychological health

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1. Introduction

Facebook use has altered the manners in which individuals interact with each other. The operation of social comparison on Facebook may be an emotionally damaging conduct. Facebook addiction indicates a series of behavior and cognitive patterns (Anderson and Kantarelis, 2016; Harris and Estevez, 2017; Lynn, 2017; Peters, 2016a, b; Teschers, 2017) by an individual's interplay with Facebook that jeopardize daily functioning. (Delaney, Stein, and Gruber, 2018) Inordinate Facebook utilization and Facebook-specific conducts generate adverse societal and interpersonal repercussions (Čepelová and Koreňová, 2017; Holzer, 2017; Maisuria, 2016; Popescu Ljungholm, 2016), influencing the individuals' psychological, social, and personal lives. The maladaptive utilization of Facebook may generate adverse societal repercussions: social seclusion, relationship distrust, absence of social attachment, Facebook addiction, etc. (Abbasi and Alghamdi, 2017) Because securely attached persons utilize Facebook in a beneficial manner and are pleased when their profile is examined by relevant others, they are likely to use social networking sites as devices to boost their sense of social inclusion and affiliation. Such users may be able to regulate social networking site utilization without developing addictive predispositions. (Monacis et al., 2017)

2. Literature Review

Facebook has swiftly become a constant feature of ordinary social life. Individuals at intervals feel disposed to disconnect themselves from their online social network by taking prolonged breaks from Facebook. A manner to grasp individuals' utilization of Facebook is to regard it as an undertaking abounding in feelings of indecision: recurrently an individual's needs to belong, consociate, etc. are steady enough to motivate him/her to participate in Facebook, but occasionally the need to decrease the stress related to redundant social cognition (Chapman, 2016; Hurd, 2016; Malott, 2016; Popescu and Bițoiu, 2017; Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Dann, 2017) stimulates him/her to disconnect from it. The standard active user may feel no end of indecision about his/her time on Facebook. Facebook utilization may have determinable repercussions on the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical activity and the body's reactions to stress. Individuals with depressive symptoms are particularly enthralled by a private Facebook context to communicate with their fellows. (Vanman, Baker, and Tobin, 2018)

Mechanisms of addiction may vary within passive Facebook use in contrast with other media uses. Passive Facebook use is shaped by social contact, whereas the outgoingness of a daily life experience influences the former. Users who participate in passive Facebook use to get away are not more presumably to be addicted to passive Facebook use than users who do not get involved in passive Facebook use to break out. Participating in passive Facebook use to get away may be instrumental in an addiction to passive Facebook use. Social interplays are gratifying experiences (Cheng, 2016; Ionescu, 2017; Morales and Andreosso-O'Callaghan, 2017; Rowlands and Kabongi, 2017), furthering involvement in other conducts which offer social connection, e.g. passive Facebook use. Users tend to participate in passive Facebook use following positive, in contrast with negative, routine life events. Taking part in passive Facebook use to get away is not related to an addiction to passive Facebook use. Particular features of Facebook utilization have beneficial consequences on a user's wellbeing, just as others have adverse repercussions. Users participate in general Facebook utilization to alleviate an absence of social contact (Cimatti, 2016; Klierova and Kutik, 2017; Nica, Potcovaru, and Mirică (Dumitrescu), 2017a, b; Ruthrof, 2017) and in passive Facebook use as regards escapism. Passive Facebook use may a less adequate approach of escapism than general Facebook utilization, impeding impulse to participate in passive Facebook use for this basis. Facebook assists users in escaping through communication with other individuals. When interaction is disconnected, in the situation of passive Facebook use, this conduct is no longer an adequate form of escapism and participants do not take part in passive Facebook use to get away. Users perceive their Facebook utilization to be regulated by escapism. (Young et al., 2017)

Depressive symptoms are positively associated with online co-reflection but are not predictive of corresponding escalations in co-rumination over time. Facebook operates as an innovative platform for flexible peer interactions (Couzigou, 2017; Lăzăroiu, 2017; Olssen, 2017; Stoian and Drumea, 2017) and for dysfunctional ones in the context of depression. Interacting on Facebook does not result undeviatingly in corresponding increases or decreases in individuals' depressive manifestations. Private Facebook interactions are diffusely associated with individuals' development of gloomy symptoms. Particular features of online peer collaborations (perceived online social backing and online co-reflection) may be instrumental in the link between private Facebook interactions and the progress of depressive symptoms in preadulthood that are predictive of corresponding escalations in private Facebook interactions. The latter are diffusely associated with comparative declines in individuals' depressive symptoms, via perceived online social backing. Users may feel more despondent when they co-reflect on Facebook (such dispirited feelings dissipate after a particular amount of time has passed). (Frison et al., 2018)

3. Methodology

Using data from Business Insider, Edison Research, Facebook, GlobalWebIndex, Hootsuite, Internet World Stats, KPCB, Pew Research Center, Piper Jaffray, Priceonomics, Retrevo, Statista, Techcrunch, Triton Digital, and We Are Social, we performed analyses and made estimates regarding social media usage among U.S. youth, teens' most important social network, the fastest growing social and messaging apps worldwide, % of users of each social media site who use another social media site, % of global population using Facebook by region, % of social networking websites's users who ever gets news on the site, % of online adults who use certain social media websites, monthly active users of selected social media networks and messaging services, % of Facebook news consumers who regularly see news on Facebook, among the users of selected sites, Facebook's daily active users as % of monthly active users, % who use each respective site with certain frequencies, % of teen social media users/online adults who use the most relevant sites most often, and leading countries based on number of Facebook users.

4. Results and Discussion

Facebook has various characteristics furthering communication between an individual and his/her group of peers. The utilization of social networks is improved among users who are objectively and/or subjectively separated, e.g. egocentrics. Users can often display status updates, remarks, or pictures of themselves, and count on prompt and incessant positive feedback. Taking into account the increase of social networking site utilization on mobile devices, social networking sites are available permanently and anywhere. Narcissists can organize and bolster an online identity all over the day, and obtain recurring feedback on their endeavors. (Casale and Fioravanti, 2018) Facebook usage may differ between people and personality types. More demanding utilization of Facebook may raise the risk of health issues. The joint effect of self-centeredness and stress (Esty, 2017; Letang, 2017; Orlova, 2017; Strielkowski, Gryshova, and Kalyugina, 2017) eloquently predicts Facebook intensity usage. The higher degrees of perceived stress an individual is exposed to, the more excessive his/her utilization of Facebook is. (O'Sullivan and Hussain, 2017) The time distortion, particularly in conjunction with self-disclosed level of Facebook use, may be instrumental in categorizing individuals to at- vs. low/no-risk groups. Users susceptible to Facebook addiction present inaccurate time appraisals that are longer than definite for assignments that indicate but do not entail Facebook use. Upward time misinterpretation operates in individuals who are susceptible to Facebook addiction, throughout assignments that hamper Facebook utilization and initiate Facebook ruminations. (Turel, Brevers, and Bechara, 2018)

Individuals who intensively utilize social networking sites may be susceptible to develop Facebook Addiction Disorder. The latter is considerably positively associated with the personality feature self-centeredness (Fast, O'Brien, and Block, 2017;

Life, 2016; Park, 2017a, b; Tanankem Voufo, Uchenna, and Atata, 2017) and to detrimental mental health parameters (depression, restlessness, and stress symptoms). Facebook Addiction Disorder thoroughly moderates the relevant positive link between self-centeredness and stress symptoms, which proves that egotistic individuals may be definitely susceptible to develop Facebook Addiction Disorder. Egocentrics may design their self-presentation to influence their viewers. The larger the turnout, the more challenging it is to astonish all communication partners (Life, 2017; Petcu, 2016; Terry, 2016; Žurga, 2017), and the likelihood to get negative feedback intensifies. This boosts the self-presentation endeavors of self-centered users and the time they spend dwelling on and utilizing Facebook, which in turn builds up their defenselessness to Facebook Addiction Disorder. As their Facebook Addiction Disorder level advances, they undergo more manifestations like disengagement and relapse (Ariso, 2017; Berloffa, Matteazzi, and Villa, 2017; Carter and Chu-May Yeo, 2017; Jordan Jaffee and Ford, 2016; Machan, 2016; Nica, 2017; Popescu Ljungholm, 2017; Tulloch, 2016), which reinforce their stress indicators. Facebook Addiction Disorder thoroughly moderates the link between self-centeredness and stress symptoms, constituting a possible risk component for individuals with raised values of egotism. Facebook utilization holds a certain meaning for narcissistic users who can swiftly take up numerous shallow connections with new Facebook pals and get considerable viewers for their carefully designed self-presentation. The positive link between Facebook Addiction Disorder and apprehension symptoms advances over time. Individuals with expanded anxiety manifestations who frequently utilize Facebook to find alleviation and to get away have an improved likelihood to develop Facebook Addiction Disorder. As a result of their anxiety manifestations, users are frequently anxious about the repercussions of their conduct. Users are apprehensive to neglect things when not utilizing Facebook (withdrawal is a principal symptom). (Brailovskaia and Margraf, 2017) (Figures 1–19 and Table 1)

Figure 1 % of online adults who say they use the following social media platforms (by year)



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 2,300 individuals conducted July–August 2017.

Figure 2 % of online adults by gender who use the following social media and discussion sites



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 2,300 individuals conducted May–June 2017.

Figure 3 Monthly active users of selected social media networks and messaging services (in millions)



Sources: Statista; We Are Social; Hootsuite; Techcrunch; and AJMR estimates.
** Estimation, as Snapchat only reports daily active users.

Figure 4 % of global population using Facebook by region



Sources: Facebook; Internet World Stats; Statista; and AJMR survey among 2,800 individuals conducted July–September 2017.

Figure 5 % of online adults who use the following social media websites (by year)



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR estimates.

Figure 6 Do you check/update Facebook or Twitter after you go to bed?



Sources: Retrevo; and AJMR survey among 2,800 individuals conducted July–August 2017.

Figure 7 Among the users of selected sites, % who use each respective site with certain frequencies



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 2,700 individuals conducted July–August 2017.

Figure 8 Which is your biggest online time-waster?

Rank	Site	% of Respondents
1	Google	26%
2	Facebook	25%
3	LinkedIn	16%
4	Yahoo	9%
5	Amazon	3%
6	YouTube	3%
7	ESPN	2%
8	Pinterest	2%
9	Twitter	2%
10	Craigslist	2%

Sources: Priceonomics; and AJMR survey among 2,600 individuals conducted July–September 2017.

Table 1 % of users of each social media site who use another social media site

	Use Twitter	Use Instagram	Use Pinterest	Use LinkedIn	Use Facebook
% of Twitter users who...	-	66	50	53	94
% of Instagram users who...	48	-	55	47	96
% of Pinterest users who...	37	58	-	42	93
% of LinkedIn users who...	46	54	42	-	88
% of Facebook users who...	28	38	37	34	-

Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 2,500 individuals conducted May–June 2017.

Figure 9 % of all teens who use the following sites most often



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 2,400 individuals conducted July–September 2017.

Figure 10 % of teen social media users who use the following sites

	2011	2018
Facebook	93%	96%
Twitter	12	28
Instagram	n/a	13
MySpace	24	9
YouTube	6	9
Tumblr	2	7
Google Plus	n/a	5
Yahoo (unspecified)	7	5
myYearbook	2	*
Pinterest	n/a	3
Gmail	n/a	3
Meet Me	n/a	3
Other	8	9
Don't know/Don't have own profile	2	4

Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR estimates.

Figure 11 Social media usage among American youth (age 14–18, U.S.)



Sources: KPCB; Edison Research; Triton Digital; Piper Jaffray; and AJMR estimates.

Figure 12 How long can you go without checking in on Facebook?



Sources: Retrevo; and AJMR survey among 2,200 individuals conducted July–August 2017.

Figure 13 Fastest growing social and messaging apps worldwide



Sources: GlobalWebIndex; Statista; and AJMR survey among 2,500 individuals conducted July–August 2017.

Figure 14 % of Facebook news consumers who regularly see news on Facebook about



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 2,300 individuals conducted May–June 2017.

Figure 15 Leading countries based on number of Facebook users (in millions)



Sources: Statista; and AJMR estimates.

Figure 16 Teens' most important social network (age 14–18, US)



Sources: KPCB; Edison Research; Triton Digital; Piper Jaffray; and AJMR estimates.

Figure 17 Facebook's daily active users as a % of monthly active users



Sources: Facebook; Statista; Business Insider; and AJMR estimates.

Figure 18 Do you check/update Twitter or Facebook first thing in the morning?



Sources: Retrevo; and AJMR survey among 2,600 individuals conducted May–August 2017.

Figure 19 % of each social networking website's users who ever gets news on the site



Sources: Pew Research Center; and AJMR survey among 2,100 individuals conducted July–September 2017.

5. Conclusions

Facebook addiction is associated adversely with broad-mindedness, affability, emotional cohesion, extraversion, and diligence. (Błachnio et al., 2017) Internalizing symptoms are not related to the overuse/addiction behavior. Higher conduct issues are inherent in the Facebook addiction but not in Facebook overuse (the former is more associated with the psychopathologies than the latter). There may be various Facebook addiction types in consonance with age groups and internalizing/ externalizing symptoms may display distinct consequences on Facebook addiction behavior throughout the generations. (Gul et al., 2018) In a social networking site like Facebook that has various applications and functions, it is relevant what precisely the user is doing with the purpose of grasping the driving forces and aftereffects of that behavior. (Carbonell and Panova, 2017) Reasonable degrees of social networking sites utilization may be risk-free and generate no negative consequences, but an immoderate time spent on Facebook or similar platforms bring about detrimental effects. (Marker, Gnambs, and Appel, 2017) Facebook allows users to strengthen their self-esteems on the basis of immediate reaction from possibly numerous persons. Users with prominent narcissistic attributes may utilize social media unreasonably as online platforms may satisfy a need for association (Bauder, 2016; Hochstrasser Fickel et al., 2017; Machan, 2017; Peters, 2017; Gava, 2016) and certifies the sense of a flawless self. (Schou Andreassen, Pallesen, and Griffiths, 2017)

Author Contributions

All authors listed have made a substantial, direct and intellectual contribution to the work, and approved it for publication.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

NOTE

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